TRAINING
73. Various schemes were deployed by the Task Force
to support people wishing to move to a new trade. The scale and
swiftness of response of the local Further Education and specialist
colleges in providing specific courses is described in the Memorandum
to us from the Association of Colleges—West Midland Region.[170]
Apart from the one day assessment courses and the training schemes
run by these providers, those wishing to set up their own businesses
had the option of support through 'enterprise awareness sessions',
the Mustard high-growth start-ups programme and one-to-one advice
on starting up an enterprise.[171]
74. In March 2006, the Task Force analysed the situation
of the 6,271 former MG Rover and supply chain employees as follows.
Of the 3,974 individuals in work on 14 February 2006, 2863 (72%)
had received no training under the Task Force schemes, but 57%
of those who had received training were in work.[172]
A further 365 people were currently in training, and another 302
were awaiting training, 230 of whom had a start date.[173]
The remaining 1630 people were classified as follows:
| Number trained but currently not working (including part trained)
| 398 |
| Number currently not working but who had not followed up training options
| 530 |
| Number who had claimed another benefit after Job Seekers Allowance
| 259 |
| All other Job Seekers Allowance claimants with no known destination
| 443 |
75. Ipsos MORI's consultees were, arguably, even more critical
about training provision than they were about advice on benefits
and job-seeking. While some were satisfied with the efforts made
to place them on relevant courses, others felt that there was
a set range of courses that did not always match their experience
or preferences, or even that there was a drive to put people into
some form of training even when it was inappropriate.[174]
These criticisms were echoed by Amicus, which suggested that people
were made to choose training too soon, while they were still in
shock over the loss of their jobs, and that there was a significant
disjunction between what was provided and what people wanted.
Moreover, the union was not impressed by the adequacy of some
of the training, which was in the form of only short-term or extension
courses despite the fact that money was supposed to be available
for up to twelve months of training. (The Association of Colleges—West
Midlands Region represented the brevity of the courses in a more
favourable light, suggesting that, since the MG Rover workers
benefited from a relaxation of the rules on paying benefits to
people training for more than a limited number of hours per week,
individuals were "able to complete training programmes in
an intensive 13 week period rather than the usual 12 months"
so that they could move into employment more quickly.[175])
Finally, Amicus said that the funding was running out in May 2006
even though some people had been able to take only introductory
courses and others were likely to be left without funding despite
the fact they had not completed their course. Amicus noted that
the training package at that time was underspent by £5 million.[176]
Richard Burden denied that money was running out, saying funding
for training was still available in the financial year 2006-07,
although, he explained, there might not be the same degree of
financial support for individuals who had already had their full
entitlement.[177]
76. Richard Burden pointed out the difficulties in
providing the right type of training for the right numbers in
a short period and at very short notice. He noted that initial
support was given fast, but training providers were faced with
a lot of people wanting to retrain as plumbers, or for other construction
trades, or as driving instructors. It was difficult to identify
enough existing courses or to set up sufficient new ones to meet
people's requests, especially as the Learning and Skills Council
was trying to ensure the quality of all the training provided;
and even when the providers did meet demand for training, it was
not possible to guarantee that those trained could find a job
immediately, as a sudden influx of newly qualified people could
flood the local market. He noted also that it was not always wise
for those who had no working experience except as employees to
become self-employed, but it was difficult to give good advice
tactfully when someone was set on doing this. All this, he conceded,
led to frustration among those who had lost their jobs.[178]
Lessons for the future
77. Our witnesses praised the way the Task Force
had brought together all the relevant departments and agencies
and the fact that support operations had started so swiftly.[179]
Special praise was given to Advantage West Midlands for its co-ordinating
role.[180] Given the
magnitude of the problem and the need for a very fast response,
the organisations involved coped very well, but, unsurprisingly,
not everything went smoothly and there are lessons to be learned.
78. The NAO's report made recommendations on a
number of issues, including the need for those providing training
and employment advice to take into account the experience and
requirements of all staff employed (managerial, unskilled, shopfloor,
technical, office and support) and not to concentrate on one section
(in the case of MG Rover, on manufacturing and engineering staff)
rather than the others; and the need to ensure that the support
and information provided on training and employment opportunities
is "made available at a time and is delivered in a manner
which is most beneficial to the recipients". We endorse these
recommendations. The NAO noted two further areas in which
the Task Force had set a standard to be followed: efforts to capture
information on the employment later gained by those made redundant,
in order to measure the effectiveness of the support given; and
the removal of barriers to completing training quickly to release
people for new jobs—in the case of MG Rover, by means of
an agreement between the Learning and Skills Council and Jobcentre
Plus which enabled benefit recipients to attend a wide range of
intensive work-based courses.[181]
79. Our witnesses suggested a number of improvements
that could be made in the event of a similar Task Force having
to be constructed in future. Richard Burden, among others, emphasised
the long-term nature of the problems arising from such a large
number of redundancies in an area heavily dependent on one industry.
