House of Commons - Defence - Twelfth Special Report

Select Committee on Defence Twelfth Special Report

Government response

ISTAR and Network Enabled Capability

1. (Recommendation 1) Network Enabled Capability (NEC) is a key future defence capability. In its response to our Report we expect the MoD to provide us with an update on the progress being made to address the challenges to delivering NEC and the latest estimates of when the NEC Maturity States are expected to be achieved. NEC is an area we plan to monitor closely. (Paragraph 11)

The Department set out a broad framework for taking NEC forward first with the Defence White Paper in 2003 and then in 2005 with the publication of JSP 777. We currently expect the initial maturity state to be achieved in 2012 and the beginning of the transitional state in 2017, with the mature state yet to be fully defined. We continue to devote significant effort to working with coalition partners to achieve as much coherence as possible with key allies. In May 2007 the Permanent Under Secretary appointed the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Equipment Capability) to be the Senior Responsible Owner for delivery of NEC in order to achieve greater coherence and a more focused approach.

There are a number of challenges to the delivery of NEC across Defence. The main ones include:

Security—we need to get the balance right between the desire for greater operational flexibility on the one hand and security risks on the other.

Information—we need greater coherence in the way we manage information to ensure our commanders and decision makers get only what they need and when they need it. Effective training is needed to take on new ways of working and overcome a shortage of dedicated staff with the skills to exploit NEC to best effect, particularly in a context where increasing competition for individuals with computer science and information management skills is predicted

Interoperability—we need to be able to interoperate with allies and host nations when required.

Culture—the aim is a culture where our people consider strong information management, information assurance and trusted collaboration as the norm.

NEC design and compliance—we need to ensure our acquisition teams and industry are aware of the technical standards and design requirements to ensure projects are NEC compliant and that we adhere to those standards and designs. But in this area the best can be the enemy of the good and we do not seek a perfect solution as this would cause unacceptable delays.

Resources and balance of investment—there will be difficult decisions particularly on funding for the networks and applications that are essential to, but outside of, the main capital projects.

These challenges are being addressed through the new NEC governance structure. The SRO is working to the Defence Operating Board and through his two star committees and is supported by senior Departmental advisers in particular the Key Systems Advisor (KSA)[1]. Work is progressing in a number of areas. For example, information management is increasingly accepted as an established discipline: specific guidance and specialist defence training is provided and initial Information governance arrangements are in place. On getting the balance right between greater interoperability and the needs of security, work has continued, coordinated with wider government work led by the Cabinet Office, to develop a fuller understanding of the information assurance and information risk issues and address identified shortfalls. Meanwhile, the networks available in operational theatres are continuing to evolve and mature. They now support increasing levels of integration. Our forces have access to more information, can analyse and assess it more effectively, move it faster and more widely and exploit it better than before. A number of programmes have contributed to this including the Reaper UAV system feeding a network of information systems to distribute Full Motion Video (FMV) and allowing users to "collect once share many times", the Skynet 5 satellite communication system which has been building up capability with satellites launched 2007 and 2008 and a new command and control system and infrastructure in Afghanistan providing access to ISAF and NATO secure networks.

More widely, the Defence Information Infrastructure (DII) aims to provide a common information infrastructure to exchange and share electronic information across the whole of Defence. In the fixed environment in the UK, by the end of June 2008 over 32,000 terminals had been rolled out with over 60,000 terminals and 130,000 accounts at 420 sites due to be achieved by the end of this year. A significant milestone was the successful roll out of DII to the Defence Equipment and Support headquarters at Abbey Wood from July 2007. This was the biggest and most complex single implementation of the programme to date, covering more than 8,000 terminals in 19 buildings on two sites. The programme for the deployed version of DII remains on-track. For example, the land deployed version is aiming to achieve an initial operating capability by the end of 2009 while the first afloat capability on a warship is expected to be achieved in a similar timescale. A further capability to handle top secret material is planned and approval to proceed is due to be sought by the end of 2008.

The increasing capability and importance of UAVs

2. (Recommendation 2) The capabilities of UAVs have increased significantly in recent years and the pace of change is likely to continue in line with technological advances. The United States in particular has made substantial investment in UAV technology. We note that the MoD has recognised the important contribution that UAVs can make, particularly in relation to ISTAR. (Paragraph 24)

The MoD has operated unmanned aerial systems since the 1960s, for example the MQM57 drone system was introduced 1964/5, the Midge drone was operated from 1971 to the early 1990s (including use in Op Granby in 1991) and the Phoenix tactical UAV system from the late 1990s. Phoenix was taken out of service in March 2008 having deployed operationally to the Balkans during the 1990s and to Iraq during winter months.

