Memorandum 47
Submission from Professor Thomas Baldwin,
Department of Philosophy, University of York
1. My background to this issue is that during
2002-05 I was a member of the HFEA and the UK Stem Cell Bank Steering
Committee. During that time, especially while the review of the
1990 HFE Act was under consideration, the issue you are considering
concerning the regulation of hybrid and chimera embryos, was often
discussed, both at the HFEA and the Stem Cell Bank Steering Committee.
I readily recall one excellent discussion at the Stem Cell Bank
Steering Committee in early 2005 (I think) when the possible uses
of different types of hybrid and chimera were clearly explained
and we reached the conclusion that as long as the 14 day rule
was strictly adhered to there was be no objection in principle
to embryo research involving such hybrids and chimeras. I regret
that I no longer have the papers from that meeting though I assume
that the MRC could supply them if you wanted them.
2. One conclusion from these discussions,
however, was that it was not clear whether work of this kind was
covered by current regulations, and that it was desirable that
it should be. So I welcome the Government's intention to bring
regulation of this kind of work under the remit of RATE as specified
in §§2.81-5 of the Review of the 1990 HFE Act. But the
issue which remains to be further discussed is whether the proposal
in §2.85 is satisfactory.
3. My own view is that the proposal in §2.85
is too restrictive. While I fully appreciate that the issue here
is one which raises strong feelings, I have yet to encounter a
good argument to the effect that embryo research involving human/animal
hybrids should not be permitted given that research involving
human embryos is permitted. It is of course obvious those who
object to the latter will object to the former as well on much
the same grounds; but the question here is whether specifically
animal/human embryo research should be permitted. A key point
here is the 14 day rule: for this rule prohibits the development
of a hybrid embryo to a stage at which it has the status of a
moral subject in its own right, since at that stage it has no
consciousness, however rudimentary.
4. It might be argued that any mixing of
cells from different species is "unnatural" and therefore
wrong. Yet animal work can involve interbreeding between species
(as with the creation of mules) and as long as no cruelty is involved
there seems nothing wrong about this. But, it may be said, there
is something special about the status of human beings, so that
creating animal/human hybrids or chimeras is intrinsically wrong.
Certainly, many people think this at first, when the issue is
put to them. But this is one of those cases where one's first
thoughts, and immediate feelings, need to be challenged. I very
much welcome this inquiry by the Select Committee precisely because
it should provide a forum in which this challenge is openly debated.
5. I do accept that the creation of living
organisms who are animal/human hybrids gives rise to difficult
ethical questions about their moral status and interests, though
much depends on the facts of the case. For example whereas the
xenotransplantation to a human of, say, a pig's kidney is ethically
unproblematic (though it may well be unsafe for other reasons),
the transplantation of a primate brain to a human would be problematic
if it radically altered the recipient's consciousness and sense
of identity. Equally the use of animals such as mice to grow replacement
parts for humans (see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/1949073.stm)
gives rise to ethical questions from an animal welfare perspective.
But none of these questions arises for embryo research restricted
by the 14 day rule. So far as I can see this restriction removes
any grounds one might have for objecting to work which involves
human/animals hybrids.
5. Hence, since there is reason to think that
the creations of hybrid and chimera embryos would be valuable
for the purpose of medical research (as §2.83 of the Review
of the 1990 HFE Act acknowledges), my judgment is that the proposal
in §2.85 is unnecessarily restrictive.
January 2007
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