The security situation in South
Eastern Iraq
28. The situation in South Eastern Iraq, in the UK
area of operations, is very different from that in and around
Baghdad. In evidence to us, Ministers, MoD officials and academic
witnesses agreed that the overall level of violence in South Eastern
Iraq was lower than in other parts of the country. The Secretary
of State for Defence told us that "in proportionate terms
a very small number of the attacks that happen in Iraq happen
in the Basra area". Mr Browne stated that "over 80%
of the violence is concentrated around a relatively small circumference
of the city of Baghdad and Baghdad itself".[38]
29. The sources of violence in South Eastern Iraq
are also very different. During our visit to Basra in July 2007
we heard from a number of those we met that the violence in the
area was self-limiting since it reflected a competition for money,
power and influence between local Shia groups rather than the
sectarian nihilism of al-Qaeda; in effect, no party wanted to
destroy that over which it wanted to assert control. In South
Eastern Iraq, there was no sectarian insurgency and none of the
jihadist elements seen elsewhere in the country. Instead, the
violence was propagated by Shia gangsterism and Iranian-backed
militias. In fact, in the South, religion was seen as a unifying
rather than a dividing factor. As the Minister for the Armed Forces
told us in evidence on 24 July, the people of South Eastern Iraq
were "religiously and ethnically cohesive".[39]
30. Academic witnesses to our inquiry agreed that
in South Eastern Iraq the problem was the battle over resources
rather than sectarianism. In evidence to us on 26 June 2007, Professor
Sami Zubaida argued that "all the sides there are Shi'ite
but they are divided along different loyalties to different parties,
to different tribes, straightforward gangs and mafias, and so
on. In Basra, "the objectives of the insurgency are actually
control of material resources: profit".[40]
Dr Eric Herring agreed that the violence in South Eastern Iraq
was "an intra-Shia political, and effectively mafia, struggle".[41]
31. We began our inquiry in June 2007 at a time of
escalating violence in South Eastern Iraq, particularly towards
the Coalition, and increasing doubts in the UK about the efficacy
of the role assigned to UK Forces in Basra. As attacks against
UK Forces increased, some witnesses to our inquiry, and some of
those we met in Iraq, suggested that the deterioration of the
security situation in Basra had demonstrated that UK and Coalition
Forces had outstayed their welcome and had become part of the
problem rather than the solution. Some suggested that the UK's
military presence in Basra was not only risky but also tactically
questionable. And some suggested that military force alone inevitably
had a limited usefulness and that a foreign army was an inappropriate
tool for the job that needed to be done in Basra.
32. In evidence to us, Dr Herring argued that what
was often seen as "the comparative stability in Basra"
was not the result of UK and Coalition action. Whatever stability
had emerged had come about "precisely because the militias
have managed to dominate". This was not stability "in
any positive sense" since it represented "a fragile
balance between militias".[42]
In written evidence to us Dr Herring questioned the role of UK
Forces in Iraq arguing that "the UK military presence in
Iraq has been tiny and under-resourced" and characterised
by "persistent incoherence and lack of integration".
He suggested that "in continual fear of being over-run, the
priority has been to avoid antagonising excessively existing or
rising armed local political actors". Notwithstanding reconstruction,
anti-militia and anti-corruption efforts such as Operation Sinbad
in late 2006 and early 2007, UK Forces had "tended to be
(often uncomprehending) spectators, occasional protagonists and
only rarely the centre of power and legitimacy". UK Forces
had "engaged in what could only be intermittent and intermittently
productive operations".[43]
The conclusion of the local Basrawi population, he said, was that
UK Forces "are making the situation worse and [they] want
them to leave".[44]
33. Dr Dodge argued that "there is no stability
in Basra".[45] In
evidence to us, he stated:
Periodically, outright conflict breaks out and
violence flows. I think to qualify that as low level is simply
not the case. People are dying in Basra. Basra is a lawless place
where the politics of the gun dominates; that is not low-level
violence, that is anarchy, and it could get worse or it could
stay at a steady rate.[46]
But despite the fact that Basra was "highly
unstable" and "extremely violent", Dr Dodge offered
a somewhat more positive assessment of the role UK Forces could
still play in the region than that offered by Dr Herring. Although
their presence was "limited", he suggested that UK Forces
nevertheless were "putting a brake, albeit a rather malfunctioning
one, on the swift movement to civil war".[47]
According to Dr Dodge, a complete withdrawal of UK Forces "may
trigger, may destabilise and increase the violence" in Basra
and South Eastern Iraq as a whole.
