Table 2: A decision on renewing the deterrent needs to be made now: arguments for and against

For	Against
The UK's Trident submarines are designed to operate for 25 years. A five-year life extension may be possible, but extending the lives of the boats beyond 30 years will not be practical or cost-effective.
	The United States is planning to extend the life of its Trident submarines to 45 years. The UK may be able to conduct a similar life extension programme, allowing decisions to be deferred.
It is not possible for the UK to conduct a US-style life extension programme. US submarines are designed and operated differently. The US has 14 Trident submarines whereas the UK only has 4 boats, so the UK has no redundancy in the system to guarantee one boat on patrol at all times.
It will take around 17 years to procure a new generation of Trident submarines. A new submarine is required by 2024 if the UK is to maintain continuous deterrent patrols. Decisions are required in 2007.
	The UK's current Trident submarines only took 14 years to design, build and commission. There is no reason why it should take longer this time around. Decisions are not required now and could be deferred for a number of years.
The Vanguard-class boats were designed, built and commissioned in 14 years from the decision to acquire the Trident system, but this did not include the time taken to do initial concept work. This time around, the concept work has not yet started. Also, safety and regulatory standards have been raised over the last 25 years.
	There is some evidence that initial design and concept work has already begun.
There have been significant changes in the UK's submarine industrial base since the last Trident submarines were built resulting in a reduction in submarine-building capacity. Procurement for a new boat will take longer than for the Vanguard-class boat.
	If the UK decided to build a new submarine based on the design of existing boats, the procurement time would be reduced. Decisions could be delayed.
Designing submarines is complex. Even if the design of a new submarine was based on the UK's existing boats, the substantial and time-consuming redesign work would be necessary.
Decisions are needed now otherwise the UK's submarine industrial base will not survive. If a gap in production between submarines develops, the UK will lose essential skills which will not be possible to replace. The UK will then no longer be able to produce or support any kind of nuclear-powered submarines, or the cost will become prohibitive.
	Although there would be an impact upon local communities, other industries can be encouraged to invest in the affected regions.
Decisions on whether to participate in US plans to extend the life of its Trident D5 missiles are required in 2007.
	The Government has provided no evidence to support this claim. It appears that the Government has already decided to participate in this programme in advance of the Parliamentary debate on the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent.

13. In our first report on the future of the United Kingdom's strategic nuclear deterrent, published in June 2006, we considered the likely timetable for decision-making on the deterrent and concluded that the key driver in the decision-making process was the limited life of the Vanguard-class submarine. The other elements of the Trident system—the Trident D5 missile and the nuclear warhead—did not appear to be decisive factors in defining that timetable. Decisions on those elements were not required imminently.[8]

14. In the White Paper, the Government states that "the timetable for decision-making is driven by our assessment of the life of the elements of the existing Trident deterrent system and the time it might take to replace them".[9] The submarine platform, it concludes, is the decisive factor in determining that timetable:

if we are to maintain unbroken deterrent capability [a nuclear-armed submarine at sea at all times] at the end of the life of the Vanguard-class submarines, we need to take decisions now on whether to replace those submarines.[10]

15. The White Paper also states that "decisions…are required by 2007" on whether the UK participates in US Government plans to extend the life of its Trident D5 missile.[11] But it confirms that decisions on the UK's nuclear warhead are not required at this stage as the existing design "is expected to last into the 2020s".[12]

16. In this part of the report, we examine the Government's assertion that a decision on the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent is needed now. This has been the subject of considerable debate.

The Government's assessment of the timing of decisions

The life of the Vanguard-class submarine

17. The White Paper states that the Vanguard-class submarine was built for "an original design life of 25 years". It says the Government has "undertaken detailed work to assess the scope for extending the life of those submarines".[13] But it notes that

our ability to achieve this is limited because some major components on the submarines—including the steam generators, other elements of the nuclear propulsion system and some non-nuclear support systems—were only designed for a 25-year life.[14]

The Government concludes that "by revalidating those components, it should be possible to extend the life of the submarines by around five years" to a maximum of 30 years.[15]

18. In response to our request for clarification on the out-of-service dates for each boat in the Vanguard-class fleet—with and without a life extension—and for an explanation of how these dates were reached, the MoD provided the following information.

