House of Commons - Science and Technology

Select Committee on Science and Technology Fourth Report

6 Restructuring of individual RCIs

98. The nature of the sector is such that there is continual review, renewal and restructuring of institutes. Some institutes are expressly established for a limited time period or to fulfil a particular remit after which they may be disbanded. It is also the case that in order to ensure that the sector remains vibrant and able to play an effective part in achieving the strategy defined by the Research Councils, there will have to be changes, including closures and mergers. NERC told us that "for the longer-standing RCIs in particular, this means that as NERC's (and external) requirements change, centres must change accordingly in order to remain responsive, fit-for-purpose and cost-efficient".[247] It may also be that the structure, rather than the science, of an institute is no longer working appropriately. BBSRC, for example, raised the issue of the critical mass of an institute, with Professor Goodfellow telling us that "some of the institutes, once they go below a certain size, will find the infrastructure costs are going to be too high for the amount of science you are getting".[248] BBSRC have "a rule of thumb that by the time you get to below about two hundred people [...] we worry very much about sustainability".[249] This is the key driver in the reorganisation of the Roslin Institute which we examine below.

99. All the Research Councils have substantial experience of restructuring their institutes. For example, the MRC told us that it "actively manages its portfolio of institutes and units, closing and reconfiguring them as scientific and strategic needs dictate".[250] In the last six years, the MRC has closed 12 units and opened or restructured seven.[251] Professor Goodfellow from the BBSRC told us that such a move

"normally comes from our board looking at the broad picture, trying to get the balance between what we are doing in institutes and what we are doing in universities then looking at the institutes and asking how we can make them fit for purpose. Are we spending our money too thinly? Are we getting the quality of science we want? We do this on a regular basis. It normally comes out of long term planning."[252]

The Council had closed the Silsoe Research Institute in March 2006 because "the area of science was not high priority for us or the UK; it was agricultural engineering and there is not really any agricultural engineering in the UK and the quality of the science had been assessed two or three times over an eight year period and was not at the level we were happy with."[253] The possibility of restructuring, then, is something institutes face every time their activities are reviewed and it forms an important part of their relationship with their parent Councils. In this chapter we examine three very different examples of current restructuring processes, one by each of BBSRC, NERC and MRC, to see what general lessons may be learned.

BBSRC and the Roslin Institute

100. The Roslin Institute, based in Scotland, conducts research into livestock genetics, breeding, welfare and biotechnology. Its most famous success was the production of Dolly, the cloned sheep. BBSRC plans to close the current site of the Institute and move it to a new £65 million+ facility on the Easter Bush campus of the University of Edinburgh where it will be brought together with researchers from the Neuropathogenesis Unit of IAH and the Royal (Dick) School of Veterinary Studies, with the possibility of additional livestock researchers from the Scottish Agricultural College. The aim is to create "the world leading centre for research in animal bioscience".[254]

101. From the evidence we have received, it appears that there is little opposition to this plan. Professor Goodfellow told us that "both BBSRC and the governing body of Roslin see that it is not sustainable in the long term with the number of people there are at the moment."[255] Other contributors to this inquiry welcomed the move or at least saw it as inevitable. The University of Leeds considered that "Roslin, although it has done valuable work, may have become too complacent"[256], and a fierce opponent of a different restructuring project told us that the institute "managed to keep a good reputation because of a few very high profile pieces of work" but it suffered from receiving its funding from a variety of sources.[257] This led to a mixed mission "with only about 50% of the institute carrying out basic research and the rest doing translational or applied research".[258] No real regret was expressed about its fate, and we conclude that this is an example of a welcome restructuring which should rejuvenate the Roslin Institute. There is a clear justification for change and for the selected outcome.

102. We also have reason to be confident about the ability of BBSRC to see through the restructuring process in an efficient and supportive way. When we asked BBSRC institute directors about their experience of working with BBSRC through restructuring of their own centres, the response was unequivocally positive. Professor Shirley of IAH, for example, praised the Council for the "high quality" assistance which it provided.[259] Our one concern is that we should like to see greater attention paid to keeping track of what happens to the skills base once an institute is disbanded or reformed. At present there seems to be no robust system for doing this in any detail or even at the level of ensuring that the whereabouts of key expertise is known. Professor Goodfellow told us:

"It is quite difficult to get the data for that, for what happens to people. We have been monitoring the process as formally as we can—which is really very informally—about the Silsoe Research Institute. We did make considerable efforts to provide resource for them and consultation to help them get jobs elsewhere. We did move some people on, so areas that we certainly saw as important we found homes for in the system (one was within a vet school and another within an institute). We do know informally that a lot of them have got jobs in the system; quite a large percentage of the scientists have actually gone on to other jobs."[260]

The position is similar in the other Research Councils. We accept that it can be difficult to keep track of people and that employees are under no obligation to tell their previous employers of future career moves. We also recognise that at a time of restructuring the institutes themselves are probably overstretched in terms of human resources expertise and therefore are not best placed to undertake exit interviews and follow-up monitoring work. Nevertheless, we believe that this would be an invaluable exercise and one which would better inform our picture of the true health of the UK's skills base. We recommend that the Research Councils develop methodologies to track the immediate career paths of scientific staff employed at RCIs which are restructured and then use this data to inform future decision-making processes on restructuring.

