Monitoring of imports
305. For the first time this year we raised with
the Government the controls on imports of weapons into the UK.
Our concerns focussed on the large volume of assault rifles which
came into the UK from the former Yugoslavia. The DTI's (now the
Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform's) Import
Licensing Branch issues licences for the import of firearms and
ammunition and the Government explained that import licences were
only granted to those with domestic authority to possess firearms
under the Firearms Act 1968, as amended, and that the import licensing
regime backed up domestic controls on firearms possession, which
were the responsibility of the Home Office.[412]
306. Between 2003 and 2005 import licences which
specifically referred to assault rifles were issued as follows:
2003 — 40 licences covering 6,220 assault rifles;
2004 — 16 licences covering 226 assault rifles;
and
2005 — 40 licences covering 194,659 assault
rifles.
During the same three years, the ECO issued Standard
Individual Exports Licences (SIELs) covering assault rifles as
follows:
2003 — 43 SIELs allowing the export of 1,202
assault rifles;
2004 — 47 SIELs allowing the export of 2,205
assault rifles; and
2005 — 56 SIELs covering 2,502 assault rifles.
307. In addition, the Export Control Organisation
also granted six Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs) during
this period for the export of broad categories of weapons which
could include assault rifles. The Government explained that one
of these was a temporary OIEL for film production purposes and
that the remaining five were for exports to countries with rigorous
firearm control regimes.[413]
As OIELs are not normally quantity limited it was not possible
for the Government to state precisely how many assault rifles
(if any) had been exported under cover of these OIELs. The Government
assured us, however, that, before any OIEL was granted, a range
of factors were taken into account, including the items to be
exported, the destinations, the Consolidated EU and National Arms
Export Licensing Criteria, and that the exporter had the relevant
authorisations to hold firearms in the UK. It added that the ECO
also carried out regular audits of OIEL holders to ensure that
they were complying with the OIELs and any particular conditions
applied to them.[414]
308. More specifically on 20,000 assault rifles imported
from Bosnia in May/June 2005 the Government assured us that the
import procedures had been fully complied with and that checks
had been carried out. It pointed out that the removal of weapons
from the former Yugoslavia had been an agreed objective of both
NATO and the UN, which was fully supported by the UK. The UN Development
Programme has been active in running a programme for the destruction
or removal of weapons from the former Yugoslavia, and NATO had
also played its part in arms reduction in the region.[415]
309. We asked HMRC about the checks made on imports.
It told us that:
There is a 100% check on commercial imports of
firearms […] Officers have some discretion over how they
execute that. If they regard the importer as a well known, regular
shipper through their port, they may confine that to a documentary
check, but they have the discretion to physically examine the
goods and to count them. Supplementing that we have a small team
of officers who work throughout the UK called Firearms and Explosives
Officers whose job is to audit the books of registered firearms
dealers with particular regard to declared imports. We have the
frontier control backed up by a deeper audit that takes place
of all registered firearms dealers, registered to hold section
five firearms, which is exactly what these assault rifles would
be. They undertake a number of audit checks. They check that all
imported goods have been entered into the firearms register.[416]
310. While we took some comfort from the evidence
supplied by the Government, no comprehensive account of the 200,000
assault rifles that were imported between 2003 and 2005 was provided.
Our concerns focus on two issues. First, to be told by that Government
that "the purpose of the DTI's import controls on firearms
is to provide a back up for domestic controls on possession"
concerns us. It appears that in contrast to the export regime,
the import licensing regime may contain little scrutiny and cross-departmental
checking and that licences are issued largely as a matter of course
to registered firearms dealers. Given the volume of assault weapons
coming into the country we consider that there must be adequate
monitoring arrangements to ensure none of these weapons leak onto
the streets of the UK and that, if they are part of a weapons
destruction programme, they are made unusable. Second, if imported
weapons are re-exported they pass through two separate sets of
controls each operated by the DTI and HMRC: import and export
controls operated by HMRC at the ports of entry and export; and
a requirement for import and export licences from the DTI (now
the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform).
HMRC explained to us that it was not "counting […] out"
the imports.[417] We
saw no clear evidence that the functions within the respective
departments joined up to track the assault rifles or that these
departments worked closely together, or with the Home Office,
to monitor these large volume of assault weapons. We recommend
that the Government improve the arrangements for monitoring and
controlling large volumes of weapons that enter the UK for destruction
or re-export. In addition, we recommend that the Government provide
a full account of the 200,000 assault rifles that were imported
into the UK from the former Yugoslavia between 2003 and 2005,
explaining how many were made unusable and how many were re-exported.
Defence attachés
311. Following press and other reports we raised
the possibility of reductions in the numbers of defence attachés
with the then Foreign Secretary. She replied: "I am sure
everybody realises, it is going to be a stretching public spending
round and in the FCO we have to look very carefully at what are
going to be very limited resources and make the best possible
use we can of them".[418]
She added "in our own department very much reprioritising,
beefing-up our posts in areas where we believe the challenge and
need will be greater in the future and in consequence reducing
areas where it would be enjoyable, comfortable, to continue to
maintain posts at the level we do".[419]
312. Whilst we appreciate the serious pressures on
budgets, we took little assurance from the Foreign Secretary's
response and we are concerned that UK defence attaché posts
may be cut, particularly in countries where the export of goods
and technology from the UK requires careful consideration to ensure
that they meet the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and the
National Export Licensing Criteria. In responding to our Report
last year the Government said that the UK Overseas Posts had standing
instructions to report any misuse of UK-origin defence equipment.[420]
We consider that defence attachés provide an essential
role in the assessment of applications for export licences and
also in checking on end-use. We recommend that the Government
do not cut defence attaché posts in countries where the
export of goods and technology from the UK requires careful consideration
to ensure that they meet the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports
and the National Export Licensing Criteria, and in countries where
the UK and other members of the international community are assisting
in the destruction of surplus conventional weapons and WMD materials,
or where there are concerns about the exporting of such surplus
weapons and materials.
395 SPIRE is the Export Control Organisation's new
fully electronic system for processing licence applications. When
it goes live in September 2007, it will replace all the methods
currently in use to apply for any of the licences processed by
the Export Control Organisation within the DTI - http://www.dti.gov.uk/europeandtrade/strategic-export-control/spire/index.html. Back
396
HC (2005-06) 873, para 55 Back
397
Q 33 Back
398
2007 Consultation Document, para 1.1.4 Back
399
Ev 69 Back
400
http://www.dti.gov.uk/europeandtrade/strategic-export-control/index.html
Back
401
Q 34 Back
402
Ev 57 Back
403
Ev 104, para 14 Back
404
Ev 130 Back
405
HC (2005-06) 873, para 69 Back
406
Cm 6954, p13 Back
407
Ev 137, section 4 Back
408
Ev 111, para 15 Back
409
Ev 153 Back
410
Q 145 Back
411
Q 146 Back
412
Ev 98 Back
413
Ibid. Back
414
Ibid. Back
415
Ibid. Back
416
Q 195 Back
417
Q 196 Back
418
Q 223 Back
419
Q 225 Back
420
Cm 6954, p 22 Back
