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SND 53
Memorandum from Dr Rebecca Johnson
The Strategic Context 1. In part because of policy failures at the end of the cold war, nuclear weapons are once again increasing in salience after a drop during the 1990s. Nuclear war is no longer as direct a threat for Britain, but the risks of proliferation and nuclear terrorism have grown, as nuclear weapons continue to be treated as a potent currency of power. The largest arsenals have been cut, but nuclear weapons and the materials to make them - plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) - are increasing as a security problem, especially for countries like Britain. 2. The primary nuclear threat envisaged during the cold war was military conflict between some or all of the nuclear weapon states leading to all out war. In the 21st century, the world now faces four kinds of nuclear-related dangers: · the continued possession of sizeable arsenals of nuclear weapons by a small number of states; · the pursuit of nuclear fuel cycle capabilities or weapons-related programmes by further states, whether outside the treaty regimes or in violation of them; · the revaluing of nuclear weapons as an instrument of policy and power projection, and the emergence (or re-interpretation) of nuclear deterrence as a doctrine for weak or tyrannical regimes to maintain domestic control and hold off outside interference; and · non-state armed groups, usually classified as terrorists, seeking to buy or steal nuclear materials and/or weapons from unsecured facilities or transport routes, or through an international nuclear black market, such as that of Pakistan's Dr A.Q. Khan. 3. As of March 2006, eight countries are known to deploy more than 13,000 nuclear weapons between them, with an additional 16,000 further weapons or plutonium cores in reserve or storage. More than 90 percent of these are in the Russian and US arsenals. Five nuclear weapon states (US, Russia, China, France and Britain) are members of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and formally committed to nuclear disarmament. Three others (India, Pakistan and Israel) acquired nuclear arsenals outside the NPT. These range in estimated size from 30 to 200. These nuclear weapon possessors all regard themselves as having the capabilities for deterrence, but their respective doctrines range from dissuasion to defence and use, and may include the following: nuclear weapons for last resort; or as a weapon that could be used for pre-emption or retaliation, especially in relation to biological or chemical threats; or to dissuade invasion or offset disadvantage when facing adversaries with greater conventional forces. 4. Britain's nuclear weapons are assigned to NATO, a Cold War security institution that is now seeking a relevant security role for the 21st century. At UK instigation, NATO's nuclear planning group in June 2005 suddenly resurrected an expression of appreciation for the "continuing contribution" made by "the United Kingdom's independent nuclear forces". But what, precisely, has Trident contributed to NATO's security and who has it deterred? Did it make a difference with former Yugoslavia or Iraq? Nuclear deterrence theory, which ignores the obvious lack of deterrent effect in Britain's recent conflicts, starting with Argentina in 1982, is a modern version of voodoo medicine. If one believes in it, there is little that rational argument and evidence can do to dissuade. Much of the time, this may be harmless, though witchdoctors can be expensive. But too often, such belief in the unverifiable, supernatural power of the rituals and quackery of voodoo lead the sick to reject more proven remedies or to become addicted to unhealthy 'cures' that further weaken their abilities to counteract the genuine sickness. In that case, voodoo medicine may be fatal. The voodoo medicine and addiction analogies are not just rhetorical. Failing to give a convincing answer to the question of what British nuclear weapons are for, those wishing to extend nuclear dependence for several more decades resort to mumbo jumbo and the tautology implicit in the constant need to refer to the euphemistic 'nuclear deterrent' rather than the more accurately descriptive term 'nuclear weapon'. 5. Cold war politics underpinned the NPT and enabled it to be generally successful in constraining proliferation for 30 years. Now its credibility and effectiveness have come under severe pressure. There are three causes for this: failures by the weapon states to devalue their nuclear weapons and move more effectively towards nuclear disarmament; de facto Western acceptance of the proliferation accomplished by Israel, India and Pakistan; and violation of the NPT by states parties to the NPT, notably Iraq (before 1991) and North Korea, which withdrew from the treaty in 2003 with little penalty. Iran has also caused growing concerns with attempts to conceal and then proceed with an unnecessary uranium enrichment programme that could be used for nuclear weapons. 