NERC and the Centre for Ecology and Hydrology

Background

103. On 6 December 2005 NERC announced proposals for restructuring the Centre for Ecology and Hydrology (CEH), under which five of its nine sites would close and staff numbers would be cut by 200 from the current 600. Following public consultation and a generally hostile reaction, these proposals were watered down. The same four sites were to remain (Lancaster, Bangor, Edinburgh and Wallingford) but NERC increased its funding allocation to CEH by £1.3 million to £16.3 million per year and also revised upwards its targets for commissioned research income, giving the CEH a total annual budget of just under £30 million.[261] As a result, projected staff redundancies were reduced from 200 to 160. NERC declared that these changes meant that "CEH now has the resources to meet its core business for NERC (monitoring and survey of national and international significance) and for delivering on key areas of public policy interest, such as: flood risk, weather extremes due to climate change, halting the decline in biodiversity, sustainable land management under CAP reform and assessments of renewable sources of energy".[262]

104. Professor Thorpe explained that there were three driving forces behind the reorganisation:

"The first one was a result of our assessments roughly every five years of the future science programme of each of our centres. We assess those via peer review et cetera for the science quality and also the strategic fit to priority. That was a major one of the three. The second one was to try to focus CEH to bring teams together. Currently it is on nine sites and costing substantial amounts in infrastructure costs to maintain those sites. In order to bring scientists together the new plans are for four sites. The third reason … the recent trends of external income which for CEH amounts overall to about 40 per cent of its total income. It was not one of those three, it was all three together, very much driven by our council and driven by the agenda of putting CEH into a long term sustainable position."[263]

The "recent trends of external income", referred to by Professor Thorpe, are a general decline in commissioned research income.[264] The Director of CEH, Professor Nuttall told us that an analysis of the Centre's historical records on external funding in 2005 "showed a decline in funding from Defra and a very sharp decline from the Environment Agency and also from DfID as well".[265] Although this decline, especially from Defra, was highlighted in written evidence to the Committee as a primary factor in the CEH's difficulties,[266] Professor Nuttall was keen to point out that part of the difficulty had arisen from the fact that CEH had been originally created in 1994 "on a political imperative", rather than "on the basis of a business plan or any strategic plan" and that "the deciding factor [on the timing of the changes] was when the money became available" for restructuring.[267] She also reassured us that "I would say that it is not totally NERC that has been the driving force. The senior management in CEH has realised that we needed to change to be sustainable".[268] The CEH supported the changes because they would "give us greater flexibility and greater critical mass as four sites instead of nine".[269] We note that NERC has previously acknowledged a fourth factor in the restructuring, which was NERC's strategic aim to move 10% of its funding from NERC institutes to universities.[270]

105. In the NERC consultation on the proposals, some 99% of the 1,327 responses were critical of the Council's plans. The main concerns were a loss in national research capacity on biodiversity and climate change, fears over staff departures and that long-term monitoring work would not be continued. We received evidence on all these issues. For example, the British Ecological Society (BES) reported its initial concerns about the maintenance of long term monitoring and the loss of expertise, although it welcomed reassurances from NERC on these issues and the announcement of £2 million funding for collaborative work with external partners.[271] BES also drew attention to the concerns of CEH staff about the lack of vision for the four remaining sites.[272] There is also the matter of the cost: transition costs are estimated to be £43 million over the four year period, whilst the move to four sites is expected to deliver annual savings of £7 million. The union Prospect argued against the spending of £43 million in order to offset an annual deficit at CEH of £1.2 million.[273]

THE CURRENT POSITION

106. Professor Nuttall gave us an update on progress in the restructuring process in her evidence of 12 December 2006. Following the publication of an implementation plan for the period 2006 to 2010 detailing the work to be undertaken by the four science programmes and supporting structure, "a milestone" had been passed "at the beginning of November when we were able to tell most of our staff what roles they would have in the future CEH".[274] The Dorset site would close on 1 June 2007, leaving just "a small group located somewhere down in the South West in order to undertake the Countryside Survey". New facilities were to be built on the Wallingford and Edinburgh sites to house relocated staff. The need for building work was "a time-limiting factor for some of the moves", with others delayed because "the science, particularly the Countryside Survey and an Environment Agency audit which is related to the Water Framework Directive, requires that people are in place at some of the closing sites for a defined period."[275] Professor Nuttall also told us that although "I do not believe morale is now rock bottom … I would not say morale is great; it is for us to move with staff and get them involved as much as possible in building the future."[276]

107. The story of the restructuring of CEH is not yet complete and there are several issues still to be resolved. At this stage we have three main concerns arising from the experience at CEH which we wish to draw out in more detail: first, the adequacy of NERC's consultation process and what lessons can be learned from this; secondly, the preservation of science and skills during a restructuring process; and thirdly, how Government departments can influence the decisions of Research Councils to restructure RCIs where they have a direct interest in the science.