The utility and importance of UAVs, particularly in relation to ISTAR, has therefore long been recognised by the MoD. Work on a new generation began in the 1990s and was supported for example by investment through the Joint UAV Experimentation Programme (JUEP) from 2003 to 2006 to examine UAV technology and to become an informed customer. The developing demands of current operations have led to an acceleration in the pace of work and to significant growth in the use of UAV capability with the acquisition of a range of UAV systems under UOR arrangements.

However, such acquisition, which of necessity is "off the shelf", is focused on the specific requirements of current operations and can only partially satisfy our longer term requirements for unmanned ISTAR capability across the full span of conflict. The ongoing Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) Capability Investigation (CI) is using the experience gained during the WATCHKEEPER programme and the lessons identified from current operations to help define the Defence UAV requirement for the next 15 years.

UAVs acquired as UORs

3. (Recommendation 3) The MoD has acquired UAV systems for current operations as Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs). In its response to our Report, we expect the MoD to set out its future plans for the UAV systems acquired as UORs and where the future costs fall within the defence budget. We also expect the MoD to set out its longer term strategy for acquiring UAVs systems, given the concern expressed by industry that keeping the UAV systems acquired as UORs in service for a long time could undermine the UK's national capability in this area. (Paragraph 28)

The Department's general principle is that an equipment capability acquired under UOR procedure will only be taken into the core Defence programme where an enduring requirement is identified. As regards UAVs, the present position can be summarised as follows:

Desert Hawk mini UAV system. In line with normal procedures, consideration is being given to bringing Desert Hawk capability into core against the background of assessing our longer term requirements for mini UAV capability. This work will encompass the wider utility of sub-tactical UAVs for tasks such as mounted/dismounted reconnaissance, force protection and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD).

Hermes 450 tactical UAV system. There are no plans to retain the Hermes 450 service provision arrangements beyond the point that the Defence-funded WATCHKEEPER tactical UAV system (approved ISD 2011) can provide broadly equivalent capability.

Reaper. In line with normal procedures, consideration is being given to bringing Reaper into core. This will be done against the background of an assessment of our longer term requirements for operational level UAV capability and aspirations for sovereign capability expressed in DIS and DTS.

While these systems remain deployed on operations, their costs fall to the Reserve. Should Desert Hawk or Reaper capability be taken into core, their costs would fall to the responsible Top Level Budget (Land and Air Command respectively), except when they are deployed on operations in which case operating costs would continue to fall to the Reserve. Our longer term strategy will be informed by the ongoing UAS Capability Investigation. The Department recognises that there is a fine balance between the aspiration in the longer term to support growth of UK national capability in this area and the more immediate requirement to support current operations with a proven and available system. The acquisition of Reaper from the US in 2007 reflects the reality of what the market can provide while the Department's partnership with BAE Systems, announced at the Farnborough Air Show in July, to make progress with the next stage of the MANTIS UAV advanced concept technology demonstrator programme reflects awareness of the issues of concern to UK industry.

Performance of UAVs on current operations

4. (Recommendation 4) The MoD has acquired UAVs as Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) for current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. These UAV systems, such as Hermes 450 and Reaper, are providing "battle winning capabilities" and are proving effective in the counter-insurgency style of operations which our Armed Forces are involved in. (Paragraph 34)

5. (Recommendation 5) The UK's Reaper UAVs, acquired from the US, are operating in Afghanistan. They are delivering vital ISTAR capability at the Theatre/Operational level and the procurement of a US system has provided substantial advantages to the UK. The MoD has assured us that the UK retains operational sovereignty over its Reaper UAVs - it can maintain, upgrade and use them independently. This is an issue we plan to monitor closely. In its response to our Report, we expect the MoD to set out what issues might arise relating to operational sovereignty and the UAV systems procured from the US if the UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty is not ratified. (Paragraph 38)

6. (Recommendation 6) We commend Thales UK for the speed at which it delivered the Hermes 450 UAV system to our Armed Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan following the award of the UOR contract. The system is providing vital high quality ISTAR information to our troops on the ground. (Paragraph 42)

UAVs continue to operate successfully in support of current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The position on Reaper UAVs described by MoD witnesses, and reflected in paragraphs 35-37 of the Report, points to a picture that is a little more complicated than the statement that the UK "can maintain, upgrade and use them independently" would suggest. The context is that Reaper was procured as a UOR to meet a specific requirement in a US led coalition operation. The UK has operational sovereignty of Reaper appropriate to deliver the requirements of the UOR. As MoD witnesses pointed out, in a number of areas there are good operational and/or cost-effectiveness reasons for choosing to share US facilities and currently there is dependency on them. For example, while we periodically review these arrangements to ensure they still meet the UK's needs, we continue to share and rely on US training, communications and support infrastructure and we maintain alignment with the USAF Reaper technical baseline. It should be noted that Reaper is a USAF development programme, with many changes to hardware and software planned before a final baseline configuration will be achieved. Maintaining alignment with the USAF baseline allows the UK to receive both software and hardware upgrades. A move away from this arrangement to develop or upgrade Reaper independently would introduce an unacceptably high level of technical risk and make the UK's small Reaper fleet extremely difficult to sustain.