6. Though the differences should not be glossed over, the incentive for these respective regimes to acquire nuclear weapons is the belief that they would augment regional power projection, enable them to deter neighbours and big powers such as the United States, and have their economic and development concerns taken more seriously. The behaviour, policies and assumptions displayed by the declared and de facto nuclear weapon states fuel and appear to justify these beliefs in aspirant proliferators. 7. While there may be disagreements over ranking, security practitioners (and, for that matter, informed public opinion) would generally list the major security challenges facing Britain (and the world) as: · Environmental degradation, climate change and depletion of agricultural or water resources; · Poverty, hunger, overpopulation, pandemics like AIDS or avian flu; · Failing states abroad and the disintegration of social institutions at home; · Non-state armed groups and terrorists, especially if equipped with biological, nuclear or radiological weapons; · Organised crime, gangs, warlords; · Trafficking in drugs, arms, people; · Poorly educated and/or unemployed males aged 15-25, especially combined with small arms and light weapons; · War, whether between states or internal, as in 'civil war'; There are overlaps between a number of these categories of security challenge. Policy-makers choosing where to prioritise resources need to ask the salient question: For which of these do nuclear weapons enhance our security? 8. At best, nuclear weapons would play a deterrent role in only one specific version of these scenarios: war between stable, rationally governed states armed with nuclear weapons. The constant repetition of the phrase 'the British nuclear deterrent' encourages sloppy thinking about defence. This becomes obvious if we consider the implied assertion "the deterrent deters"; this is a linguistic tautology that tells us nothing about whether nuclear weapons actually play a role in strategic deterrence, which comprises many other elements to which, sadly, less attention is paid. 9. UK nuclear weapons, assigned to NATO, are likely to have potential targets in accordance with the US Joint Nuclear Doctrines. These would result in a large loss of civilian life and significant environmental and health damage for millions. In almost all cases it would be impossible to distinguish between civilian and military targets and the nuclear explosions would result in massive radioactive contamination. It would be impossible to have such targets and comply with international law, which prohibits the indiscriminate killing and maiming of civilians. 10. Such a wide range of nuclear targets also indicates that US nuclear strategy goes well beyond deterrence into the area of nuclear war fighting. Documentation from US Strategic Command refers to nuclear weapons as the "capability to create a fear of 'national extinction'". Moreover, "should we ever fail to deter such an aggressor [referring to Iraq and North Korea], we must make good on our deterrent statement in such a convincing way that the message to others will be so immediately discernible as to bolster deterrence thereafter." This policy amounts to punishment in order to deter others, which is also contrary to international law and well outside the only possible use the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion did not categorically rule out in July 1996, i.e. when the very survival of a state is at stake. The non-proliferation regime and Britain's legal obligations 11. Part of the strategic context that should not be ignored is the broader context of the non-proliferation regime and Britain's legal obligations. The rather vague language in the NPT's Article VI on "cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" was brought up to date and given greater clarity and meaning during the past decade through agreements adopted when the NPT was indefinitely extended in 1995, an authoritative interpretation by the ICJ in 1996, and by agreements negotiated by the nuclear weapon states and adopted by all NPT parties by consensus at the 2000 Review Conference. 12. In particular, the 2000 NPT Review Conference built on the ICJ's interpretation of the NPT's legal obligations in a thirteen paragraph section of the final document, for which Britain has claimed credit, having played a constructive role with key non-nuclear states (the 'New Agenda Coalition') and the Clinton administration to strengthen the NPT. In accordance with the consensus final document, the five nuclear powers made an "unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals" and committed themselves to a programme of "practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI". 13. Among the thirteen principles and measures that were explicitly identified, the agreements required further unilateral, bilateral and plurilateral reductions of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons, adherence to the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verified compliance, and "a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimise the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination". 