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Written evidence submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

 

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office welcomes the opportunity to provide written input into the Committee's inquiry into 'Global Security: Russia'. This Memorandum addresses the issues and questions the Committee will consider in the terms of reference for its inquiry, published on 23 March 2007. An annex on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's presence and activities in Russia is provided separately.

 

UK-Russia relations: Overview

 

Close engagement with Russia is important to the successful achievement of a wide range of the Government's international priorities. We work with Russia at the UN and in the G8 on policy issues such as Kosovo, Iran, MEPP, and energy and climate security. We also work bilaterally with Russia on the promotion of trade and investment, and in practical co-operation, for example on serious crime. But the relationship is overshadowed by tensions arising from the asylum/refugee status of individuals in the UK and the Russian response to the continued presence of those individuals. The Russian administration has not fully accepted that these questions are matters of law, not of politics or diplomacy. Regrettably this impacts upon other areas of potential co-operation and upon British interests in Russia.

 

 

In a testing environment, where commercial and political interests are closely entwined, we also need to remain robust in the promotion of the interests of British investors, notably in the oil and gas sector. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office continues to pursue an approach to relations with Russia underpinned by critical engagement. Where obstacles and disagreements exist, our aim will continue to be to seek to resolve them by means of a transparent, open and honest dialogue.

 

During Russia's 2006 G8 Chairmanship, many UK Ministers visited Russia, including the Prime Minister, the Chancellor, the Foreign Secretary, and the Attorney General. The Minister for Europe visited three times in 2006, and the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry visited in February 2007. A visit by the Minister of State, Trade and Industry is planned for July 2007. In addition to regular and ongoing senior official level contacts, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Vladimir Titov, visited the UK in March this year. The Government welcomes the Committee's proposed visit in June, as well as Parliamentary engagement more broadly, including recent outward visits by Members of the All Party Russia Parliamentary Group and Members of the House of Lords respectively.

 

Energy security

 

· Are the United Kingdom and the European Union doing enough to ensure that Russia is a reliable energy partner?

· What is the significance of the energy principles agreed under Russia's G8 Presidency and how can we ensure that they are applied consistently to foreign investors in Russia's energy sector?

· How much of a constraint does Russia represent on efforts to develop a more independent energy relationship between the UK and EU and states in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus?

 

The UK government consistently underlines to Russia the importance of being and being seen to be a reliable energy partner. Against the background of disruptions in gas supply from Russia that occurred in January 2006 and oil supply in January 2007, the Government has consistently stated, including in dialogue with Russian partners, how important it is that energy producers and transit states maintain reliability. The Government welcomes the alignment of EU Member States with a statement in support of the principles on global energy security, agreed by the G8 at the St Petersburg summit in July 2006. The EU had an opportunity to discuss the importance of these principles at its Informal Meeting with President Putin in October 2006, and they have remained an active and developing theme in UK/Russia and EU/Russia discussions.

 

The Government also welcomes the agreement by the European Council in March 2007 of an EU Energy Action Plan. The Action Plan sets out the way in which significant progress in the efficient operation and completion of the EU's internal market for gas and electricity and a more interconnected and integrated market can be achieved. This should result in a truly competitive, interconnected and single Europe-wide internal energy market that will have major benefits for competitiveness and EU consumers as well as increasing security of supply. This, as well as the full use of the instruments available to improve the EU's bilateral co-operation with all suppliers, should ensure reliable energy flows into the Union. The Action Plan develops clear guidelines for an effective EU external energy policy.

 

At the July 2006 G8 Summit in St Petersburg, G8 Member States agreed, under Russia's Chairmanship, a set of key principles on the functioning of global energy markets. These include principles derived from the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT): transparency, predictability and stability in global energy markets, and at all stages of the supply chain. The Government supports strongly the consistent application of the St Petersburg principles across all G8 Member States. The Government has also repeatedly underlined to the Russian Government the importance for future security of energy supply of conditions, which encourage and protect investment in new production sources. We reiterated these concerns in the context of the Russian Government's approach to the operating arrangements for the Sakhalin II project. The Government has also re-affirmed the openness of the UK to all foreign investors who are prepared to operate within markets governed by competitive, liberal market principles, most recently during the visit to Russia by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry in February 2007.

 

The Government notes that Russia signed the ECT in 1994, but regrets that Russia has not yet ratified it. The Government notes the particular importance of legally binding agreement on transit arrangements, for which the ECT and its Transit Protocol provide a framework. In its approach to the negotiation of a successor Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Russia, the Government attaches importance to a component on energy that includes legally binding dispute resolution mechanisms.

 

In keeping with the Government's commitment to energy markets grounded in liberal market principles and mechanisms, the Government supports diversity of supply - both of source and export route. The Government believes that the move towards market price levels in the energy sector across Central Asia and South Caucasus is a welcome trend, but believes that a graduated approach would assist the economies of the states in the region. Russia itself advocated such an approach during its economic transition in the late 1990s, in the context of its aspiration to accede to the WTO.

 

International and regional security

 

· What role is Russia playing in the United Nations Security Council and the Non-proliferation regimes and what should the United Kingdom's response be?

· What is the state of Russia's relations with Central Asian and Transcaucasian countries and Ukraine?

· What are the prospects for relations between the enlarged NATO and Russia?

· What is the role of Russia in the Middle East Quartet?

· What are the prospects for Russia's relations with China and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation?

 

Russia plays an important role as a permanent member of the UNSC, G8 and other international organisations and groupings. Russia's foreign policy has become increasingly assertive as its economic strength has grown over the last few years. On a range of international issues, Russia has sought to play a prominent, influential or blocking role. Its foreign policy vision places much emphasis on 'multipolarity' as the key to success in meeting international security challenges. It continues to place a special emphasis on its relations with countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). While recognising that the CIS as an institution has modest (and diminishing) capacity and cohesion, Russia remains acutely sensitive to developments in CIS countries' relationships with Euro-Atlantic countries and institutions. Russia has been explicit in its reservations about the prospects of Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO. And it has been an uncommitted and unsupportive partner in the European Union's efforts to build success and promote modernisation and reform in the region, notably through the European Neighbourhood Policy.

 

Russia's permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is a key element in its foreign and security policy approach. As fellow permanent members, there is close co-ordination between the UK and Russian missions in New York, in addition to regular UK/Russia dialogue on UNSC business in capitals. The UNSC has reached unanimous positions on many issues of concern for the UK, including in recent months on Iran. There are also issues on which Russia differs, such as a recent draft UNSC resolution condemning the situation in Burma, which Russia vetoed. It remains an important aim of British foreign policy to work successfully with Russia to ensure the UNSC operates with maximum effectiveness in addressing threats to international peace and security.

