INTRODUCTION

  Free Tibet Campaign broadly welcomes the Annual FCO Report on Human Rights 2004 though notes certain important omissions.

  2004 was also an important year in UK-Tibet relations as it marked the 100th anniversary of the UK's invasion of Tibet and Free Tibet Campaign called on the Prime Minister Tony Blair to make an historic apology to the Tibetan people. In 2004, the UK also received visits from the new Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao in early May whilst the Dalai Lama visited in late May/early June 2004. China would have noted with interest that the Prime Minister, Tony Blair did not meet with the Dalai Lama (though met with the Foreign Secretary Jack Straw).

1.  PROACTIVELY CONTRIBUTE TO THE RESOLUTION OF THE TIBET ISSUE

  In 2002, contact between the Tibetan Government-in-Exile and China resumed following a nine-year impasse. In 2003, the Dalai Lama's representatives visited China for a second time in an attempt to build confidence between the two sides with a view to commencing negotiations to resolve the issue of Tibet. The international community viewed these two visits as a positive step forward, but few governments have made legitimate efforts to bring both parties to the negotiation table.

  On 23 May 2004, the Chinese government issued a 30-page White Paper on Tibet which ruled out providing genuine autonomy in Tibet, effectively blocking the Dalai Lama's attempts to find a "Middle Way" approach to peacefully resolving this issue of protracted discontent. Coming at a time when the two sides should be making a constructive effort to enter into substantive dialogue, the White Paper is a deliberate act by China to undermine the negotiation process. The Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government-in-Exile have restrained from making any critical comments in response to the document in an ongoing attempt to create an atmosphere conducive to commencing earnest negotiations.

  The UK should urge the EU to encourage China to take constructive, confidence-building measures so that the two parties can enter into dialogue without preconditions as soon as possible. Internationally it is recognised that the situation in Tibet can only be resolved peacefully through negotiations. The UK should take a leading role in pushing the EU to immediately implement the recommendation overwhelming supported by the European Parliament to appoint a EU Special Representative for Tibet, an office that would have practical value in encouraging China to enter into negotiations with representatives of the Dalai Lama.

2.  UK AND EU HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUES

  Over a number of years, Free Tibet Campaign has sought to engage the FCO and the EU in a fundamental review of their relationship with China over the issue of human rights and Tibet. Unfortunately, our opinion is that neither the UK nor EU dialogue process have so far delivered fundamental change of the kind required. One of the main problems with both the UK and EU human rights dialogues is that although both set out a framework for analysis, neither is timebound thus ensuring that there is substantive progress.

  China's human rights record remains a controversial issue in the foreign policies of most Western nations. This is due primarily to the tension between adherence to the principles entrenched in the international human rights regime, economic self-interest, and geopolitical concerns. China has deployed significant procedural dexterity at the United Nations (UN) bodies that monitor human rights, ie effective and frustrating blocking and stalling techniques.

  There has been a general shift in the manner in which China is held accountable for its compliance to human rights principles—from multilateral to bilateral dialogue. The bilateralization of multilateral processes threatens to undermine the universality and credibility of the international human rights regime entrenched in the UN. And so there is much at stake in the bilateral dialogue process, including and extending beyond the current human rights situation in China, the UK-China, and EU-China relationship. Ensuring that bilateral processes enhance the authority of multilateral frameworks, rather than undermine them, is critical.

  In fact, the UK-China human rights dialogue may be seen as being held as a hostage to prevent outspoken criticism of China at the UN by individual countries and through the EU mechanism. Thus China has managed to elude serious criticism at the annual UN Commission on Human Rights due to the unwillingness of the EU to champion a resolution with the USA. In October 2000, Robin Cook told the Foreign Affairs Select Committee "we have to be open-eyed about this. If we do co-sponsor a resolution it will be the end of the dialogue." It is imperative that further mechanisms and a more holistic approach to dealing with the human rights situation in Tibet and China be integrated into all interactions with China.