14. This makes clear that the nuclear disarmament objective of Article VI does not depend on accomplishment of general and complete disarmament (although this is also an objective), and that the obligation is not just reductions in nuclear weapons, but their elimination. The decisions and final document adopted in 1995 and 2000 contained many other provisions to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, including commitments to the IAEA's Additional Protocol and measures to strengthen nuclear safety and security and combat illicit trafficking. 15. The British government recognises the binding authority of the NPT. In 2004, two eminent lawyers attached to Matrix Chambers, Rabinder Singh QC and Professor Christine Chinkin of LSE, noted that consensus agreements by states parties in a review conference are "an appropriate source of interpretation of the obligations of the NPT". They further argued, "The importance of Article VI to the objects and purposes of the NPT is shown both by the negotiation history of the NPT and by the reaffirmation of its significance by the 2000 Review Conference. The Review Conference also emphasised that strict observance of the NPT is required, that is observance with both the letter and spirit of its articles." 16. In late 2005, Singh and Chinkin published a further legal opinion, concluding that "The replacement of Trident is likely to cause a [material] breach of article VI of the NPT". In accordance with these judgments, none of the nuclear weapons systems under consideration as a follow-on to Trident would be in conformity with UK obligations under the NPT. 17. A core question that needs to be asked is whether the continuing possession of nuclear arsenals or the abolition of nuclear weapons offers more national, regional and global security. Proliferation not only diminishes security; it also erodes the marginal utility attached to existing arsenals. As the number of states acquiring nuclear weapons grows, the deterrence or security value and status of such weapons for their existing possessors diminishes exponentially. 18. It is necessary to recognise that what prevents the nuclear genie from being put back in its bottle is not the technology or know-how, but the value still accorded to nuclear weapons, particularly by states that have them. That nuclear weapons are presently regarded as an important emblem and currency of power is not a natural or military fact or attribute connected with the weapons' utility, but a social and political construct bolstered by the actions of the major powers. Hence, when a country such as Britain acts as though its prestige and security are guaranteed only by the continued possession of nuclear weapons, it sustains a context in which nuclear weapons become the ultimate necessity for, and symbol of, state prestige and security. This is a recipe for proliferation. 19. The government's desired timeframe for a decision means that the question of Trident's replacement has come to the fore when the non-proliferation regime is under heavy and damaging pressure, as illustrated by the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea and the ignominious failure of the NPT Review Conference in May 2005. We risk making a nonsense of the non-proliferation regime if our decision conveys to the rest of the world that nuclear weapons are far too valuable for even these small islands off western Europe to think of giving them up for at least the next fifty years. Two scenarios for how the threats and strategic context might change in 20 years20. As stated succinctly by the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in 1999, "The world faces a choice between the assured dangers of proliferation or the challenges of disarmament." As a significant country and a long-time possessor of nuclear weapons, Britain is not a passive onlooker: our choices and policies will play into future developments. Whether we like it or not, the British decision about whether to replace Trident could prove to be a tipping point, with profound implications - positive or negative - for global non-proliferation efforts. Unless the non-proliferation regime is strengthened and given renewed credibility, it is highly unlikely that the status quo will remain stable. Therefore we need to look at two possible scenarios for the year 2025: greater proliferation or substantial progress in global nuclear disarmament. Scenario 1: A nuclear proliferated world in 2025 21. The impetus behind the NPT was President John F. Kennedy's nightmare vision of a world with over 20 nuclear weapon states. He knew just how fragile, dependent and unreliable the deterrent relationship between just two rival powers, the United States and Soviet Union, could be. As Kennedy well understood, the more nuclear players there are, the less the security for all. The risks of miscalculation, accident, unauthorised or terrorist uses are greatly multiplied. 