CONSULTATION PROCESSES

108. It is inevitable that proposals to make such major changes as those proposed by NERC in connection with the CEH are not going to be welcome to many people. This was reflected in the strength of feeling which came through some of the written evidence we received on this subject.[277] However, there was also a clear perception that NERC had not handled the announcement and subsequent consultation in a manner which would mitigate the innate difficulties of the situation. The vote of no confidence in the Director of CEH reported by the Biosciences Federation reflects that perception, as does the Federation's concern in June 2006 that "Six months after announcing plans to reorganise it is still unclear what science will continue and what will end" and its conclusion that "The skills and experience needed to undertake a successful reorganisation on this scale are not present within NERC".[278]

109. We asked the Chief Executive of NERC what he had learned about consultation from this experience. Professor Thorpe told us that "it was certainly the case with CEH that much of this was in the public domain so there has been quite a protracted period of uncertainty for staff which I regret … I feel that to have rushed it would have been the wrong thing to do but I think it is tough because of that period of uncertainty."[279] As we heard from Professor Nuttall, this period continued for a further five months after these comments were made until November 2006, nearly a year after the initial announcement. Professor Thorpe agreed that it would be better to move towards the BBSRC's emerging approach of "much more open consultation".[280] We recommend that all Research Councils adopt a best practice approach to consultation on restructuring which is as open as possible with those affected within the institutes. We return in our discussion on National Institute for Medical Research to whether the Research Councils have the necessary expertise to handle consultations and restructuring projects of this size without additional assistance.

PRESERVING SCIENCE AND SKILLS

110. The importance of the work undertaken by CEH was underlined by evidence to this inquiry, including that submitted by the University of Leeds who wrote that "there is a considerable amount of work which needs to be done for which a CEH-type infrastructure is essential, such as the long-term monitoring of ecological change".[281] We have referred elsewhere to the need to ensure that such work is protected when institutions change in order that future generations of scientists may benefit from long-term sequences and datasets. In the case of CEH, we note that it was recognition of the possibility that the changes could result in datasets and monitoring work being put at risk which led to NERC Council increasing funding for these areas after the initial announcement.[282] We remain concerned, however, that there are areas of science which will be lost in this restructuring. Professor Thorpe told us that in drawing up the science plan NERC had "looked at not only what CEH is going to be delivering but also where the areas that are not going to be done within CEH where they will be delivered elsewhere".[283] When pressed, he admitted that he did not know "the complete plan yet" of what science will be lost because discussions with staff had not been concluded but he also told us that "scientists who do not want to stay with CEH are staying within the UK and within the field".[284] Therefore, there would not be a loss of science to the UK as a whole as a result of the CEH restructuring process.

111. Six months later, the CEH Director had far less comfort to offer on this point. We asked her first about the retention of staff at the renewed CEH since it is this that will largely determine exactly which areas of scientific expertise are retained. She told us that "in total we are losing more staff than we want to lose, 224 at the last count".[285] This is in excess of the 160 planned redundancies because when a site is closed, all staff are entitled to count themselves as redundant and leave if they do not wish to relocate. The Director told us that as a result "we are currently anticipating having to recruit just over 70 staff".[286] It is not known whether all these staff will stay in science but Professor Nuttall accepted that "at least one is going abroad; some are just going to take the generous redundancy terms and have some time off".[287] Of particular concern is the fact there were 77 staff who were identified early on as having "unique skills" and whom CEH "critically needed going forward in order to deliver our implementation plan" and of these, "eight have said that they will not stay with CEH and five are as yet undecided".[288] More worryingly still, Professor Nuttall told us that she could only be "75 per cent confident" that the restructuring process would not lead to a loss of science in the UK as a whole.[289] She clarified in follow-up evidence that "it is likely that the CEH restructuring process will acerbate the loss to the UK of science expertise in freshwater ecology", necessary to inform legislation and policy including the EU Water Framework Directive.[290] We note that this risk is in addition to seven areas of science which will be lost to CEH itself and a further eight that will be reduced.[291]

112. We are strongly of the view that when restructuring of an institute is mooted by a Research Council, steps should be taken to identify key science programmes which must be preserved. It should be a priority aim in developing business plans that all such science highlighted in this way is helped to find a placement within the UK science base in order that national capacity is not lost as a casualty of the restructuring of an RCI. We recommend that the Research Councils organise their future strategic plans on this basis and also invite views on such nationally important capabilities when undertaking consultations on the restructuring of particular institutes. In the case of CEH, we recommend that NERC prepare and publish an analysis of key skills and capabilities at CEH prior to the reorganisation, together with an indication of how these will be affected by the changes and, where applicable, how they will be replaced elsewhere within the UK.