Table 3: Expected out-of-service dates for Vanguard-class SSBNs

	Commencement of Sea Trials/Reactor went critical	Out of Service Date (no life extension)	Out of Service date (with life extension)
HMS Vanguard	1992	2017	2022
HMS Victorious	1994	2019	2024
HMS Vigilant	1996	2021	2026
HMS Vengeance	1999	2024	2029

Source: MoD

19. The MoD states that "these dates are based on the date that the reactors on the four submarines first went critical".[16] It says that the dates reflect "the original design life of the submarines…of at least 25 years" and "our assessment of the maximum additional in-service life that we believe it is currently prudent to assume can be achieved through a life extension programme".[17] According to the MoD, this assessment was based upon its "experience of operating the Vanguard-class submarines, experience with other classes of submarines, the results of discussions with our internal experts, and the views of industry".[18]

20. The Government maintains that beyond the point at which the second boat, HMS Victorious, is withdrawn from service, "continuous deterrent patrols could no longer be assured…if no replacement were in place by then".[19] It argues that a successor submarine would need to enter service in 2024 in order to maintain continuous-at-sea deterrence.[20]

21. The White Paper states that extending the life of the Vanguard-class submarines beyond 30 years would be a substantial technical undertaking with considerable risk and cost implications. It maintains that

Any further extension of the life of the submarine would mean that the key components described previously would need to be replaced or refurbished, and this would require a major refit of the submarines. This would not extend the lives of the submarines much further and would not therefore be cost effective.[21]

It also warns that "past experience with UK submarine programmes suggest that even a 5-year life extension will involve some risk," with boats experiencing "a significant loss of availability and increase in support costs towards the end of their lives".[22] On this basis, the White Paper concludes that

while we believe it should be possible to extend the life of the Vanguard-class into the 2020s, we believe that it would be highly imprudent now to plan on the basis that it will be possible to extend them further.[23]

Further information about the risk as well as the cost implications of a five-year life extension of the Vanguard-class submarines are considered in Chapter 6.[24]

THE SUBMARINE PROCUREMENT TIMEFRAME

22. The White Paper maintains that the Government "considered carefully how long it might take to design, manufacture and deploy replacement submarines" and concludes that a "reasonable estimate" would be "around 17 years from the initiation of detailed concept work to achieve the first operational patrol".[25] The Government says a Vanguard successor is required in-service by 2024 if the UK is to maintain continuous deterrent patrols. On that basis, a 17-year procurement timeframe means that "detailed concept work on renewal of our deterrent needs to start in 2007 if we are to avoid a gap in deterrence at the end of the life of the Vanguard-class submarine".[26] The White Paper says that the 17-year procurement estimate "reflects the judgment of industry and is consistent with US and French experiences".[27]

23. In our first report on the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent we concluded that a life extension of the Vanguard-class submarine "would allow the UK to postpone decisions on whether to replace Trident until around 2010," based on the assumption the "procurement of a Trident replacement would take approximately 14 years"—the same length of time it had taken to procure the original Trident system.[28]

24. The White Paper acknowledges that procurement of the Vanguard-class submarine did indeed take "some 14 years from the decision to purchase Trident in 1980 to the system being deployed operationally in 1994". But it maintains that "in the preceding decade a good deal of initial concept work had already taken place," which reduced the time which was required after the decision was taken to purchase Trident.[29] The Government says that concept work for a Vanguard successor has not yet started and so a longer procurement timeframe is required.

25. The White Paper also states that a new SSBN is likely to take longer to design and manufacture than the Vanguard-class because of changes in the capacity of the UK's submarine industrial base, which is considerably smaller now than in 1980. It maintains that the procurement timetable must ensure that a production gap does not develop between the end of the Astute-class SSN build programme and the beginning of construction on the new SSBN, otherwise design skills would be lost.[30]

26. The implications of a gap in production between the Astute-class SSN and any potential Vanguard successor, and the associated risk of losing key skills in the UK's submarine industrial base, were issues we considered in our second report on the future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent. We concluded that the UK submarine industry draws on a uniquely skilled and specialist workforce and that retaining those skills would be essential if the UK wanted to continue to design and build nuclear submarines. We stated that the skills base was now at a critical level and that any further erosion of the workforce may have significant implications for the future of the submarine programme. We also noted that the gap between the Vanguard and Astute programmes had had a debilitating effect on the UK's submarine industry and that if the Government wanted the UK to continue to design and build nuclear-powered submarines, it would be essential to maintain a regular rhythm of production. Decisions on the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent should be taken on the strategic needs of the country, not on industrial factors. However, whilst industrial considerations should not affect the substance of decisions, they will necessarily affect the timing of those decisions. It is not unreasonable for the Government to take these factors into account.