 

It remains an important aim to work for successful outcomes on the major WMD proliferation challenges posed by North Korea and Iran. On these issues, Russia's view has often varied from ours on the timing and nature of economic pressure or sanctions, and on the role that the UNSC should play. But we share the overall aim not to see the emergence of new nuclear-armed states, and we will continue to seek cooperative ways of promoting this objective.

 

Russia is a member of most of the major international non-proliferation regimes (see box below). The UK and Russia maintain a constant dialogue on non-proliferation issues through a variety of international fora.

 

A key part of the UK response to proliferation concerns within Russia is the Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The Programme was launched at the 2002 G8 Summit in Kananaskis with the goal to "prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment and technology". Work was initially focused in Russia and on the four priority areas of destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantling of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials and the employment of former weapons scientists. The UK pledged up to US$750 million over the ten-year life of the programme and has played an important role in all four priority areas. This has been made possible by the establishment of strong relationships with Russian counterparts at the working level. As Russia's economy has strengthened, its contributions have increased and current estimates suggest it will have spent about US$6 billion of its own money by 2012.

 

 

Russia was an original signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Like the UK and the US, is a depositary state. It is one of the five recognised nuclear weapon States.

Russia is also a depositary of The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) along with UK and the US. In 1992, in a joint UK/US/Russian statement, Russia acknowledged inheriting an illegal BW programme from the Soviet Union. More recently Russia has appeared to backtrack and has been reluctant to engage in Global Partnership discussions on projects

related to redirection of BW scientists.

 

Russia is a Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It declared a stockpile of Chemical Weapons of nearly 40,000 tonnes of chemical agent, about 80% of which was highly toxic nerve agent. Work to destroy the stockpile was initially slow. But Russia is now spending far more domestically, and is working to hit their deadline to destroy 20% of their stockpile by 29 April 2007. G8 partners and others have provided substantial financial assistance for this programme through the Global Partnership. Russia recently agreed to improved transparency measures; it and the US will host visits to destruction sites by members of the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Export Control Regimes

Russia is a member of the following export control regimes: Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Zangger Committee, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC). In all of these fora Russia takes an active and robust approach. Russia's membership of these regimes provides regular opportunities for discussion of issues of proliferation concern and on how to improve existing regimes, although the UK and Russia's positions do not always coincide. Issues being discussed at the moment include Iran/DPRK; controls of transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing goods and technology and updating the MTCR Technical Annex. Within the HCOC, Russia contributes by far the most Pre-Launch Notifications (PLNs) of any of the Subscribing States. Russia has expressed interest in joining the Australia Group.

Regarding conventional weapons, Russia is an active member of the Wassenaar Arrangement which aims to promote transparency and greater responsibility in the transfer of conventional arms and dual use goods. During 2007, the Arrangement will undergo a self assessment and we hope to agree a number of measures to improve its role and functioning. Russia abstained from the vote for the Arms Trade Treaty resolution at the UN General Assembly in December 2006. The UK is committed to securing a legally binding treaty to regulate the international trade in arms. We are engaged in a constructive dialogue with Russia on this initiative and are encouraging them to participate in the UN process which is now beginning.
 
 

 

 



Russia, along with the US, retains by far the world's largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Two main bilateral arms control treaties currently drive reductions in these stockpiles: the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) and the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). Under the terms of the latter, both countries will reduce their operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a maximum of 2,200 by 2012 (representing a reduction of around two thirds since the end of the Cold War). However the deals expire in 2009 and 2012 respectively. Bilateral talks on successor arrangement have begun, but there are no clear indications as to whether firm commitments on further numbers reductions will emerge.

 

Recent Russia-US and Russia-NATO interaction on strategic issues has been dominated by US plans to site ballistic missile defence (BMD) interceptors in Poland, with associated radar in the Czech Republic. Russia remains concerned, challenging US argumentation on the location of the interceptors and complaining that BMD could upset the strategic balance in Europe. Moscow does not accept that the proposed sites are demonstrably only intended for - or capable of - defending against a limited missile strike from the Middle East. Following announcement of US BMD plans, senior Russian representatives have repeated public threats to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, under which the US and Russia eliminated all of their mid-range cruise and ballistic nuclear missiles. Russia has also announced a moratorium upon the implementation of the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty. The UK Government does not agree with the linkage that Russia has made between these issues. We will continue to work closely with NATO allies to ensure that all these questions are addressed with objectivity and transparency - including in the NATO-Russia Council.

Russia's priority in international disarmament talks is progress towards a Treaty on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). Their proposals look to many (particularly in the US) to be specifically aimed at restricting any future deployment of missile defences in space. The UK maintains consistent support for the UNGA resolution on PAROS and the associated resolution on Transparency and Confidence Building Measures. The UK could not agree to any measure that could limit the UK's inherent right of self- defence as preserved in article 51 of the UN Charter.

 

Russia actively maintains close relations with the republics of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), both multilaterally through fora such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and bilaterally. Energy plays an important part in this relationship; the Soviet-built pipelines from the Central Asian Republics still run through Russia before the oil and gas can reach European markets. Russia appears to aspire to maintain and strengthen its control over energy exports from the whole region, and its unwillingness to ratify the ECT is in part based on a reluctance to allow the EU an opportunity to access Central Asian gas supplies.

 

The collapse of the centralised planning system following the break-up of the Soviet Union sapped Russian demand for goods from the Central Asian states. However, commerce and trade between the countries and Russia remains important. Russian firms are active across the region, particularly in raw materials sectors. Russia has significant energy investments in Kazakhstan, and is seeking to expand activities in Turkmenistan.

Russia is generally supportive of the incumbent regimes in Central Asia, citing the need to maintain stability in a volatile region. We encourage both Russia and the countries of the region to cement stability through the introduction of true democracy. Russia co-operates with the countries on issues such as terrorism through the CSTO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), one of whose goals is to combat 'extremism, separatism and terrorism'.

 

There is also a high degree of military co-operation between Russia and the countries of the region. There is a Russian military presence in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan as part of deployments under the Collective Security Treaty Organisation.