GOVERNMENT INFLUENCE

113. The Government's memorandum to this inquiry stated baldly that progress on reorganisations involving RCIs "are matters for individual Councils".[292] Nevertheless, we are interested to note that Defra has intervened in the consultation process over the future of CEH. For example, Defra contributed to NERC's consultation on CEH as a key stakeholder and in response to a question from the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee in June 2006, the Minister of State (Climate Change and the Environment) wrote that "Defra supports the need to establish a sustainable CEH" and that "we acknowledge the risks in the restructuring and delivery in a number of science areas and the impact of these will need to be monitored carefully in the light of the benefits to the wider climate change and R&D effort".[293] These views were made known to NERC and Defra believed them to be a factor in the decision by NERC Council "to strengthen biodiversity and climate change research in areas that we [Defra] highlighted were of key importance to us."[294]

114. This situation is not unique. For example, where BBSRC institutes are concerned, the Minister of State (Climate Change and the Environment), Defra told the EFRA Committee in June 2006 that "We are working with IGER to ensure that it is able to match its skills to our needs both now and in the future".[295] However, there are limitations on what a department can do to preserve its own science needs under the current arrangements. Professor Dalton told us:

"We are in a position of being able to provide and give them information and advice as to what is important for us. If, on the other hand, the research councils decide that it is not for them and they want to go on and do something else, then that is entirely up to them, but we would certainly be active in engaging in trying to persuade them to do otherwise, but I cannot tell them precisely what to do, I am not their master."[296]

We recognise this but we are pleased to note this proactive attitude on the part of Defra and we hope that the recommendations earlier in this Report on improving co-ordination on strategy wil provide a platform for raising and resolving such issues.

CONCLUSION

115. There is a perception amongst some stakeholders, voiced most clearly by the Biosciences Federation, that the reorganization of CEH "is being driven by finance not by science".[297] NERC's willingness to listen to reasoned objections and to alter its plans appears to have lowered the temperature of the debate somewhat, although serious concerns remain about loss of science, loss of people and the cost of the exercise in restructuring CEH. This is undoubtedly an area to which we will return in the future. We urge NERC to provide us with regular updates on progress with CEH restructuring in order to inform our future deliberations on this subject.

MRC and the National Institute for Medical Research

116. We turn now to what has proved to be the most contentious aspect of this inquiry. We state at the outset that, like all those who have given evidence to this inquiry, including the MRC itself, we have no doubts at all about the quality of the science programmes at the NIMR, which indeed have been objectively evaluated in successive quinquennial reviews and reflected in awards and citations. It is in no way an institute in financial crisis or suffering from a drift in its scientific mission. We also firmly believe that what all parties—the MRC and NIMR staff, in particular—want to achieve is to provide the best possible contribution to medical research into the future. The dispute is over how the structure of NIMR needs to be adapted to meet this challenge.

BACKGROUND

117. The NIMR has been based at Mill Hill, North London, since 1950, prior to which it had been located at Mount Vernon Hospital, Hampstead, for thirty years. It is currently organised into four major research groups (Neurosciences, Structural Biology, Genetics and Development, and Infections and Immunity), containing 18 specialised divisions. It is the largest of MRC's three institutes, with an annual budget of £34 million from the MRC (the seventh largest item of expenditure by any of the Research Councils in 2005-06)[298] and approximately 700 staff, including directly supported staff, externally funded staff, fellows, students and visiting workers. Its past achievements have included the discovery of the influenza virus; the isolation and determination of the structure of penicillin; the elucidation of the structure of immunoglobin; and the discovery of the sex-determining gene. Current and future high-profile research programmes include stem cells and avian influenza.

118. In 2003 the MRC's Forward Investment Strategy Subcommittee recommended that the NIMR be moved to a university/medical school site at Addenbrooke's in Cambridge. The reaction to this report, especially among NIMR staff, was such that the MRC set up a task force to make recommendations to MRC Council on the future of the institute. In October 2004, MRC Council accepted the task force recommendations that the Institute should be renewed as a multi-disciplinary biomedical research institute with a mission to undertake basic and translational research in partnership and that it should be co-located with a university. Subsequently, MRC Council selected UCL as the preferred partner for NIMR, in part since UCL is in close proximity to a major hospital and has relevant university departments including chemistry and physics. Land for this purpose was identified and subsequently purchased on the National Temperance Hospital (NTH) site in Hampstead Road at a cost of £28 million (£13 million more than originally estimated).[299]