He noted the continuing attempts by the local authority and Regional
Development Agency to encourage diversification in the local economy,
including the possibility of creating a technology park on the
Longbridge site, and a vocational centre for 14-19 year olds.
However, he felt that it was going to be particularly difficult
to get those still unemployed back to work. He suggested that
they required more personalised help and that because the ramifications
of the collapse extended beyond the immediate workforce, the agencies
should bear in mind the need to raise skills and aspirations in
the general community. As a result, he welcomed the new intensive
personalised Employment Support Package which the Task Force was
putting in place.[182]
He noted with approval the pilot projects elsewhere in the country,
such as the working neighbourhood projects, which targeted funds
on areas with long-term employment problems so that agencies
had more scope to tailor their support to the need of individuals.[183]
80. As a result of these long-term needs, Richard
Burden would have liked to see an extension to the life of the
Task Force, which he thought should reconvene to carry out a review
of the situation every six months.[184]
However, the Task Force decided to evolve into a smaller group
of core agencies, a Task Force Executive Sub-Group, meeting approximately
every three months to provide co-ordination for continuing inter-agency
work relating to MG Rover.[185]
81. On specific problems that might limit the effectiveness
of future Task Forces, we were told that further measures should
be taken to ensure supply chain companies knew about the help
available; the Government should look at relaxing the rules limiting
employment benefit recipients from undertaking more than 16 hours
training a week and the 28 Day Rule[186]
(though this was done at Longbridge, it was achieved as a result
of the local agreement mentioned by the NAO); the Government should
adopt a more systematic approach to the questions of VAT recovery
and deferrals; there was a need to address the 'join' between
benefit regulations and matters such as payment in lieu (workers
entitled to payment in lieu had to wait three months until the
state paid just in case MG Rover made the payment, and there were
difficulties over possible loss of benefits if payment was made
earlier); and there had been a lack of clarity over whether Rover
pensions would be covered by the Pensions Protection Fund (the
Government decided that they would be).[187]
82. We asked PSA and GM whether the experience of
the MG Rover Task Force was contributing to the way in which the
job losses that they had announced were being handled. GM said
that it had done a lot of work with the North West Development
Agency on an appropriate transition programme and other assistance,
and that it was receiving good collaboration from local and national
public bodies. GM also said that it had been encouraged by the
number of local employers contacting the plant because they were
interested in recruiting workers from it.[188]
PSA had established a resource centre at Ryton to help people
look for work. Jobcentre Plus, the Learning and Skills Council,
Coventry Partnership and Advantage West Midlands all had representatives
on site to give advice. A number of companies were interviewing
Ryton employees on site, and the company was finding alternative
employment within PSA, in the UK and abroad, for staff who wanted
this. PSA was also providing training opportunities for more
than 1,000 employees: the Learning and Skills Council was interviewing
them all to ascertain their training needs, and by June 2006 the
company had already approved training courses for over 700 people.[189]
83. Advantage West Midlands said:
"Throughout the last twelve months, we have
seen the West Midlands region at its best. Advantage West Midlands,
Accelerate and Birmingham Chamber of Commerce, Jobcentre Plus,
Learning and Skills Council, Birmingham City Council, other Local
Authorities, the Unions, community groups, industry bodies, politicians,
and many more organisations and individuals, from both the public
and private sector, have come together as the MG Rover Task Force
to develop solutions and deal with an industrial collapse exceptional
in scale and suddenness."[190]
While recognising the very good work done in many
areas, there were difficulties of co-ordination and in providing
enough of the right type of support, so we cannot fully endorse
Advantage West Midlands's boast.
84. On balance, the Task Force was a success,
though, as with most disaster management, a number of areas—in
particular, training provision—could have been improved
if more time had been available. Useful lessons have been learned
in how to address large-scale redundancies in future, and we detected
that the relevant public bodies and PSA and GM appeared to have
absorbed some of them in their longer-planned approach to the
job losses at Ryton and Ellesmere Port. We look forward to hearing
from the Government how it intends to address the specific weaknesses
raised by our witnesses, especially those resulting from conflicts
between training and benefit policies, such as the 16 hour rule.
