The changing role of UK Forces
82. The impending handover of Basra Province to Iraqi
control, scheduled for December 2007, will presage a change in
the role of UK Forces in South Eastern Iraq. In a statement to
the House of Commons on 8 October 2007, the Prime Minister announced
that "the next important stage in delivering our strategy
to hand over security to the Iraqis is to move from a combat role
in the rest of Basra province to overwatch" across the whole
of South Eastern Iraq and transferring overall responsibility
for security to Iraqi control. Switching to a position of overwatch,
the Prime Minister stated, would have two stages:
In the first, British forces that remain in Iraq
will have the following tasks: training and mentoring the Iraqi
army and police force; securing supply routes and policing the
Iran-Iraq border; and the ability to come to the assistance of
the Iraqi security forces when called upon. Then in the Spring
of next year—and guided as always by the advice of our military
commanders—we plan to move to a second stage of overwatch
where the coalition would maintain a more limited re-intervention
capacity and where the main focus would be on training and mentoring.[113]
83. The Prime Minister outlined the implications
of the transition to overwatch for the number of UK Forces deployed
in Iraq:
We plan from next Spring to reduce our force
numbers in southern Iraq to a figure of 2,500. The first stage
begins now. With the Iraqis already assuming security responsibility,
we expect to: establish provincial Iraqi control in Basra province
in the next two months […] move to the first stage of overwatch;
reduce numbers in southern Iraq from 5,500 at the start of September
to 4,500 immediately after provincial Iraqi control and then to
4,000; and then in the second stage of overwatch from the Spring
[…] reduce to around 2,500 troops, with a further decision
about the next phase made then. In both stages of overwatch, around
500 logistics and support personnel will be based outside Iraq
but elsewhere in the region.[114]
Table 6: Projected reductions in UK force
levels from September 2007
| Date | Number of troops
|
| September 2007 | 5,500 |
| November 2007 | 5,000 |
| Christmas 2007 | 4,500 |
| From Spring 2008 | 2,500 |
Source: Ministry of Defence[115]
84. In a joint statement on 31 October 2007, welcoming the Iraqi
Prime Minister's announcement that Basra Province would be transferred
to Iraqi control in December 2007, the Defence Secretary, Des
Browne, and the Foreign Secretary, Rt Hon David Miliband MP, emphasised
that "the transition of Basra does not signal the end of
our commitment to the people of Iraq". Instead, "it
now enters a new stage" in which:
we will continue to train and mentor the Iraqi Security Forces
and we will protect the border and supply routes, while retaining
the capability to support the Iraqis directly if so requested.
But the Iraqis will take the lead, as they have proved more than
capable of doing in Muthanna, Dhi Qar and Maysan.[116]
Despite ceding control for security in the region to the Iraqis,
Mr Browne and Mr Miliband emphasised that the UK would "remain
closely engaged with the Government of Iraq to promote national
reconciliation, and to ensure the development of a diverse and
strong economy".[117]
85. Until now, UK Forces in South Eastern Iraq have held overall
responsibility for security in Basra. As the Minister for the
Armed Forces told us in evidence on 24 July, "we are […]
the ultimate guarantor of any chance of progress" in South
Eastern Iraq.[118]
With the switch to overwatch, this would change. Iraqis themselves
would assume responsibility for security across the whole of MND(SE).
86. Mr Ainsworth defined overwatch as "being
there, able in the absolute extreme to offer support, but to stand
back and allow the Iraqi forces themselves to try and deal with
the situations that arise".[119]
In written evidence to our inquiry, the MoD explained that overwatch
is "a term specific to UK forces" within MND(SE) which
"is used to describe the force structure for a given province"
and "is subdivided into 3 phases: tactical, operational and
strategic".[120]
At the tactical stage of overwatch, UK Forces remain responsible
for security:
Initially, they are responsible for the routine
provision of security. Over time, routine and non-essential Multi-National
Force (MNF) activity progressively reduces, as Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) take increasing responsibility for providing security
as a means of moving towards security self-reliance.[121]
87. The operational phase of overwatch takes place
after the transfer to Provincial Iraqi Control. According to the
MoD, in this posture UK and Coalition Forces "provide a re-intervention
capability, but the requirement to intervene will be only in
extremis and at the request of the Iraqi authorities".
The principal focus of UK Forces during this period is on security
sector reform: the training and mentoring of the Iraqi Security
Forces, particularly the Iraqi Army. Nevertheless, the UK continues
to protect "key supply routes" and "points of entry".
This is the current stage of overwatch in Al Muthanna, Dhi Qar
and Maysan provinces, and will also be the case in Basra Province
following transition to Provincial Iraqi Control which is scheduled
for December 2007.[122]
88. The MoD describes the final stage of overwatch
as "strategic overwatch". During this period, the UK
and Coalition effort "will move to supporting the Iraqi Government
and Security Forces in facing strategic threats to their internal
and external security".[123]
89. The MoD envisages regional variations across
South Eastern Iraq. In evidence to us on 24 July, Brigadier Hughes
told us that:
What we do not envisage in overwatch is one package
fits all, so if the Iraqi Security Forces were going to ask us
for support once they have got provincial control, we do not envisage
them necessarily meaning that we have got to put a battle group
into the middle of the city. What they might be short of is intelligence
and surveillance assets, so it might be just flying something
high up, or it might be another niche capability or a piece of
logistics that they need putting in place. We foresee in over-watch
maybe nothing or maybe very limited and a scaled approach to it.[124]
90. As the UK moves towards full operational overwatch
in South Eastern Iraq, the key issues are how many troops will
be needed in theatre, whether overwatch could be performed outside
Iraq, and whether the UK might need to maintain a reserve of troops
to re-intervene if the security situation in South Eastern Iraq
deteriorated significantly.