119. The Business Plan approved by MRC Council in July 2005 estimated a total capital investment of £320 million, with a net cost to MRC of £240 million, after allowing for UCL funding and the sale of Mill Hill. By December 2006, this had risen to a total of £367 million. At the start of the process the MRC sought approval from the OSI for £140 million of funding from the OSI's Large Facilities Capital Fund. The bid was well received and the money notionally earmarked by the OSI, but the OSI and Treasury required a more detailed Business Case to be produced, with options setting out what could be achieved on the NTH site with a range of different levels of investment. This was expected to be put before the MRC Council initially in October 2006. It was delayed to December when it was announced that the decision would be delayed once more until March 2007 to allow the MRC to rewrite the Business Case in order to build up the case from the lowest option of 40% less than the original £320 million capital investment, rather than start at the top option and work down. The Treasury also insisted that the 'do nothing' option of staying at Mill Hill be included.

120. To add to these difficulties, MRC is also in the process of appointing a new Director for NIMR, to take over from Sir John Skehel, who retired in September 2006. The Directorship has been offered to Professor Scott Fraser who is currently Anna L Rosen Professor of Biology and Bioengineering at Caltech, USA. He has made it clear that acceptance of the appointment would be conditional on approval for the release of funds and for work on the new building to proceed. In the meantime, Sir Keith Peters, President of the Academy of Medical Sciences, Chairman of the Council for Science and Technology and former Regius Professor of Physic at Cambridge, is serving as Acting Director on a part-time basis.

121. In its Report on The Medical Research Council's Review of the Future of the National Institute for Medical Research, published in February 2005, the previous Science and Technology Committee described the review process as "less than ideal" but recommended that MRC should pursue the Task Force recommendations, provided that it is "fully satisfied that the preferred bidder is highly likely to be able to match the ideal identified by the Task Force".[300] However, it noted that "MRC must be satisfied that the long term funding required to support the renewed institute in central London is likely to give a scientific return that exceeds that of the Mill Hill alternative. No less important is the need to ensure that any transition process does not do irreparable damage to the science being conducted at the institute." It flagged up the possibility of leading scientists leaving NIMR in the transitional phase.

122. More pertinently to us perhaps, our predecessor Committee also concluded that "the debate over the future of NIMR has polarised opinion to a remarkable degree".[301] Their report was severely critical of the attitude of "many senior staff" at NIMR who

"were more intent upon resistance than engaging with the process and too willing to characterise conclusions and intentions of the majority of the Task Force as evidence of the pursuit of a personal agenda by the Chief Executive. Their actions stopped only a little short of serious interference with the process and a deliberate attempt to undermine the position of the Chief Executive of their own organisation."[302]

Shortly after that Report was published, this situation improved, with staff responding positively to the Task Force report and to the potential for further scientific collaboration with UCL.[303] However, the situation has now reverted to one which could be caricatured as open suspicion on the one side and uncompromising determination to pursue a set path despite all obstacles and objections on the other. We do not attempt to mediate between these two parties but to look at the best possible outcome for UK science from the undesirable position in which the MRC and the NIMR find themselves.

A RENEWED NIMR: THE COMPETING VISIONS

123. Professor Blakemore described two drivers for the decision to move the NIMR from Mill Hill:

"one, the very long-standing commitment of the MRC to use its investment in its intramural programme to provide maximum benefit for the science that it supports. Part of that policy involves attempts to embed, wherever possible, within the university sector investments in units and institutes … The second driver—and in some senses surely the primary one—is the scientific driver… There is a prevailing view, first of all that the biomedical sciences have new opportunities to move in a translational direction and to deliver benefits for healthcare more quickly and secondly that to achieve that requires close association between basic research, clinical research and other aspects of the translational process. We feel that is—that this is a view that is shared around the world—is best achieved by co-location between basic researchers and the broader scientific environment."[304]

Professor Blakemore added that through the joint project with UCL, "we are aiming towards the most exciting institute for the future of the biomedical sciences in Europe, a place that people want to flock from the world to work in, a place that will set the standard for the combination of basic research and translational research to develop healthcare benefit."[305]

124. The MRC/UCL vision is of a renewed NIMR based on a site "300 or 400 yards" from the main UCL campus but with "some parts of the institute literally embedded into other parts of the UC campus" and with "University College scientists working alongside MRC scientists" in the main building.[306] This should increase interaction by MRC staff "not just with clinicians but with the physical sciences, with the social sciences, with mathematics and with computing."[307] From the UCL point of view, the Provost, Professor Grant saw the enhanced opportunities for these interactions as the key benefit to be realised from co-location.[308] He also emphasised that for UCL "the whole point of the co-location would be for a much better integration of the science" and that it would not be acceptable to UCL either for Mill Hill to be simply relocated in a single building near the UCL campus or for the university to develop alongside the NIMR on its current site.[309]

125. Despite the general welcome given to the outcome of the Task Force which recommended the move, this vision of how the institute and the university will be enmeshed with one another does not seem to have penetrated very deeply into the perception of other parties. Representatives of the staff at NIMR argued that translational research is "a mindset with the scientists rather than where we physically are", especially given the increasing use of the internet and other electronic communication.[310] In addition, concern has been expressed anecdotally that co-location with one particular university or medical school will make it harder for the Institute to foster translational research with other institutions.