34. Professor Zubaida called the situation in Basra
in June 2007 "desperate". He agreed that UK Forces remained
"a brake on much wider violence" but he questioned whether
this would make a difference in the long-term. If UK Forces left
precipitously violence could well increase, but a withdrawal of
UK Forces in two years' time could well have the same effect.
For Professor Zubaida, the key question was "what is going
to happen in the those two years which is going to lead to a different
outcome?".[48] There
was a real risk that whenever UK and Coalition Forces withdrew
the country could descend into civil war.[49]
35. When we took evidence from the Minister for the
Armed Forces on 24 July 2007, he acknowledged "grand scale
criminality" was "a huge part of the problem in the
South". There were regular attacks on UK Forces at the Provincial
Joint Co-ordination Centre (PJCC) at Basra Palace and at the Contingency
Operating Base at Basra Air Station. Indeed, as we witnessed,
July saw some of the highest numbers of attacks against UK Forces
in Basra in 2007, peaking at almost 120 attacks in the week beginning
20 July. By mid-August 2007, UK Forces were suffering the highest
sustained level of attacks of the year, an average of over 90
attacks per week over the preceding four week period.[50]
36. Mr Ainsworth, however, said the fact that UK
Forces were being targeted was "not surprising". After
all, the insurgents and militias understood that "we are
the ultimate guarantor of any chance of progress" and "we
[
] are effectively providing the backbone of stability"
in South Eastern Iraq.[51]
37. Since July 2007, the security situation in Basra
has changed significantly. The handover of Basra Palace to Iraqi
control on 3 September coincided with a dramatic reduction in
the number of attacks on UK and Coalition Forces. From a 2007
peak of almost 120 attacks per week in late July, the number of
attacks on UK and Coalition forces fell to an average of below
10 attacks per week in the six weeks after the handover of Basra
Palace.[52] The MoD estimates
that the handover of Basra Palace to Iraqi control was "a
significant factor in this reduction" though the MoD's figures
suggest that the reduction in the number of attacks against UK
and Coalition Forces began in mid-August 2007, prior to the handover.[53]
This would appear to reflect what we heard from local politicians
in Basra, that is that much of the violence in the city was aimed
at the Coalition Forces.
Table 3: Attacks on Multi-National Forces
in MND(SE), January-October 2007

Source: Ministry of Defence[54]
38. In evidence to us on 23 October 2007, the Secretary
of State for Defence described the security situation in Basra
as "stable". Since July, he stated, the number of attacks
had "gone from 401 to 19 in September".[55]
Despite predictions to the contrary, he told us that the violence
of the early Summer had not continued following the handover of
Basra Palace and that UK Forces based at the COB at Basra Air
Station were not coming under heavy or sustained attack from insurgents
and militias. Similarly, Lieutenant General Peter Wall, Deputy
Chief of the Defence Staff (Commitments), told us that there had
been a "very significant, a ten-fold reduction of activity
against MNF".[56]
39. Yet despite the reduction in attacks on UK and
Coalition Forces in South Eastern Iraq, the security situation
in Basra remains challenging. There has been no corresponding
reduction in the number of attacks aimed at civilians. The MoD's
statistics reveal that the number of attacks on civilians in Basra
city have "remained broadly the same". But in written
evidence to us, the MoD maintained that "this is in line
with our assessment that [the attacks] would stabilise [
]
we still believe that over time they will reduce as the Iraqis,
and the Iraqi Security Forces, grow in capability and confidence".[57]
According to the MoD, the fact that there have been no increases
in attacks on civilians in Basra demonstrated that "the ISF
are doing an effective job of maintaining control of the city
without UK support".[58]
Table 4: Attacks in MND(SE) by target,
January-October 2007

Source: Ministry of Defence[59]
40. In the long-term stability and security in
South Eastern Iraq will only come about through progress with
political reconciliation. But, as at the national level, political
reconciliation at the local level demands a degree of security
for the political process to function. When we visited Basra,
we met a group of local politicians and discussed the security
situation and the prospects of political progress in the province.
