APPENDIX 3
Memorandum submitted by RMT
INTRODUCTION
1. The National Union of Rail, Maritime
and Transport Workers (RMT) welcomes the opportunity to provide
written evidence to the House of Commons Transport Committee inquiry
into "Passenger Rail Franchising".
2. The RMT organises over 73,000 members
in all sectors of the transport industry and with over 45,000
members employed in the rail industry, the RMT is the largest
of the rail unions.
SUMMARY
3. RMT's support for public ownership of
the rail network is well documented. We are firmly of the view
that the current franchising regime is fragmented, financially
opaque, poor value for money and provides the train operators
with no incentive to commit long-term investment in station upgrades,
improvements and enhancements. In short the current arrangements
have failed the travelling public. RMT believes that passenger
franchises should be returned to the public sector as expire.
4. There should be greater transparency
in the franchising process. Specifically we believe that Invitation
to Tender documents should be made publicly available and that
rail trades unions should be included in the list of organisations
that can access bids once they are lodged.
5. Financial risk should be held by the
private sector. Recent "cap-and-collar" franchise awards
continue to expose the public purse to inappropriate levels of
risk. The policy of indemnifying train operators from losses incurred
as a result of industrial action should be scrapped.
6. RMT supports vertical integration of
the rail network in the public sector but is opposed to private
sector horizontal fragmentation of Network Rail's safety and operational
powers and responsibilities over the national railway infrastructure.
7. The dispute over open access on the East
Coast Main Line demonstrates a lack of strategic leadership in
the provision of passenger services. The Government should resolve
the structural flaws which have led to the dispute in the 2007
Rail White Paper.
What should be the purpose of passenger rail franchising?
8. Franchises should provide punctual, accessible
and reasonably priced services to the travelling public. However,
a series of reports have supported RMT's view that the current
franchising arrangements are fragmented, heavily subsidised by
the public purse, poor value for money, with fare and ticketing
structures that are too expensive and unnecessarily complex.
9. The Transport Select Committee's April
2003 report: The Future of the Railway found "The
network is now being run by a patchwork of companies, which operate
in a variety of ways, with a variety of incentives. It is not
for us to judge whether more efficient companies could have performed
more creditably; however, the number of franchises in difficulties
suggests something is fundamentally wrong with the structure of
the industry".
10. The July 2005 National Audit Office
report: Maintaining and improving Britain's railway stations
points out that there is no overarching strategy or single organisation
leading on the modernisation of Britain's stations. In February
2006 the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee (PAC) confirmed
that "the number of bodies involved in maintaining and improving
stations has led to a fragmented approach, lacking overall leadership
and strategic focus". RMT believes that the current franchising
arrangements act as a disincentive for operators to invest in
station improvements and enhancements, particularly when the franchise
is in the last few years of life.
11. The September 2005 Catalyst working
paper: the performance of the privatised train operators
explains that initial post-privatisation Government estimates
of the level of public subsidies required to fund the franchisees
had proved to be "hopelessly optimistic". The report
concluded "These companies (the ToCs) are totally dependent
on subsidy for their financial survival. They could not cover
their operating costs, let alone provide a return to the providers
of finance, without generous public subsidies".
12. The May 2006 Transport Select Committee
report: How fair are the fares? Train fares and ticketing
confirmed the RMT's longstanding view that, 10 years after the
break-up of passenger services, the franchises operate a fare
and ticketing regime that has been an "abject failure"
which is "not fit for purpose".
13. RMT believes that over the past decade
the franchises have failed to deliver what they are designed to
do. That is to provide passengers with a quality service. We are
strongly of the view that Government should return franchises
to the public sector as they fall due.
How well does the process for awarding franchises
work?
14. RMT believes that the time and energy
expended by management teams drawing up bids to retain franchises
is an unnecessary distraction from the task of providing a good
service to the travelling public. In an interview with the Times
on 20 April 2004 Michael Holden, the then managing director
of South Eastern Trains, made the point that "bidding for
franchises takes management time and time is the most precious
commodity we have. We have been able to declutter the agenda and
focus everyone on running the railway better".
15. In addition the franchising and re-franchising
process has proved to be expensive; two parliamentary questions
indicating that over £60 million has been spent franchising
passenger serivces.