THE PROPOSED NEW SITE

126. Views have hardened as attention has focussed on the site chosen for the main building of the institute. The location of the former National Temperance Hospital (NTH) site was criticised by representatives of staff at NIMR for its distance from UCL, with the argument that "we would not benefit scientifically from being co-located on the NTH site about 15 to 20 minutes away from the University College hospital and even further to the UCL main campus".[311] Witnesses have also objected to the new site as being too small (0.35 hectares as compared to 19 hectares at Mill Hill) and too constrained in terms of its central London location with regard to planning permission, security and practical factors such as underground tube lines.[312] Particular concern has been raised over the facilities which MRC will be able to provide at the NTH site and whether these will be inferior to those at Mill Hill or simply lacking altogether. A key example of this was the suggestion that the NTH site was not suitable for Level 4 containment laboratories which are necessary for work on highly dangerous pathogens.[313] Taken together with the evident pressures on budgets for the project, these concerns have led former members of the Task Force such as Richard Flavell to withdraw support from the proposals. He argued in evidence to us that "it was a very clear recommendation of the Task Force that relocation of the Institute was conditional on the move being able to provide a better partnership arrangement than could be achieved by the Institute staying at Mill Hill" and that "Moving the Institute did not, and does not, make sense unless it can be done properly so that it can deliver more than it can achieve in Mill Hill".[314]

127. We put the objections raised by opponents regarding the NTH site to the MRC, either in oral evidence or in writing. The Council's responses are published alongside this report.[315] We do not intend to go into each of them in detail, although we would observe that the example of the category of containment facilities required by NIMR is an outstanding illustration of how misunderstanding and distrust can allow single issues to cause genuine concerns on one part and to create enormous unnecessary workloads on the other. The Mill Hill site currently has category 4 facilities. However, MRC told us that "we will be applying for HSE CL3 facilities [for the NTH site]- which [...] is uncontroversial with both Camden [the relevant planning authority] and MI5."[316] This sounds on the face of it as if a downgrading of facilities is needed to fit within the limitations of the new site. However, the MRC provided us with a file of correspondence containing 30 letters and emails over an eight month period which established that what is required for handling avian flu and other such pathogens is a facility classified as category 3 by the HSE under guidance from the Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) but with a licence from Defra at level 4 under the separate Specified Animal Pathogens Order 1998 (SAPO).[317] The two regimes are intended first, in the case of ACDP to protect workers and prevent external release affecting humans and second in the case of SAPO to ensure that there is no environmental release, endangering wildlife. This interpretation was supported by the advice we received directly from HSE.[318] We are satisfied with the explanation from HSE on this issue.

128. It is important to note that the MRC readily accept that "it is unlikely that the NTH site could, within the restrictions of planning permission, provide a building sufficiently large to accommodate the whole of NIMR as it currently is, plus a significant number of UCL staff and expansion space".[319] However, MRC would say that these objections miss the main point of the move which is to integrate the NIMR into UCL and not to reproduce it in either its current or a diminished form within central London. Professor Blakemore identified the key issue when he objected that "you paint a picture of the institute as it is now, and I think one of the problems we have got into is that there is a conception that the institute as it is now, or really as it was in 2003, which is what is defended, is inevitably the way it must be forever in the future".[320] Both the MRC and UCL share a vision of a new reformed NIMR, with access to the same level of facilities at present but physically interlinked with the university's other departments. This is a policy which has found favour with by the OSI in the form of Professor O'Nions who told us that "I am very supportive of [the MRC] vision of co-locating medical research activity with clinical practice in universities and the Cooksey report supports that".[321]

MILL HILL SITE

129. The response of objectors to the perceived drawbacks of the NTH site is to champion the retention of the NIMR at Mill Hill. This site certainly has the advantage of size, and its location makes it more suitable perhaps for facilities with higher security concerns such as animal housing or laboratories dealing with highly pathogenic organisms. In addition, it would allow the NIMR to retain its close proximity to MRC Technology and there would be ample space available to encourage new institutions to move to Mill Hill to work alongside the institute. Money would have to be spent on the building. The MRC described Mill Hill as "a very old building that cannot meet all the standards of convenience, servicing, efficiency and flexibility that are expected in modern laboratories".[322] However, the Step Change Option prepared by NIMR management in November 2004 estimated the cost of a renewed NIMR at Mill Hill to be £35 million, significantly less than the cost of the proposed move to central London.[323]