Views on the White Paper's timing assumptions

The life of the Vanguard-class submarine and the procurement timeframe

27. The assumptions about both the life of the Vanguard-class submarine and the procurement timetable contained in the White Paper are contested. Some commentators suggest that the Vanguard-class submarine could be maintained in-service for far longer than the 30 years anticipated by the MoD. They suggest that since the United States plans to extend the lives of some of its Ohio-class Trident submarines to 45 years, the UK could do likewise with its Vanguard-class Trident boats, allowing decisions on the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent to be postponed for several years.

28. Professor Richard Garwin, an American physicist with extensive experience of the US nuclear weapons programme, told us that the decision to replace the Vanguard-class submarines was "highly premature".[31] In written evidence to our inquiry, he and his colleagues argue that decisions on the future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent do not need to be taken imminently since it is "likely that the Vanguard-class submarines can safely and economically be operated for 40-45 years rather than 30".[32] The American Ohio-class SSBNs, they argue, are older and are worked harder than the UK's Vanguard-class SSBNs. The UK's boats, they argue, "are still relatively young" and "improved management of their water chemistry could drastically extend the steam generator lives".[33] They suggest that the 25-year design life, cited by the MoD, actually represents a "minimum design life" for the Vanguard-class submarine.[34]

29. This argument is also made by the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), which suggests that, by adopting "a more conservative base life expectancy" for the Vanguard-class submarine, the Government brought forward the decision-making timetable. According to BASIC, the decisions set out in the White Paper are "premature and can be delayed for a further 8-10 years".[35] Similarly, the Oxford Research Group argues that the Government's life expectancy for the Vanguard-class is "surprising" given that "a less intensive deployment regime," introduced by the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, "might be expected to increase longevity".[36]

30. Dr Eric Grove, a defence policy analyst and naval expert at the University of Salford, argues that although the White Paper generally "presents a good case for retention of an SSBN-based deterrent," he is "far from convinced" that an American-style life extension programme would be "such a difficult option" for the Vanguard-class submarine. He suggests that any attempt to use "past experience" with previous generations of UK submarines to draw lessons for the life extension of the Vanguard-class is "questionable". Dr Grove also argues that "even if the White Paper's arguments are indeed sound, one might question the policy of building SSBNs for a life span much shorter than that expected by our closest ally for its similar assets".[37] Similarly, the Scottish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament says that the relevance of the White Paper's conclusions about reliability and availability, it implies, are open to question.[38]

31. We asked Professor Garwin how he would respond to the manufacturing and skills base implications of a decision to prolong the life of the Vanguard-class submarines to around 45 years. He told us that "the question of the skills base and the manufacturing plant…is a big problem". However, he considered it possible to build nuclear-powered submarines at the rhythm of one every four years, rather than every two years as suggested by industry and the MoD, while maintaining an adequate skills base. In evidence to our second-stage inquiry on the future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent, the MoD argued that a 22-month drumbeat for submarine construction is required and that a longer interval would endanger the UK's manufacturing and skills base.[39]

32. Critics of the White Paper also question the 17-year timeframe for the procurement of a successor SSBN. The Oxford Research Group argues that concept work on a Vanguard successor has already begun. The organisation cites a written answer of 30 June 2004 in which the then Secretary of State for Defence stated that concept studies on options for platforms to carry the Trident missile in the longer term had been undertaken between May 2002 and May 2003 at a cost of around £560,000.[40]

33. Other commentators, however, support the White Paper's conclusions. Witnesses from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) argued that there is no contradiction on the life expectancy of the Vanguard-class submarine between the White Paper and earlier Government documents. The 30-year life mentioned before the White Paper, they say, "consists of a standard 25-year service life, plus an option for a life extension of up to five years". They acknowledges that "what appears to be new in the White Paper is the inclusion of two years of sea trials in the life of the submarines", but suggest that "this is understandable, as the life should indeed be measured from when the hull and the reactor first began operating".[41]

