United Kingdom Parliament
Publications & records
Advanced search
 HansardArchivesResearchHOC PublicationsHOL PublicationsCommittees
Select Committee on Defence Eleventh Report


2  Overview of Strategic Lift

Strategic Lift and Tactical Lift

5. Strategic Lift covers the movement of personnel, equipment and stores to an operational theatre, whereas Tactical Lift covers the movement within an operational theatre.[4] These definitions have become blurred in recent years. For example, in the past Strategic Lift aircraft used to fly to a benign location outside the operational area and the personnel, equipment and stores would be transported into the operational area by tactical transport which provided some protection against enemy action by means of tactics and defensive systems. However, Strategic Lift aircraft, such as TriStar and C-17, now fly from the UK into the middle of the operational theatre. Aircraft such as Hercules, which provided the Tactical air-lift, are also now being used in the strategic air-lift role. AVM Leeson accepted that there had been some blurring of the boundaries between Strategic Lift and Tactical Lift:

our various aeroplanes have the flexibilities and capabilities to operate in a strategic way as well as, in some cases, a tactical way. The nature of the operations means that we need to cover quite a wide spectrum.[5]

6. The MoD estimates that Strategic Lift tasks cost almost £800 million a year. In 2006-07, some £700 million was spent on strategic air-lift, some £70 million on strategic sea-lift, and some £10 million on Strategic Lift infrastructure.[6]

Strategic Lift requirements in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review

7. The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) published in July 1998 stated that:

We cannot at present deploy Joint Rapid Reaction Forces quickly enough to meet operational requirements in the changed strategic environment, nor is commercial shipping or air-lift likely to be available in sufficient quantities to meet rapid deployment deadlines, although it will have an important place in transporting follow-on forces.[7]

We have an urgent need to improve our strategic transport, to allow us to move more powerful forces quickly to an overseas theatre. In the short term we expect to do this through acquiring four additional roll-on roll-off container ships and four large C-17 aircraft or their equivalent. In the longer term, we will also need to consider a replacement for our remaining elderly transport aircraft. The European Large Aircraft is a contender for this requirement.[8]

8. The following table provides the MoD's overview of the progress made to date in meeting the SDR requirements for Strategic Lift.

Table 1: MoD's overview of the progress in meeting the SDR requirements for Strategic Lift
Strategic Lift requirement in the SDR MoD's overview of progress
Four roll-on roll-off container ships "The SDR stated a requirement for a four-ship Ro-Ro capability. This was converted into a PFI [Public Finance Initiative] for six Ro-Ro ships, which entered service between 2002 and 2003".
Four C-17 large aircraft or their equivalent "In 2000, we contracted with Boeing to lease 4 C-17 aircraft and announced last year [2006] our intention to procure these aircraft at the end of their lease in 2008. We are also procuring a fifth C-17, to enter service next year [2008]".
European Future Large Aircraft "The Committee will also be aware of our plans to procure 25 A400M aircraft to replace the C-130K Hercules currently in-service with the RAF".

Source: MoD[9]

9. We examine below the Ro-Ro container ships and the four C-17 transport aircraft, and the progress in acquiring the 25 A400M aircraft, later in the Report (Parts 3, 5 and 6).

Current Strategic Lift assets

10. The MoD has a range of assets which can perform Strategic Lift tasks. These are set out in Table 2 below. At any one time, a proportion of these assets will be unavailable for use owing to routine maintenance or other reasons, such as being withdrawn for modifications.[10]

Table 2 : The MoD's current Strategic Lift assets
Assets Quantity Lift Capability Procurement route / Ownership
Roll-on Roll-off container ships 6Freight Private Finance Initiative [PFI] arrangement
Landing Ship Dock (Auxiliary) vessels 4Freight and passenger MoD owned (3 in service, 1 being fitted out)
C-17 aircraft4 Passenger and freight Leased until 2008, then purchased
TriStar C2 aircraft 3Passenger MoD owned
TriStar KC1 aircraft 4Passenger, freight and tanker MoD owned
TriStar K1 aircraft 2Passenger and tanker MoD owned
VC-10 CMk1K aircraft 10Passenger, freight and tanker MoD owned
C-130K Hercules Mk3 aircraft 20Passenger and freight MoD owned
C-130K Hercules Mk1 aircraft 4Passenger and freight MoD owned
C-130J Hercules Mk4 aircraft 14Passenger and freight MoD owned
C-130J Hercules Mk5 aircraft 10Passenger and freight MoD owned

Source: MoD[11]