22. Either nuclear weapons are used against a non-nuclear adversary, which breaches international laws and binding security assurances, or the nuclear logic of 'use them or lose them' will make it likely that a first use - whether accidental or for regional or strategic purposes - would cause at least a bilateral nuclear exchange. If regionally confined (for example, to South Asia or the Middle East), this may possibly be contained; but the greater likelihood is that crisis decision-making and alliance politics could quickly result in escalation into wider nuclear war involving most if not all nuclear weapon possessors. In such a post cold war scenario, Britain would not necessarily be a primary target, but our nuclear weapons could well contribute to the catastrophe. UK nuclear weapons would neither prevent such a scenario nor deter an attack, but they could well make it impossible for a government to avoid being drawn into destroying others, even as we ourselves are destroyed. 23. How might such a proliferated world come about? Look first to the 'defence' corporations and arms traders. Britain, France, the United States and South Africa helped Israel acquire a substantial nuclear arsenal and they now turn a blind eye. There was initial outrage when India - closely followed by Pakistan - conducted nuclear tests in 1998, but the Bush administration has managed to put a seal of approval on the accomplished proliferation of these volatile South Asian neighbours, most recently with the US-India nuclear deal. On the political plus side, during the 1990s, several countries, including South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan gave up nuclear weapons, while Brazil, Argentina and others renounced nuclear weapon programmes or ambitions. 24. Though more than a dozen countries had nuclear weapon programmes, only Iraq and North Korea are known to have violated their NPT obligations and developed substantial nuclear weapon programmes. Iraq's programme was dismantled under international inspections (by the IAEA and UNSCOM) during the 1990s. North Korea repudiated the NPT in 2003 and now claims to have nuclear weapons; while revelations about Iran's nuclear programme give substantial grounds for suspicion that Tehran has ambitions to develop a nuclear weapon option, if not the weapons themselves. 25. In a complex game of bluff and bluster, capitalising on muddled policies by the US and China, North Korea pursued the development of missiles and reprocessing capabilities for twenty years, weathering several regional and international attempts to persuade it to give up these programmes, including the 1994 Agreed Framework signed with the United States. In 2003, one year after being lumped in with Iraq and Iran as the 'axis of evil' in President Bush's 'State of the Union' speech of January 2002, North Korea evicted the IAEA inspectors and announced its withdrawal from the NPT. This withdrawal was reported to the UN Security Council, which did nothing, despite the fact that there is substantial disagreement about whether the withdrawal is legal. There are indications that North Korea can still be bought off, so the Six Party Talks continue to press for Pyongyang to accept economic and security incentives in return for its return to full compliance with the NPT. However, for the time being North Korea acts as a poster boy for others, viewed as having got away with proliferation and convinced the United States that it has a "nuclear deterrent" and must be treated with kid gloves. 26. While North Korea's nuclear gamesmanship appears to be chiefly directed towards the United States, the inadequacy of Kim Jong Il's regime, the shared border with South Korea, long and painful history with Japan and the mistrustful US-China relationship all contribute to a volatile security environment, where misjudgement or miscalculation could potentially result in the use of nuclear weapons. 27. Though the crisis over Iran's nuclear fuel cycle programme formally dates back to August 2002, with revelations about undeclared nuclear facilities for heavy water production and enriching uranium, Iran's nuclear ambitions date from the 1980s, when the West supported Iraq and turned a blind eye to Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons against Iranian towns and troops. Iran has fought hard against being referred to the UN Security Council for concealing key nuclear facilities and violating its IAEA safeguards by claiming that it sought uranium enrichment - and all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle - solely for peaceful purposes, evoking the NPT's Article IV as enshrining this right. At time of writing, Iran is under threat of being reported to the Security Council and President Ahmadinejad has threatened in turn to expel the IAEA inspectors and proceed with uranium conversion and thence to enrichment. Though Iran continues to claim interest only in nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the IAEA's finds and the configuration of Iran's planned nuclear fuel cycle suggest otherwise. UK contributions to scenario 1 28. There are two ways in which UK policies currently impede a more concerted international strategy to reduce nuclear dangers: our commercial interest in reprocessing clashes with efforts by the IAEA and others to find non-discriminatory international approaches for controlling the production of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium; and our constant reiteration of the military utility and security value Britain attaches to its nuclear weapons. 