  Policies on the human rights situation in China should be part of a consistent, principled approach in which all countries are subject to the same international human rights standards. Nations must not use dialogue as an excuse not to sponsor or actively support a resolution of concern about China at the UNCHR, should an objective analysis of the human rights situation there justify such a course of action. Threats that support for a China resolution would result in the cancellation of the dialogues can be disregarded. The US experience clearly demonstrates that they are not mutually exclusive strategies, and the US willingness to walk away from dialogue and support a resolution at CHR has added a degree of credibility and substance to its China dialogue.

Background

  Free Tibet Campaign believes that it is essential to look more deeply at the reasons and history behind the suspension of the US-China human rights dialogue that has been somewhat misrepresented in the report.

  The US decision to sponsor a resolution at the 55th UNCHR in 1999 provoked threats but China did not cancel the dialogue at that stage. In May 1999 China cancelled the dialogue in retaliation for the bombing of the Chinese Embassy by NATO in Belgrade. The dialogue was announced as restarting in late 2000: a gap of less than two years. It was formally suspended again by China in March 2004 after the US announcement that it would table a China resolution at UNCHR, but US had passively suspended the dialogue during 2003 due to lack of results from December 2002 session.

3.  RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND VISITS OF UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEURS

  China's signing and ratification of the ICESCR and its signing of the ICCPR are positive indicators but, so long as human rights abuses continue on the ground, acknowledging compliance with these covenants should not be viewed as an end in themselves.

(i)   ICESC

  China ratified the ICESCR in February 2001 but its implementation of this in Tibet lags behind the rest of China:

"Human development indicators for the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) are far below those of any other province in China. In particular, the statistics on education clearly indicate a neglect of rural education at the primary and secondary levels. This has had an important linkage effect in labour markets as the poor educational background of the average Tibetan has decreased his or her ability to access urban and skilled employment opportunities. This in turn has led to a strong sense of alienation in the Tibetan population and resulted in the resurgence of Tibetan refugee flows during the 1990s. "

  Tibetans have very limited or no access to health care facilities. The few facilities available in rural areas are curative rather than preventative, and are extremely expensive. Modern medical amenities are generally concentrated in areas where large numbers of Chinese migrants reside.

  In addition, the measures used to implement state religious policy have been particularly harsh in Tibet because of the close link between religion and Tibetan identity. Tibetan Buddhism continues to be an integral element of Tibetan identity, and is therefore perceived as a threat to the authority of the state and the unity of the PRC.

(ii)   ICCPR

  China signed the ICCPR in 1998 and has recently made overtures that it intends to ratify this covenant, however, human rights protected by the ICCPR continue to be systematically violated inside Tibet. A number of measures taken by the Chinese government are deliberately designed and implemented solely in Tibet and effectively restrict Tibetans' civil and political rights and freedoms, as the following two examples illustrate.

  One, in 1998 the Chinese government launched the "Patriotic Education" campaign in Tibet, as part of its China-wide "Strike Hard" campaign. Its aim was to stop "splittist activity", such as support for Tibetan autonomy and allegiance to the Dalai Lama, Tibet's leader in exile. Patriotic Education "work teams" were imposed in monasteries and expelled thousands of practitioners for refusing to renounce the Dalai Lama and their political beliefs. Religious repression has intensified with the secular control of monasteries by "Democratic Management Committees"; quotas on the number of monks and nuns permitted; an 18-year age limit on the admission of novices; and the detention and torture of practitioners.

  The steady intensification of official control has recently expanded beyond the Tibet Autonomous Region to Tibetan areas in the present-day Chinese provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan. To illustrate, the important Buddhist institutes of Serthar and Yachen in Sichuan province have been ransacked by the Chinese authorities and subjected to harsh state-specified limitations on monastic life. In 2002, 7,000 monks and nuns from Serthar Buddhist institute were expelled and evicted.

  Two, a new Internet surveillance system was instituted in Lhasa in 2003 requiring residents to use an individual registration number and an associated password in order to access the Internet via Internet Explorer or other portals or to send and receive email at public cyber cafes. China employs some 30,000 people to monitor its citizen's use of the internet.

4.  RESPECT FOR FREEDOM OF RELIGION, CULTURAL RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS AND ACCESS TO PANCHEN LAMA

  Free Tibet Campaign welcomed the various demarches and public statements made by the FCO in respect of the case of Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche, the Tibetan religious leader currently under suspended sentence of death (date: 23 January 2005). We sincerely hope that the UK will be more proactive in advance of 23 January, the date that Rinpoche may be executed or face a lifetime in prison for a crime he did not commit.

