Question 1:   What progress has been made on developing a headline figure for all counter-terrorism expenditure; and what has such expenditure been in each of the last three years?

  The 2004 Spending Review White Paper (chart 6.1) showed the growth in CT and resilience spending since 2001-02 with annual planned expenditure rising to £2 billion by 2007-08. In this paper it was acknowledged that this money was within departmental budgets and subject to final internal departmental allocations. This money is not necessarily provided for specific projects and is in some cases, integrated into other law enforcement (especially policing) and security expenditure, so departments do not as a matter of course break down their outturn to identify these costs.

As spending in this area remains a priority, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced in his RUSI speech on 13 February 2006 and reiterated in the 2006 Budget Report that there would be a review of the strategic allocation of counter-terrorism resources across government.

Question 2:   What progress has been made in developing a co-ordinated programme of counter-terrorism research; how much has been committed to this programme?

  To co-ordinate counter-terrorism research across Government, the CONTEST Research Analysis and Development (RAD) Working Group was formed as part of the streamlining of the Cabinet committee structure dealing with counter-terrorism, following the May 2005 election. Its remit is to support the CONTEST strategy with a focussed and prioritised research, analysis and development work programme.

  The Working Group is working towards creating a single, joined-up programme of counter-terrorism research across Government. This single programme will ensure that there is no duplication of effort across Government and that counter-terrorism research is informed by a common understanding of research requirements. Due to the wide range of issues which counter-terrorism research covers this programme will be managed though separate Departments.

Question 3:   What role will the new Counter-Terrorism Science and Technology Centre play in managing the research programme; what links will it have with Government Departments and the Research Councils; where will it be based; and what will be its budget?

  The MOD Counter Terrorism Science & Technology Centre (CT Centre) has been created to manage MOD's counter-terrorism research and any research conducted by MOD on behalf of another Government Department if requested. The CT Centre will be a centre of expertise which will be available to other Government Departments for the commissioning of research from MOD and other research organisations.

  It will promote innovation, problem solving and analysis in order to deliver technical solutions to the challenges of terrorism. The CT Centre will ensure that the best available science underpins MOD's and more broadly the Government's response to terrorism.

  The Centre will provide a gateway for Government Departments and other Governments wishing to access any of MOD's science and technology capability that is relevant and applicable to counter-terrorism. It will develop close relationships with the Research Councils, other academic institutions and industry in order to access the best UK S&T that is available.

  Ministers have approved an initial £5M to establish the centre.

Question 4:   What provision has been made for large scale vaccine manufacturing since 2004; and what further steps are planned to develop this capacity?

  To develop the manufacture of orphan products (products for rare diseases which are financially disadvantageous for pharmaceutical companies to develop), the Department of Health is bringing together an expert group from industry and vaccine development to advise on the feasibility of such capacity being developed outside of the conventional vaccine pharmaceutical companies.

  For pandemic influenza vaccine, the Department of Health is in frequent contact with the manufacturers and has met all of them to discuss their current manufacturing capacity, as well as their proposed future capacity. There have also been numerous discussions about antigen-sparing strategies that would further increase the availability of effective immune responses to the capacity defined quantities of vaccine that will be available.

  For other routine vaccines, manufacturing capacity from the commercial sector meets requirements, and the UK has not faced significant vaccine shortages.

Question 5:   How has the integration of surveillance information, including NHS Direct data, been implemented?

  The integration of surveillance data takes place through a variety of mechanisms. Cross-Government working has been strengthened through the appointment of a Medical Officer to the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre and the establishment of close working links between the Health Protection Agency (HPA), the Anti-terrorist Branch of the Metropolitan Police and the Medical Intelligence Team at the Ministry of Defence. The HPA Primary Care Surveillance Unit produces daily feeds of call data from NHS Direct, analysis of the data for any abnormal trends and weekly summary reports. Alerts are issued if any abnormal trends are identified that cannot be explained by further investigation. HPA facilitates a weekly "communicable diseases" teleconference which has participation from NHS Direct and a number of government departments and agencies. The agenda also covers other incidents and wider abnormal occurrences.

  This is all in addition to routine HPA surveillance systems for infectious diseases and the HPA monthly CBRN report.

Question 6:   What progress has been made on the development of capabilities to monitor CBRN threats on transport infrastructure, with particular reference to the US PROACT system?

  Please refer to the accompanying RESTRICTED response.

Question 7:   What steps have been taken since 2004 to improve the dissemination of counter-terrorism advice to companies regarded as part of the critical national infrastructure?

  Please refer to the accompanying RESTRICTED response.

Question 8:   What progress has been made in developing standardised vetting or screening arrangements for workers in high risk sectors or at high risk facilities?

  Please refer to the accompanying RESTRICTED response.

Question 9:   What proportion of NHS A&E Departments has been provided with radiation monitors and what proportion of ambulance crews has been supplied with personal radiation dosimeters? What further detection equipment is planned for medical services?

  Ambulance Paramedics and Technicians have been issued with Electronic Personal Dosimeters which are primarily used as an alert to the presence of ionising radiation.

  All Type One and Type Three Emergency Departments have been issued with two RAM GENE radiation monitors. Spare units have also been given to trusts to be strategically located by the trusts themselves. These units are for use by casualty staff as a decision-making tool.

  The Department of Health are now looking into other potential locations for radiation detectors.

Question 10:   What proportion of front line fire and rescue vehicles has been supplied with chemical and biological detection equipment; and what further procurement is planned?