 

There are many migrant workers from the Central Asian Republics in Russia (Tajikistan estimates that there are up to 800,000 Tajik labour migrants in Russia). There is concern that a new Russian law, which bans foreigners from working in markets, will reduce the flow of remittances back to these countries. Many ethnic Russians also remain in Central Asian countries following the break-up of the Soviet Union.

 

Russia's relations with the countries of the South Caucasus region (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) are complicated by the unresolved conflicts of Nagorno-Karabakh (Armenia-Azerbaijan), South Ossetia (Georgia) and Abkhazia (Georgia). Overall Russian foreign policy objectives towards Armenia and Azerbaijan follows the same broad lines as towards the countries of Central Asia.

 

Relations with Georgia are more tense, particularly since the inauguration of the current Georgian President Saakashvili in 2004. One of President Saakashvili's election promises was to regain Georgian control over the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It is regrettable that there has been little advance towards a peaceful solution to these conflicts. Russia is a member of both the organisations tasked with seeking a solution to these conflicts. But Russia also maintains close contacts with the separatist leaders of these regions and Russian businesses are the main investors there. Russian peacekeepers are present in both regions under cease-fire agreements, but Georgia views the presence of these troops as destructive and would like to internationalise the peacekeeping operations. Tensions between the two countries still flare up publicly. In the course of 2006, Russia banned Georgian wine, water and agricultural products, and closed land border crossings. Tensions escalated in October 2006 when Georgia expelled four Russian army officers whom they claimed were intelligence officers. In response, Russia introduced a series of further economic measures, including the cessation of air links between the two countries, and took measures aimed at Russia's Georgian community. There was also a widespread anti-Georgian campaign in the media. In discussions with both countries, we have encouraged a calm and constructive approach to reducing these tensions.

 

Russia is a member of the Minsk Group which is working towards a solution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia continues to maintain good relations with Armenia, where it is the main foreign investor. Armenia also voluntarily hosts Russian troops. Relations with Azerbaijan have been more variable, as Azerbaijan has pursued a more independent foreign policy, particularly in the energy sector.

Russia's involvement in the politics of Ukraine was evident during Ukraine's presidential election campaign in 2004, when Russia openly backed Viktor Yanukovych's candidature. Ukrainian President Yushchenko's pro-EU and pro-NATO policies strained relations with Russia in 2005-06. The transit of Russian gas through Ukraine to European markets plays a key role in the relationship. Russia cut off gas supplies to Ukraine in January 2006 as the two sides had not been able to agree a gas price for domestic use. The Ukrainian government under Prime Minister Yanukovych appeared to have a better relationship with Russia than his predecessor, and a price for the supply of gas has been agreed until the end of 2007. The Russian Black Sea Fleet is stationed in Sevastopol, Crimea, under a leasing agreement which runs to 2017.

 

NATO currently has 26 members. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union ten former Warsaw Pact countries joined in two waves of Alliance enlargement, in 1999 and 2002. A further three countries (Croatia, Albania and Macedonia) are currently participating in NATO's Membership Action Plan - a programme that prepares aspirants for NATO membership. The decisions on whether each of these countries are ready for membership will be taken at the 2008 NATO Summit.

 

Russia's relations with NATO were formalised with the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. In 2002 the NATO-Russia Council was created, with the aim of bringing a qualitatively new relationship between NATO and Russia. It was conceived to provide a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, co-operation, joint decision and joint action on a wide spectrum of security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region. It meets regularly at Ambassadorial level in Brussels, and there are frequent meetings at Ministerial level. As well as carrying out joint exercises and discussing strategic issues such as counter-proliferation and missile defence, the NATO-Russia Council is the principal forum for discussion of further NATO enlargement with Russia. Russia has expressed no difficulties with the countries currently participating in the Membership Action Plan, but it is clear that it does have concerns about the aspirations of Georgia, and Ukraine, currently in Intensified Dialogue (the stage before the Membership Action Plan). Russia does not have a veto over NATO decisions but we continue, through the NATO-Russia Council, to assure Russia that the principal reason for NATO enlargement is to promote security and stability in the wider Euro-Atlantic region - not to create tensions.

 

Russia, alongside the EU, the US and the UN, is an active member of the Middle East Quartet. Following the election of the Hamas Government, the Quartet, in their 30 March 2006 meeting in London, "noted with grave concern that the new government has not committed to the principles spelled out on 30 January." These principles are of non-violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations, including the Roadmap. As the Hamas Government failed to meet these, the "Quartet concurred that there inevitably will be an effect on direct assistance to that government and its ministries." Russia, unlike the other Quartet members, has engaged a policy of contact with Hamas members. Hamas' political leader Khalid Mishal visited Moscow in February 2007. In doing so, Russia was not in breach of the Quartet principles.

 

 

There is close cooperation between Russia and China on energy projects, economic ties and in the UN Security Council. We welcome good relations and greater understanding between two such key global players - the current negotiations on North Korea's nuclear programme show where this can have concrete results. There are areas of Russia's policy towards China with which we do not agree, for example Russia's arms sales to China. We encourage Russia to act responsibly in its conduct of arms exports, including engaging on the Arms Trade Treaty.

 

Russia pays increasing attention to developing the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In recent years, the SCO's focus has moved beyond its original task of promoting cross-border security and confidence building to encompass an ambitious, if loosely-defined, agenda for economic and security co-operation. The Presidents of Russia and China agreed to expand and deepen trade and economic cooperation among the SCO members during President Hu's visit to Moscow in March this year. The extent to which this will develop remains unclear.

 

EU-Russia relations

 

· What are the prospects that the EU-Russia Partnership and Co-operation Agreement will be successfully concluded and will prove an effective framework for the pursuit of UK aims vis-a-vis Russia?

 

The EU has still to agree that talks can begin on a successor to the current Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA). Poland has made clear it is unwilling to approve the mandate (thus enabling negotiations to be launched) while a Russian ban on imports of Polish food remains in place. Lithuania is similarly reluctant for talks to start until Russia resumes oil supplies to Lithuania's only oil refinery. These concerns have coincided with difficulties experienced by Estonia following the relocation of a Soviet War Memorial from the centre of Tallinn - though the Estonians have not called for PCA talks to be delayed as a result.