29. First, there is only a small handful of countries that produce plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU) for commercial purposes (Britain, France, Japan and a few others); but there is a growing number of others (including North Korea, India, Brazil, Iran) on the threshold of doing so. Iran and other developing states have termed the 'sheep and goats' approach that Britain prefers - restricting the activities of some countries based on political suspicions - 'nuclear apartheid'. Such an approach may have prevailed during the Cold War, but it carries little weight and no moral authority in the more complex proliferation environment of the 21st century. This may be one (though not the only) reason for the inadequacy of attempts by Britain, France and Germany (the EU-3) to mediate the crisis with Iran. Sellafield has long been an economic albatross, and it now stands in the way of Britain playing a leadership role in promoting more effective strategies to curb the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium worldwide. 30. It is too early to know whether a nuclear crisis with Iran can be averted. One frequently-raised parallel is particularly unhelpful: If Britain needs a nuclear deterrent, then why doesn't Iran, given its volatile region, the previous use of chemical weapons by Iraq, and greater fears of invasion? In addition to security considerations, Iran's leaders have drawn a further lesson from the 'successful' proliferation examples of India, Pakistan, Israel and, most recently, North Korea. If some states take the route of nuclear weapons acquisition and can be seen to gain enhancements in status, security, political or regional prestige - or are perceived to have gained the capability to hold off invasion or pressure from more powerful countries - it will become increasingly difficult for governments to explain why they are not giving these advantages to their people as well. 31. Each new nuclear entrant or proliferation aspirant will cause several of its geostrategic rivals to reconsider their position. If lack of constructive action allows the non-proliferation regime to erode any further, the danger is not just that a few additional countries will hedge their bets, but that global restraints will crash, causing a proliferation surge - perhaps to 20 or 25 nuclear weapon capable states in 2025. In this daunting scenario, the marginal utility for Britain of being one of the 20 or 25 nuclear weapon possessors will be greatly outweighed by the overall human insecurity that this outcome would mean for the world - and therefore, of course, for UK national security. 32. In addition to the heightened risk that nuclear weapons will be used, more nuclear proliferation means wider production and distribution of nuclear materials and technologies, together with a higher number of nuclear facilities and transports. Not only will these activities increase environmental problems and the dangers of accident, but they also increase the opportunities for theft or black market trading - and therefore the risk of terrorist acquisition. Scenario 2: fewer nuclear weapons and possessors 33. Even if nuclear disarmament were really pursued in good faith, as required under the NPT, there are technical and political hurdles that make it unlikely that a completely nuclear- weapon-free world could be achieved by 2025. However, if effective policies to reduce nuclear weapon salience were put in place from now on - starting with the existing nuclear states - it is not at all unrealistic to conceive of a strategic context in 2025 where nuclear weapons were totally marginalised from security or military policies. In such a situation, a much smaller number of nuclear weapons might remain for a while in the arsenals of only a few powers - perhaps only the United States, China and Russia - in a form of storage that Stansfield Turner called 'strategic escrow'. Some American analysts have called this situation 'recessed' or 'existential' deterrence. Though nuclear weapons would remain in existence, either in a couple of well-secured national arsenals or at an internationally-guarded location, they would not be deployed or on alert status, but retained solely as a 'hedge', pending the final managed transition to a nuclear weapon free world. Though I do not argue that such a hedge is needed, since I think the full abolition of nuclear weapons would be more practical to enforce and verify, I recognise the attraction of this transitionary phase for US policy-makers, which would probably insist on being the last to give up its nuclear weapons. It would be illogical and foolish for Britain to expect to hang on to the last as well. 34. Even with the possibility of a resurgent Russia (with some retained nuclear weapons) becoming antagonistic to the UK and its interests, it is very difficult to envisage how or when it might seek to use nuclear weapons against Britain or Europe, with which it is now economically interdependent. Instability in Russia could be dangerous for Europe's security and interests, but not in terms of a Soviet-style nuclear threat. 