Future Strategic Lift assets

11. The MoD plans to have the following Strategic Lift assets in 2017 and also expects these assets to be in service in 2027:

12. The MoD also plans to have the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (FSTA) in service by the turn of this decade which should be available to undertake some Strategic Lift tasks. We examine the progress on the acquisition of the FSTA in Part 7 of the Report. Vessels which are expected to be procured under the Military Afloat and Sustainability (MARS) programme, may also contribute to the MoD's Strategic Lift capacity.[13]

Options for Strategic Lift

13. For operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, Strategic Lift is provided by either sea or air because of the distances involved. Strategic land-lift using lorries has been used for moving equipment and stores, for example during operations in Bosnia, but is not a viable option for operations in Afghanstan and Iraq. We asked what were the key factors which were taken into consideration when choosing between sea-lift and air-lift. Brigadier Mason, Director Defence Supply Chain Operations and Movements, told us that:

As long as one has the timelines with the preparation and planning, and applies an element of foresight to the plan, one will look at what one can move by sea to the operational theatre, because that means moving much greater volumes and it is better value for money. But there will come a time when we are into routine sustainment where we have to send high priority stores by air and we will always move Pax [people] by air. I suppose it comes to the decision points and timelines of planning and operation.[14]

14. It is important that decision-making by the Government and the military customer is quick enough to allow the option of using sea-lift as an alternative to air-lift. Brigadier Mason said that he sought to "influence" the military customer to make decisions early so that sea-lift could be used. He said that there had "been occasions when that has been difficult to do, but in the main we have managed to achieve it". Air-lift was generally used to transport Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) to the operational theatre as they were needed quickly.[15]

15. Strategic sea-lift enables large volumes of defence equipment and stores to be transported to operational theatres in the most cost-effective way, but early political and military decision-making is needed if sea-lift is to be possible. We recommend that the MoD identify how the speed of its decision-making could be improved further in order to maximise the use of sea-lift.

16. One of the Members of the Committee had flown to Afghanistan earlier in the year on a C-17 transport aircraft and had been surprised to see that bunk beds and flat packs of building timber were being transported.[16] AVM Leeson considered it "highly improbable" that there would be an emergency requirement for such things because they were not in short supply, although local sourcing in Afghanistan was difficult.[17] Brigadier Mason suspected that the explanation was that "there was space to be filled and rather than fly fresh air we moved stock".[18] The MoD subsequently informed us that:

There was a flight on the 15 Feb 07 that contained cargo that was to be used for Force Protection purposes, including re-enforced bunk-beds to protect the incumbent in the event of insurgent indirect fire…. it was determined that the equipment was required in theatre as quickly as possible and air transport was the quickest available method.

17. Strategic air-lift is an expensive option for transporting equipment and stores when compared with strategic sea-lift, but is the fastest option for transporting equipment and stores needed urgently in theatre. When using strategic air-lift, the MoD must ensure that the lift capacity of aircraft is fully utilised, giving priority to the equipment and stores urgently needed in theatre. However, where spare capacity is available, it makes sense to transport other items which are not needed as urgently, rather than "fly fresh air".

18. We were surprised to hear that Warrior armoured vehicles were to be flown to Afghanistan rather than transported by sea-lift. AVM Leeson acknowledged that using air-lift was an expensive way to move "sizeable items like heavy armour". However, he told us that "moving warlike stores through third countries obviously gives rise to interesting intelligence as well as political issues and we try to avoid that where we can".[19]

19. We asked about the difficulties of transporting equipment through third countries. AVM Leeson considered that

our record so far is simply exceptional. We have had tremendous support significantly from the Kuwaiti and Pakistani governments in terms of permitting us to operate through commercial ports, and by and large we use commercial transport arrangements.[20]

The MoD confirmed that there had, to date, been no significant issues regarding air transport through third parties and "the same is largely true of shipping". Equipment transiting Pakistan by road to Afghanistan had generally moved freely.[21] We note that the transportation of equipment through third countries to support current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has generally not caused any problems.


4   Ev 44 Back

5   Q 2 Back

6   Ev 47-48 Back

7   Cm 3999, Supporting Essay Six, Future Military Capabilities, para 18 Back

8   Ibid., Chapter 5, para 96 Back

9   Ev 45 Back

10   Ev 44 Back

11   Ev 44-45 Back

12   Ev 45 Back

13   Ibid. Back

14   Q 6 Back

15   Q 8 Back

16   Qq 10-11 Back

17   Ibid. Back

18   Q 10 Back

19   Q 9 Back

20   Q 12 Back

21   Ev 50 Back


 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2007
Prepared 5 July 2007