John McDonnell: To ask the Secretary of State
for Transport what total costs have been incurred by the Government
and Government agencies in the franchising and tendering of passenger
rail services since 1997. (176270)
Mr McNulty: Between April 2001 and April 2004
the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) has spent £40.7 million
on franchise replacements and extensions. This includes the full
costs of tendering and implementation. Prior to the SRA's inception
in 2001 total spend, in the period between 1998 and April 2001,
on franchising was £6.095 million. (7 June 2004)
John McDonnell: To ask the Secretary of State
for Transport what total costs have been incurred by the Government
and Government agencies in the franchising and tendering of passenger
rail services since April 2004. (29262)
Derek Twigg: Costs incurred in the specification
and tendering of passenger franchise services since April 2004
are £14.4 million. (22 November 2005)
16. Furthermore, the process for awarding
franchises is insufficiently transparent. In February 2005 RMT
requested a copy of the Integrated Kent Franchise (IKF), Invitation
to Tender document. The request was rejected on the grounds that
disclosure would, or would be likely to prejudice the commercial
interests of the SRA or of others. The SRA concluded that it would
not be in the public interest to make the ITT's available and
told RMT that the Stakeholder Briefing Document which had previously
been made publicly available, "sets out in some detail what
the SRA is asking of bidders".
17. The Invitation to Tender documents were
finally released to the RMT after the franchise had been awarded
to Govia. There were some important differences between the ITT
and the Stakeholder Briefing Document. Bidders were asked to consider
changes to ticket retailing policies and procedures. As the Committee
will be aware, South Eastern Trains had already brought forward
proposed Schedule 17 changes to booking office opening times and
staff numbers, which had led to industrial action ballots being
called by RMT and, our sister rail union, TSSA.
18. Bidders were also told not assume any
limit on the extension of Driver Only Operation (DOO), except
on the CTRL west of Ebbsfleet where an additional person per unit
will be required for emergency evacuation in the event of an incident
in the long tunnels on this section of the route. The ITT goes
on to say "should bidders propose to extend DOO, then their
bid must clearly show the cost of any infrastructure or rolling
stock enhancement and their industrial relations handling plan".
(Emphasis added). RMT contends that these differences between
the ITT and the SBD represented a key reason for the refusal of
the SRA to make documents publicly available. Huge sums of public
money, in the form of Government subsidies, are available to successful
bidders. RMT therefore believes that Invitation to Tender documents
should be made publicly available in order that stakeholders can
scrutinise the assumptions and criteria that bidders are being
asked to make.
19. The ITT also deals with disclosure of
information contained in the bids. It lists a series of bodies
and organisations that, once a bid is submitted, can access the
information in the bids, excluding commercially sensitive information.
The organisations in question include DfT, Treasury, HSE, TfL,
LCR, Network Rail, ORR, RPC, Regional Planning Bodies, affected
Local Authorities and the Disabled Persons Transport Advisory
Committee. However, trades unions are excluded from the list.
As representatives of the railway workforce affected by re-franchising
exercises RMT believes that the trades unions should be added
to the list of organisations that can access information contained
in bids.
Are risks suitably apportioned between the Government
and the franchise holders?
20. The 2003 Transport Select Committee
report: The Future of the Railways maintained "The
new generation of franchises must be structured in a way which
prevents franchisees returning for ever more public money, and
ensures that costs are properly anticipated and controlled. Revenue
risk should be assumed by the private sector wherever possible".
21. RMT has on a number of occasions expressed
the view that on both the privatised rail network and in relation
to the Public Private Partnership on London Underground, risk
is not appropriately transferred to the private sector. The Virgin
West Coast and Virgin Cross Country "cost-plus" contracts
are but two examples of where services are provided for a guaranteed
rate of return to the franchise holder.
22. We are concerned that recent franchise
awards continue the process of the public sector retaining revenue
risk. On the face of it the £1.1billion premium payments
that First Group has agreed to pay the Department for Transport
over the length of the franchises appears to be a very good deal
for the taxpayer. However the "cap-and-collar" arrangements
associated with the repayment regime transfers risk from private
to public if First's revenue projections are not met.
23. In relation to Greater Western, Christian
Wolmar explained the "cap-and-collar" arrangements in
the 18 January 2006 issue of Rail Magazine. "This works in
such a way that broadly, 80% of any large shortfallor excess
profitswill be borne by government. The formula is that
First takes the whole risk of the first 2% shortfall, then half
the risk of the next 4%, but only 20% of the rest. So it loses
little if there is a really big shortfall". RMT is extremely
disappointed that Government is continuing the practice of awarding
franchises that do not transfer financial risk to the private
sector.
