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Select Committee on Standards and Privileges First Report


APPENDIX: EVIDENCE TO THE SSRB FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS AND PRIVILEGES, 21 NOVEMBER 2006

The Allowance Regime

Introduction

1. The aggregate value of allowances which Members are entitled to claim, in pursuance of their official duties, is substantially greater than the salary they receive (though more modest than the entitlements of members of the European Parliament.) It is therefore not surprising that the annual publication of details of Members' Allowance claims attracts significant press and public interest. To the extent that it is alleged that the levels of allowances that Members can and do claim are excessive, this can bear on the reputation of Members both individually and collectively. This in turn has repercussions for the esteem in which the public holds both Parliament as an institution, and the wider democratic system.

2. Criticisms of the allowances claimed by Members generally have elements of one or more of three different strands: a failure to distinguish between salary and allowances; concern that the allowance structure is unduly generous; and concern that Members are misusing the system by making unjustified claims. However, press comment in particular rarely makes clear the precise root of any concerns expressed, and there may well be a role for SSRB in making clear the damage that criticisms which lack such focus can do to public confidence generally.

3. The House itself takes a firm line with Members who misuse the allowance system, or facilities and services provided by the House to help them perform their parliamentary duties. Such misuse is an explicit breach of the Code of Conduct, and there have been a number of decided cases over the years where, misuse having been established by this Committee, the matter has been dealt with firmly by the House.

4. The Committee on Standards and Privileges is charged, amongst other responsibilities, with considering 'any matter relating to the conduct of Members'. There are three contexts in which the Committee has an interest in the structure of the allowance system, and the levels at which these are set. These are the general reputational implications for Members, referred to above; the need to maximise public confidence in the validity of these arrangements; and the need to ensure that the structure of the system is as simple as possible, both to minimise the scope for unintended errors, and to provide a clear basis for determining in particular cases whether there has been deliberate misuse.

5. In many respects, the arrangements for setting allowances resemble those used by the House to respond to complaints made against Members. In each case, there is a strong independent element in the process—in the case of complaints investigation, the role of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards; and in the case of allowances, the role of the SSRB—with the House (or, in some standards cases, this Committee) taking the final decisions. In both cases, the arrangements work best when there is congruency between the views of both components in the decision-making process. As a Committee, we believe there should be compelling reasons for the House to vote itself levels of allowance in excess of those recommended by SSRB.

6. The Chairman of the Committee on Standards and Privileges makes this submission on behalf of the Committee. It is an institutional view, without prejudice to any views individual Members may wish to express in a personal submission in response to the SSRB invitation to Members generally.

The Underlying Problems

7. Members are office holders, not employees, and have a right to be reimbursed reasonable expenses necessarily incurred in performing the duties of their office. There is no reason in principle why they should subsidise these from their parliamentary salaries, and no one should be deterred from seeking election or be unable to look after their constituents because they are obliged to meet, from their own pockets, expenses properly incurred in this respect.

8. However, one enduring difficulty with the ongoing debate over allowances is that the important differences in the character of the various elements which make up the overall structure tend to be overlooked. Provision must be made to cover costs tangibly related to Members' performance of their parliamentary duties, such as the cost of staff, constituency office accommodation, stationery, equipment and communications costs. Many of these, while technically constituting 'allowances' are met direct by the House authorities, with Members having only limited control over the figures. Others fall within the scope of the Incidental Expenses Provision (IEP), over which Members have much more control. There are also allowances which relate to Members' personal costs, such as those associated with the need to spend time away from 'home', (for the most part covered by the Additional Costs Allowance (ACA)) and travel costs between Westminster and constituency. It is unfortunate that public comment, particularly comment in the context of the differences between Members in the levels of allowances claimed, rarely brings out these critical differences.

9. It is sometimes asserted that, in the past, the allowance system has been used as a conduit for the Government of the day to avoid politically inconvenient levels of increase in Member' pay, thus blurring the distinction between salary and allowances; and there are concerns that the allowance regime may in practice be subsidising party political activity. Taken together, these fuel concerns in some quarters that the scale and scope of the available allowances goes beyond that strictly needed by Members to meet costs necessarily incurred in discharging their parliamentary duties.

10. We hope the SSRB will propose a regime which is both fair to members, and to their constituents who have to pay for the allowances under review. We make some specific suggestions.

11. The ACA should cover what its name implies—additional costs necessarily incurred by Members as a result of having to live, for the most part, in two places. Anything else tends to undermine its non-taxable basis. Greater clarity in what it is intended to cover, and how the figure is determined, might build public confidence. It might also be sensible to recognise that public confidence will be enhanced if the allowance is seen as taut.

12. The allowance should also be structured in such a way that it is not possible for Members to arrange their affairs so as to maximise their claims at the expense of personal outgoings, and in particular to avoid costs which constituents in similar circumstances could not avoid. Within the context of an allowance system common to all Members, there should nonetheless be an overarching presumption that every Member, including Ministers and office holders, should in practice meet from their own resources what amounts to the full reasonable costs normally associated with a principal domestic residence.

13. One component of the ACA is the claim for additional food costs. Living away from home almost inevitably means higher food costs, but the element chargeable to public funds ought to be proportionate. This is an area where comparison with practice elsewhere would be possible and might be beneficial.

14. It is important, though, that the system is at the same time kept as simple for Members as possible. Again, reference to best practice elsewhere would be helpful, over matters such as the level at which receipts or other relevant documentary validation should routinely be provided in support of claims.

15. Members' expenses are always likely to prove controversial in some quarters, and the level of allowances, like Members' salaries, will inevitably remain a matter of public debate. Independent involvement in determining fair levels for these, which balance Members' rights to reasonable levels of reimbursement of the costs of their office with taxpayers' expectations that public funds should not be used to facilitate private benefit, is a key element in maximising public confidence in this area where the natural sensitivity is compounded by Members ultimately being judge and jury in a matter in which they have a direct personal interest.

21 November 2006


 
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Prepared 21 February 2007