 

We believe that Russia should lift its ban on Polish food exports. We support Presidency and Commission efforts to resolve the dispute. We also understand why disruptions to the oil supply to Lithuania cause the Lithuanians such concern. The disruption affects supplies to their only oil refinery, whose operation accounts for a significant proportion of GDP. We believe that Russia should look to resolve this issue speedily. We believe the location of war memorials in Estonia is an internal matter for Estonia. We recognise the right of the Estonian Government to relocate war memorials and war graves; and we note that in this case the relocation was done with sensitivity and respect. The Estonian Prime Minister himself attended a ceremony commemorating all the victims of World War II, and held partly at the new site of the statue, on 9 May. More widely, we were particularly concerned about the violent demonstrations aimed at the Estonian Embassy in Moscow, as well as the attack on the Estonian Ambassador. We fully supported the EU Presidency and NATO statements, which called for Russia to fulfill its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

 

We nevertheless continue to believe that it would be better for talks to open on a successor to the PCA sooner rather than later. The talks will provide a framework for us to engage Russia, critically as well as cooperatively, on issues of substance. And despite the delay to the start of talks, there is broad agreement on the text of the mandate among EU member states. The negotiating mandate covers all the areas that matter to us: democracy, human rights, energy, international issues, counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism, and trade. It calls specifically for effective dispute settlement mechanisms. During negotiations on the mandate, the UK ensured there were clearly agreed mechanisms for Member States to oversee and advise on the negotiations.

 

The future of the British Council and BBC World Service

As they report in a separate memorandum to the Committee, the British Council has a network of Centres across Russia and runs a comprehensive programme of cultural, educational and scientific events in Russia. Events during 2006 included the Whistler Exhibition, the development of the BRIDGE programme of partnerships in higher education, and a Zero Carbon City exhibition. In Russia, however, the British Council has, over recent years, experienced numerous legal, administrative and practical difficulties operating in the country as a result of intervention by the Russian authorities and continuing absence of an agreement (see below) to clarify the Council's legal status. We have frequently raised these issues with the Russian authorities at both official and Ministerial levels.

 

The Prime Minister was delighted to be able to open the Council's new offices in St Petersburg in July 2006, indicating the importance the Government attaches to the Council's work in Russia. We welcome the prospect of the opening of a Russian Cultural Centre in the UK, not least to allow Russian language learning and teaching to flourish here. Given the mutual benefits of cultural exchange, we would like to agree a Cultural Centres Agreement (CCA) with Russia. We have worked closely with the British Council for nine years to negotiate an agreed text with Russia. A text was agreed at official level with Russia in 2001, but was not signed. In March 2006, Russia submitted a revised text. Officials in the Foreign & Commonwealth Office and the British Embassy, Moscow have continued to work actively with the British Council towards an agreement. We assisted the British Council to prepare negotiations on the text in Moscow in January this year, and jointly negotiated the text with the British Council during face to face talks with the Russian authorities. The text has been largely agreed with the Russian authorities, but they are currently reluctant to guarantee consent, under the terms of the Agreement, for the British Council to establish centres (which already exist), outside Moscow. Among other things, successful conclusion of this Agreement will clarify the Council's legal status in Russia and reduce the potential for the hostile treatment it has undergone at the hands of some parts of the Russian bureaucracy.

 

The BBC World Service has also submitted a separate Memorandum to the Committee on their activities in Russia. The Government believes that the BBC World Service plays an important role worldwide as an authoritative source of independent news. Given the decreasing plurality of print and broadcast media over the last few years, this is particularly important in Russia. The BBC has a professional Russian Service. Some of its programmes discuss topics rarely raised in the Russian media scene (e.g. climate change), and with speakers who are often unable to appear on mainstream Russian media outlets.

 

At the moment the BBC Russian Service broadcasts on Medium Wave and through an increasingly popular internet service. It was unable to broadcast on FM in Moscow for a number of months earlier this year - and is still unable to broadcast on FM in St Petersburg. We believe that an FM frequency is important for the BBC Russian Service to reach their audience.

 

We remain in close contact with the BBC World Service on handling this issue with the Russian authorities. During a previous interruption to BBC World Service transmission in 2006, the former Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, raised the issue with the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Mr Lavrov undertook to investigate personally and the matter was speedily resolved. The Ambassador has raised this issue on a number of occasions with the Foreign Ministry, and the Embassy is in regular touch with the BBC on the matter. We and the BBC are mindful of the need to balance (a) the benefits of further lobbying on behalf of the BBC with (b) the risk of the BBC being wrongly perceived as an arm of the British government. The BBC are working on these issues themselves, but we stand ready to raise continuing difficulties with the Russian authorities when deemed necessary.

 

 

Human rights and democracy

 

· How can the UK and the international community best promote human rights and the rule of law in Russia?

 

International efforts to promote human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Russia are often challenging. Russia has not made the democratic progress that optimistic observers in the mid-late 1990s had hoped for. However, the UK Government is committed to continue its bilateral and multilateral engagement with the Russian Government, its support for civil society, and its financing of project work, to advance international standards in Russia. Whilst the Russian authorities acknowledge certain deficiencies, they remain combative in defence of the democratic path that Russia is taking and their adherence to international human rights standards. The FCO set out a range of concerns about human rights, democracy and rule of law in Russia in its Annual Report on Human Rights, released on 12 October 2006. The Russian Foreign Ministry responded to our report in a statement on their web site:

"Unfortunately, the section devoted to Russia ... as in previous years, is based on distorted conceptions of the actual state of affairs, and it abounds in gross errors and references to unverified sources. The facts cited in the document have been collected under previously formulated conclusions which are of a purely political nature.

Our position regarding tendentious criticism of Russia ... has been explained to our British colleagues on several occasions at various levels, but it would appear that the United Kingdom's foreign policy department has developed the determined practice of ignoring it. One gains the impression that London has still not realized that it is counterproductive and fruitless to try to apply "double standards" in the field of human rights, as it is to politicize the subject of human rights.

 

Since the publication of our report there have been further negative trends:

· The murder of Anna Politkovskaya in October 2006.

· UN Committee against Torture November conclusions of "numerous, ongoing and consistent allegations of acts of torture committed by law enforcement personnel".

· Russian NGOs suffering under the bureaucratic burden of NGO legislation.

· Restrictions on the participation of some political parties in local elections.

· Restriction on, and heavy handed policing of, political demonstrations.

 

The Government regularly discusses the progress of democratic reforms and human rights in Russia with the Russian authorities, including at Ministerial level. We take this approach because we believe that an open and democratic Russia will provide better opportunities for Russians and consolidate Russia as a stable and reliable international partner. We invest significant effort and resources in support of the promotion of human rights in Russia through international institutions such as the EU, the UN, the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the G8.