  The situation of the 11th Panchen Lama continues to cause concern. 2005 marks the 10th anniversary of his abduction and when he will turn 16 years of age. China has consistently refused to reveal further information on his case, claiming that his parents have requested privacy or to allow impartial international observers to gain access to check on his well-being.

5.  OTHER ISSUES

  Prior to China winning the right to host the 2008 Olympic Games, the organisers made a promise that media freedom would be guaranteed with the presence of the Games. Following the July 2001 decision to give China the Games, the Beijing Organising Committee (BOCOG) and the Chinese Government have reneged on that promise and year on year we have witnessed a tightening of media reporting and access to the internet (see http://www.freetibet.org/campaigns/olympics/index.html for the three annual reports that Free Tibet Campaign has published on China's preparations for the Olympic Games and its continued crackdown on human rights.) The International Olympic Committee (IOC) has unfortunately allied itself with the Chinese authorities through a provision in its Olympic Charter which states that no "political meetings or demonstrations are allowed to take place" in the immediate run-up to the Games.

  Since Beijing was awarded the Olympic Games in 2001, Tibet campaigners have met with the IOC on two occasions—in December 2001 and October 2002. In the latter meeting, the IOC refused to lift the ban on political meetings and demonstrations during the Games, or to disclose the controversial Host City contract, despite promises by Jacques Rogge, the IOC President, to protect human rights.

  Beijing's preparations for the 2008 Olympic Games clearly provide economic opportunities for companies worldwide anxious to either enter the Chinese market or increase their standing. Free Tibet Campaign's worry is that this economic "cherry" will be used to mitigate international criticism of its human rights record for fear of scuppering large scale economic opportunities. Given that the Olympic Games cuts across the concerns of a number of UK Government departments (eg FCO, DTI, DCMS), there is a need for a concerted approach from all departments to ensure that human rights are integrated and promoted at all levels.

6.  CO -OPERATION WITH HR MECHANISMS

(i)   Co-operation and openness

  It is erroneous to believe that dialogue encourages China to be more co-operative in other UN mechanisms. This type of trade-off undermines the mechanisms of the UN rather than supports them.

  China consistently disregards the conclusion of UNCHR experts and obstructs UN mechanisms, rendering them ineffective. China remains wholly capable of being disruptive in the Security Council and in the proceedings of the UNCHR if it is criticised through use of the "no action motion" and other procedural mechanisms. The "no action motion" has repeatedly been effectively used by China, most recently at the 60th Session of the UNCHR to obstruct debate of the US-sponsored draft resolution on China.

  China has also taken the lead in dismissing the contribution and role of Tibet support groups and other NGOs in the UNCHR and other international fora. For example, the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) was granted UN accreditation to take part in the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in 2001 but, the following year, China successfully lobbied against ICT's attempts to secure accreditation to the UN Commission on Sustainable Development in South Africa.

  An often-remarked outcome of China's bilateral human rights dialogues is China having accepted human rights as a legitimate subject for discussion (previously often referred to as "an internal affair" or the imposition of Western values). However, it appears that China has co-opted many of the discussions on human rights. For example, instead of proactively discussing human rights issues, China increasingly justifies its abuses in Tibet as "counter terrorism" and "state security" measures.

(ii)   Rapporteurs

  The visit of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, Katarina Tomasevski, to China in September 2003 concluded, in part, that the illiteracy situation in Tibet was "horrendous" and lacking far behind in comparison with the situation in China. However, rather than addressing the issues raised by the Special Rapporteur, China issued a statement (dated 10 December 2003) vehemently accusing the UN expert of making "biased and irresponsible" comments on the status of education in Tibet.

  Similarly, a statement of April 2004 issued jointly by the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Ambeyi Ligabo, Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Leandro Despouy, and Special Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights defenders, Hina Jilani, regarding Tenzin Delek Rinpoche (refer points 1.c.i.; 1.d.iv.; and 1.f.ii. below) said they were "concerned at the alleged lapses in respect for human rights during the trial proceedings and urge the authorities to grant Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche a new trial ensuring respect for international norms and standards of due process."