130. The MRC's policy on the redevelopment of Mill Hill leaves no room for doubt. In October 2006, Professor Blakemore told the Times Higher Education Supplement that the Mill Hill site would close whatever happens to the application to the Treasury for funding for the move to central London.[324] He explained to us that this was not an isolated view and that "the most unanimous feature [of the long-running review process was] that the Mill Hill site is simply inappropriate in the long run to deliver the vision of the science".[325] It was no doubt because of this that the option of remaining at Mill Hill was not included in the draft Business Case discussed with the OSI for presentation to the Treasury. Now, however, the Treasury has explicitly asked that it should be included. Mr Nick Winterton, MRC Executive Director, explained that the MRC "have to present an option which allows a comparison to be made so that a judgement can be made about the value of the capital investment compared to the MRC's proposal".[326] This does not mean that retaining the NIMR at the Mill Hill site is back on the agenda. Should the Treasury refuse to grant MRC the money to fund the move to the NTH site, the MRC would "look at the other possibilities and options that were achievable within the funds we have available, but against the background of the Council having stated very clearly that its desires to pursue science could not be fulfilled in the long run on the Mill Hill site".[327]

COMMUNICATING THE VISION

131. In many ways, this restructuring process has been an object lesson in how not to handle such a project. From the outset, with the publication of the forward investment strategy in 2003, staff have expressed the view that they have not been sufficiently consulted or kept informed of what has been going on. They have not been convinced of the case for any move from the Mill Hill site, and from a general acceptance of the proposed partnership with UCL, relationships with the MRC have again deteriorated in the light of both the developing difficulties over the NTH site (from its high price to the doubts over planning permission and its capacity) and the increasing concern over whether the Treasury will give any money at all. Despite Professor Blakemore's outward confidence about the project in giving evidence to us in June 2006 and again in December 2006, as well as in his written evidence, the demand from the Treasury for the MRC to completely redraft its Business Plan suggests that the whole process is in serious doubt.

132. Speaking as an interested non-MRC party, Professor Spyer of UCL suggested that it was the lack of confirmed financing and hence of confidence that the project would proceed which had led to the fatal inability of MRC to sell the vision: "If we had been in a situation when the discussions began with an absolute certainty of the financial resource to complete the project actually being there and that we could have demonstrated immediately the real advantages (because the advantages that both Professor Grant and I have talked about are less tangible to people who are working in a very comfortable environment) I think the process would have been somewhat different".[328] We agree that it would have been far easier for MRC and UCL to persuade staff at NIMR of their case if they could have presented firm plans for the new look institute. The long drawn out process of getting OSI and Treasury approval for the draft Business Plan, and the debacle of December 2006 when it was revealed that the whole process had to start again, has been at the heart of these problems. It is difficult to see how MRC management can avoid censure for this.

133. These problems could be rectified if there were mutual trust between the MRC and the NIMR. Instead, the two camps are as entrenched as ever. This can be seen by the dispute laid out in evidence to us over whether the setting of a two year rather than five year budget was an attempt to undermine the institution and on whether there was a cap on senior appointments. Both these matters were attributed by the MRC to the desire not to tie the hands of the incoming director. However, the continued delay in Professor Scott Fraser taking up his post, entirely due to the delays in deciding the future of the institute, is both a result of and a factor in the ongoing uncertainty over what will happen to NIMR. In this context we note that it was extremely unhelpful of Professor Blakemore to tell the press that Mill Hill would close whatever happened. We accept that Professor Blakemore meant that "the Mill Hill site would close" rather than the institute but given the unfortunate reliance by many parties on "Mill Hill" as a synonym for "NIMR", his words were open to misinterpretation and unduly provocative. Having built up expertise and the scientific base at NIMR, it is important that this is used to the nation's benefit and simple closure of Mill Hill would be unacceptable.

134. The sadness is that the excitement behind the MRC's vision and its coherence has been completely lost in its communication to staff. It seems to us that many, although by no means all, of the objections to the MRC plans are based on misconceptions which have been allowed to fester through too much rumour and not enough straightforward information. The impression has been left amongst NIMR staff and others that the MRC's continued pursuit of this path has been dictated by dogma and, in its latter stages, has been short-sightedly fixed on the NTH site and what that can deliver rather than the best possible institute to deliver the best possible science. This failure to communicate the MRC's clear sense of vision is both symptom and cause of the state of the relationship between MRC and Mill Hill.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

135. We appreciate the MRC Chairman's implied rebuke when he told us that "it is unusual in business, while you are conducting a very complicated and difficult assessment, to find yourself having to answer questions in the interim as you begin to develop a sound case".[329] Nevertheless, this restructuring project has been under discussion for four years and it is surely to the credit of the NIMR staff and management that the scientific reputation and retention of key staff has not suffered as a result of the painful uncertainty and constant distraction. Professor Grant of UCL went out of his way to praise the staff of NIMR for the way that they "have remained loyal to their institution and have been anxious to try and secure from us an outcome which is to the benefit of British science."[330] It is time to move forward to secure the renewed institute for medical research which is much valued and needed as part of the UK science base. Given the outstanding achievements and recognised excellence of NIMR, it would be foolish not to base a renewed institute on what has been built up so successfully over many years. We believe that all parties would accept that the renewal can mean beneficial change, rather than the simple translation of the existing institute to a new location. On the whole, we agree with the MRC goal to achieve closer links between basic and clinical research and between medicine and other disciplines. What we are less persuaded of is the interpretation of that vision in this case.