UK Reaper tasking is currently coordinated through ISAF and is made available to coalition forces, with UK forces receiving the majority share. This is the result of a decision made by UK operational commanders. The UK retains operational command of Reaper and can return it to solely national tasking if required. The UK does not require US agreement to individual tasks. In the longer term, should an operational UAV system be acquired outside the context of the current UOR, the question of dependency would be taken into account and, for example, sufficient UK communications and support could be put in place to ensure a sovereign UK capability.

UAVs are controlled under the Missile Technology Control Regime, to which the UK is a signatory, and are excluded from, and therefore unaffected by, the Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty.

Lessons learned from current operations

7. (Recommendation 7) We note that, from the experience of current operations, the MoD is broadly content with the assets it has, such as UAVs, which collect ISTAR information. However, the MoD considers that further improvements are required in relation to the Direct, Process and Disseminate elements of the ISTAR chain. (Paragraph 45)

8. (Recommendation 8) Our inquiry has focused on UAVs and their contribution, primarily as collectors of ISTAR information, to current and future ISTAR capability. The MoD has a number of key programmes, such as Defence Information Infrastructure and DABINETT, to improve how the ISTAR collection effort is directed and how the intelligence and information collected is processed and disseminated. In its response to our Report, we expect the MoD to provide us with an update on the progress made to date on these two key programmes. We plan to examine the Direct, Process and Disseminate elements of the ISTAR chain in future inquires into ISTAR. (Paragraph 47)

We keep all our requirements for current operations under constant review. In the Direct, Process and Disseminate (DPD) area, we are improving the ability of intelligence analysts to link all source intelligence information to provide a greater understanding of the capability of hostile forces and we are providing units responsible for collecting intelligence with an improved capability to search for, retrieve and exploit collected imagery in order to produce better intelligence products to support Coalition operations. We will also consider providing additional collection assets where a specific requirement that cannot be fulfilled by other means is identified.

DABINETT is the principal Defence funded programme with the primary focus of incrementally improving DPD capability, although the programme also contains provision for the acquisition of a deep and persistent collection capability. The programme aims to provide new tools and procedures for ISTAR management and processing and to break down legacy intelligence stovepipes by, for example, improving awareness of existing intelligence and access to collateral information.

A number of measures across all lines of development, ranging from changes to legacy systems to new training requirements have already been identified. Within the overall programme approach, there are currently up to 35 identified new projects (based on current planning and including later project increments and non-equipment projects, and noting that the number of projects can change to reflect changing requirements and resourcing levels). The DABINETT Programme Initial Gate was approved in January 2008 and so far three projects have been initiated. These are intended to deliver an intelligence requirements management and resource tasking tool to improve use of ISTAR resources including UAVs; to provide, in conjunction with DII, information handling services to improve dissemination of intelligence through an ISTAR virtual knowledge base; and to integrate imagery sources through this virtual knowledge base, including WATCHKEEPER data. The next group of projects should come forward in autumn 2009.

The general position on progress with DII is described in the response to the first Conclusion and Recommendation.

9. (Recommendation 9) We recognise that when UAVs are operating in hostile environments some losses can be expected. It is essential that the risk of such losses is minimised, particularly in relation to the large UAVs such as Reaper which carry sensitive payloads. In its response to our Report, we expect the MoD to set out the lessons identified from the UAVs lost on current operations, how it plans to address them, and to update us on the number of UAV losses. (Paragraph 51)

All flying operations, manned or unmanned, carry some degree of risk. The UAVs used by UK forces are making a significant contribution to coalition operations and the losses that have occurred to date have not involved casualties. To sustain the current planned level of Reaper UAV capability on operations in Afghanistan we have ordered a further two Reaper UAVs (in addition to the replacement for the one lost in April 2008) to support training and to provide an immediate reserve should any of the fleet become unavailable on operations. Hermes 450 UAVs are provided as a service from the contractor (Thales). As such, the contractor is responsible for maintaining the service taking account of losses. The current version of Desert Hawk, which lands by means of a controlled crash and is designed to be easily repaired, has been in use for a year and operator experience is informing decisions on the rate of re-supply needed to maintain the capability. Given operational sensitivities we would like to offer the Committee a confidential briefing on UAV losses to enable a more comprehensive understanding of these matters.