 

In addition to ad hoc engagement on specific human rights questions, we hold regular and structured bilateral human rights dialogues with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The most recent round of talks took place at the FCO on 22 and 23 January 2007. The FCO Minister responsible for Human Rights, Ian McCartney, headed the UK delegation. The talks covered a broad range of our human rights issues including; Russia's adherence to its international obligations; violations in the North Caucasus; the environment in which NGOs and civil society operates; media freedom; torture; independence of the judiciary and treatment of minorities. We had a constructive and practical exchange on the question of how to respond effectively to racially-motivated violence - a problem of topical relevance in both countries.

Another example of the Government's commitment to human rights in Russia is the dialogue that we maintain with NGOs and civil society in Russia. In addition to ongoing working level contacts, five FCO Ministers, including the Foreign Secretary, met with a number of Russian NGOs during 2006. The Government also supports practical projects in co-operation with local and international NGOs and the Russian Government. The aim of these projects is to promote international human rights standards in Russia. In financial year 2006-07, the FCO committed approximately £1,000,000 to projects in the field of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Our funding last financial year, for example, helped extend a system of public prison inspectors and supported the Russian Union of Journalists in their defence of journalists' rights. We are concerned about the regularity with which Russian official representatives complain that other governments' support of NGOs is part of a subversive or hostile agenda. We have made particular efforts to show that the mechanisms and objectives of all our support for NGOs in Russia are entirely open and transparent.

 

The EU holds structured human rights consultations with Russia twice a year, which enable in-depth discussion of a wide range of our concerns. Strengthening human rights cooperation will be an important objective for the EU in the negotiation of a successor Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. We made a special and successful effort during our 2005 EU Presidency to secure President Putin's agreeement to the EU's €20m TACIS Special Programme for the North Caucasus. Implementation of this programme was finally agreed in September 2006. We will continue to see this as an important and developing role that the EU can play in helping to apply recipes for socioeconomic development and success in a troubled region.

 

Russian and UK approaches diverge on a number of issues addressed by UN human rights fora. The UK Government will continue to work to ensure that UN human Rights machinery continues to make an effective contribution to the promotion and protection of human rights, including in Russia.

 

The Council of Europe in Strasbourg is another key forum in which we engage with Russia on human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Council of Europe monitoring mechanisms encourage Russia's fulfilment of its commitments and obligations as a member State. Russia's membership also gives its 140 million citizens access to the European Court of Human Rights. We believe that a key mechanism to improve the Court's effectiveness is Protocol 14. This measure would reduce the number of sitting judges on each case and thus alleviate the significant backlog in cases before the court - including those lodged by Russian citizens. Although the Russian Government has stated its support for this measure, the Russian State Duma failed to ratify it in December 2006.

 

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) deals with three "dimensions" of security - the politico-military, the economic and environmental and the human. A few OSCE states, including Russia, have expressed concern about the balance between the OSCE's three dimensions. They allege that there is too much emphasis on the human dimension and are particularly uncomfortable with the organisation's election observation work. We believe it is important that OSCE has the autonomy to carry out its mandate on election observation work separate from the politics of member States. Russia's discomfort appears to be increasing as their parliamentary and presidential elections approach.

 

Terrorism

· How should the UK and international community engage with Russia to tackle extremist threats?

 

As elsewhere, where terrorists have made attacks in Russia, they are indiscriminate and have in the past targeted heavily populated areas frequented by foreign nationals. British citizens were taken hostage, and later released unharmed, during the Dubrovka theatre siege in Moscow in 2002. The threat from terrorism in Russia comes from extremist groups linked to the Chechen separatist cause. The continuing instability in and around Chechnya has radicalised many Muslims in the North Caucasus. A number of factors contribute to the instability, including popular discontent with poor socio-economic conditions, corruption, ethnic and clan-based tensions, as well as ongoing security problems related to the recent history of conflict in the region.

 

International terrorists, especially senior figures in Al-Qaida, have claimed the Chechen separatist cause as a jihad. A relatively small number of foreign extremists have in the past participated directly in the conflict but now external support is largely confined to propaganda messages posted on jihadist web-sites. The financial, material and human support which was thought to have been provided to separatist groups from individuals in the Middle East has subsided.

 

The Government acknowledges the real security threat Russia faces, and we work with Russia to address it in United Nations Security Council, G8 and OSCE, as well the EU-Russia Troika format and the NATO-Russia Council. In all of these fora, the United Kingdom, Russia and the rest of the international community engage on a range of counter-terrorism measures and activities designed to tackle the extremist threat. The UK and Russia also continue to address the full range of counter-terrorism issues on the international agenda through the work of the G8, not least in the Roma Lyon Group. Examples include tackling incitement by assisting the United Nations to get UNSCR 1624 (see below) implemented by third countries, tackling the growing problem of radicalisation and recruitment, improving transport security, addressing the need to protect critical energy infrastructure and tackling terrorist financing.

 

We have consistently reminded both federal and local authorities bilaterally and through the EU that all security measures must be combined with full respect for human rights. Security measures that do not respect international humanitarian law are counter-productive, and a long-term solution to the problems in the North Caucasus is only possible once an end has been put to human rights violations. HMG has welcomed the current Russian administration's public commitment to tackling the problems, which may contribute to radicalisation and recruitment to extremist causes. But progress has been slow. Within Russia there is a growing problem with racist, xenophobic and extremist activity, especially in large urban areas. There are also credible reports that the police routinely target Caucasian and Central Asian men. The President's Special Representative for the Northwest Federal District announced that during 2006 the number of extremist crimes in the district has risen by 127 per cent. Ella Pamfilova, Chair of the Presidential Council on Human Rights, has also protested that many racist attacks have been labelled as "hooliganism", meaning that those prosecuted are rarely convicted of committing an offence on the more serious charge of ethnic hatred.

 

There has also been widespread concern about the Russian government's attempts to combat extremism through domestic legislation, including fears that the law may be applied to restrict critics or political opponents and that amendments were passed with minimal consultation. Although some of the law's provisions are to be welcomed, most campaigners against racism in Russia agree that the problem is not the wording of previous legislation, but its implementation. HMG continues to raise these and similar issues with the Russian authorities, most recently at the UK-Russia Human Rights Consultations in January 2007. Since 2001 we have held several bilateral Joint Working Groups on counter-terrorism with the Russian authorities. These have led to constructive discussions on radicalisation and recruitment, as well as important work on countering terrorist financing.