We heard that Iraqi politicians had no experience of acting within
a political process and that the Provincial Council lacked the
authority to deal with many of the problems Iraqis faced, particularly
security. We were also told that the lack of security impeded
political progress. In evidence to us, the Secretary of State
told us that there needed to be "more political leadership
at the centre" in Baghdad and that local Shia militia groups
such as Jaish Al Mahdi (JAM) needed to be brought into the political
process.[60] He also
stated that this could bring "the sort of sustainable progress
we need" but that the UK would have "to leave the Iraqis
[
] the opportunity and space to do it". To this end,
transition to Provincial Iraq Control would be important from
a political as well as a security perspective.[61]
Mr Browne also expressed optimism that in the next provincial
elections, the date of which remained unclear, would deliver more
representative Provincial Councils. The UK, he said, supported
"early provincial elections" because:
we believe that there would be more involvement
[
] if all the political parties engage in the process, then
the electoral system will ensure that the provincial council is
representative of the balance of political power in the area which
it presently is not because people boycotted the elections in
the past.[62]
41. The reduction in the number of attacks on
UK and Coalition Forces in South Eastern Iraq since August 2007
is significant. However, the fact there has been no corresponding
reduction in the number of attacks against the civilian population
of the city is a matter of concern. Violence in Basra Province
continues to undermine the development of civil society. The relative
security of Basra is said to owe more to the dominance of militias
and criminal gangs, who are said to have achieved a fragile balance
in the city, than to the success of the Multi-National and Iraqi
Security Forces in tackling the root causes of the violence. Although
the reduction in attacks on UK Forces can only be welcome, this
alone cannot be a measure of success. The initial goal of UK Forces
in South Eastern Iraq was to establish the security necessary
for the development of representative political institutions and
for economic reconstruction. Although progress has been made,
this goal remains unfulfilled.
Regional influences
42. A further factor affecting the security situation
in Iraq is the nature and extent of Iranian influence. In evidence
to us on 24 July 2007, the Minister for the Armed Forces made
clear the destabilising effect and the extent of Iranian influence
in South Eastern Iraq. He told us:
there is clear evidence of malign influence across
the border in the Basra area. There is little doubt, when you
look at some of the munitions that are being used against our
people, to kill our people, they are not being made in garages
in down-town Basra; they are coming from outside the area.[63]
43. In his report to the US Congress in September
2007, General Petraeus presented a similar picture of malign Iranian
involvement in Iraq. He argued that Iranian elements, particularly
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), had provided "training,
arming, funding, and in some cases, direction of militia extremists".
They had been involved in assassinating and kidnapping Iraqi government
leaders. Iraqi Shia gangs had "killed and wounded our soldiers
with advanced explosive devices provided by Iran". [64]General
Petraeus concluded that:
it is increasingly apparent to both Coalition
and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of the Qods Force,
seeks to turn the Iraqi Special Groups into a Hezbollah-like force
to serve its interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi
state and coalition forces in Iraq.[65]
44. The US Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, reported
to the US Congress that "Iran plays a harmful role in Iraq".
