Abbreviations used in this note: PM—Sir Philip Mawer; SH—Mr Stuart Halford; GG—Mr George Galloway; FZ—Mr Fawaz Zureikat; AZ—Dr Abu Zayyad. Mr W, X, Y and Z—Identity not relevant to a conclusion on the complaint and therefore not disclosed below.

1. SH asked who else had been interviewed in the course of the inquiry. He stressed that he wanted to give his version of events, and to bring the distress caused to him and his family by his involvement in these events to an end.

2. PM explained who else had been interviewed and explained the nature of the conversation, including the implications of Parliamentary privilege.

3. PM set out the different hypotheses that could be proposed in relation to the material published in the Telegraph.[61] His job was to explore them and to try to discover the truth.

4. SH said that he felt he had been unfairly treated by the Charity Commission report,[62] which had identified him personally as having received unauthorised benefits and thereby blackened his name. He had been open with the Charity Commission and intended to be so with PM. He added that he had never considered himself as a trustee of the Appeal, which he believed, and had been advised, was a campaign rather than a charity.

5. PM said that he understood, from his reading of the Charity Commission report, that the guiding lights of the Appeal believed that it was not a charity, had received legal advice confirming that view, and had acted accordingly. Although under charity law it had been inappropriate for trustees to receive payments, those payments had been paid for services rendered in good faith.

6. SH accepted the report could be read that way, but believed he had been portrayed in a negative light and he reiterated that he had not believed, and did not believe the Appeal was a charity.

The Nature of Stuart Halford's Role in relation to the Mariam Appeal

7. PM turned to the list of questions previously sent to SH.[63] Question 1 asked about the nature of SH's role and responsibilities in relation to the Appeal.

8. SH replied that he had been director of operations. He had been GG's researcher in the House of Commons since May 1996. The Appeal had started in 1998, but had not been fully operational until 1999 when it had received money from the UAE. He had been responsible for organising the campaign, including conferences, seminars, pickets and meetings; organising campaign materials; and delegating jobs to other, mainly temporary staff when possible. When he received bills or invoices he had written cheques and sent them off to co-signatories. He was not a bookkeeper and was not experienced in keeping financial records. He said he had asked GG for bookkeeping assistance. GG had refused, but after many requests by SH, had arranged for an accountant acquaintance of GG's to look at the financial records during 2000/01. The accountant had looked over the books four or five times and had been happy with the records.

9. SH said that he had a background in campaigning and believed the Appeal was not a charity but a campaign to highlight the killing of 7,000 children every month because of the UN sanctions imposed on Iraq. GG had said that the Appeal was a campaign not a charity, and SH believed that GG should, as a former director of War on Want, know the difference. Sabah Al-Mukhtar, a lawyer who was also a trustee, should also have been in a position to know whether or not the Appeal was a charity.

10. PM understood that SH was saying that he had had no basis to believe otherwise. He asked about other staff of the Appeal.

11. SH explained that other staff were employed on a temporary basis as funds allowed. Other staff were involved in a range of activities, such as producing campaign literature, but were not close to the centre of the organisation. [Mr W] was GG's Parliamentary assistant in Glasgow. He was good at designing campaign literature and had therefore been asked to produce some of the campaign materials for the Appeal. He was also involved in constituency work.

12. [Mr X] had been on the Big Ben to Baghdad bus trip. He was a good talker and had helped at meetings handing out literature and greeting people. Neither he nor [Mr W] had been intimately involved in the overall running of the Appeal.

The Overall Direction of the Appeal

13. PM asked about who was at the core of the organisation.

14. SH said GG was the figurehead, founder and chairman. GG was in control and would give instructions. Nothing happened without his say so. SH was GG's number two, who would then delegate jobs to others. SH said that until FZ arrived, he (SH) would have discussions with GG and take away instructions.

15. PM asked whether FZ took on a strategic role after his arrival.

16. SH said that while FZ was a new presence who had assumed the chairmanship of the Appeal and become its main benefactor, GG still made the decisions regarding the work of the Appeal. SH (who continued in the status of employee) was not present at all meetings between FZ and GG but was told what was decided at those meetings and his job was to make it happen. GG was still the boss. SH had never taken direct instruction from FZ regarding the Appeal.

17. PM asked who else had had a strategic role.

18. SH said that GG had lots of friends. [Mr Y] was involved in the media strategy in connection with the bus trip to Baghdad. [Mr Y] was vice-chair of the Stop the War Coalition, but he was not on the books of the Appeal. SH said it was a loose organisation with little structure. Meetings were held and he then received instructions about what to do.

