1.  REASONS FOR THIS EXTRA MATERIAL

  This provides some personal history on the Strategic Reviews of NIMR carried out by the MRC that the committee might want to have, although much of it has been discussed by the Select Committee in its earlier hearing on NIMR. The subcommittee will realise that the decision to review, with the intention of moving, and in FIS reducing as well, a large and most successful institute was massive in consequence and practicalities. This history I hope is relevant because it explains how the reviews were so destabilising to a staff committed to the MRC and NIMR and why, given the unfolding of the process, it was imperative to be more sensitive to the concerns of the staff.

  The details underline the need for consistency, transparency and proper representation of institutes in Council decisions. They also demonstrate that in making an inflexible decision before the practicalities had been addressed, let alone resolved, the decisions and strategies were infinitely more complex and emotionally loaded. Decisions of this substance cannot be taken lightly and must be credible to the staff concerned and to the larger community.

  I have come to the conclusion that the RC's and their staff need a mechanism for resolving differences. This need in the MRC has been crystallised for me by the absence of representation on the Council. In addition the corporate structure now employed by MRC and the other RCs means, as I have seen, that the Chairman and the CEO dance to the same tune—with an unrepresentative Council this is highly unsatisfactory.

2.  FORWARD INVESTMENT STRATEGY—FIS

  The first approach from MRC to NIMR to have a review that I was aware of was made in early 2003 on the basis of the need to renew the building. This revealed that the MRC was intending to review the NIMR but that it was seriously ill-informed on the building which did not need replacement.

  Finally, after some hiccoughs new reasons for review were developed such as the retirement of the Director, the inadequacy of the site, the FIS review was extended to a strategic character. This second approach included first the NIMR, LMB, CRC and then the Mary Lyon Centre at Harwell. The proposals made for the LMB, CRC and Harwell, were not wholly new and raised few issues.

  The device by the MRC to include the other institutes was used one presumes to give an impression of strategic character to the review. The NIMR felt the review was aimed at them and although denied, I think it probably was.

  The proposals for NIMR were radical: to move the NIMR to Cambridge and be halved in size. They were unanimously endorsed by the Council.

  However they were seen to be both uninformed and inappropriate (See Select Committee 2004). They were overwhelmingly rejected by the community in the subsequent consultation exercise (See Consultant's report 2004) though to read the MRC response this is not obvious. According to the independent analyst, out of 932 respondents 883 expressed "grave concern". All of this had an understandably seismic affect on the NIMR—and on me personally. The relations with MRC were more than soured, they were dreadfully damaged. Worst, confidence was lost and communication became very difficult.

  Ironically at this period NIMR was in really good mettle and still implementing the increased funding awarded by the highly supportive report from the 2000 quinquennial review. The FIS recommendation to move and to reduce the NIMR to half seemed to me a clear comment on the value that MRC attached to the scientific value (and quality) of the research at NIMR and I am afraid, of its normal review procedures.

  In its defence of the FIS exercise and conclusions the MRC has claimed that the 2000 review did not address the larger strategies. In the MRC view the comment from the 2000 review: "it is of paramount importance that the integrity of the institute be preserved" was taken out of context and was not relevant to MRC strategy. The context however concerned the NIMR management structure and in my view the extract is completely relevant to the institute's future and to the FIS decisions. It seemed to me a pity that the MRC did not seem to appreciate the compliment it and the NIMR were being paid by this remark from the review committee.

  The meeting held with the MRC Head Office, and various discussions, during the FIS exercise were disappointing. It emerged for me that insufficient thought and very poor judgement had been exercised, especially on the finances. Our concerns were shared by the Select Committee on Science and Technology Fourth Report (NIMR).

  See below:

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

  1.  The reasons for taking a long term look at the direction and viability of NIMR at Mill Hill were not presented in a coherent or convincing way to NIMR staff or the wider community. The initial proposal for the FIS review made no reference to the simultaneous strategic science review. MRC was right to broaden any initial focus on NIMR to include other facilities, but the consequence was that management at NIMR gained the impression that the focus was really on Mill Hill and, rightly or wrongly, confidence in the ensuing process of review was damaged at the outset. (Paragraph 18)

  2.  We were told by members of the committee on the Forward Investment Strategy that their work was "not about money" and yet cost was one of the two reasons given for its conclusions. It is regrettable that confusion over the justification for the conclusions of the FIS review was allowed to develop. (Paragraph 24)

3.  THE TASK FORCE

  The speed with which the MRC established the Task Force to continue its review of the NIMR was remarkable and rang alarm bells for me. What was needed above all was discussion with NIMR about its future. I sensed, possibly wrongly, that there was frustration in MRC about the NIMR's reluctance to accept its orders—for that is what they seemed. Possibly the walkout by Heads of Divisions from the original meeting with MRC Head Office staff had something to do with MRC attitudes.

