Memorandum submitted by Dr Colin S. Gray

1. It is usual in a defence debate for there to be weighty arguments on both, or all, sides of an issue. The issue of Britain as a nuclear weapon state (NWS) is unusual in that all of the merit lies on one side of the argument, the case for Britain remaining a NWS.

2. This short paper argues that the case for Britain retaining a nuclear capability is an overwhelming one. It argues also that in cost-benefit terms, the cost is modest while the benefits are potentially priceless.

3. The case for a British, or, to be honest, a US-enabled, British nuclear deterrent, has eight components, the first of which is by far the most weighty. In summary form, Britain should remain nuclear armed because:

I The future is deeply uncertain, it is not 'foreseeable'.

II Nuclear weapons offer the ultimate protection of core national values

(survival, independence, way of life).

III Our denuclearisation would be completely irrelevant to the prospects

for non proliferation.

IV Conventional weapons cannot substitute fully for the political and

military effects of nuclear weapons.

V If British forces deploy to regions that contain nuclear weapon states,

they need to be supported by a British nuclear arsenal.

VI Denuclearisation would be interpreted correctly abroad as a gratuitous

self-demotion in global diplomacy.

VII A nuclear capability might offer Britain an alternative to accepting

conventional defeat, should some expedition go very seriously wrong.

VIII It is necessary to retain Britain's nuclear infrastructure. That is a

wasting asset and it would be hard to restore once it had been run

down. A denuclearised Britain could well realise it had made a

terrible mistake and would want to rebuild its nuclear capability,

or option at least.

4. Assumptions drive arguments. Here are mine:

· Nuclear weapons are here to stay, like gunpowder they, and the knowledge of how to build them, will always be with us.

· The future cannot be foreseen. In 2006 we can no more predict the strategic history of the 21^st Century, than our predecessors in 1906 could predict what the 20^th Century would bring.

· What we do know about the 21^st Century is not encouraging. We have a modernising China that is on a collision course with the USA. We have a dissatisfied Russia which has large irredentist claims on virtually all of its frontiers, and has a military doctrine emphasising nuclear escalation. Also, we know that climate change is underway, and that it has the potential to explode all civility in international relations. And we know that there will be further cases of nuclear proliferation. Nuclear non-proliferation is a lost cause, but it is one that we can try to lose slowly and survivably.

· There are no moral issues involved with British nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons exist. States acquire them for reasons that seem persuasive. Moral attitudes are simply irrelevant.

· Nuclear disarmament is a nonsense. Everyone is for it, in principle, but noone will do it. Furthermore, an agreement on complete nuclear disarmament is utterly non negotiable. It could never be verified. If verification did not matter, because we all trusted each other, we would not need a disarmament treaty.

· Unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain would be a self-inflicted diplomatic and strategic wound offering zero rewards. Each seriously potential nuclear weapon state will have its own reasons for wanting nuclear weapons. Whether Britain retains or abandons its semi-independent nuclear arsenal would be entirely irrelevant.

· Strategically viewed, a NWS is different from a non-NWS. NWS are treated with greater care and their enemies are obliged to exercise great caution in upsetting them. It is prudent for Britain to go into the unknown future as just such a state.

· Financial assessment of cost and benefit of NWS is, of course, impossible to make. We can price nuclear forces, we can specify some alternative military uses for that money, but what financial value do we place upon the literally unique strategic and political consequences of being nuclear armed? A few more conventional arms may be useful, no question. But, a strategic nuclear force might save a British or Allied military expedition from disaster, or even Britain itself from blackmail or assault by WMD. Price that, if you can!

5. I do not know, and cannot know, the value to Britain of it remaining a NWS. Opponents of Britain remaining nuclear armed are similarly ignorant. There are no experts on the unknowable future. The first rule of statecraft is prudence, do not take avoidable risks. Especially is that true if the defence insurance is modestly priced and is readily obtainable.

6. If I am wrong, and Britain's nuclear weapons are of little strategic utility, then we will have spent some money prudently, but unnecessarily. Our nuclear armament certainly will not have worsened our security condition. But if I am right, then Britain will come to bless the wisdom with which it decided to retain its nuclear crown jewels, the ultimate guarantor of our survival and independence.

16 March 2006