35. China is clearly an emerging power in international affairs. While the US and some Europeans might view China as a strategic rival, this is less about military threat than about economics and geostrategic projection. Neither China's history and culture nor its capabilities lend themselves very plausibly to theories of future threat to Britain that could reasonably be cited as a reason for retaining nuclear weapons. Moreover, China would be more likely to pursue asymmetric warfare capabilities to undermine US military dominance than try to match its nuclear or conventional prowess. 36. How to manage the transition to a nuclear-weapon-free world is the scenario that NATO's Nuclear Policy Directorate invited Sir Michael Quinlan, Dr David Yost, Joseph Pilat of Los Alamos nuclear laboratories, and me to explore with representatives from 25 of the 26 NATO members in Prague in March 2005. Though it was not to be expected that such diverse experts would come to happy agreement overnight, there was a large measure of acceptance for the view that to stand any chance of moving in this direction, the first steps would need to be taken to change nuclear policies now. Leadership would be needed to devalue nuclear weapons and prohibit the production of nuclear weapon materials - whether for weapons or civilian purposes. (It should be noted that the IAEA has determined that nuclear energy can be efficiently produced using low enriched uranium (LEU) and that neither plutonium nor HEU are necessary in the non-military fuel cycle). 37. Leadership will also be necessary to build the political will, expertise and confidence for there to be further progress in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. In the first stage, this would necessitate reducing the salience of nuclear weapons by embedding a normative prohibition, starting with use. (The use of biological and chemical weapons in war was prohibited in 1925, creating an essential norm that helped develop the conditions for banning these weapons altogether in 1972 and 1993 respectively. Such norms do not of themselves prevent all use but they greatly reduce the incentive and provide a basis for concerted international action against any perpetrator.) 38. Instead of pursuing new types and designs of nuclear weapons that destabilise international relations, the expertise of nuclear weapons scientists must be directed towards working out the technical and verification issues so that the transition towards a nuclear weapon free world can be managed safely and securely. (The UK has been widely commended for verification studies carried out by AWE scientists, for example on a nuclear test ban and, most recently, the five-year study on verifying nuclear disarmament 2001-2005.) 39. A decision to replace Trident would mean AWE's scientific resources would have to prioritise warhead research, design and maintenance, instead of addressing the more vital questions of verification and the safe decommissioning and dismantlement of nuclear facilities and secure disposal of weapons-usable materials. It would also undermine the credibility Britain has painstakingly built up with its constructive approach to the NPT and verification in the past 8 years. By contrast, Britain would have far more to gain by being the first to renounce dependence on nuclear weapons, thereby enhancing its credibility with the non-nuclear weapon powers (over 180 countries) and leading the way back from the proliferation brink. UK contributions to scenario 1 40. According to government policy since 1997, "When satisfied with verified progress towards our goal of the global elimination of nuclear weapons, we will ensure British nuclear weapons are included in such negotiations". Such progress won't happen if we sit in our status quo and do nothing: our future security will necessitate creating the political will and security conditions for the abolition of nuclear weapons to become a feasible reality. 41. To facilitate the conditions for progress in creating the political and security conditions for non-proliferation and disarmament to be made, current policies need to change, which will in turn lead to further progress and change. This is a dynamic process, where each level of increased confidence and security stimulates and reinforces the next. The reverse is also true: each failure to take a step in the right direction will reinforce the perceived military and security value attached to nuclear weapons, thereby stimulating others to acquire them too. We are on the brink of a proliferation spiral caused by current policies and inertia. By having the foresight to give up its own nuclear reliance, Britain could promote a different kind of future and contribute to creating an alternative non-proliferation and disarmament spiral. 