91. In July 2007 the Minister for the Armed Forces
told us that, in order to perform effective overwatch, a force
of around 5,000 would be required. Anything below this number
would prove difficult to sustain:
The force is not self-sustaining and able to
protect itself and do all the other work it has to do below about
5,000, so we are approaching levels where we cannot go much further
[…] in an actual overwatch situation we cannot go much below
5,000 because we have to sustain the force and self-protect the
force itself, so overwatch itself does not take us down a lot
further than that.[125]
92. Mr Ainsworth's suggestion that a force package
of around 5,000 represented a minimum sustainable number reflects
what we heard during our visit to Iraq in July 2007. During our
visit, we were told that minimum force levels had already been
reached. Although limited reductions might prove possible following
the transition of Basra Palace to Iraq control, there remained
a critical mass of around 4,000 to 5,000 below which the sustainability
of the force package would be called into question. We heard that
any further reductions would mean that the remaining UK Force
would be able to do little more than sustain and protect itself
at the Contingency Operating Base at Basra Air Station.
93. In his statement to the House of Commons on 8
October, however, the Prime Minister announced plans to reduce
UK force levels in Iraq to 4,500 following the transfer of Basra
Province to Iraqi control in December 2007 and, shortly thereafter,
to 4,000 in the first stage of overwatch and to 2,500 in the second
stage of overwatch "from the Spring of 2008".[126]
94. We asked the Secretary of State for Defence about
the apparent discrepancy between the Prime Minister's announcement
in October 2007 of a reduction in UK force levels to 2,500 from
the Spring of 2008 and the Minister for the Armed Forces' suggestion,
in July 2007, that a force package much below 5,000 would not
be sustainable. Mr Browne denied that there were any discrepancy
and told us that:
what has changed is that we are now in a position
to have a very clear idea, in consultation with our allies and
with the Iraqis themselves, as to exactly what we will be doing
and what tasks we will be carrying out and we plan the number
of troops in relation to the tasks, so the tasks have changed.[127]
Mr Browne added that he was satisfied that on the
basis of the evidence he had received the Prime Minister's "figure
of troops to tasks is the right figure". That figure was
"a product of a close assessment of our future requirement"
and "the key to this figure has been the judgment of the
military commanders".[128]
The MoD subsequently provided us with classified written evidence
addressing the tasks that UK and Coalition Forces would be required
to fulfil following the transition of security responsibility
in Basra to Provincial Iraqi Control and the number of troops
that will be required to fulfil those tasks.
95. Lieutenant General Wall maintained that the proposed
reductions in UK Forces in Iraq were not the result of overstretch.
According to Lieutenant General Wall, "this has not been
driven by what is available". He maintained that "were
more forces needed at this stage of the campaign […] the
Army could provide additional forces […] That is not to say
it will not benefit from a reduction".[129]
Reducing the UK military commitment to 2,500 was "perfectly
workable in light of the tasks that we envisage". The reduction
would mean a that the number of Battlegroups in theatre would
be cut from four to two. However, the difference in the number
of Battlegroups could be "accounted for in terms of the change
of tasks […] as we go increasingly towards a mentoring and
supporting role rather than that which we are engaged in at the
moment".[130]
Nevertheless, Lieutenant General Wall maintained that, even after
the drawdown of Forces, the UK would still be capable of deploying
a Battlegroup in a combat role if the security situation so demanded.[131]
96. We also asked the Secretary of State whether,
in light of the proposed reductions, UK Forces could be re-deployed
to Iraq if the security situation were to deteriorate significantly.
Lieutenant General Wall maintained that reinforcements could be
found from a variety of sources, from Iraqi, Coalition, and UK
Forces:
If it is a question of delivering reserves into
the MND South East area in response to requests from the Iraqi
agencies and presumably at that stage through the Iraqi MoD with
the Iraqi Prime Minister's endorsement, then there are a number
of levels at which those reserves could be delivered, starting
with the Iraqi security forces themselves, we could redeploy into
the area either from elsewhere in the south or from nationwide,
the MNF core-level reserves […] or indeed, if required and
in extremis, additional UK forces from our own reserves.[132]
Lieutenant General Wall stated that there were sufficient
UK Forces to replenish and reinforce those in Iraq if needed,
irrespective of what happened in Afghanistan.
97. The MoD has said that, despite transferring
security responsibility to the Iraqi Security Forces, UK Forces
will retain the capability to re-intervene in South Eastern Iraq
if the security situation deteriorates. If that re-intervention
capability is to be credible the UK will need to be capable of
drawing upon Forces from outside Iraq. We call upon the MoD to
clarify how it plans to maintain a re-intervention capacity, which
Forces would be assigned to that role, and where they would be
based.
98. The Prime Minister's announcement that the
number of UK Forces in Iraq will be reduced to 2,500 from the
Spring of 2008 is noted, but important questions remain about
the sustainability of a force of this size. If there is still
a role for UK Forces in Iraq, those Forces must be capable of
doing more than just protecting themselves at Basra Air Station.
If the reduction in numbers means they cannot do more than this,
the entire UK presence in South Eastern Iraq will be open to question.
96 