19. PM asked whether SH's responsibilities had changed over time.

20. SH said that he basically organised the campaigns under GG's direction. When money was available, other staff would be employed. As the money ran out staff left, the Appeal moved from offices in Northumberland Avenue to Borough High Street, and eventually to SH's own home. As the operation contracted, SH took on more responsibilities, along with GG's Parliamentary staff. SH confirmed that GG's parliamentary staff were involved in some aspects of the Mariam Appeal, such as organising travel and helping when things were busy(eg to get out a mass mailing of 7,000 supporters). There had been close contact with GG's office.

21. PM asked whether that work related to the implications for GG's Parliamentary commitments of Appeal activity, or related to the wider campaigning work of the Appeal itself.

22. SH said that GG's office staff did do work for the Appeal as well as Parliament. For example, some of GG's parliamentary staff were counter-signatories for the Appeal and one went on the bus trip. The office was used as an extension of the Appeal in some ways and assisted in large database mailings, but did not use Parliamentary stationery, rather the time of GG's staff.

Receipts by SH from the Appeal

23. PM asked about the second question from the letter, how much money did SH receive in payments from the Appeal.

24. SH said he had been paid a salary—initially £30,000, which had risen to £35,000 after the success of the bus trip to Baghdad. In mid-2002 GG had increased his salary to £45,000. The bus trip had increased GG's profile and standing in the Middle East. GG had said to SH that he should buy himself a vehicle for £15,000 after the bus trip. SH had also received a pension contribution of 10 per cent, in line with that he had received as a member of GG's Parliamentary staff. All of the pay increases and benefits had been suggested by GG rather than being solicited by SH. The only other payments SH had received related to office and other expenses which he had been reimbursed.

25. PM explained that from the incomplete information received from the Charity Commission, it appeared that SH had received standing order payments, presumably salary, in the order of £73,000 and in addition cheques made out to SH between October 1998 and November 2002 totalled about £45,000.

26. SH explained that he would pay for office stationery and equipment himself and be reimbursed. He was surprised that over four years the total he had received in cheques was as high as £45,000. This seemed a lot of money purely for office expenses.

27. PM suggested that he provide SH with copies of the cheques on which we had based those figures, and then SH could provide an explanation for those payments.

28. SH agreed to this suggestion and confirmed that the cheque to Hummigbird Motors was for the vehicle.

29. SH said that GG decided on all significant aspects of the Appeal's expenditure.

GG's role in relation to the Appeal

30. PM asked about the third question, on GG's role. From what SH had already said, it appeared that GG had been the guiding light of the Appeal throughout, having initially been chairman in 1998.

31. SH said that GG had been the chairman from the start until the end of 1999 or early 2000. GG had then turned round and told SH that he was chairman, but after a few weeks GG had said FZ was chairman. SH did not know the circumstances surrounding those decisions, but had simply accepted them. Throughout, whatever his nominal role, GG had clearly been in charge of the Appeal.

Fawaz Zureikat

32. SH confirmed that he had first met FZ in Cairo on the bus trip in October 1999. FZ had then accompanied the bus from Cairo to Baghdad.

33. SH explained that on the bus trip, when they arrived in a country they were met by a welcoming committee who would help smooth the way. In Morocco and Algeria the bus was accompanied by a local host and in Algeria the security services had accompanied the vehicle due to the political tensions in the country at the time. In Egypt they were also accompanied on the road much of the time. It was in Egypt that he first met FZ. FZ accompanied them on into Jordan (where he organised meetings) and then on to Iraq.

34. PM asked whether AZ had made the introduction.

35. SH did not know whether she had known FZ before.

36. PM clarified that FZ was an active participant from October 1999 and (from the information available) had become a significant donor in August 2000. SH confirmed that FZ's first involvement was in Cairo.

37. PM set out the sequence of events as already known to him. FZ's first involvement was in October 1999. GG then wrote a 'to whom it may concern' letter announcing FZ as his representative in Baghdad. According to the documents published in the Telegraph, the alleged meeting between GG, FZ and an Iraqi intelligence officer had taken place on Boxing Day 1999. FZ then became a donor to the appeal.

38. SH said he did not know about the Boxing Day meeting and that he had not been in Baghdad at Christmas 1999. He had first met FZ, and thought GG had first met FZ, on the bus trip. GG had returned to London after the bus trip but may have returned to Iraq at Christmas. PM said GG had admitted that he was in Baghdad during Christmas 1999.

39. PM asked about SH's role during his brief chairmanship. SH said that the chairmanship had not changed his role and that it was a title without foundation. A few weeks later FZ had become chairman.