Current operational activity with modern UAV systems remains developmental and is evolving all the time. It is contributing greatly to our understanding of UAVs and will inform the acquisition and use of future systems. For example, there will be stringent security requirements placed on future programmes such as WATCHKEEPER that will mitigate the compromise of sensitive payloads from losses on operations in the future, and design enhancements for planned and future UAS programmes will include twin engines, control system redundancy and automatic takeoff and landing systems that will mitigate the actual UAV loss rate. Moreover, the development of more compact, stealthy platforms will allow increased numbers and greater networking to reduce the impact of losses. Larger, more capable, but less numerous, platforms (as currently represented by Reaper) are also likely to embrace stealth technology as well as acquiring manned aircraft levels of flight assurance. However, to gain full advantage of the unique characteristics and lower cost of unmanned systems a differently balanced approach to losses compared to manned aircraft may be needed, albeit supported by a design architecture that prevents security compromise.

10. (Recommendation 10) We note that for some of the UAVs acquired as Urgent Operational Requirements, the MoD is using new approaches to contracting such as "ISTAR by the hour". We welcome new approaches to contracting for defence equipment, particularly where such approaches improve reliability and availability. We look to the MoD to evaluate whether these new approaches are delivering the expected benefits and, if they are, to consider how they might be used more widely. (Paragraph 54)

Procurement approaches used for UORs are not necessarily directly applicable more widely to Defence procurement owing to the absence of the need in the former case to consider long term sustainability across all lines of development. In the case of the Hermes 450 capability requirement, conventional equipment procurement was considered but dismissed on grounds of the cost and the complexity of delivering across all the lines of development. The solution arrived at is a hybrid that provides equipment and capability that is operated and maintained by Army personnel. The arrangement is working well and has the additional benefit of providing the opportunity for Army specialists to learn in advance of the introduction of the similar Watchkeeper UAV system. A more accurate example from current operations of "ISTAR by the hour" is the project that is providing at short notice flexible ISTAR capability in Iraq using light aircraft operated by a civilian company but held on the military register (Contractor Owned Military Registered— COMR), for which the Department pays an hourly rate.

Watchkeeper programme

11. (Recommendation 11) We note that the Watchkeeper UAV programme is currently forecast to be delivered within the approved cost and to the planned in-service date. We look to the MoD to identify the factors which have resulted in the good progress to date on this programme and how they could be applied on other equipment programmes. (Paragraph 59)

The WATCHKEEPER UAV programme remains on track. The DE&S organisation will generate a Learning from Experience (LFE) paper prior to reaching Initial Operating Capability to capture all lessons. It should be noted that the Defence Acquisition Change Programme is currently reviewing key projects including WATCHKEEPER to capture the full range of lessons in order to inform future programmes. WATCHKEEPER was one of the first major programmes to seek to achieve confidence across all lines of development before committing to major contracts. This approach combined with continuing close working relationships with capability planners and the front line users has enabled trade-offs to keep performance, time and cost in balance and has contributed to the success of WATCHKEEPER to-date.

12. (Recommendation 12) We note that, when it enters service, the Watchkeeper UAV system should provide substantial advancements over the Hermes 450 UAV system both in relation to the air vehicle and the ground network enabled infrastructure. (Paragraph 64)

The WATCHKEEPER capability will represent significant enhancement over the proven Hermes 450 system in the following main areas:

Substantial redesign of the existing air vehicle to provide greater payload, structural integrity and ease of maintenance

Enhancement of EO/IR sensor resolution

Addition of a SAR/GMTI radar sensor

Addition of a Laser designator/rangefinder

Redesign of the undercarriage to allow rough strip operations

Addition of an Automatic Take-Off and Landing (ATOL) system

Secure UK datalink and communications infrastructure

De-icing system for improved survivability and operating envelope

Integral expeditionary and mobile capability

Organic training facility

UK airworthiness qualification and Release To Service for UK training

UK logistic infrastructure, manufacturing and repair facility

13. (Recommendation 13) The air vehicle for the Watchkeeper UAV system is derived from the Hermes 450 which was developed by an Israeli company. We note that a UK joint venture for Watchkeeper has been created and will hold the intellectual property. Thales UK assured us that the UK will have sovereign capability relating to the Watchkeeper UAV system. (Paragraph 67)

The need to achieve and sustain a UK manufacturing capability was addressed in detail during the WATCHKEEPER bidding process. In order to achieve technology transfer to the UK, the Thales bid undertook to set up a Joint Venture company (Thales and Elbit Systems of Israel) in the UK. This was subsequently set up in Leicester and construction of a manufacturing facility commenced earlier this year. The transfer of manufacturing capability will take place following construction of the first ten WATCHKEEPER air vehicles in Israel. In addition to this, the WATCHKEEPER contract contains comprehensive and robust IPR conditions designed to safeguard security of supply through access to both foreground and background intellectual property. In circumstances where any element of the contract supply chain are unable or unwilling to produce the WATCHKEEPER system or sub-system, the UK has access rights to a full Technical Data Pack to allow a third party to undertake the manufacturing role. The Department has continued to monitor operational sovereignty aspects as the programme has proceeded and, for example, has taken additional steps to ensure that the UK has the ability to modify a piece of software relating to the vehicle management system.