34. The RUSI witnesses accept that it may be technically feasible to extend the life of the Vanguard-class submarine beyond 30 years, but they argues that "past experience has shown that defects and costs rise sharply following refit of older submarines". And they maintain that this "could lead to the last years of the class being spent fighting unreliability and increasing costs, while struggling to maintain a credible deterrent".[42] Dr Lee Willett, of RUSI, told us that

there is nothing technically impossible about doing this, but the risks and costs do increase considerably while availability actually declines, so in the end you get very little return in terms of life extension.[43]

These risks and costs, he argued, "grow sharply towards the end of life and through the extended life cycle in particular".[44]

35. Dr Willett challenges Professor Garwin's suggestion that the UK could extend the life of its Vanguard-class submarines as long as that of the US Ohio-class boats. According to Dr Willett, the US boats are designed for a longer life, they have more regular and thorough maintenance, and they are subject to a different safety regime. Dr Andrew Dorman, of King's College London, agrees that "there are a number of weaknesses in [the] argument" that if the US has extended the lives of its boats so can the UK. Direct comparisons, he insists, are not possible the since the boats are "built to different designs" with "differing safety requirements based on differing reactor authorising bodies" and "have been operated differently". Moreover, Dr Dorman maintains that the fact that the Americans have a greater number of SSBNs means that "if a fault does begin to emerge in one or two boats they will still be able to maintain their deterrent". By contrast, "the much smaller size of the British force means that there is little built in redundancy and such risks cannot be taken". He argues that "this was clear at the end of the lives of the Polaris fleet which struggled to continue in service whilst the Vanguard-class was built". Dr Dorman, therefore, concludes that "the government line is…plausible given available information".[45]

The Government's response

36. In evidence to us, the Secretary of State for Defence confirmed that the Government plans to embark on a five-year life extension of the UK's fleet of Vanguard-class submarines. Mr Browne stated that although he believed it to be "imprudent, indeed risky, to plan any greater life extension…it does not mean that we have fixed the actual date for each submarine for when it leaves service". Instead, the scheduled out-of-service date "forms the basis upon which we plan the programme to replace them with the new class of submarine".[46]

37. The MoD's memorandum of 1 February also outlines which components of the submarine are "critical" in limiting the service life of the submarines. It states that

Life extension much beyond 5 years is likely to require replacement of some of the systems critical to submarine operations, such as external hydraulic systems, elements of the control systems (plane and rudder), sonar systems, electrical systems (including main battery) and refurbishment or replacement of elements of the nuclear propulsion system… Extension to both component safety justifications and the whole reactor plant safety justification would also be required (and could not be assured). Other systems would need careful assessment and replacement of the turbo generators, secondary propulsion gear and assemblies, deterrent missile hydraulics, hatches and mechanisms, might be required. There would also be increasing risks with the reliability of other major systems, including potentially the main engine, gearbox shafting and propulsor, all of which could require replacement.[47]

According to the MoD, the replacement of these major components "would involve some hull penetrations" and "would require extended additional maintenance periods". The consequence would be a "loss of boat availability and significant cost". However, the MoD's view was that this "would not enable significantly increased life" of the submarines.[48] The MoD says it does "not at this stage completely rule out further life extension of the Vanguard-class," but its judgement was that "on current evidence it is highly likely to represent poor value for money". It also notes that there is "serious concern" as to whether further life extension will be "technically feasible".[49] Ultimately, it argues that

given the severe uncertainties associated with life extension beyond the 30 year point, it would be grossly irresponsible not to start concept and assessment work in time to ensure we can field replacement submarines when the Vanguard-class reaches the 30-year point.[50]

38. The Secretary of State for Defence told us that "this is…an issue about maintaining [a] key national capability…and the level of risk we are willing to take with that capability". The threat of losing boat availability, and thus of compromising the continuous-at-sea deterrent posture, Mr Browne told us, was "at the heart of our decision-making process". In his judgement, the kind of life extension suggested by Professor Garwin "would entail too much risk to our national security" and "would be poor value for money".[51]

39. Mr Browne also told us that comparisons with the US Ohio-class boats were "not particularly useful or indeed relevant".[52] They were planned for a different life, were a different design and were built and maintained specifically for a longer life. Rear Admiral Andrew Mathews, Director General Nuclear at the MoD, told us that "Ohio started off with a more modern design". The United States, he argued, "made a decision about up-front investment to generate that life by using a different material from that which we do" which "puts them at a different sort of place in terms of trade-offs through life". According to Rear Admiral Mathews, the MoD was "driven quite hard in terms of unit production cost at the outset, so we set ourselves a design time-line and built a submarine to meet that". The Americans, by contrast, "built some fat into their design" and therefore "have the ability to take some risks with their programme".[53]