40. PM asked if there had been any other chairmen. SH replied that only GG, himself and FZ had been chairmen, but that it was an empty title. Job titles bore no real relation to what people actually did. It was a campaign, with a fluid structure, and SH's focus was on the job to be done.

41. PM asked about the transfer to Jordan, in 2000, of books and records of the Appeal, when FZ had become chairman. SH said that he had no idea why the records would have been sent to Jordan, and that if they were sent they did not include any material that had been in his possession. GG had told him to get rid of the records he had of the Appeal at the end of 2002. SH did not consider any of that material to have been sensitive—it had consisted of petitions and letters of support, databases (of supporters, etc), receipts for expenditure, normal office material, information about other organisations' anti-sanctions work, bank statements (which he knew could be replaced) and so on. He would not have been given any sensitive material by GG or FZ since he did not believe that GG had fully trusted him.

42. PM asked about the records that SH had held. SH said that the records had consisted of letters, petitions, stationery and so on. He had been uncomfortable about GG's instruction that they be destroyed but at this point the records had been held in his house and he had been the sole employee of the Appeal for some time. He did what he was told and GG was not someone to argue with.

43. PM asked about the significance of the books and records which it was said had been transferred to Jordan. SH said that he had no knowledge of the records GG said he had sent to Jordan. They may have been documents GG considered sensitive. If documents were sent to FZ they did not include anything SH had held, but other documents could have been sent to FZ by GG.

44. PM asked how things had changed when FZ had taken over as chairman.

45. SH said things had been the same. GG may have found FZ a useful name and contact for organisations in the Middle East. When the Appeal was running out of money SH would notify GG. He would then tell SH donations were on the way, contact FZ directly to ask for donations or ask SH to contact FZ to ask for donations.

46. PM summarised his understanding of what SH was saying. The Appeal was a campaigning organisation, with a fluid structure where titles were not significant in the allocation of responsibility. GG was the guiding light from start to finish, even after his formal chairmanship had ceased.

47. SH confirmed this understanding. He said the titles made no difference to him. He simply carried on with his campaigning work.

Donations to the Appeal

48. SH confirmed that the Government of Abu Dhabi was the main contributor to the Appeal. They had donated around £500,000 in May 1999. That contribution had enabled the Appeal to take offices in Northumberland Avenue, and prepare for the bus trip. SH and GG had been to a symposium in Abu Dhabi paid for by the UEA Government sometime earlier, possibly in 1997. GG had made a good speech and had subsequently written asking for an audience with the Deputy Prime Minister. The audience had been granted and the donation secured after a number of trips to Abu Dhabi by GG. A contribution of £1 million had been promised. In the end it was £500,000.

49. PM asked about the contribution from the Saudi Government.

50. SH said that the Saudi contribution had been the first. He had been asked to go to GG's home where he was given a large amount in dollars to pay into the original Mariam Appeal account held at Lloyds TSB, Westminster. This donation had largely paid for the hospital bills for Mariam. There was not much left over from that contribution and hence the lobbying of the UAE. After those contributions, FZ had kept the Appeal going financially.

51. PM said that from the available records there appeared to be a later Saudi donation, made after the Abu Dhabi contribution, on 30 November 2000. SH was unaware of that donation (£20,000 from the Saudi Royal Embassy in London). He could only recollect the initial Saudi contribution, which had paid for the hospital bills. SH said he understood GG had decided after a visit to a hospital ward in Iraq in 1998 to bring Mariam back to the UK for treatment. GG had later returned from a meeting with the Saudis with cash to cover the cost of this, which was paid into the account. The £20,000 (of which he had no recollection) must clearly be a later payment.

52. PM confirmed that there were records of payments to Yorkhill NHS Trust, the Al Amal centre in Jordan and Christ's hospital. SH thought the payment to Christ's hospital may have been at the start of Mariam's treatment, when she had first arrived in the UK.

FZ's Donations

53. PM asked about FZ's contributions, which according to the records available to him had included £225,000 in August 2000 and other payments totalling £238,000, making a total of around £463,000 (although those figures were subject to confirmation).

54. SH said he thought the £350,000 mentioned in the press had sounded too high but on the figures PM had given, it appeared the contrary was the case.

55. PM said that on the information available to him, FZ appeared to be the second largest contributor. SH agreed that without FZ's donations the Appeal would have stopped once the UAE money ran out.

56. PM asked whether SH would phone FZ if money was needed. SH said he would phone or meet GG and let him know the position on the account. GG would ring or ask SH to ring FZ, who would say if and when he could donate more money.