  While some visits have taken place and China is more open to issuing invitations to Special Rapporteurs, the postponement of Theo van Boven, the Special Rapporteur on Torture's visit to China (expected to have occurred in June 2004) is without legitimate justification given that it has taken more than three years for China to agree to the terms of this visit. As far as we are aware, Tibet was not to be part of the Special Rapporteur's mission.

  The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention visited Tibet in September 2004 but its visit to Tibet's notorious Drapchi Prison which houses the vast majority of political prisoners was cancelled at the last moment with technical details being cited. The Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief is scheduled for 2005.

(b)   Reform of administrative detention; introduction of judicial supervision of procedures; respect for the right to a fair and impartial trial and for the rights of the defence

(i)   More opportunity to promote technical co-operation programmes

  There is a need for more transparency and discussion of human rights projects promoted by the UK to China. It is maintained that dialogue creates an environment in which to promote co-operative and development projects. Whilst these programmes have some value, there are key problems and limitations, as follows:

—  They fail to address structural systemic problems in China, such as the non-independence of the judiciary, eg regional training of police officers to alter treatment of prisoners is an important objective, but where the policies concerning the detention or treatment of certain kinds of dissidents are being directed from Beijing, behaviours may not be altered, and such training does not address the reason why that dissident is in custody in the first place.

—  They are designed to address only the formal legal processes, rather than the arbitrary and extra-legal processes (such as re-education through labour) which affect millions of people in China and Tibet.

—   There is a failure to consult independent NGOs in their design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

(ii)   Rights of the defence

  While China's Constitution provides independent judicial power to the courts, in practice, the judiciary is subject to policy guidelines from both the government and Communist Party. This is also the case in Tibet. Despite the "majority" of judges being Tibetan, most have little or no background in legal training. "Trials are closed and invariably defendants are not allowed independent lawyers."

(iii)   Re-education through labour

  Various UN bodies, including the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and the Committee Against Torture, have repeatedly urged Chinese authorities to abolish its use of re-education through labour. During the May UK-China bilateral human rights dialogue, China indicated that the practice of re-education through labour would be abolished by the end of this year and replaced by a new system that had a better judicial structure including greater access to lawyers.

  However, "considering past experience regarding PRC policy, we can reasonably assume that if any reforms are undertaken, Tibetan areas, especially the TAR, will be the last to benefit. But even if the Chinese authorities agreed on a reform, there is still the question of whether the reform will actually change the law, the courts, legal practice, and the police, so that the rule of law and citizens benefit. The idea that a `reform' proclaimed in Beijing will be reflected by the implementation of adequate measures `on the ground' simply does not match with reality. It is the implementation, non-implementation, or `selective' implementation of laws and regulations that is the most crucial issue in China, not the laws and regulations themselves."

(c)   Respect for the fundamental rights of all prisoners; progress on access to prisoners in Chinese prisons, including the autonomous regions

  Political prisoners are generally imprisoned for activities that are peaceful in nature but have been criminalised because of their political content. Chinese authorities arrest and detain Tibetans in Tibet as much for their religious beliefs and practices as for so-called political reasons. Almost 90% of currently incarcerated political prisoners are monks and nuns. Clergy continue to be confined, tortured and subjected to other forms of ill-treatment on account of their religious beliefs.

  Of continued concern is the treatment of political prisoners who have been released either early or following completion of their sentences. Phuntsog Nyidrol, released in March 2004 continues to be the subject of police surveillance in her home. Another former political prisoner, Ngawang Sangdrol who was released in October 2003 has testified that "Tibet remains a prison" for former political prisoners and all Tibetans.

(d)   Untrammeled exercise of freedom of religion and belief, both public and private

  Tibetans are trapped in the contradictions between the promises of "freedom of religious belief" in the Chinese Constitution and applications of the atheist doctrine by the Communist Party. The current campaign promoting atheism has gone hand-in-hand with an increasing number of restrictions on public expressions of belief such as bans on hoisting prayer flags and pilgrimages. China controls and restricts the limits and depth of Tibetan Buddhist transmission to the extent that the essence of Tibetan Buddhism is now degenerating.