  The New Dimension Programme is delivering a national capability for CBRN incidents to the Fire and Rescue Services (FRS).

  There has been no chemical detection equipment or biological identification equipment issued to front line fire appliances under the New Dimension Programme.

  Radiation detection equipment has been issued to every FRS in England and Wales on the Incident Response Units (IRU) provided for Mass Decontamination of the public. Each IRU has been equipped with three Rados 200 Radiation Survey Meters and 50 Electronic Personal Dosimeters. There are 72 IRUs across England and Wales (with 10 in London).

  We plan to provide every full-time front-line fire engine (pump) with a Rados 200 Radiation Survey Meter this year.

  We will also be providing a suite of chemical and radiation detection and identification equipment and biological identification equipment to the FRS at 17 strategic locations across England (Wales will provide one of their own). This equipment will be fixed on bespoke vehicles and available 24 hours a day. The roll-out of this capability will commence on 14 August 2006 and be completed by the end of October 2006.

Question 11:   What large scale counter-terrorist exercises have been held since January 2004? How are the lessons of recent international terrorist attacks being assimilated in UK planning?

  Please refer to the accompanying RESTRICTED response.

Question 12:   What was the result of the Government's review of the range of organisms included in the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001?

  Since the drafting of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCS Act) it has become apparent that terrorist scenarios could involve more agents than currently listed in schedule 5. The current schedule 5 is a "classical" list of agents from state biological warfare programmes produced by the "Australia Group".

  This list has been revisited by a cross Government group with the aim of placing it more squarely within the current UK context. This process has involved staff from the Health & Safety Executive (HSE), the Defence Science & Technology Laboratory (DSTL) at Porton Down, the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), the Health Protection Agency (HPA), and the Security Service.

  In identifying which pathogens were of concern from the terrorist perspective a number of criteria were used including:

—  the extent to which the UK population is vulnerable to infection by the pathogen;

—  how infectious the pathogen is when spread by the airborne route or through contamination of food or water supplies;

—  the extent to which the disease caused by the pathogen is transmitted from person-to-person;

—  the availability of measures such as vaccines, to deal with potential incidents;

—  the severity and duration of illness caused by the pathogen, including the availability of treatment;

—  how long the pathogen is able to survive in the environment; and

—  how easy it is to grow, and store, the pathogen.

  Under the ATCS Act, the Secretary of State may modify, by Order, any provision in Schedule 5 if satisfied that the substance could be used in an act of terrorism to endanger life or cause serious harm to human health. The Secretary of State may also extend, by Order, the legislation to cover animal pathogens if satisfied that they could be used in an act of terrorism to cause widespread damage to property, significant disruption or alarm to the public.

  A new list of biological agents has consequently been drawn up extending beyond the existing schedule 5 and it is also intended that the legislation will be extended to cover animal pathogens in response to concerns raised by DEFRA. This offers a more comprehensive and meaningful coverage of substances that could be used in acts of terrorism. The revised list has been independently validated.

  The intention is to lay the draft Orders as soon as possible.

Question 13:   What were the results of the review of the Voluntary Vetting Scheme, and how have these been disseminated?

  We are planning to announce and implement a new scheme to replace the Voluntary Vetting Scheme later this year.

Question 14:   What progress has been made on securing international support for the Government Chief Scientific Adviser's good practice guidelines for scientists, "Rigour, respect and responsibility"; and when will the conclusions of the current cross-Government pilot scheme will be announced?

  Following the December 2004 Carnegie meeting, Sir David King wrote to members of the Carnegie Group in March 2005 enclosing the final text of "Rigour, Respect and Responsibility: A Universal Ethical Code for Scientists". In his letter, Sir David pointed also to the pilot among UK Government scientists. The results of this pilot are due to be announced in the autumn. Once the pilot is complete OSI will develop an action plan for implementing the code across Government science and into the wider science, engineering and technology community, and roll this out from the autumn onwards.

  Recipients of the letter included:

—  European Commission: Commissioner for Research and Head of Unit, Ethics in Science and Research.

—  USA: Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy and Director of the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

—  Japan: Council for Science and Technology Policy.

—  Russia: Minister for Science and Innovation.

—  Italy: Minister for Education, Universities and Research.

—  Canada: National Science Advisor.

—  Germany: Federal Research and education Minister.

—  France: Minister for Research and Minister for European Affairs.

  In June 2005 Sir David King also explained and advocated his code to the Meeting of Experts of the States Party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention where it generated a good deal of discussion and the response was generally positive.

Question 15:   What steps have been taken to ensure that university staff are fully aware of the implications of the relevant provisions of the Export Control Act 2002?

  The Export Control Act and its secondary legislation are now in their third year of operation. Specific provision was made for academic interaction under Section 8 of the Act. The Government has throughout sought to balance regulation with the needs of UK businesses and other stakeholders such as academia.

  The Government has engaged with representatives of academia prior to, during and post implementation of the Export Control Act 2002. The Government has also provided tailored guidance for academics which is available through DTI Export Control Organisation's (DTI ECO) website at http://www.dti.gov.uk/europeandtrade/strategic-export-control/legislation/export-control-act-2002/eca-2002-guidance/page10964.html. Representatives of Universities UK and the Royal Society attend meetings of the DTI ECO chaired "Export Control Advisory Committee" (ECAC). ECAC was set up to allow for a structured dialogue with representatives of industry, academia and others who are subject to the strategic export control regulations administered by DTI ECO.

  A post-implementation review, pursuant to Cabinet Office guidelines, of the Act, is scheduled for 2007.

July 2006