 

In their April 2006 report on "Tolerance and Combating Extremism in Russian Society" the Russian Public Chamber identified socio-economic factors as one of the driving forces behind extremism and picked out education as the key to solving potential conflicts. This mirrors the Prevent strand of the UK government's counter-terrorism strategy. HMG is actively assisting development in the North Caucasus through our bilateral £1 million North Caucasus Education Initiative, individual projects supported through the Global Conflict Prevention Pool and the Global Opportunities Fund. At the United Nations, Russia was very supportive of the UK in calling for adoption of UNSCR 1624 by the Security Council. UNSCR 1624 is a UK initiative that calls upon all states to continue and enhance an international dialogue aimed at preventing the indiscriminate targeting of different religions and cultures, to counter the incitement of terrorist acts motivated by extremism and intolerance, and to prevent the subversion of educational, cultural and religious institutions by terrorists and their supporters.

 

HMG remains concerned about allegations of torture and illegal detention during counter-terrorism operations, which have been made against security forces in the North Caucasus. The UK unreservedly condemns the use of torture. We work hard with our international partners to eradicate this abhorrent practice. International action against torture has been a priority for the UK Government since the launch of the UK Anti-Torture Initiative in 1998. The FCO has intensified its efforts to combat torture wherever and whenever it occurs through diplomatic activity, practical projects and funding for research. The British Government, including the intelligence and security agencies, never uses torture for any purpose, including to obtain information. Nor would we request others to do so.

 

The granting of asylum in the UK in 2003 to Akhmed Zakayev, whom Russia has accused of terrorist-related activity in his role as a prominent Chechen separatist leader, has caused significant tensions in the UK-Russia relationship. Representatives of the Russian government have accused HMG of double standards and of harbouring terrorists. HMG continues to assert the importance of the rule of law and independence of the judiciary. Mr Zakayev was granted asylum after due assessment by the relevant authorities of his case and of the UK's obligations under the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees and domestic law. A grant of asylum does not imply support from the UK Government for an individual's views, activities or statements. We have noted Mr Zakayev's statement aligning himself with the events in Nalchik in 2005, and deplore such sentiments. There can be no circumstances in which it is right to condone or encourage acts of terrorism.

 

Climate security

 

· How is Russia responding to climate change and how are the EU and UK engaging with Russia on this issue?

 

Russia is the world's third largest greenhouse gas emitter. This is despite the fact that emissions are currently some 40% lower than 1990 levels (the Kyoto benchmark). Russia's energy intensity per unit of GDP is almost three times higher than the OECD average. Electricity and heat generation account for approximately 60% of all Russian GHG emissions. The IEA estimates that in 2004, 70 billion cubic metres of gas were lost during the transmission process or flared at source. This equates to just over one third of annual Russian gas exports. There are therefore significant gains to be made in energy efficiency in Russia. It is also important to secure Russia's commitment to action on climate security as an impetus for Brazil, India and China to do likewise.

 

Russia has been slow to recognise the impact which climate security will have on its economy. Risks include the damage to forestry and agricultural sectors, as well as oil and gas pipelines, caused by melting of the permafrost and flooding. Russia has been quicker to recognise the benefits of improved energy efficiency, which was made part of its agenda during its presidency of the G8 in 2006. Russia has huge scope for energy efficiency improvements (particularly in the oil and gas sector as well as in other industry and domestic heating). Gas flaring is substantial (Russia is the second-worst global offender, after Iran), with around 28% of associated gas wasted. Russia's Energy Strategy to 2020 aims to lower Russia's energy consumption by 50%. However, substantive practical action by Russia is absent. The Kyoto Protocol's flexible mechanisms offer the potential for significant foreign investment in energy efficiency in Russia and government approval of Joint Implementation guidelines is imminent.

 

The Government works with Russia bilaterally and multilaterally to promote implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and action on climate security. In February 2007 the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and Viktor Khristenko, Russian Minister of Industry and Energy, met in Moscow and agreed to establish a UK-Russia Energy Forum. The Secretary of State said that work needed to be done on energy efficiency, reducing gas flaring and investigating carbon capture techniques and Khristenko agreed that these were important areas.

 

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office currently has a number of bilateral Global Opportunity Fund projects on climate security in Russia. The projects aim to promote change in the governance and use of energy resources and systems to help secure the UK's global climate change objectives. Our projects in Russia include: promotion of energy efficiency and greenhouse gas emissions reduction in combustion plants; sustainable energy training for Russian decision-makers; and supporting the development and implementation of renewable energy laws in Russia. The FCO has also targeted the scientific and economic debate surrounding climate security, to encourage continued commitment to Kyoto, to improve Russia's forest management and to raise the profile of climate security with government, business, academia and the public.

 

In the EU context, the energy efficiency working group of the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council on Energy has developed an Action Plan focussing on comparison of legislative and regulatory frameworks in the area of energy efficiency and energy savings, in order to exchange experiences and identify areas for improvement. The EU and Russia hosted a joint seminar in Moscow in April to discuss post-2012 action on climate change, and the inclusion of language in the PCA successor with Russia will be a further means to promote attenuating the risks of climate change.

 

The EBRD is a substantial investor in Russian energy efficiency, having invested around $1bn in the Russian power sector to date, and aims to invest a further $1.5bn in energy efficiency over the next three years through its Sustainable Energy Initiative. As part of this initiative, and with DFID funding, the EBRD is working on studies of the potential for deployment of clean coal technologies in Russia, and on an analysis of the challenges involved in investment in energy efficiency projects in Russia, particularly on the demand side.

 

The Government also works with Russia on climate change through the G8 and its mechanisms. Climate security will be a key issue at this year's G8 summit in Heiligendamm. We are working closely with and through the German Presidency on these issues. The Gleneagles Dialogue group is also following up on the commitments made during our G8 Presidency in 2005. Integral to this follow up is the International Energy Agency (IEA). The IEA's current work programme with Russia (with the participation of the European Commission and EU member states) incorporates technology co-operation through Russian involvement in the IEA's Implementing Agreements for energy R&D, development of energy efficiency indicators as part of the Gleneagles Plan of Action, and increasing dialogue with Gazprom on energy saving and reform in the gas sector.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Annex 1: THE BRITISH EMBASSY

 

OVERVIEW

 

1. Moscow is a large overseas mission, with 70 UK-based and 210 locally engaged staff. The UK-based work for 5 different government departments, agencies or joint directorates. FCO staff account for around 50% of the total.