There were mistakes in the Task Force arrangements.

(i)  To have the MRC's CEO as the Chair with, as it turned out, a casting vote, was one. It certainly put extra tensions on MRC employed staff on the Task Force and in principle presented a conflict of interest. In saying this I am aware that the CEO has been complimented for the way he handled many of the issues.

(ii)  The extensive involvement of consultants meant that there was no direct contact with the MRC and NIMR staff.

(iii)  The sidelining of the present Director from the Task Force and its discussions. This was doubly disappointing since an undertaking had been given that he could attend when issues to do with the new Director were not on the agenda. By so marginalising him from appropriate deliberations the Task Force lost priceless insight and the confidence of NIMR staff in the process was reduced significantly. The explanations for this volte-face were then, and remain, utterly unconvincing.

  Marginalising John Skehel from appropriate deliberations by the MRC was a poor management decision, betraying I think a lack of confidence. The explanations for this volte-face were then, and remain, utterly unconvincing to the NIMR staff. Unfortunately the report by the Select Committee [See below para 64] states that Sir John Skehel's attending all Task Force meetings is wrong. He attended only one. Furthermore, the reason for his exclusion—issues to do with the new Director—was I understand barely discussed.

[64.  Mill Hill representatives were given the opportunity to present their case to the Task Force. Sir John Skehel, after initially seeking to serve on the Task Force himself, had his request to attend the parts of meetings not relevant to the appointment of his successor granted, and he attended most of its meetings.]

(iv)  The relentless speed with which the exercise was conducted also alarmed me. The extensive use of consultants and the sidelining of the Director from meetings, gave a poor impression. Those who make decisions should face consequences. Finally the consultants, I understand, too often provided inaccurate figures, eg the bibliometric analyses, and/or inadequate data.

(v)  The key recommendation of the Task Force was to move the NIMR, intact and enhanced, to central London in order to catalyse translational research. It was unanimously endorsed by Council. I for one took the Task Force recommendation the endorsement by Council as gratifying.

  However there were still problems that were soon recognised, namely the cost of relocation and the issues of animal housing and category 4 in central London. Moreover, the Task Force decision denied the FIS proposals by implying that the institute was a key and powerful component in the MRC's future, capable of driving the linkages between basic research, medical thinking and clinical practices. As such it warranted increased, not decreased investment.

  This recommendation, it seems to me, put the MRC and Council in an odd position that I suspect they did not welcome, and which I still wonder about. They must have worried about the finances and the commitment to enhance the NIMR in central London that was a condition to the Task Force recommendations:.

[However, it will be essential to develop a partnership agreement for this move that is more attractive than would be possible between a university and NIMR at Mill Hill.]

  Here is one episode where the CEO's chairmanship of the Task Force was important. Did the MRC appreciate the full implications of this condition and if they did, accept them.

(vi)  I felt that I could happily sign up to the Task Force concept, though the huge costs made me uncomfortable when I thought about other demands on MRC and OST/I funds. Now that the cost estimates have soared from ca £120 million to £340 million (and will they go up? I am sure they will), I feel rather differently. I wonder what the community's view on this sum would be and how the MRC plans to handle its views.

(vii)  A most contentious issue, viz that the NIMR should abandon the Mill Hill site whatever the outcome of the central London plans, was announced in a very muddled way at the end of the review. The decision, and the way it was made, has caused real upset in the NIMR, There simply seems no good reason to get rid of the site and the episode was a further illustration of the questionable management that on occasion plagued the Task Force.

RESPONSE

Type	No comment	Grave concern	Positive	Positive with reservations	No specific discussion of NIMR site	Sub-total
Individuals UK	0	298	3	11	1	313
Individuals-International	0	388	0	1	0	389
*All Individuals	0	686	3	12	1	702
Organisations UK	1	14	7	9	16	47
Organisations	0	1	0	0	0	1
All International	1	15	7	9	17	48
Organisations
Trade Unions	0	5	0	0	0	5
NIMR Staff	0	177	0	0	0	177
Totals	1	883	10	21	17	932

  *Includes some group signed submissions

  Note: 172 (133 individual, 39 NIMR) responses were submitted in the form of standard letters.

(iv)  Financial Clarity.

  I quote: (Select Committee on Science and Technology Fourth Report para 24.)

   We were told by members of the committee on the Forward Investment Strategy that their work was "not about money", and yet cost was one of the two reasons given for its conclusions. It is regrettable that confusion over the justification for the conclusions of the FIS review was allowed to develop.

  The lack of clarity on funding is being repeated for the Task Force recommendations