Examination of Witnesses (Questions 360-379)
MR BILL
EMERY, MR
MICHAEL BESWICK,
MR BRIAN
KOGAN, MR
MARTIN STANLEY,
MR JOHN
BANFIELD
19 JULY 2006
Q360 Mr Scott: Do tight franchise
specifications make companies risk-averse? That is for anyone.
Mr Emery: I am not saying there
is an automatic link. What tight specifications do is to limit
the options that are available to respond to the market and in
a sense you create a lot of barriers to responding to the market
place, and that is where some of the difficulties are. There is
an issue about what the franchising process is about; it is about
selecting the right player and then it is about getting the right
specification, and you could say that there is a little bit of
a question mark in some of these things that they join up those
two things and then they do not go on and look at a more flexible
specification.
Q361 Mr Scott: A question for the
ORR. You appear to indicate that the government is too preoccupied
by the objective of minimising subsidy or maximising premiums.
Could you explain the position more clearly, please?
Mr Emery: Certainly the government
has a very legitimate role in seeking value for money from the
railways, and in the sense of pursuing the best franchise bid
for the services that it wishes to buy then it has done exactly
what is right. What I think it does, it gets back to the point
of saying that there is a tendency then to assume that the full
benefit arises from just during the franchising process and not
allowing the flexibility, it having got there, for the franchisee
then to respond to the market, and barriers are put in that make
it more difficult for the franchisees to respond to the market.
The incentives in the system are such that the franchisee has
little incentive, working very closely with Network Rail, to reduce
Network Rail's costs, because in fact the way the risk allocation
plays out the majority of risks are carried by government and
that again presents a marginally sub-optimal way of running it,
although the testing regularly of what is the best franchise is
a way of getting value for money at that time. The question is
open. You are going out with a franchise bid and yet it is running
for a period of seven years or longer, it is very difficult to
be able to forecast what the market needs over that period of
time. You lock that in too much and if you do not give the franchise
companies full incentive to operate and cooperate with Network
Rail then you are losing something. This is an area we want to
explore with the railway industry as to better ways in which we
can align incentive, as I said at the beginning.
Q362 Mrs Ellman: How can you get
more entrants into the franchise markets, or do you think that
is necessary?
Mr Beswick: I think it is always
desirable to get new entrants into the franchise market. I think
the thing that you have to do is to make the franchise proposition
attractive to a wide range of different players, and you may well
find that different companies like different sorts of franchises.
Some of them will like a franchise that is very heavily specified,
the sort of thing which you might have in a PTE area or something
like that, and others will want to have franchises where they
have more chance to innovate and take risk. I think probably the
most important thing is to have a franchise offer that is targeted
on the sort of railway that may be a bit different for some of
the franchises.
Q363 Mrs Ellman: Are you aware of
any specific obstacles impeding access?
Mr Beswick: In terms of impeding
new entrants then clearly the cost of bidding is always a serious
consideration, but there will be a cost in bidding. Clearly a
part of that which I know we are all concerned about is that if
they have to go through the procedure of competition clearance
then that again is another cost, and I think we are working with
the competition authorities and the Department to ease that.
Q364 Mrs Ellman: Are there any other
observations on that? No. Would it be better to have a one-stop
competition authority instead of having the OFT and the Competition
Commission in respect of rail issues?
Mr Stanley: Would you like me
to take that?
Q365 Chairman: Shall we get rid of
you is what we are saying, in the nicest possible way!
Mr Stanley: The difference between
the Office of Fair Trading and ourselves is that they take a first
look at a wide range of issues, a wide range of mergersthey
might look at 200 cases a year. There always, whether you have
a separate authority or the same authority, has to be a second
stage where the problem is identified and somebody has to do a
really heavyweight job and a really proper deep economic analysis
before you can stop a merger happening or permit it. In Europe,
in the States it is done within the same authority within a two-stage
process; here we happen to have two different authoritiesan
advantage or disadvantage I guess in different places. But it
seems to work here. I think the cost of changing would be quite
large.
Q366 Mrs Ellman: Can I ask the Competition
Commission, what proportion of all bids is referred to you?
Mr Stanley: Franchise awards or
mergers more generally?
Q367 Mrs Ellman: Both.
Mr Stanley: The Office of Fair
Trading look at around about 200 maybe a bit more mergers per
year, including the number of rail franchise awards.
Q368 Chairman: Sorry, is that 200?