Bandwidth and frequencies

14. (Recommendation 14) UAVs are collecting increasing amounts of ISTAR information, in a range of different formats, which is then disseminated to users. This is putting increasing pressure on the available bandwidth. The MoD is alert to this issue and is "bandwidth conscious". In its response to our Report, we expect the MoD to provide us with a summary of how it is seeking to address the issue of bandwidth and its assessment of the progress being made. (Paragraph 73)

Increasing pressure on bandwidth is an issue equally for civil and Defence users. It will require innovative technology and capable regulatory frameworks across governments to address. It is a particular issue in the development of UAV capability because all of the raw data collected by unmanned platforms is currently disseminated for off-board exploitation in real time. The Department is adopting a two strand approach to address this problem. The first is to reduce to a minimum the bandwidth requirement through technology and procedural changes. Examples include improved compression techniques, autonomous UAV operation, onboard autonomous exploitation and alternative data link technologies. Compression techniques are being applied in the WATCHKEEPER programme which will reduce the bandwidth requirements for the dissemination of product to the tactical user. The second is to seek to secure through the appropriate spectrum management organisations continued access to the minimum bandwidth required for operation of UAVs in national and international airspace. Key current activity is gaining a full understanding of future UAV bandwidth requirements prior to discussion with spectrum authorities.

Airspace and Air Traffic Control

15. (Recommendation 15) UAV operations in the UK are restricted to segregated airspace as they cannot currently satisfy the requirement to see and avoid other air users. We note that the MoD is working with national and international organisations on this issue. In its response to our Report, we expect the MoD to set out why it supports the ASTRAEA programme only in an "observer role" and its future plans with regard to this programme. We see UAVs, when permitted to operate in the same airspace as manned aircraft, as playing a major role in operations relating to both civil and national defence. (Paragraph 80)

The Department's contribution and support to the ASTRAEA programme has been significant and should not be underestimated, despite being subject to legal limitations. Under European policy regulations it is prohibited to use national defence funding to support industrial activity that is also funded by the Regional Development Agency. As a result the Department is unable to directly contribute to the ASTRAEA programme and is constrained to what it termed as an 'observer role'. This situation is understood and accepted by the other members of the ASTRAEA programme. Although ASTRAEA Phase II faces the same funding constraints, the Department is for example looking at supporting test and evaluation activity by providing access to restricted UK airspace such as Air Weapon Ranges. In addition, we have provided intellectual input and facilities to BAE Systems' HERTI autonomous UAV programme and financial and conceptual support to the BAE Systems MANTIS UAV advanced concept technology demonstrator programme. These are key examples of our engagement with UK industry. In a wider perspective, the Department's regular engagement with for example the NATO and the Eurocontrol organisation demonstrates our resolve to address the regulatory aspects of sense and avoid issues, thus further underpinning ASTRAEA activity.

16. (Recommendation 16) We note that the MoD has announced that it is undertaking a public consultation on proposals to extend the existing airspace used by UAVs above Salisbury Plain. We will wish to be kept informed of the outcome of the consultation and to be updated on the progress of the MoD's proposals. If the MoD's proposals are accepted, it will be important that appropriate procedures are put in place to ensure that any disruption caused by new airspace is kept to a minimum consistent with the requirements of defence and security. (Paragraph 85)

The Salisbury Plain Airspace Change Proposal (ACP) is being developed in accordance with mandated procedure and is currently in the public consultation phase. This phase finished on 29 September 2008. The process requires that interference with existing users is minimised. Early consultation with and comments from aviation stakeholders has led to a number of changes to ensure this is the case. The final arbiter on whether the proposal is implemented is the Director of Airspace Policy within the CAA, who will base his decision on the formal submission that takes public consultation into account. A decision is expected in mid 2009.

UAV operators and imagery analysts

17. (Recommendation 17) The MoD needs the right number of UAV operators with the right skills to make maximum use of the UAV systems it has acquired and is in the process of acquiring. We are concerned to learn that there are substantial deficits in the number of UAV operators in the Army and that the position may worsen when the Watchkeeper UAV system enters service at the end of the decade. We will wish to be updated on the success of the measures being taken to address the deficits in UAV operators. We note that the MoD considers that the deficit in UAV operators has had no impact on current operations. (Paragraph 92)

