Conclusions and recommendations
1. A fifth (21%) of Senior Responsible Owners
of mission critical and high risk IT-enabled programmes had not
met with the nominated Minister and a further 28% met the Minister
less than once a quarter.
For these major high risk undertakings to succeed, Ministers need
to be briefed fully and candidly at least quarterly on risks,
progress and cost escalations, including key findings from Gateway
Reviews and mission critical reporting, and assessment of the
performance of suppliers and contractors.
2. The role of the Chief Information Officer
Council, comprising senior board level representatives of all
major government departments, is not yet clear and its profile
remains low. The Council
offers the potential to identify key risks to the delivery of
programmes and projects and to drive up and ensure greater consistency
of practice and performance across government. It needs to raise
its game, acting more like its American counterpart to become
a key influence in government IT by, for example:
- reporting regularly on the
emerging risks around the Government's portfolio of IT-enabled
programmes and projects, and making informed judgements about
the Government's capacity to handle that portfolio;
- providing authoritative advice
and promoting good practice, and encouraging the greater use of
tools and techniques such as the IT industry body Intellect's
Concept Viability Service to help test at an early point the robustness
of new IT-enabled plans and proposals; and
- acting to strengthen relationships
with the supplier community; for example by seeking ways to encourage
the involvement of smaller suppliers through streamlining and
standardising processes such as pre-qualification questionnaires.
3. The Payment Modernisation Programme and
Pension Credit demonstrate that success can be achieved in major
Government IT-enabled programmes and projects.
Evidence from across government shows that to replicate this success
more widely, departments need to make significant changes to their
management practices. For example:
- more than 70% of Heads of Centres
of Excellence remain concerned about a lack of programme and project
management skills within departments; and
- over half of Senior Responsible
Owners (SROs) are in their first SRO role, and nearly half spend
less than 20% of their time on such duties. Lack of relevant experience,
combined with a regular turnover of post-holders, adds unnecessary
risk to the management of IT-enabled change.
- To address these issues, departments
should appoint a Senior Responsible Owner at the outset of an
IT-enabled business change on the presumption that he or she will
remain in post until the programme or project is delivered, with
performance and reward linked to agreed targets and milestones.
4. Within departments, there is a lack of
clarity about the respective roles of Chief Information Officers
and Centres of Excellence, and how, in turn, they should support
individual Senior Responsible Owners of programmes and projects.
38% of Senior Responsible Owners, for example, have no involvement
with their Centre of Excellence. The Office of Government Commerce
and the Delivery and Transformation Group should set out clearly
for departments their expectations of Chief Information Officers,
Centres of Excellence, and Senior Responsible Owners. Departments
should in turn translate these into clear management hierarchies
and reporting structures at a local level.
5. There
is potential confusion between the Delivery and Transformation
Group's initiatives to strengthen the IT Profession through the
Technology in Business Fast Stream and the wider Professional
Skills for Government agenda, and the role of the Office of Government
Commerce in developing the Programme and Project Management Specialism.
To obtain the full benefit of these initiatives and to build the
collective IT knowledge base across government, they need to be
overseen by a single body with a clear brief to develop career
paths and succession planning. This should include developing
and consolidating individuals' skills over a succession of major
programmes and projects and ensuring that the contributions of
successful teams are exploited fully.
6. The lessons from Gateway Reviews are not
shared consistently across departments, with only some three quarters
of Centres of Excellence routinely receiving such Reviews.
Within departments, Gateway Reviews and mission critical reporting
should form the focus for regular discussions between the Chief
Information Officer, Centre of Excellence and Senior Responsible
Owners. Departments need also to seek the views and concerns of
suppliers in Gateway Reviews.
7. Of all the IT-enabled programmes and projects
that had completed a Gate 4 (Readiness for service) Gateway Review
by June 2005, only a third had by June 2006 completed a Gate 5
(Benefits evaluation) Review.
Following the example of the Payment Modernisation Programme,
departments should appoint a senior nominated individual to make
sure that Gate 5 Reviews occur within twelve months of a preceding
Gate 4 Review, and to ensure that new IT processes are exploited
to achieve their full potential, as would be the case with an
expensive IT investment in the commercial world.
8. Where IT-enabled programmes and projects
have succeeded, the organisations concerned were clear about the
business process they wanted to change and the outcome they wanted
to achieve. In the case
of Pension Credit, for example, the project team were thus enabled
to resist demands for unnecessary alterations to the initial specification.
Britannia Building Society's board kept control over changes to
its "Really Big" transformation programme by requiring
expenditure over a 3% contingency to be referred to the board.
Where changes to original specifications are planned that involve
expenditure or time delays beyond any pre-agreed thresholds, the
Senior Responsible Owner should re-submit the business case to
the departmental board, setting out why a change is necessary
and providing an assessment of the risks associated with the change.
9. The Office of Government Commerce and the
Delivery and Transformation Group have not had the power to halt
failing programmes and projects.
The Treasury's new Major Projects Review Group will however be
reviewing all new business cases for high risk or mission critical
programmes and projects for robustness and deliverability in order
to ensure that departments do not embark on ill thought out ventures.
It will need well rehearsed action plans to intervene to stop
programmes and projects that begin to falter.
10. Nearly half of Audit Committees are not
briefed on the results of all Gateway Reviews.
To fulfil their key role in providing independent scrutiny and
oversight of a department's portfolio of programmes and projects,
Audit Committees need regular briefing about the status of those
activities and information about emerging risks. The Statement
on Internal Control signed annually by the Accounting Officer
should confirm that the Audit Committee has received this information.
11. Very little has been made public about
the identity or performance of the mission critical programmes
and projects that underpin much of the Government's IT strategy.
In response to the Committee's request, however, the Office of
Government Commerce has provided a list of the 90 mission critical
programmes and projects agreed with departments in July 2006.[2]
This is an important first step in improving the transparency
of departments' management of IT-enabled change, but it needs
to be extended into regular reviews of the progress and performance
of individual programmes and projects within the Annual Report
of the Delivery and Transformation Group.[3]
2 Ev 14 Back
3
The first Annual Report was published in January 2007: www.cio.gov.uk/documents/annual_report2006/trans_gov2006.pdf Back
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