40. One key difference between the US and UK submarine deterrent programmes is that the UK seeks to operate a continuous-at-sea deterrent with just four boats whereas the United States is "generating two or three hulls from 14". According to Rear Admiral Mathews, this gave the US "a considerable amount of flexibility about how they operate their submarines, what decisions they can make through life and the balance of risk they can take". He argued that generating "one from four is much tougher". It was not the case, he told us, that the UK's SSBNs were at sea for less time than American SSBNs. In fact, he maintained that the UK's boats were "comparable with the US Ohio-class" in terms of their operational availability.[54]

41. Rear Admiral Mathews also stated that, from experience, the availability of nuclear submarines "reduces through life". He told us that in the first 20 years "it typically reduces by about five to seven % across that period". However, he stated that "once we have gone beyond 20 years, the three classes which we have got operating records for…show that we lose availability of around ten to 15 percent over the next ten years, which is in addition to that five to seven percent". This was "a significant drop in availability" which "falls off fairly sharply". Rear Admiral Mathews told us that the Swiftsure SSN had "not been good in terms of availability" during "those last difficult years". Similarly, in the early 1990s with the Resolution-class SSBN, he stated that "we were really struggling to maintain one boat out at sea" and commented that "I do not think it would be conceivable that we would be successfully maintaining the continuous-at-sea deterrence with that class of submarine now". He concluded that "we know from experience that, in getting towards 30 years, four boats becomes very tough in terms of generating one" and, on that basis, "we do not believe that the risk equation supports taking the Vanguard-class beyond 30 years".[55]

42. In evidence, Rear Admiral Mathews told us that a 17-year procurement timetable "is the time we believe is the minimum needed" to design and build a new ballistic missile submarine.[56] According to Admiral Mathews, it would take

about two years to get through our concept stage…about seven years to design, seven years to build, and then the final bit is taking it on sea trials, testing it, proving it, training the crew, putting the missiles in, test-firing the missile and putting it on operational patrol: total duration 17 years.[57]

43. The White Paper states that decisions are required now on the future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent. It says that the life of the current deterrent platform, the Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarine, was designed for a service life of 25 years, which could be extended to 30 years with a life extension programme, albeit not without some risk. It maintains that procurement of a new submarine will take around 17 years. On this basis decisions are required in 2007. Some witnesses to our inquiry challenged the Government's timetable. On life extension, the evidence we received from critics suggested the Vanguard-class, like the US Ohio-class Trident submarine, could be maintained in service for up to 45 years. The Government has told us that to plan for life extension beyond 30 years would be unwise, given the 25 year design life of the Vanguard-class, the operational demands placed upon it in order to maintain continuous deterrent patrols, the experience of the declining reliability and availability of previous submarines beyond the 25-year point, and the design and construction differences between the Vanguard and the Ohio-class submarines.

44. A procurement timetable of 17 years is three years longer than for the existing Vanguard-class submarine. The Government says that the additional time is required because of changes in the capacity of the UK's submarine industrial base and because initial concept and development work on the Vanguard-class was already underway when the Government of the day announced its decision to acquire the Trident system. The Government says that no such work has yet begun on a Vanguard successor and that Parliament is being consulted at a much earlier stage than on previous occasions.

45. The challenge to the Government's estimate of 17 years is partly based on the suggestion that work has started on "concept options for platforms", whereas the government timetable commences with the "detailed concept work". We take it that these two things are different and accept that the 14-year period which we commented on in our previous inquiry commenced from a more advanced stage in the procurement cycle (years rather than months away) after a period of detailed concept work had been carried out.