24. Finally, franchise holders also benefit
from the Government decision to indemnify train operators for
losses incurred as a result of industrial action. To date over
£23 million has been spent by Government in compensation
payments. The financial incentive for franchise holders to dig
in their heels in the hope that they will be indemnified should
industrial action result, does not encourage good industrial relations
and should therefore be scrapped.
Do we need more vertical integration?
25. The 1 April 2003 Transport Select Committee
report: The Future of the Railways called for a public
sector Railway Agency to combine the strategic functions of the
SRA and control of the railway infrastructure. RMT also supports
the vertical integration of "wheel and steel" in the
public sector.
26. We are however, completely opposed to
horizontal fragmentation, which would see the franchise holders
controlling the tracks over which their services operate. RMT
remains convinced that a single infrastructure controller, currently
Network Rail, is the most appropriate way to set and monitor national
operational and safety standards on the rail infrastructure. Recent
improvements to Moving Annual Average train punctuality figures,
now approaching figures achieved pre-privatisation in the early
1990s, have been aided by Network Rail returning maintenance functions
in-house. Network Rail has reported delays caused by infrastructure
falling by 17% and 8.7% in 2005 and 2006 respectively. In all,
delays caused by Network Rail have fallen 28% since the company
took control. RMT would not want to see these continuing improvements
threatened by an unnecessary and potentially expensive fragmentation
of the railway infrastructure.
27. RMT believes that some train operators
would simply "sweat the assets" on the railway infrastructure,
particularly in circumstances where their franchises were coming
to end and the existing operators were either not bidding for
or were not short-listed for the replacement franchise. RMT has
serious concerns that horizontal fragmentation would repeat the
Railtrack experience where the company systematically underinvested
in order to maximise returns to shareholders. The result was a
catastrophic degradation of the railway infrastructure.
28. In relation to the proposed vertical
integration of Merseyrail RMT agrees with Network Rail which argued
that proposals to split the national infrastructure would prove
to be more expensive given that separate contracts would have
to be drawn up for supplies and for track maintenance and renewals
equipment.
29. The Committee will be aware of concerns
that the RMT has raised in the past in relation to the rolling
stock manufacturing and maintenance sector. Since privatisation
rolling stock orders have been placed worth more than £4.5
billion. The Rolling Stock Leasing Companies, the only remaining
wholly unregulated part of the rail industry, have at the same
time made excess profits.
30. Regrettably the past period has also
seen significant job losses and plant closures at sites including
Derby, Washwood Heath and Eastleigh. This is unacceptable state
of affairs which Government should take steps to address. As a
priority Government must breathe life into the railway workshop
sector, protect the highly skilled workforce and encourage domestic
production of new rolling stock. As franchises fall due and are
returned to public ownership Government should develop a publicly
owned rail manufacturing and maintenance division.
Is franchising compatible with open access operations?
31. The current dispute between GNER, the
Office of Rail Regulation (ORR), Grand Central and the DfT is
indicative of deep-rooted problems in the franchising regime.
32. For the Strategic Rail Authority to
award the East Coast Mainline (ECML) franchise to GNER, promising
extra half-hourly London-Leeds services and then see the ORR award
Grand Central open access paths on the ECML and refuse the GNER
London-Leeds services demonstrates a lack of strategic leadership
in the organisation and delivery of passenger services This absence
of leadership reflects the structural flaws inherent in the current
privatised network. The 2007 Rail White Paper provides Government
with the opportunity to address these structural flaws and take
overall responsibility for all passenger services on the network.
CONCLUSION
33. RMT believes that the current franchising
arrangements have failed to provide value for money for the tax-payer
and the fare-payer. Franchise awards are shrouded in commercial
confidentiality and the franchising process has cost the public
purse over £60 million since 1998.
34. In addition risk is not borne appropriately
by the train operators, who according to the May 2006 issue of
Modern Railways made operating profits of £306 million in
2004-05.
35. The current dispute in relation to open
access routes on the East Coast Mainline demonstrates the lack
of strategic leadership and serious structural flaws inherent
in the privatised rail industry. The 2007 Rail White Paper provides
the Government with the opportunity to take the necessary steps
to resolve these issues.
36. RMT supports the vertical integration
of the rail network in the public sector and is firmly of the
view that at the heart of the 2007 Rail White Paper should be
a commitment to return franchises to the public sector as they
expire. We stand completely against the horizontal fragmentation
of the network. Recent improvements to network performance have
been delivered thanks in no small part to Network Rail bringing
maintenance in-house, leading to reduced delays caused by infrastructure
failure. Controlling the whole network has enabled the company
to plan strategically across the national railway infrastructure.
20 June 2006
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