 

2. Responsibility for the UKTI operation throughout Russia is held by Moscow, operating in conjunction with the Consulates-General in St Petersburg and Ekaterinburg. The British Council, which operates as the Cultural Section of the Embassy, has a network of centres in Moscow, St Petersburg and across Russia.

 

3. The Missions' work is directly linked to all but one of the FCO Strategic Objective (the exceptions being SP10 - Dependent Territories). The 2006/07 post objectives are attached.

 

COUNTER TERRORISM/WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) (SP1)

 

4. The Embassy maintains an active dialogue with the Russian authorities on a range of proliferation and arms control issues, from the Iran nuclear programme to negotiations on an Arms Trade Treaty. The Embassy also plays a key role in managing the implementation of UK-funded Global Partnership projects.

 

5. There is no direct terrorist threat to the UK emanating from Russia, though Russia faces a terrorist threat from extremists linked to the Chechen separatist cause. Post maintains an active dialogue with the Russian authorities on a range of Counter-Terrorism issues, which feed into the broader dialogue between capitals, both bilaterally and multilaterally.

 

INTERNATIONAL CRIME (SP2)

 

6. The Embassy has a team with representatives from SOCA and HMRC dedicated to co-operation with the Russian authorities for mutual benefit. They focus on liaison with host law enforcement agencies on threats from organised international crime that may adversely impact on the UK. This is achieved by close co-operation on intelligence gathering and operational fronts.

 

7. Notable recent successes include:

 

¨ close co-operation on high-tech crime with long sentences imposed on 3 Russian hackers (8 years each) who extorted millions from UK online companies.

¨ excellent cooperation with Federal Drugs Control Service against international cocaine and weapon smugglers.

¨ The Kirov Project, which promoted British policing values to future law enforcement personal from the Russian Federation.

 

 

CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION (SP3)

 

8. Post maintains a regular dialogue with key Russian interlocutors, including in the Foreign Ministry, the Presidential Administration, and the Security Council on issues related to conflict and conflict prevention.

 

9. Post, together with other Allied embassies, is engaged in promoting the benefits and further potential of the NATO Russia Council. As well as dialogue with the Russian authorities, this includes public diplomacy to highlight the advantages of Russia and NATO working together, for example to counter terrorism and in Afghanistan.

 

10. Post also supports continued reform of the Russian Armed Forces through a more productive Military-Military relationship, including by continuing to prepare personnel leaving the Russian Armed Forces for worthwhile civilian careers.

 

11. Post engages directly with the Russians, on the 'frozen conflicts' and other aspects of the Russian relationship with Georgia, aiming to promote and support constructive dialogue.

 

12. The North Caucasus has been identified as a priority area for projects under the Global Conflict Prevention Fund. Post also uses a proportion of its Bilateral Programme Budget in support of activities which will contribute to normalisation and, therefore, conflict resolution in the region.

 

 

EU (SP4)

 

13. Post maintains a regular dialogue with key Russian interlocutors, including in the Foreign Ministry and the Presidential Administration, to promote co-operation and inform Russian policy on the EU, particularly on issues such as the successor to the EU-Russia strategic partnership agreement, and the energy relationship. In addition, the Post regularly discusses with key Russian interlocutors, the Common Neighbourhood, including frozen conflicts in Georgia and Moldova, and Ukraine and Belarus.

 

 

SUPPORT FOR UK ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS INTERESTS (SP5)

 

14. As an emerging market, Russia is now a priority for trade and investment activity under the new UKTI Global Strategy. Post offers a wide and growing range of services to companies seeking to export or invest in Russia. Output of our major product (On-line Market Information Service reports) rose 16% last year. In 2006 the UK was the largest source of foreign investment in Russia. Post has a close and active relationship with the UK business community in Russia. It assists companies with difficulties, through lobbying and other activities.

 

15. Post organises Ministerial visits to promote trade and investment and engage on economic reform issues. Alistair Darling's visit in February, with the most senior CBI delegation ever to come to Russia, revived the Inter-Governmental Steering Committee on Trade and Investment, and established a new UK-Russia Energy Forum. The Lord Mayor's vist in April, also with a senior business group, promoted the City as a provider of financial and related services.

 

16. The 06/07 Whitehall Survey of Economic Work ranked Moscow as the number 1 major Post for economic reporting, and number 2 for economic policy work. The Survey described Post's Economic Governance programme under the Global Opportunities Fund as "rightly respected as one of the most productive in the Network". Last year this programme delivered £350K of projects supporting the dissemination of best principles and practices across a range of economic policy issues.

 

 

CLIMATE SECURITY (SP6)

 

17. The Embassy helps drive forward the UK's climate security agenda. We lobby in support of UK positions, particularly with regard to the UNFCCC negotiations and G8 processes, and inform UK policy-making and negotiating positions by regular reporting.

 

18. The Embassy works to secure Russian commitment to Kyoto, including post 2012, to move forward the scientific and economic debate on climate security, and to encourage improved energy efficiency. We manage a £760,000 portfolio of Global Opportunities Fund projects supporting all these objectives. We are also engaged, working with DEFRA and DFID, on the crucial linked issue of improved forestry management.

 

 

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT/DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE (SP7)

 

19. The Embassy actively engages in dialogue with civil society organisations across Russia to support their work. These organisations work in a wide range of areas, including democratic development, access to a free media, improving the rule of law, and monitoring the situation in the North Caucasus.

 

20. Post maintains a constructive and frank relationship with the Russian Government on these issues, including regular bilateral human rights consultations, which last took place in January 2007. The next round of these will take place in Moscow. The Embassy also regularly raises human rights issues directly with contacts at all levels.

 

21. Through the Global Opportunities Fund (GOF) and Bilateral Programme Budget the Embassy supports partners from civil society, NGO and government-affiliated bodies. With this support our partners implement projects focusing on human rights issues such as torture, freedom of expression and access to justice.

 

22. The DFID bilateral programme in Russia was completed on 31 March 2007 and the devolved DFID office located in the Embassy in Moscow was officially closed. Programme closure reflects a changing nature of DFID's engagement with Russia. Although DFID will continue to support the Government of Russia's governance reforms through provision of DFID funds to a World Bank public administration reform programme, the main focus will be to enhance UK-Russia dialogue on important global issues such as climate change, energy efficiency and sustainable development. DFID will also support Russia with it development aspirations as an emerging donor. DFID will resource a First Secretary Development to work within the Economic Section of the Embassy on these issues.