57. SH said that he did not know FZ was an oil trader. GG had described FZ as a wealthy businessman who traded throughout the Middle East. SH said that he had heard that FZ was an oil trader only after the war. SH said he had also seen in Newsweek, of around 3rd May 2005, that Ron McKay claimed that FZ was supplying weapons to the US army or acting for a US arms manufacturer. It appeared that FZ was a businessman who did not mind which side he was on.

58. Personally FZ was a nice guy who had good contacts in the UK as well as the Middle East and had treated the Appeal staff well. SH had not known FZ was involved in Oil for Food or was trading in Oil for Food contracts. However, before the Appeal had closed, SH had begun to develop suspicions about FZ's links with the former Iraqi regime. For example, in the latter stages of the Appeal, FZ had facilitated high level meetings in Iraq where the British media were involved. At one point GG had asked SH to arrange a meeting for FZ with Dennis (the fire engine manufacturers), because FZ wanted to supply fire engines to the Iraqi Government. Only someone who had good links with the regime could have contemplated arranging such a deal. In the event, while the meeting had gone ahead, the deal had not.

59. FZ was funding Arab TV, which was run by Ron McKay. SH had himself worked for the TV station for the first 3 months of 2003. After the Appeal had ended, GG had arranged for SH to take [Mr Z] out to Iraq to interview Saddam Hussein before the war. On that trip it was clear to SH that ATV was based close to the Iraqi Ministry of Information and must have had state backing. He had himself met the Iraqi Minister of Information (subsequently known as "Comical Ali") during the trip. SH therefore concluded that FZ had very good links with the Iraqi regime. He was clearly able to arrange things at a high level in Iraq. Given all that had emerged since, SH now felt it was highly likely that the Appeal had been used by the former Iraqi regime and that FZ had been used to channel money to it.

60. SH said that he would have been surprised if GG had not known about FZ's links to the regime. He would also be surprised if GG had written the document[64] referred to by David Blair. GG would not write such a stupid document and preferred not to have any written records. PM clarified that the document being referred to was a memorandum of a meeting GG was said to have had with an Iraqi intelligence officer (the Intelligence Chief's memo.) GG had not written the document, only the letter announcing FZ as GG's representative in Iraq. He denied ever having had such a meeting.

61. SH said that GG claimed the document was a forgery. When the discovery of the documents hit the news in April 2003, Channel 4 had sent a news reporter to the same offices where the document was said to have been found. A document relating to an e-mail exchange SH had had with Denis Halliday, UN humanitarian coordinator, had been shown on TV. It had been genuine. SH therefore believed the other document could have been as well.

62. PM asked when the Appeal had folded. SH said that it had ended in December 2002 or January 2003.

63. PM asked whether he was correct in understanding that SH was saying that with hindsight, he believed the money for the Appeal from FZ came about as a result of FZ's close contacts with the Iraqi regime. SH said he believed this was highly likely.

64. PM asked whether GG was aware of this connection. SH said that GG was not a stupid man. GG met FZ lots of times. SH did not know what GG knew about FZ. However, SH had had his own suspicions about FZ. If it were true that FZ had links with the Iraqi regime, he would be very surprised if GG was unaware of this.

65. PM asked who had been the beneficiaries of the campaign. SH said that Mariam and her family had certainly been beneficiaries. GG and FZ had taken care of that. The campaign had saved her life. Her cancer was in remission but there were complications and she was now blind because it had not been possible to get the equipment necessary for her treatment in Iraq. She was mentally impaired because of that. She was, however, alive and last time SH had seen her she was happy and smiling, and learning Braille.

66. PM asked about the role of AZ. It appeared that AZ had received £41,000 between June 1999 and June 2001, in addition to cheques worth £20,000, making a total of £62,000. SH replied that she was officially the medical and scientific director of the Appeal. She had accompanied Mariam to Jordan and Baghdad. However, AZ had had little input to the Appeal. If she had attended any Appeal meetings, it was certainly only a couple throughout the entire duration of the Appeal.

67. Generally, but not always, GG asked that his expenses were made out to AZ and were sent to their joint account at the Cooperative Bank in Glasgow. SH believed that AZ would not have been aware that she was being paid all of the expenses that were actually being made out in her name.

68. PM asked whether SH still had contact with AZ. SH did not have any contact with her and thought she would be in Jordan.

69. SH confirmed the only things he still had linked to the Appeal were some photos and videos. For his part, he was content for PM to have access to any Charity Commission records about the Appeal.

62   Volume II, WE 33. Back

63   Not printed. Back

64   Volume II, WE 4. Back