Media handling
21. The Hall report was published in full on 19 June
2007. The key conclusion was:
We have not been able clearly to identify a single
person who in practice took the decision to authorise payment,
or a clear moment when that authority was given. That lack of
clarity on who was authorised to decide, on who should decide,
and on how the decision was taken, is in itself potentially one
of the main lessons from the episode. This was a collective failure
of judgement or an abstention from judgement, rather than a failure
of judgement by any one individual. Many people were consulted
or involved, but very few took a clear view, and nobody clearly
took control of the issue. Many people could have said no, and
nobody did.[10]
22. The Secretary of State for Defence told the House
that he had accepted the Hall report's recommendations in full.[11]
Because it is in the public domain, we have not given the Hall
report the close attention in this inquiry which we have given
to Fulton. We note that the Foreign Affairs Committee considered
the media handling in its report on the Foreign Policy Aspects
of the Detention of Naval Personnel by the Islamic Republic of
Iran, published on 22 July 2007.[12]
It is clear
that the decision to allow the Service personnel to sell their
stories was a serious mistake and deeply damaging to the reputation
of the Royal Navy. The Secretary of State for Defence has accepted
responsibility and apologised.[13]
This should not absolve others from blame.
23. The MoD has provided us with a progress report
on its implementation of the recommendations in the Hall report,
which had been seen and agreed by the Service Chiefs of Staff.
This is published as an appendix to this report. The MoD reports
that it has clarified its regulations regarding public communication
and contact with the media for both military and civilian personnel;
and has made clear that payment is not acceptable where individuals
are speaking or writing about their work or experience derived
from their service. It also reports that it has increased the
involvement of the military in media handling by giving the three
single Service Assistant Directors of Public Relations formal
responsibilities for news issues, and has increased the military
component of the Defence Press Office from three to six, out of
27.[14] While
we continue to have concerns about the MoD's media operations,
we note the progress made in implementing the Hall recommendations
and particularly welcome the decision to increase military involvement
in media handling.
Conclusion
24. The
Fulton report, and the evidence provided to us in support of it,
contain a depth of operational detail which it would be damaging
to make public. This makes it difficult for us to demonstrate
openly the grounds on which we have reached our conclusions. However,
we assure the House of Commons, and the public, that we have scrutinised
the report thoroughly, and have obtained extensive additional
evidence from the MoD. We have written to the Secretary of State
for Defence with a number of classified conclusions and recommendations.
While the hostage-taking exposed worrying weaknesses, action has
been taken to address them. The incident was a national embarrassment,
deeply damaging to the reputation of the Royal Navy. It has, however,
provided the spur to remedy major weaknesses.
1 HC Deb, 16 April 2007, cols 23-26 Back
2
Ibid. Back
3
HC Deb, 24 April 2007, col 21WS Back
4
HC Deb, 19 June 2007, cols 1255-1258 Back
5
Report by Tony Hall on Review of Media Access to Personnel,
19 June 2007, available at www.mod.uk Back
6
HC Deb, 19 June 2007, cols 1255-1256 Back
7
HC Deb, 19 June 2007, col 1256 Back
8
Ibid. Back
9
HC Deb, 19 June 2007, col 1255 Back
10
Report by Tony Hall on Review of Media Access to Personnel,
para 48 Back
11
HC Deb, 19 June 2007, col 1256 Back
12
Sixth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2006-07,
Foreign Policy Aspects of the Detention of Naval Personnel by
the Islamic Republic of Iran, HC 880. Back
13
HC Deb, 16 April 2007, col 26 Back
14
Ev 1 Back