(e)   Rise in repression of religion in Tibet

  China proclaims to be protecting religion and culture in Tibet but its internal documents flatly contradict this and show an intensification of control and repression by the government. Tibet is now experiencing a level of government intrusiveness and control over monasteries that was unheard of in the 1980s and early 1990s.

—  Officials at all levels in Tibet are now being exhorted to strengthen control over monasteries and over the process of identifying reincarnations of important Buddhist monks and nuns.

—  Crackdowns on prayer ceremonies for the Dalai Lama and important religious institutions in eastern Tibet in recent years have been described by some Tibetans as being like a "second Cultural Revolution".

—  Political education campaigns continue in monasteries and nunneries throughout Tibet, contrary to claims by Chinese officials to Western governments that they have been discontinued.

—  The PRC authorities are focusing increasingly on the "control" of religion through administrative and legal mechanisms that enable them to clamp down on religious activities while claiming they are operating according to a "rule of law".

—  The atheist Chinese government is aggressively inserting itself into the identification, enthronement and education of reincarnate lamas following the escape of the 17th Karmapa into exile in 2000.

(f)   Respect for cultural rights and religious freedoms in Tibet and Xinjiang

1.  Population Transfer

  In addition to the above concerns and human rights violations in Tibet, the Chinese government continues to systematically dilute the indigenous Tibetan population through its policy of transferring Chinese settlers into Tibetan land.

  The population transfer of non-Tibetans to Tibet has produced a massive demographic transformation and has marginalised Tibetans in economic, educational, political and social spheres, and thereby threatens to undermine the Tibetan people's cultural rights and identity. Non-Tibetans are provided government-sponsored financial and other incentives to facilitate the expansion of existing settler communities and prompt the establishment of new ones.*

  The Gormo-Lhasa Railway, due for completion in 2007, will increase access to the Tibetan Plateau and facilitate a substantial in-flow of migrants from China, resulting in further demographic changes, environmental damage, and increased pressure on Tibet's distinct culture and identity. The decision to build and operate the Gormo-Lhasa Railway is based primarily on longstanding political and military considerations, rather than economic ones. Expenditure of the railway exceeds the combined outlays Beijing has allocated for education and healthcare in Tibet since 1952.

  Any development projects in Tibet funded by the EU or its member states should be designed to principally bring benefits to the local Tibetan people, not the Chinese migrants. EU projects should conform with the Tibetan Government-in-Exile's "Guidelines for International Development Projects and Sustainable Development in Tibet".

  * International Campaign for Tibet (2003) Crossing the Line: China's Railways to Lhasa, Tibet International Washington DC: Campaign for Tibet. These can be found at http://www.tibet.net/diir/eng/enviro/guide.

7.  APPRAISAL OF THE DIALOGUE AND SEMINARS

(a)   Adopt Multi-faceted approaches

  In light of the complex challenges faced, we support multi-faceted, integrated bilateral and multi-lateral strategies to promote human rights in China. Dialogues may be part of these strategies, but must not be an obstacle to pursuing other courses of action. We recommend that a high-level Impact Assessment is designed and conducted, to analyse the impact of dialogue on other strategies, and the outcome of such assessments to be made public.

(b)   Maintain International Pressure; EU Arms Embargo

  International pressure has a role in encouraging progress by China. Ongoing multilateral pressure gives "spine" to bilateral dialogues. An evaluation conducted by Bern University into the Swiss/China dialogue concluded:

"In the early years China was very much prepared to consider certain messages of the Swiss. However, as the pressure from the international community diminished and other countries took up a Human Rights dialogue in institutionalised talks, the dialogue with Switzerland obviously lost much of its importance to China. The readiness to carry out a genuine dialogue waned. "

  The UK and EU must demonstrate a commitment to pursue additional strategies, in addition to the dialogue and the UNCHR, to put pressure on China. The profile of human rights across the bilateral relationship must be enhanced, particularly through trade agreements and contacts, to become part of all bilateral or multilateral contacts with China. In this regard, ongoing human rights abuses in China must be the key consideration to any UK and EU decision to lift its EU-China Arms Embargo. The EU did decide not to lift the Embargo at the recent EU China Summit at the Hague on 8 December but did give notice that this would continue to be reviewed. France and Germany continue lobby for the lifting of this Embargo, therefore it is imperative that the UK act as a ballast for other European nations in actively opposing the removal of the Embargo without substantive and prolonged improvements in the human rights situation in Tibet and China. Lifting the embargo at a time when the human rights situation in Tibet and China remains serious would see the EU project an erroneous and dangerous impression of there being a problem-free human rights situation in Tibet and China.