The Army has sufficient manpower allocated to UAV related tasks although there is a particular shortage of UAV operators qualified to Level 4 (the highest standard of technical expertise) against the future WATCHKEEPER requirement. This does not affect current operations because there is no Level 4 qualification for the Hermes 450; Level 3 operators undertake a conversion course delivered by contractors that teaches the specific Level 4 skills required to fly the H450. When WATCHKEEPER enters service Level 4 training will be delivered by Royal Artillery instructors to meet the requirement. The current pressure on trained manpower is largely due to the demands of sustaining current operations. This has increased the pressure on training time between operational tours, which must be balanced with post operational leave and other activities (such as training related to the ongoing transition from the Phoenix UAV to WATCHKEEPER). To address this, the Department has approved the establishment of a new fifth UAV battery in 32 Regiment Royal Artillery which, on current planning assumptions, will allow for a return to 24 month tour intervals and normal career training patterns. This, along with retention measures and the completion of advanced training facilities optimised for WATCHKEEPER (planned for 2009), will ensure that WATCHKEEPER is appropriately manned when it enters service.

With respect to Reaper, UK pilots and sensor operators are currently trained within the USAF Flight Training system. Under current arrangements the UK would struggle to train the number of people needed to sustain Reaper operations. However, the position is expected to improve from early 2009 with the planned provision of an additional UK Reaper and associated ground equipment dedicated to training activity. The RAF has sufficient numbers of personnel planned to support UAV operations but will require close co-ordination with other ISTAR platforms to ensure the correct balance of operator and pilot competencies. In addition, arrangements have been made to draw upon RN and Army manning resources. The RN currently contributes 8 key personnel to the Reaper capability, including a pilot and sensor operator. These appointments make a significant contribution to the delivery of this important capability and provide the seed corn for the development of the skills to support any future maritime UAV capability.

18. (Recommendation 18) UAVs are delivering increasing amounts of imagery. In order to optimise the value of the imagery collected, the MoD requires sufficient imagery analysts trained in areas such as Full Motion Video. We are concerned that there is an 18% deficit in imagery analysts in the RAF and that a recruitment strategy which is being implemented is not expected to provide additional analysts for some two years. As with UAV operators, we will wish to be updated on the success of the measures being taken to address the deficit in this area. (Paragraph 93)

FMV capabilities and their use on operations are evolving rapidly and different competencies are required depending on the level of analysis necessary to interpret the imagery being produced. As a result of a review of skills and capabilities required by UAV analysts, training has been reorganised. A short basic Full Motion Video (FMV) course is now in place and a longer intermediate level FMV interpretation course aimed at senior non-commissioned officers is being developed to begin in January 2009. These courses mean that there is no longer a need to divert fully trained imagery analysts (IAs) to exploit FMV. The shortened training time means the manpower available within 32 Regiment Royal Artillery (as well as other users) can be fully trained and potential significant shortfalls averted in personnel able to exploit UAV imagery.

The introduction of the FMV-specific training courses will alleviate the pressure on fully trained IAs. For example, the predicted number of IAs required for future systems such as WATCHKEEPER has reduced significantly as the majority of personnel need only FMV training. There remains a shortfall of IAs in the RAF against predicted demand. This is being addressed through an active recruitment campaign and internal reallocation, and training is being weighted towards imagery intelligence. The latest figures show a deficit of 13% against the established RAF requirement.

19. (Recommendation 19) We look to the MoD, in its response to our Report, to provide us with a list of the manning pinch points that impact upon the operation of UAVs, including those trades involved in supporting and maintaining UAVs. The list should set out the current deficits and the action in hand to address them. (Paragraph 94)

Subject to the points made in response to Conclusion and Recommendations 17 and 18, there are currently no manning pinch points in the Army that impact upon the operation, support and maintenance of UAVs in Iraq or Afghanistan. However, the Army recognises that trades related to UAVs are an important recruiting priority. Avionics and Aircraft Technicians across all ranks including those that support UAVs are classed as a Critical Manning Group which allows the Army to offer a bounty to those who have left the Service and wish to return. In addition, an additional 44 fixed term posts have been created to help support current UAV operations, which allows manpower to transfer from other parts of the Army, albeit leaving gaps. This additional manpower is provided from the REME.

For the RAF, in addition to points made in response to Conclusion and Recommendations 17 and 18, introduction of UAVs has been one element in the growing demand for communications and CIS engineers (Trade Group 4) across the RAF. The pressure on Trade Group 4 is not UAV specific and personnel are managed so that there is no impact on UAV operations.