He stated:
While claiming to support Iraq in its transition,
Iran has actively undermined it by providing lethal capabilities
to the enemies of the Iraqi state. In doing so, the Iranian government
seems to ignore the risks that an unstable Iraq carries for its
own interests.[66]
45. Academic witnesses to our inquiry offered a somewhat
different analysis. Dr Herring, for example, told us that, on
the basis of publicly available information, it was "inconclusive
at best" that Iran was exporting Improvised Explosive Devices
(IEDs) to Iraq. Indeed, Dr Herring argued that the bigger problem
in Iraq was weaponry supplied by the United States to the Iraqi
Police which had found its way into the hands of the militias.[67]
46. Dr Ali Ansari, of St Andrews University, told
us that it was too simplistic to state that Iran was backing the
insurgency in Iraq. He argued that Iran was "a very plural
society" and that Western policy towards Iran had been "too
monolithic". He acknowledged that the IRGC, which tended
to "operate on its own agenda", was one of "the
more unhelpful elements of Iranian intervention in Iraq".
Some elements in Iran, he argued, sought to foster violence in
Iraq so as "to make life as uncomfortable as possible"
for the United States and its Coalition partners. But he also
stated that there were some in the Iranian Foreign Ministry who
favoured "some sort of constructive engagement with the Coalition,
tacitly, behind the scenes [
] to ensure that some form of
stable Iraq is left, because the last thing they want is [
]
another Afghanistan on their Western border".[68]
47. Iranian influence in Iraq is longstanding
and religious and cultural links between Iranians and Iraqis is
strong, particularly in the Shia South. However, reports that
elements within Iran are fuelling the violence in Iraq through
the supply of arms are deeply troubling.
13 The Iraq Study Group Report, 6 December 2006 Back
14
Ibid. p 9 Back
15
Ibid., p 10 Back
16
Ibid, Executive Summary Back
17
"President's Address to the Nation", White House Press
Release, 10 January 2007 Back
18
House of Commons Library Standard Note SN/IA/4099, 20 September
2007 Back
19
Q 6 Back
20
Ibid. Back
21
Q 22 Back
22
Q 2 Back
23
Qq 2, 5 Back
24
The Iraq Commission Report, The Foreign Policy Centre and
Channel 4, 14 July 2007, p 14 Back
25
Q 151 Back
26
Ibid. Back
27
Prospects for Iraq's Stability: Some Security Progress but
Political Reconciliation Elusive, National Intelligence Estimate
(United States), August 2007, p 1 Back
28
Ibid. p 1 Back
29
Ibid. p 1 Back
30
Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq by General David H
Petraeus, Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq, 10 September
2007, p 3 Back
31
Ibid. Back
32
Ibid. p 4 Back
33
Ibid. p 1 Back
34
"President's Address to the Nation", White House Press
Release, 10 January 2007 Back
35
Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq by Ambassador Ryan
C Crocker, US Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq, 10 September
2007, p 3 Back
36
Ibid. p 3 Back
37
Oral evidence taken before the Defence Committee on 23 October
2007, Iraq and Afghanistan, HC (2006-07) 1091-i, Q 43 Back
38
Ibid., Q 4 Back
39
Q 112 Back
40
Q 4 Back
41
Q 2 Back
42
Q 21 Back
43
Ev 46 Back
44
Ev 43 Back
45
Q 21 Back
46
Q 49 Back
47
Qq 46, 7 Back
48
Qq 47, 48 Back
49
Q 7 Back
50
See Table 3 below. Also HC (2006-07) 1091-i, Ev 19, Figure 1 Back
51
Q 83 Back
52
HC (2006-07) 1091-i, Ev 19 Back
53
Ibid. Back
54
Ibid. Back
55
Ibid., Q 4 Back
56
HC (2006-07) 1091-i, Q 5 Back
57
Ibid., Ev 20 Back
58
Ibid. Back
59
Ibid. Back
60
HC (2006-07) 1091-i, Q 45 Back
61
Ibid. Back
62
Ibid., Qq 46, 47 Back
63
Q 164 Back
64
Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq by General Petraeus,
10 September 2007, p 4 Back
65
Ibid. Back
66
Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq by Ambassador Crocker,
10 September 2007, p 4 Back
67
Q 41 Back
68
Q 28 Back