Mr Stanley: 200 or slightly more,
perhaps. Of those we normally get to look at around 15 mergers
so we would look at the London Stock Exchange, Waterstone's/Ottakars,
those sort of famous cases. Rail awards, I reckon we get the majority
but not all of them, by any means.
Q369 Chairman: It is an affirmative
nod there. Mr Banfield?
Mr Banfield: We have had five
references since 2002. There are obviously some franchise bids
that have not come to us such as the integrated Kent franchise
or Trans-Pennine, but we probably do the majority.
Q370 Mrs Ellman: Would you say that
it is sensible to consider the awards of the franchise as being
the equivalent of a merger?
Mr Stanley: Whether it is sensible
or not, it is the law first of all so we cannot avoid it.
Q371 Mrs Ellman: Is it sensible now?
Mr Stanley: Yes, I think so because
there are a lot of implications as a lot of these companies own
local bus routes, local coach routes and somebody has to defend
the consumer and look at that particular aspect of it. The Department
for Transport has enough on its hands without employing a large
number of lawyers and economists to carry out that sort of analysis.
So I think it is quite wise to have a separate authority look
at that aspect of an award.
Q372 Mrs Ellman: Do you think it
justifies the expenditure? Is there not a simpler way of doing
it?
Mr Stanley: These cases are quite
complicated. It used to be five or six years ago that mergers
were dealt with in a quicker and less expensive way, but these
days with us taking our own decisions and companies wanting a
fair hearing and wanting to argue they themselves have good lawyers
and good economists and it all gets rather expensive. But at the
end of the day the process is a very strong one and it is well
respected, which I think is important.
Q373 Mrs Ellman: The train operating
companies tell us that it costs around £1 million to go through
your process. Is there any way of reducing that cost?
Mr Stanley: It is quite hard to
given the depth to which we have to go into these things. Something
like the Great Western Franchise that John Banfield looked at,
involving a huge number of different flows covering the whole
of the West Country, you have to do a lot of analysis of what
would happen where in Bristol and on other routes in terms of
passengers switching between bus and coach and rail if prices
were to change, and it is a very deep process, but it is also
a good one. Most people are happy if the end result is they get
the permission, which they did in this case.
Q374 Mr Leech: Mr Stanley, you made
the very interesting comment, you talked about buses, coaches
and trains but you did not mention cars. I think one of the concerns
raised by the rail companies is that their biggest competitor
is the car and certainly I would strongly agree with that. Do
you not take that view?
Mr Stanley: It is a perennial
debate. John you are the expert on that.
Mr Banfield: This is an issue
on which we regularly disagreed with the companies. There is a
lot of research on demand of the use of public transport and what
is called the price elasticity of the demand and the extent to
which you could put your prices up because if you put your prices
up by 10%
Q375 Chairman: A little louder I
think, Mr Banfield. Have a heart because we are writing a record!
Mr Banfield: Broadly, if you put
your prices up by 10% does your demand go down by 10%? Do you
make any money or not? A vast amount of research does suggest
that demand for public transport is inelastic and it is profitable
to put your prices up, so the competition from the car is not
an effective competitive constraint, at least in the short term.
Chairman: Mr Efford.
Q376 Clive Efford: The train operating
companies have told us that going through the full Competition
Commission process can cost £1 million. Why is it so expensive
and is that in the public interest?
Mr Stanley: It is expensive because
we do a very thorough job. We ourselves of course do not charge
them anything, we employ our own economists and our own accountants.
In order to combat the clever people like John Banfield on my
right and all the other teams the industry chooses to employ very
expensive consultants and very expensive lawyers and to do a lot
of research and put in a lot of data and it costs them a lot of
money. I cannot control that cost; we just do the best job we
can and a fairly thorough job, and in response they choose to
spend that money.
Q377 Clive Efford: So the charge
that these costs are imposed by the strictures that are imposed
on them to satisfy the procedure is not a fair one?
Mr Stanley: Obviously they feel
it is a burden and indeed it is, but the choice of whether to
spend half a million or three-quarters of a million or a million
is very much their choice, depending on the depth into which they
wish to go. If the end result is that they get allowed, as they
usually do at the end of the day, having put forward very persuasive
arguments, if at the end of the day they not only get the franchise
but also get the competition clearance they probably on reflection
think it is good value for money.
Q378 Chairman: That is actually quite
an interesting point, but you have not blocked any awards and
you have only imposed conditions in one case since 2002.
Mr Stanley: Indeed.
Q379 Chairman: But you looked at
seven bids through five separate referrals all at very considerable
cost, as we have heard.
Mr Stanley: Yes.
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