Service issues

20. (Recommendation 20) We note that on current operations the RAF is operating the Reaper UAV and the Army is operating the Hermes 450 and Desert Hawk UAVs. The MoD has assured us that this approach has not caused any problems regarding the dissemination of ISTAR information, and that the focus has been on delivering what was required to the troops on the ground. In its response to our Report, we expect the MoD to set out its plans regarding which Service will have lead responsibility for future UAV systems and what consideration it has given to a joint UAV command. (Paragraph 98)

The Department's forward plans include only one defined UAV programme: the WATCHKEEPER tactical UAV system that will be operated by 32 Regiment Royal Artillery. Given that the focus of UAV capability is the delivery of ISTAR to the user, the Department believes that the current arrangements on operations are working well. The Army is well placed to manage and operate tactical assets while the RAF is best suited to operating operational level assets where issues such as airspace management and integration are more significant. Joint and cross-cutting issues are part of the remit of the UAV Management Group chaired by the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff which includes representatives from all interested parties in Defence. The Department keeps organisational issues under review but sees no pressing case for new organisational structures in this area at the present time.

Operating with allies

21. (Recommendation 21) We note that there are arrangements in place to make sure that the UK's UAV systems are interoperable with those of other nations. In Afghanistan, the ISTAR information is collected by Predator A, Reaper and Hermes 450 UAVs, but it can be processed by the same ground terminals. The MoD assured us that, while there were some problems with some systems, these were being addressed. We consider it vital that the MoD ensures that interoperability is a key requirement when acquiring future UAV systems. (Paragraph 104)

The Department, in conjunction with NATO and other national defence ministries, has consistently sought interoperability between ISTAR systems, including UAVs. However, there is a tension between working towards this goal through open or agreed standards and the commercial imperative of key industry players to establish their own proprietary technology as the de-facto standard. Currently there are three major downlink standards used for dissemination from ISTAR platforms of which two are either proprietary or subject to US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) controls. Interoperability is currently achieved on the remaining, relatively low technology, analogue downlink standard. The need for more efficient use of the radio frequency spectrum has already mandated the move to digital downlinks for future capabilities such as WATCHKEEPER but with no internationally agreed single standard, there remain challenges to overcome to ensure that the user has access to all the information collected by coalition ISTAR platforms.

Exploiting the ISTAR information collected

22. (Recommendation 22) The MoD faces a major challenge to ensure that the systems which process and disseminate the ISTAR information collected keep pace with the systems which collect it. The MoD's progress in addressing this challenge is a matter we plan to examine in future inquiries into ISTAR. (Paragraph 111)

The Department recognises the need to balance the emergent capabilities delivered by it's new generation of capable collectors (such as ASTOR and WATCHKEEPER) with appropriate processing and dissemination capabilities (underpinned by good direction) to ensure that users continue to receive the right information at the right time. The Department is currently addressing a number of challenges in balancing end-to-end ISTAR capability. Some of these have been referred to earlier in this Response but in summary they include:

Provision of adequate numbers of trained analysts

Exploitation of NEC to improve delivery of processed intelligence and increase agility of deployed forces

Provision of improved infrastructure for analysis work by rationalising locations

Provision of improved toolsets for analysis and exploitation through DABINETT and other more specialist programmes

Provision of improved storage for intelligence—DABINETT is defining standards for future intelligence storage.

Better user access to intelligence—a key objective of DABINETT

Better coherence with end-user needs—working towards a Joint assessed intelligence view as part of the Joint operational picture.

The Department is using the Through Life Capability Management (TLCM) process to support a coherent and balanced end-to-end ISTAR capability. Capability Planning Groups (CPGs) manage their specialist areas but cross-membership ensures a coherent management approach. The work of CPGs is co-ordinated by an overarching Capability Management Group (CMG) which provides overall strategic direction and prioritisation. All bodies have representation from across all the Defence lines of development. In the delivery space, the DE&S organisation has established an ISTAR Systems Engineering & Programming Office, to provide system-of-systems integration across the equipment elements of capability. The Department is currently exploring the use of an ISTAR Enterprise Architecture as a basis for capability planning and issue resolution.

Industrial issues

23. (Recommendation 23) The Defence Industrial Strategy published in December 2005 acknowledged the importance of capabilities and technologies relating to ISTAR and UAVs. In its response to our Report, we expect the MoD to provide us with an update on the progress made to date in taking forward the strategy relating to ISTAR and UAVs. We consider it vital that industry is kept updated on the industrial strategy relating to ISTAR and UAVs to help it retain its position in those technologies where it is currently considered leading edge. (Paragraph 117)

In the Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS), the Department explained that targeted investment in Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) technology demonstrator programmes would help to sustain the same aerospace engineering and design capabilities and technologies needed to provide assurance of our ability to operate and support our future fast jet combat aircraft. In December 2006, MoD signed a contract for a £127M project to design and build an experimental UCAV. The TARANIS project is a jointly funded four year Technology Demonstrator Programme between the Department and a BAE Systems led industry team comprising Rolls Royce, GE Aviation Systems and QinetiQ. This project and some related research and technology demonstration activities will sustain some of the key skills and capabilities within these companies and the supply chain for the next few years. Specifically, TARANIS will address a range of technology issues including low observable signature technology integration, vehicle management (including autonomous operation), sensor and payload integration, air vehicle performance, command and control and communications integration. It should also help to provide an initial step-up to help UK industry develop a competitive edge in a potentially lucrative civil and military UAV market. Since the contract was agreed, as well as making progress towards the building of the demonstrator vehicle, the project is also reaping benefits from an open and transparent relationship between the parties involved. This investment should help inform future long term decisions over the future mix of manned and unmanned aircraft.