 

 

MANAGING MIGRATION (SP8)

 

23. Visa applications in the Russian Federation are rising year on year by approximately 20%. Last year, we processed approximately 120,000 visas. Outsourcing was introduced in 2006, and has contributed to continued achievement of PSA targets.

 

 

SUPPORT FOR BRITISH NATIONALS ABROAD (SP9)

 

24. There are an estimated 10,000 British nationals resident in Moscow alone, and a much larger number in the Russian Federation as a whole. Accurate numbers are difficult to specify as not all residents register with the Embassy despite frequent notices and invitations to do so. There is also a substantial transient population, comprising people on short-term contracts, consultants and company representatives who move in and out of the country on a regular basis.

 

25. The Consular Section processed 711 passport applications in FY 2006/07 and has consistently met PSA targets. Assistance activity is relatively low level, and mostly focuses on lost passport replacement, assistance with expired visas, and occasional assistance to people taken ill or for sudden deaths. There are currently no British national prisoners in the Russian Federation.

 

PROGRAMME WORK

 

26. The British Embassy in Moscow supports work on Strategic Priorities 3,5,6,7 through programmes funded mainly by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office but also other Whitehall departments. The principle programmes are the Global Opportunity Fund (GOF), Global Conflict Prevention Pool, Public Diplomacy Fund and Bilateral Programme Budget. Climate change, human rights and economic governance are the main focus of our project work. But the Bilateral Programme Budget enables us to support a wider range of Post Objectives and Strategic Priorities. A full time UK based officer is responsible for co-ordination and oversight of project activity across Russia with programme management devolved to specialists in the relevant sections of the Embassy. Post aims to exploit linkages across projects and programmes in order to maximise the success and impact of our activities..

 

MANAGEMENT ISSUES IN MOSCOW

 

27. The Estate comprises offices and residential accommodation with recreational facilities on a single compound, plus the Residence and some staff accommodation in another compound, and off-compound housing for around 50% of the UK-based staff. The main compound at Smolenskaya Naberezhnaya was built in the late 1990s and the Embassy moved to the new site in 2000.

 

28. The Residence at Sofiiskaya Naberezhnaya (which formerly also housed the Embassy) is currently under complete refurbishment. While this work is going on, HMA is housed in the building which formerly accommodated the DHM and Defence Attache. Refurbishment work is expected to be completed by the end of 2008.

 

29. The Embassy contains a clinic headed by a Regional Medical Adviser. Tour lengths in Moscow are a standard three years. Staff at C4 and above serve a minimum of three years with the option to bid for a fourth year. Staff at Bands A and B serve three years, with a fourth year being granted only in exceptional personal or operational circumstances.

 

 

BUDGET

 

30. The local budget for 2007-08 is £6.1 m.

 

 

SECURITY

 

31. There is a continuing very high espionage threat. Embassy staff remain subject to harassment and surveillance from the Russian Security Service. The threat from crime is moderate; theft is quite common. Drink-spiking is a major concern - one member of staff was the victim of a serious attack a few months ago. Terrorism presents a moderate threat, but there have been no major attacks in Moscow since two outbound airliners were blown up with serious loss of life in 2004.

 

 

THE BRITISH EMBASSY POST OBJECTIVES 2006/07

 

1. To increase UK-Russian co-operation on Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferation (including implementation of the Global Partnership), terrorism, drugs and organised crime, so reducing the threat to the UK.

 

2. To support continued reform of the Russian Armed Forces through a more productive Military-Military relationship, including by continuing to prepare personnel leaving the Russian Armed Forces for worthwhile civilian careers.

 

3. To promote EU/Russia co-operation and dialogue, including on democracy and security in the neighbourhood.

 

4. To achieve progress in resolving regional conflicts by political engagement on frozen conflicts in neighbouring countries, and support to conflict prevention in the Northern Caucasus.

 

5. Through briefing, advice and logistical support, to contribute to a smooth, effective, and well-informed G8 process under the Russian Presidency, producing summit outcomes that meet UK objectives.

 

6. To develop a strengthened bilateral dialogue, facilitating delivery of HMG's strategic policy objectives, underpinned by a constantly improving understanding of political activity and thinking in Russia.

 

7. To support the development of Russian civil society, with particular emphasis on encouraging respect for human rights, promoting the rule of law and supporting freedom of expression.

 

8. To promote understanding and support for HMG's policies, especially FCO Strategic Priorities, in Russian media and amongst informed public opinion. Build a positive image of the UK amongst opinion formers by creating and using public diplomacy opportunities. Promote a coherent and positive view of contemporary Britain by co-ordinating HMG public engagement with that of British Council, Visit Britain, and other PD partners, and by implementing the recommendations of the Carter Review of public diplomacy.

 

9. To promote our economic interests, by promoting better economic governance; by developing our a Global Opportunities Fund economic governance programme; deepening our engagement on energy issues; promoting the City as a centre of excellence among Russian businesses; and producing timely, high quality economic reporting for a diverse Whitehall audience.

 

10. To bring to a satisfactory conclusion DFID programmes at federal and regional level supporting public administration reforms, particularly social and public health reforms that will help improve the livelihoods of poor people.

 

11. To support energy reform through an enhanced energy dialogue under the new Permanent Partnership Council, which will enhance efficiency and security of supply to the UK, improve business opportunities for UK firms.

 

12. To contribute to global climate security by promoting improved energy efficiency, the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol in Russia, and post 2012 commitment, including through GOF projects and public diplomacy opportunities.

 

13. To facilitate the implementation of the UK's £37m p.a. Global Partnership Programmes in Russia, thereby ensuring the successful delivery of major projects in the areas of Chemical Weapons Destruction and nuclear non-proliferation, security and safety.

 

14. To provide a high quality service to British companies and institutions seeking to develop their business in Russia, and enhance the competitiveness of British companies through trade and hi-tech collaboration.

 

15. To deliver high quality, cost-effective entry clearance services that meet UKVisas targets on service delivery and timing and Best Practice requirements, and to maximise co-operation with the Russian authorities.

 

16. To continue to meet Citizen's Charter targets for all consular activities, by providing accurate, up-to-date information to the visiting and expatriate British community, and maintaining prompt, efficient and considerate service standards.

 

17. To promote the UK migration agenda and raise awareness and engagement on migration issues with the relevant Russian authorities.

 

18. To operate the Mission effectively and efficiently, by optimising the human, financial, technical and security resources available, developing staff capacity and skills bases, achieving year-on-year efficiencies and making full use of Value For Money savings.

 

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

 

May 2007