136 A comprehensive account, upon which much of this
chapter is based, is given in the National Audit Office Report,
The closure of MG Rover, Session 2005-06, HC 961, published
on 10 March 2006 (hereafter 'NAO Report') Back
137
For the exact nature of financial support provided by BMW, see
NAO Report, para 1.3 Back
138
Qq 187-199 of the oral evidence printed with the Committee's Eighth
Report of Session 2003-04, UK Automotive Industry in 2004. Back
139
For more detail on this group, see NAO Report, paras 3.2-3.5 Back
140
Ibid., paras 3.1-3.43 Back
141
By further contributions of £10 million each from Birmingham
City Council and Advantage West Midlands: See Annex 1 to Appendix
1 (AWM). EU support formed part of the package. Back
142
For details, see NAO Report, paras 3.6-3.8 Back
143
Para 3.9 Back
144
More detail is given in the NAO Report, paras 3.10-3.29 See also
Appendix 8, para 34 (DTI) and Appendix 1, paras 3.3-3.7 (AWM) Back
145
NAO Report, para 3.32 Back
146
Ibid., para 3.33 Back
147
Ibid., paras 3.35-3.36 Back
148
Ibid., para 3.37 Back
149
Regeneris Consulting, Closure of MG Rover: Economic Impact Assessment
- Interim Report, July 2005, available on http://www.advantagewm.co.uk/rover-response.html;
cited in NAO Report, para 3.37 Back
150
Appendix 1, para 4.6 (AWM) Back
151
MG Rover Task Force Final Update Report: The Work goes on,
page 10, available on http://www.advantagewm.co.uk/rover-response.html Back
152
Q 33 and Appendix 4, para 8.7 According to press reports, a February
2007 survey of 1750 former MG Rover employees who were Amicus
members showed that 23% were still unemployed or on training
courses: 'A quarter of Rover workers still unemployed', The
Guardian, 5 February 2007, p24 Back
153
Q 104 The T&G gave us oral evidence in June 2006 Back
154
Life after MG Rover: the impact of the closure on the workers,
their families and the community, 2006, published on http://www.theworkfoundation.com/Assets/PDFs/MGRover.pdf Back
155
See 'Ex-Rover staff take pay cut of £3,500', Daily Telegraph,
29 March 2006; and 'T&G reveals former Rover workers forced
into low-paid "McJobs"', Morning Star, 28 March
2006; 'Life after Longbridge', The Guardian, 26 April 2006 Back
156
Not all the redundant workers made claims. Back
157
Q 42 Back
158
The date of its second memorandum to us Back
159
Appendix 2, para 2.1 Back
160
Ibid. Back
161
Q 46 and Appendix 6, para 32 Back
162
Q 51 Back
163
Appendix 1, para 4.5 (AWM) Back
164
For speed of processing, see Appendix 1, para 4.3 (AWM) Back
165
NAO Report, paras 3.14-3.15 Back
166
Ibid., para 3.19 Back
167
Q 14 Back
168
Q 31 Back
169
Q 51 It is described in more detail in Appendix 17 (Skills4Auto) Back
170
Appendix 5, paras 5-10 Back
171
Appendix 1, para 4.5 (AWM) Back
172
1111 out of the 1946 who had been trained Back
173
MG Rover Task Force Final Update Report, page 11 Back
174
NAO Report, para 3.25 Back
175
Appendix 5, para 5 Back
176
Qq 14, 31 and 34 Back
177
Qq 50-51 Back
178
Q 49 Back
179
Q 103 (T&G) See the list of actions over the first three weeks
of the Task Force in Appendix 1, paras 3.3-3.6 Back
180
Appendix 3, para 8 (Amicus); Appendix 19 (T&G) Back
181
NAO Report, pp 13-14 Back
182
Appendix 6, para 31; Appendix 1, para 4.5, 6.2-6.3 and 7.2 (AWM) Back
183
Qq 46-48 and 57 Back
184
Q 56 Back
185
MG Rover Task Force Final Update Report, page 17 Back
186
Any temporary return to work for a period of more than 28 days
bars the redundant worker from receiving a training allowance.
As Advantage West Midlands says, "This is a disincentive
to take temporary work while waiting for vocational training":
Appendix 1, para 1.11 Back
187
Qq 53 and 55 and Appendix 6, addendum (Richard Burden) Back
188
Qq 156-157 Back
189
Qq 266-267 and 271-274 Back
190
Appendix 1, para 4.1 Back