More recently, in July 2008 MoD entered into a programme with BAE Systems to design and build a Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) UAV advanced concept technology demonstrator. The MANTIS project is jointly funded by the Department and a BAE Systems led industry team, including Rolls-Royce, Selex, Lola and Meggitt, and will result in a flight trials demonstration of the MANTIS UAV in early 2009. This demonstrator project is the first element of a possible spiral development programme which, if successful, has the potential to provide the Department with a sovereign operational UAV capability. MANTIS will address the technology issues of rapid engineering to reduce the timescales from concept to production capability, sensor integration, certification for use in non-segregated airspace and Beyond Line Of Sight (BLOS) communications. No commitments have been made by the Department beyond the current stage of the programme.

With regard to ISTAR capability, the DIS confirmed our intent to ensure that the UK maintains a sovereign capability to integrate sensors and other systems onto UAV platforms. In addition, the UK needs to retain the ability to incorporate UAVs into the wider ISTAR system of systems through the application of robust systems engineering techniques. This is being taken forward through programmes such as DABINETT (to improve the management of intelligence and provide a deep and persistent collection capability) and the wider systems engineering work within MoD. Industry continues to be engaged on these activities and is generally content with the principles and direction.

To complement this work the Department has sponsored a UAS Capability Investigation which aims, in consultation with Industry, to inform the way ahead for UAVs over the next 20 years. The investigation is addressing the UK's military UAV capability requirement and how should it be delivered, including questions such as a UAV industrial strategy to ensure a coherent approach to UAV acquisition, how interoperability might be improved and the development of UK airspace policy for UAVs. The study is due to complete during November 2008.

24. (Recommendation 24) The Defence Technology Strategy published in October 2006 set out the "way forward for C4ISTAR Technology Development". In its response to our Report we expect the MoD to provide us with an assessment of the impact which the Defence Technology Strategy has had to date in the C4ISTAR technology area and, in particular, the impact relating to UAS/UAV technology. (Paragraph 124)

The Defence Technology Strategy (DTS) has had an effect on the development of C4ISTAR technology in a number of ways. Perhaps the main impact has been through taking the DTS forward in developing the Defence Technology Plan, which has for the first time enabled us to take a coherent view across the needs of the whole C4ISTAR area—and beyond to those areas which use C4ISTAR services—and to put in place a plan to meet stakeholders' needs across the board. A more specific example is the establishment of the posts of C4 Architect, the ISTAR Architect and the NEC Architect within DE&S to lead the design of the C4ISTAR architecture. We have a baselined technical architecture for HERRICK and TELIC as well as a deployed technical architecture for 2012. Further work will be carried out in consultation with UK industry through the Key Systems Advisor. Other examples include experimentation and modelling which has a high priority in the DTP and includes "Representation of the Future NEC Environment" and a technology roadmap which has been prepared and will be taken forward as the DTP is implemented. A concrete example in relation to UAVs is the Department's funding of QinetiQ's Zephyr world leading solar powered high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) UAV demonstrator which, in partnership with the US Department of Defense, recently established an unofficial world record for endurance in unmanned flight of over 82 hours.

25. (Recommendation 25) The updated version of the Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) was not published in December 2007 as planned, as the MoD considered that "it would be more appropriate for the strategy to be aligned to the ongoing planning round". The MoD announced on 19 June 2008 that the planning round had been completed. We consider it vital that the MoD ensures that the updated version of the DIS is published without further delay, so that industry is provided with the clarity it requires about future work and where it needs to invest. This is particularly important for those parts of industry working in high technology areas, such as those relating to ISTAR and UAVs. In its response to our Report we call on the MoD to set out the publication timetable for the updated version of the DIS. (Paragraph 126)

The Department remains committed to the Defence Industrial Strategy and is engaging closely with industry to develop it further. We have developed the policy framework but industry has indicated a preference for us not to publish the updated version of the Defence Industrial Strategy until work to examine the medium and long term equipment issues that will inform the industrial sector strategies have concluded. We continue to review the timetable for the publication of the planned update but a date has yet to be determined. We will inform the Committee of the rescheduled publication date in due course.

Future requirements

26. (Recommendation 26) We welcome the capability investigation that the MoD is sponsoring to identify the long term military requirements for UAVs and how these might be best delivered. We will wish to be kept informed of the outcome of the investigation once it is completed. (Paragraph 129)