The timing of decisions on the Trident II D5 missile

46. The White Paper states that decisions on the future of the Trident II D5 missile are also required now. It says that the United States Government "plans to extend the life of the Trident II D5 missile to around 2042 to match the life of their Ohio-class submarines". It says that this "will involve the manufacture of a number of new missiles and the modernisation of the existing missiles". The Government states that this "work will focus entirely on replacing components of the system" and that "there will be no enhancement of the capability of the missile in terms of its payload, range or accuracy". The White Paper states that

Unless we participate in that life extension programme, it will not be possible to retain our existing Trident D5 missiles in service much beyond 2020, except at much greater cost and technical risk. Decisions on whether or not we should participate are required by 2007.[58]

47. In an exchange of letters between the Prime Minister and the US President on 7 December 2007, Mr Blair stated that

we have decided that we will replace the Vanguard submarines with another class of submarines in the 2020s, and would like these submarines to continue to carry the Trident II D5 missiles…Accordingly, we wish to participate in the planned life extension programme for the Trident II D5 missile, which we understand is intended to extend the life of the missiles into the 2040s.[59]

48. The Prime Minister also sought an assurance that "we can, if we so choose, maintain a nuclear delivery system, with US assistance, for at least the remainder of the life of our successor submarine force". He also stated that "the United Kingdom wishes to ensure that any successor to the D5 system is compatible with, or is capable of being made compatible with, the launch system for the D5 missile, which we will in the meantime be installing into our submarines". Consequently, the Prime Minister stated that

there would be merit in the United Kingdom having the opportunity to participate, at an early stage, in any programme to replace the D5 missile, to match the potential out of service date of our new submarines.[60]

49. The reply from the US President stated that the United States "continues to attach great importance to the maintenance of an operationally independent nuclear deterrent capability by the United Kingdom". It also said that

the United States fully supports and welcomes the intention of the United Kingdom to participate in the life-extension program for the Trident II D5 missile. We will work to ensure that the necessary components of the overall system are made available to the United Kingdom to support life-extended D5 missiles…For the longer term…I would invite the United Kingdom to participate, at an early state, in any program to replace the D5 missiles or to discuss a further life extension—for your purposes—of the D5 missile to match the potential out-of-service date of your new submarines. In this respect, any successor to the D5 system should be compatible with, or be capable of being made compatible with, the launch system for the D5 missile, which you will be installing into your new submarines. The United States will also ensure…that the United Kingdom has the option to sustain an effective nuclear delivery system for at least the life of your successor submarine force as was done with the Polaris system.[61]

50. Neither the White Paper nor the exchange of letters between the Prime Minister and the US President in December 2006 explain adequately why decisions on UK participation in the Trident D5 missile life extension are required by 2007. The Government should clarify why decisions on the missile are required now.

9   Cm 6994, para 1.2, p 9 Back

10   Cm 6994, para 1.11, p 11 Back

11   Cm 6994, para 1.9, p 11 Back

12   Cm 6994, para 1.10 p 11 Back

13   Cm 6994, para 1.3, p. 9 Back

14   Ibid. Back

15   Ibid. Back

16   Ev 123 Back

17   Ibid. Back

18   Ibid. Back

19   Cm 6994, para 1.3, p 10 Back

20   For the MoD's explanation of why continuous-at-sea deterrence ends when the second boat is withdrawn from service, see Chapter 2, para 12 Back

21   Cm 6994, para 1.4, p 10 Back

22   Cm 6994, para 1.5, p 10 Back

23   Cm 6994, para 1.5, p 10 Back

24   See paras 114-115 Back

25   Cm 6994, para 1.7, p 10 Back

26   Ibid. Back

27   Ibid. Back

28   HC 986 (2005-06), para 110, p 29 Back

29   Cm 6994, para 1.6, p 10 Back

30   Ibid. Back

31   Q 136 [Garwin] Back

32   Ev 93 Back

33   Ibid. Back

34   Ibid. Back

35   Ev 97-98 Back

36   Ev 146 Back

37   Ev 168-169 Back

38   Ev 87-89 Back

39   Ev 92-96 Back

40   HC Deb, 30 June 2004, col 358W and Ev 147 Back

41   Ev 113 Back

42   Ev 113 Back

43   Q 141 Back

44   Ibid. Back

45   Ev 181-183 Back

46   Q 322 Back

47   Ev 123 Back

48   Ibid. Back

49   Ev 124 Back

50   Ibid. Back

51   Q 316 Back

52   Q 314 Back

53   Q 319 Back

54   Q 318 Back

55   Ibid. Back

56   Q 405 Back

57   Q 398 Back

58   Cm 6994 para 1.9, p 11 Back

59   Annex 2 Back

60   Annex 2 Back

61   Annex 2 Back