42. This memo is not the place to explore what these steps would entail in more detail. However, it must be noted that at issue are not just the costs - over £25 billion - but the opportunity costs. Britain is not an extraordinarily wealthy country for which the billions earmarked for a new generation of nuclear weapons would be easy to find. The cold war justifications for nuclear weapons don't work as they once did, and there is no longer any traction in the argument that nuclear weapons provide an economical deterrent that keeps conventional defence costs lower than would otherwise be required. On the contrary, the MoD is stretched thin by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Treasury issues frequent warnings about the future funding of the health and social services, pensions and schools. 43. As terrorism continues to dominate the agenda, the onus must be on preventing access to such materials or devices. The most effective long term approach is through the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and weapon-usable nuclear materials. Pending the achievement of this objective, important practical measures can be put in place to limit the available sources, increase physical safety and security, and reduce vulnerability through better intelligence and security provision relating to materials production and storage, fuel cycle facilities and bases. Such measures would be much more effectively pursued in a context in which nuclear weapons were systematically devalued in military and security policies. At present, British efforts are too easily dismissed as an example of the failed colonialist approach of 'do as I say, not as I do'. Timing and Options 44. The question of replacement has arisen because Trident's procurement cycle was 14 years, following a decision in 1980 to replace the Polaris system. The first submarine, HMS Vanguard, went operational in 1994, and the fourth, HMS Vengeance, finally entered operational service in February 2001. In large part due to the design of the nuclear reactor, the official operational life of these submarines is given as 25 years: without service life extension they can be expected to be decommissioned around 2019-2026. On that basis, the government has put the decision on replacement onto its agenda for this Parliament. 45. This timing allows for the most expensive option to be chosen: a like-for-like replacement, requiring that a new fleet of submarines be built to carry similar or upgraded missiles. A final decision on other options could be delayed, giving more time for the government to assess the political and security trends - and, more importantly, contribute to creating a political and security environment more conducive to UK and international security and disarmament. 46. Extending the service life of the existing submarines, which in practice means a major refit of the hulls and nuclear reactors, could be accomplished in up to 10 years. Both of these options would cement Britain's heavy dependence on US delivery systems and continued nuclear collaboration (for example, in the supply of tritium and neutron generators). Both options are also vulnerable to "The Scottish Question", i.e. the lack of any practical alternative to the Royal Navy base at Faslane in Scotland for berthing the larger submarines capable of firing Trident missiles. If pressure builds for nuclear weapons to be removed from Scotland, as some Scottish Parties and anti-nuclear groups are determined to achieve, Trident or its replacement might be turned out of Faslane with no other suitable berth in sight. 47. Theoretically, there is also the option of a "new capability", which might be US-supplied sea or air-launched cruise missiles, or even a return to free fall nuclear bombs on long-range aircraft or collaboration with France for a joint 'Eurobomb'. While there is some military interest in cruise missiles, which could avoid the Scottish Question and are viewed as more flexible for 'sub-strategic' purposes, very few can be found to argue in favour of a joint Franco-British nuclear force or a return to nuclear bombers. However, it must be noted that these all could be viewed as a cheaper way to remain a nuclear weapon state, and procurement decisions could be delayed for at least another decade. 48. Current US plans anticipate deployment of Trident D5 missiles to 2042, but this could change if US policy were to change. It is projected that replacement UK submarines would be expected to be operational to at least 2055. If the US decided to discontinue D5 missile production before 2055, Britain could be left with expensive but impractical submarines with years of life left in them. Or else British planners might be faced with the awkward task of finding alternative missiles, perhaps requiring new missile types to be retro-fitted into submarine hulls that were designed to carry the D5. 