(c)   Enhance Transparency

  The UK must push to EU to open up its human rights relationship with China to be more transparent and available for public consideration. This should include what the EU is doing directly with China, and what the EU and its member states are doing in conjunction with other countries, towards improving the human rights situation in China.

8.  APPRAISAL OF THE DIALOGUE AND SEMINARS—SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

(a)   Structure

(i)  Agenda

  Careful consideration should be given to the composition of the agenda, to minimise overload on thematic issues and ensure that time is given and specific strategies developed to progress "minority" issues. In particular, issues related to Tibet should form an integral component of the agenda.

(ii)  Time Frame for Compliance

  Objectives for the dialogues should always be made public, and be linked to a timeframe for compliance by China. The objectives should be specific and should relate to action by China, rather than merely agreements to talk about an issue, provide information or accept visits from partners.

(iii)  Evaluation

  A timetable and criteria should be published for regular evaluation of the dialogues. Regular evaluations should incorporate submissions by NGOs. If, during the course of evaluation of the dialogue the objectives or timeframe for compliance are altered, reasons should be given for doing so.

(b)   Periodicity

(i)  Suspension or Termination of the Dialogue

  Specific criteria should be articulated for the circumstances under which dialogue would be suspended or terminated. The continuation of dialogue at any cost should be abandoned as an operating principle.

(c)   Participants

(i)  Status

  Dialogues should be conducted by high-level officials on both sides and include Ministerial exchanges.

(ii)  Chinese side

  The UK should encourage the Chinese side to include key and responsible members from the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and other Tibetan regions in their delegation. One of the main problems in building trust and promoting human rights in Tibet is that the leading local Tibetan authorities are usually more reluctant to discuss issues related to human rights than are their seniors in Beijing. If the Chinese side included Tibetan officials in the dialogue it would also show that China takes the dialogue more seriously when it comes to Tibet.

(iii)  Civil Society

  Dialogue sessions should include independent social groups, experts, scholars, lawyers and other individuals. NGOs should be self-selecting and be guaranteed the right of free expression.

(d)   Follow-up between sessions

(i)  Dialogue Co-ordination

  International co-ordination is essential with respect to the EU China Human Rights Dialogue. The recent introduction of the "Bern Process", an initiative of the Swiss government, has sought to increase information-sharing amongst dialogue partners, although some countries (eg Chile) do not appear to take part. We urge the EU and its member states with bilateral human rights dialogues with China to continue taking part in these sessions. Wherever possible, countries should seek to use co-ordinated multilateral approaches to dealing with human rights in China.

(ii)  Transparency at the EU level—The Bern Proces

  The "Bern Process" meetings should be formalised and NGOs with specific relevant expertise invited to participate in a section of these meetings. The EU's use of, and role in, the Bern Process should also be made transparent. We additionally recommend that a website be created to publish information from all bilateral dialogues with China (a useful initial model is the website of the WTO compliance reporting mechanism). The site should include a timetable of meetings and dialogue sessions, reports and a forum for NGO submissions. Such a process should include the technical co-operation projects, taking into consideration NGO's concerns about their composition and limitations.

(iii)  Permanent Secretariat at the EU

  The UK would assist in building a stronger and more sustained action plan to solve the issue of Tibet by persuading the EU to create a Permanent Secretariat to oversee the dialogue and ensure better continuity. This Permanent Secretariat to the EU-China HR Dialogue should be headed by an official at least as senior as the head of the China dialogue team (currently the Director General of the Department for International conferences, Ministry of Foreign Affairs). It would report regularly on whether the benchmarks and targets are being met—and what steps the EU commits itself to taking if China fails to meet these.

Anne Callaghan

Campaigns Manager

Free Tibet Campaign

13 December 2004

  The views expressed here are not necessarily those of Free Tibet Campaign.