136. The first priority for MRC, UCL and NIMR itself must be to design the right institute doing the right research, with the ability to adapt rapidly to new demands. This entails a new mission to which all parties are prepared to commit themselves and a recognition, again on all sides, that in planning the new institute, one must start from the science, rather than the geography, and adopt a broader vision than before, including taking account of the Cooksey recommendations. We believe that there is much to be gained from partnership between UCL and a renewed NIMR. This does not necessarily demand a wholesale move of the Institute from its current site nor a commitment to the use of the NTH site with its obvious limitations in terms of size and location. We wish to see an end to this restructuring process in order that scientists and MRC administrators can concentrate on science once again and so we do not recommend reopening the entire project. Rather, we should like to see the MRC use the information amassed during the process so far to develop a new plan for fostering a revitalised NIMR and increasing its translational research with stronger links with UCL, using the sites at both Mill Hill and the former NTH or another site which could command the approval of all interested parties. We are concerned that the NTH site on its own is inadequate because of its size, and we believe that the MRC should seek a site of sufficient capacity to meet the existing needs of the NIMR and allow for future expansion, in order to enable the development of a world class medical research institute and include MRC technology transfer activities on one site with enhanced access to the university.

137. To do this, we believe that MRC will need to employ more specialist project management. Professor Grant refused to comment on the project management skills of the MRC as demonstrated throughout this process,[331] but the evidence clearly calls those skills into question. We note the indication from Sir John Chisholm that "once we have decided on the project and we have launched the execution of it, we will certainly need some outside assistance to ensure that it is properly, robustly managed and delivers according to the plan".[332] However, the time for engaging such skills is now and we recommend that the MRC conduct an urgent review of its project management needs and employ expertise to fill the gaps as soon as possible. While we hope that these moves towards a fresh start, taking on board many of their concerns, would re-engage staff, we believe that there are further steps which should be undertaken in this regard. We recommend that MRC adopt a new more open strategy to regular consultation and communication with staff at Mill Hill. We also recommend that the MRC reconvene the task force, which included staff representatives, to advise them on the way to proceed and to provide a forum for scientific and other interests to be expressed. This approach is essential if alternative arrangements involving either joint use of the NTH site and Mill Hill or the identification of a new site in London become the preferred option.

138. Despite the controversy and the examples of behaviour which are open to criticism on both sides, there is reason to be confident about the ability of the parties involved to turn looming disaster into success. For example, Professor Blakemore did not instantly dismiss the suggestion that the task force should be reconvened, even if he "was not sure that would add constructively to the proposals at this stage".[333] Similarly, Professor Grant of UCL signalled a willingness to discuss other options if they were to be brought forward by MRC, such as a model with "part of [UCL] enterprise activity and other non-translational science activity might be located at Mill Hill and there might be a flow between the two".[334] Just as pertinently, the unions' representatives assured us that "We accept that MRC has the right to make its own policy" and that "we are not against a move or a new institute, I think it is at the very beginning we do not believe the logic".[335] It is the responsibility of MRC management to ensure that the staff do see the logic and are prepared to work with the grain rather than against. It is obvious that the Treasury is more likely to be persuaded of a case presented by a united front than the current situation. It may take a change of management before the two sides are able to engage fully in this process but the task of creating a new medical research institute fit for 21^st century science is too important for it to be lost in infighting and personal attacks.

General lessons

139. These three examples of restructuring projects involving RCIs are clearly extremely different but some general lessons can be drawn from them which may be applicable to other instances which may occur in the future. First, Research Councils need to have a clear idea of what they are trying to achieve and to communicate this effectively as early and confidently as possible to those affected. Secondly, they need the management skills to see the process through. Thirdly, we believe that there may be room for the OSI to take a more active role in overseeing and assisting RCI restructuring, as we discuss in the next chapter. We recommend that the OSI satisfy itself that individual Research Councils have the capacity to manage significant restructuring projects where these occur and that the OSI ensure that assistance is available to the Councils for project management where deemed necessary. Further restructuring projects are inevitable, given the nature of RCIs and their work, but we would hope that the experience suffered by NIMR and MRC, in particular, will not be repeated in the future.

247 Ev 142 Back

248 Q 51 Back

249 Ibid Back

250 Ev 134 Back

251 Ibid Back

252 Q 18 Back

253 Q 17 Back

254 Ev 122 Back

255 Q 51 Back

256 Ev 82 Back