49. Britain has found itself in similar difficulties as a result of US policy changes on at least three previous occasions: when Washington cancelled the Skybolt air-launched ballistic missile system in 1962; when the Reagan administration decided in 1980 to equip its submarines with D5 missiles instead of the C4 design that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had thought she would be leasing; and when President George H.W. Bush signed a Senate-mandated moratorium on nuclear testing just weeks before Aldermaston was due to conduct a warhead test explosion in Nevada in October 1992. The dangers of dependence on the United States have also been highlighted by the recent problems in negotiations on the Joint Strike Fighter. Pre-empting parliament's decision? AWE upgrades and defence industrial strategy 50. Two other points need to be highlighted when considering timing and decision-making. During 2003-2005, planning permission was sought and new investment was committed by the MoD as part of plans to upgrade AWE Aldermaston by building new laboratories, a super-computer, and laser and hydrodynamics facilities for designing, refurbishing and testing nuclear warhead components. Although the previous contract was not due to expire, a further 25 year contract worth over £5 billion was signed with AWE's management consortium (that includes Lockheed Martin and British Nuclear Fuels). 51. Secondly, despite government insistence that no decision has yet been taken on whether to replace Trident, the MoD's White Paper on Defence Industrial Strategy seems to be predicated on the assumption of further submarine procurement to maintain the UK's capability in this field: "We have duties of nuclear ownership and commitments to the USA which can only be fulfilled by close control of an onshore submarine business..." 52. There is the danger that some decisions committing finances to future procurement and new weapons facilities are already being taken, driven more by the demands of defence contractors in this field than by assessments of Britain's real security needs. I can provide further detail on both these developments if requested. Conclusions 53. The British debate on nuclear policy should not just be about which nuclear system will follow Trident, but must pre-eminently address the question of whether it is in Britain's best interests to have a nuclear follow-on to Trident at all. 54. Two scenarios can be envisaged, depending on whether the non-proliferation regime is reinforced or eroded. Failure to take disarmament seriously or dissuade Iran and others from acquiring nuclear weapons will lead to the collapse of the NPT. This will make the world a much more dangerous place and is likely to result in a proliferation cascade by 2025. After constructive engagement for a few years during the 1990s, British nuclear policy - including the upgrading of AWE Aldermaston - has become retrogressive and is now contributing to the erosion and weakening of the non-proliferation regime. 55. There is growing consensus that traditional state-based conflict will be less of a threat than the kinds of diffuse, transboundary, human security challenges arising from climate change, non-state armed groups with terrorist agendas, pandemics (naturally occurring or associated with bioweapons), poverty and conflicts over energy or water supplies, as well as organised crime and trafficking. 56. A nuclear follow-on to Trident will not only be irrelevant for dealing with the foreseeable security priorities of the next few decades: it will contribute to proliferation, divert defence resources away from the real threats, and diminish the efficacy of dissuasion and deterrence that could more reliably be provided by non-nuclear tools. 57. In the 21st century security environment, non-proliferation and deterrence must adapt or else they will fail. Having acknowledged that nuclear weapons are useless against terrorism, the government needs to take the next logical step and think beyond nuclear weapons to deter and defuse the foreseeable threats of this era and help to establish alternative approaches that recognise the security needs of all peoples. 58. The only sustainable long term solution will require the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and weapon-usable nuclear materials. While there is still a chance to prevent proliferation by limiting the available sources and increasing physical safety and security, Britain and the other nuclear powers have to recognise that their own weapons and policies are part of the problem and hinder international efforts to devalue nuclear weapons and reduce proliferation incentives. 59. Now is the time to begin phasing out nuclear weapons, starting with a decision not to replace Trident. Contrary to myth or parody, giving up nuclear weapons will not happen overnight or leave Britain naked and vulnerable. It is high time to recognise their irrelevance and start planning for a safely-managed transition to a more relevant security approach, with a more appropriate allocation of defence resources. 60. While this Defence Committee inquiry is an important first step, the government should undertake a comprehensive security and defence review that combines the perspectives of foreign affairs, international law and defence. The review should analyse the role of nuclear weapons and efficacy of theories of nuclear deterrence and use in the post 9/11 security environment, including wider concepts of security and the issues of decommissioning, safety and security of materials, components and facilities.
6 March 2006
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