INTRODUCTION

  1.  Prospect is a trade union representing 105,000 scientific, technical, managerial and specialist staff in the Civil Service and related bodies and major companies. Our members include 4,000 scientific and technical staff in five research councils and 68,000 scientists, engineers and technologists overall.

  We have welcomed the increased funding for the science base since 1997 and the high profile given to science and innovation through the ten-year investment framework published in 2004. However, we are increasingly disquieted about the dissonance between Treasury policy statements on these issues and practical experience across the public sector science base, especially in research council institutes. The terms of this inquiry are at the heart of Prospect's concerns over the nation's science base. These are set out in detail in our briefing, "Who is looking after British science?" circulated to the Select Committee in April. We have similar concerns about the future of core scientific facilities in Scotland, on which we are preparing separate briefing for a lobby of the Scottish Parliament on 14 June. A copy will be sent to the Select Committee as soon as it is available.

  Our response to this inquiry does not seek to replicate this more detailed evidence, but supplements it by posing the key issues as we see them and as our members experience them at first hand. We also identify questions and challenges that need to be addressed if the UK is to maintain strategic SET capacity and preserve and develop key scientific skill sets. These are requirements that were core to the mission of the research councils when they were established and which in our views remain equally, if not more relevant, today.

Where does the responsibility for national core scientific capability lie?

  There is currently no effective central oversight or responsibility for the health of the nation's science base. Thus research council boards and government departments are able to make decisions that may make sense in the context of their own remits but have no regard for the wider implications or potential losses to Britain's core scientific capability. It is evident from our contacts and discussions that the impact is not monitored by the DGRC, Chief Scientific Adviser, Science Minister, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, or by the Secretaries of State of other Government Departments. Yet, it is absolutely important for the future of the science base to pin down where the responsibility does lie. As the Science and Innovation Framework emanates from the Treasury, it may well be that the Chancellor should take ultimate responsibility. At the moment, however, there is a marked dissonance between Treasury policy statements and practical experience in research council institutes. Prospect wrote to the Chancellor on 3 April to seek his views on this issue. As yet, he has not responded.

  There are three key dimensions of scientific capability:

  Skills:   Our enquiries show that there is no oversight of the scientific skills lost (and those retained) in government as a result of research council cuts and closures. It is our view that RCUK has failed to exercise any strategic vision, mirroring the failure across government as a whole to exercise any central monitoring of scientific capability. It is therefore reasonable to assume that government has no contingency plan for accessing the skills that have been lost eg in the event of a major disease outbreak or other emergency. Evidence collected by Prospect indicates that when research council institutes close no more than one quarter of scientific staff remain in scientific employment of any kind. Further it seems to us that no comparison is being made of existing capability in relation to scientific foresight, and that there is an absence of planning to close skills gaps.

  Infrastructure:   Government funds major infrastructure projects in research councils through a ring-fenced portion of the science base allocation. Whilst necessary, this can crowd out other maintenance and improvement projects. At departmental level, there is no integrated approach. For example, in DEFRA different Ministers have responsibility for agriculture, fisheries and food. None has overall responsibility for the health of the science infrastructure across the department. Yet, this is rightly a political responsibility. Chief Scientific Advisers have a more narrowly defined role, and carry it out with varying levels of authority and influence. Neither Ministers nor their advisers appear to pay much attention to the terms of the RIPSS agreement: it is not clear where departmental responsibility for implementation of this agreement does lie.

  Funding:   The dual funding system was established more than 25 years ago in very different circumstances to those that pertain today. There is much greater emphasis now on competitive funding. Whilst Prospect does not oppose competition in principle, this must be underpinned by a core strategic grant that is sufficient to provide institutional stability. This is not currently the case. Universities, by contrast, are able to spread their financial risk over a wider base and are thus less vulnerable to variations in overhead costs. It may be that dual funding has outlived its usefulness and that consideration should be given to replacing it with some form of block (core) funding.

Is the case for change scientifically robust?

  In recent months there has been a series of announcements about cuts or closures in the absence of evidence to support a scientific case for change (eg at the Centre for Ecology and Hydrology) and demonstrating a failure to consider whether—in the event of lack of continued funding by the parent research council—the science in question could or should be done elsewhere in the interests of the UK Plc. For example, Professor King warned recently of the reality of a 3% rise in global temperatures. This will have significant implications for agricultural, economic and social development. Viable responses need to be underpinned by long-term multi-disciplinary research that simply will not be done by the private sector because it does not offer immediate commercial returns. Yet, changes in BBSRC and NERC are breaking up research teams that contribute directly to this agenda. The reality is that scientific expertise cannot be turned off and on at will and the current chopping and changing of research priorities places the UK at a real risk of being unable to respond.

How might governance arrangements be improved?

  The issue of institute governance has been addressed by the Costigan report and is being taken forward primarily by BBSRC, though BBSRC's aims in doing so lack clarity. In our view there are more deep-seated governance issues to address so that it is clear, underlying the veneer of delegation that currently exists, where responsibility and accountability for decision-making actually lies. It is undeniably the case that both institute governing bodies and research council boards include a range of members with a direct interest in the outcome of strategic and funding decisions. Yet there is no voice for employees as a key stakeholder group. Further, this is at odds with the university senate model in which employee representatives are able to participate both in the overall management of their institution and in determining its strategic direction.

NEXT STEPS

  We hope that the Select Committee's inquiry will provoke a much-needed strategic debate both in research councils and at the centre of government about the true value and role of public sector science. That debate must in turn result in a new inclusive and forward -looking approach to evidence-based policy making—underpinned by appropriate resource allocations and not overridden by short-term pressures to cut costs.

June 2006