A Military Ombudsman?
411. During our inquiry we considered the merits
of establishing an alternative means of exercising external and
independent oversight over Army training. In particular we considered
whether a UK Military Ombudsman could provide a useful means of
complaint for Service personnel which would be outside the chain
of command. The Independent Review of the Armed Forces Manpower
Career and Remuneration Structures (the Bett Report) recommended
extending the terms of reference of the Parliamentary Commissioner
for Administration to permit him to deal with complaints from
Service personnel about administrative matters. The recommendation
was not accepted "mainly on the grounds that the Services
already have procedures for dealing with the redress of complaints".[630]
MoD has hitherto rejected the case for a Military Ombudsman a
stance that was confirmed by the Minister when he told the House
on 24 May 2004
I think that that is a step too far because there
is a chain of command. The Armed Forces are a unique set of people—there
is no doubt or question about that. They are asked to do things
that no one else is asked to do. That respect of the chain of
command is vital.[631]
412. When we asked General Palmer for his view he
commented that, 'I think we should like to see how the ALI goes.
We have, quite understandably, a plethora of people who are currently
inspecting and looking at the training establishments'.[632]
413. Typically, where military ombudsmen have been
established, their responsibilities include: overseeing and supervising
the observance of law by the military and initiating legal procedures
when individuals' rights are believed to have been violated.
414. There are three main models:
- a military ombudsman appointed
by and accountable to the parliament (Germany, Norway);
- an ombudsman appointed by MoD
and accountable to MoD and/or parliament (Canada/Australia, Israel);
- an ombudsman which has a variety
of responsibilities including the military (Sweden, Finland, Portugal).
[633]
415. In the German model, the Ombudsman can be instructed
to investigate specific issues as determined by the Bundestag
and the Defence Committee and also to take action under his own
initiative in matters which suggest 'a violation of the basic
rights of a member of the Armed Forces'. All Service personnel
have the right to contact the Parliamentary Commissioner directly,
without going through official channels. The Ombudsman has a right
at any time and without prior announcement to visit any unit headquarters
installations or administrative agency as part of his investigation
into a complaint.[634]
416. In the Canadian model the Ombudsman is regarded
as an avenue of last resort for individual complaints available
only when all internal mechanisms for complaint through the chain
of command have been exhausted. The Ombudsman's jurisdiction does
not apply to any complaint or matter relating a military judge,
court martial or summary trial. The Ombudsman also has a responsibility
to provide information to individuals on their rights to redress
and on his or her instigation to investigate and report publicly
on any welfare issues that affect the Services.[635]
417. In Sweden responsibility for military oversight
is incorporated into the general responsibilities of the Parliamentary
Ombudsman. Members of the Swedish Armed Forces may submit grievances
or complaints to the Parliamentary Ombudsman only after exhausting
the military grievance system. Conscripts whose complaints are
not settled at the local level through direct appeal to the unit
officers up to the commanding officer may raise the complaint
with the national conscript board and if still unsatisfied, with
the Parliamentary Ombudsman. For officers a complaint can be raised
by the individual through the chain of command to the Supreme
Commander if necessary. If still not resolved, it is referred
to the Parliamentary Ombudsman.
418. The Parliamentary Ombudsman is appointed by
the Swedish Parliament. He can visit units of the Armed Forces
at any time to investigate complaints or just to talk to conscripts,
officers and civilian employees. Lately, on average, only about
ten cases per year have reached the Parliamentary Ombudsman.[636]
In Denmark, an advisory system has been established to provide
assistance and advice to soldiers and officers who feel that they
have been subjected to discrimination or have been accused of
discrimination. The system consists of advisers outside the chain
of command. They perform this advisory function alongside their
normal assignments. When exercising their advisory function, they
report to a Chief Advisor who sits in the Army's Personnel Command.
The advisers provide pastoral guidance or, if necessary, assistance
in formulating a complaint through the chain of command. The system
does not constitute an external/independent complaint process
in itself.
419. The UK police force, also an organisation based
on discipline with a strong ethos, has since 2002 been monitored
by the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC).[637]
The IPCC, which reports to Parliament, provides a channel for
complaint about the police both for serving officers and members
of the public It is not part of any Government department and
its decisions cannot be overruled other than by a court of law.
The IPCC has its own teams who are able to investigate incidents
of alleged police misconduct even when no complaint has been made.
Senior police officers were initially resistant to an external
body monitoring its work and investigating complaints about its
work. Concerns included the effect it would have on operational
effectiveness and additional bureaucratic burden and worries that
"busy bodies" with no understanding of the challenges
faced by the police would reach inappropriate decisions when judging
complaints. We have seen no independent assessment of whether
these fears have been borne out by experience but we have been
told by senior police officers that, in contrast to the concerns
expressed above, the IPCC has had a beneficial effect on police
working practice and made it more transparent.
420. Although we recognise that the chain of command
is central to the culture and ethos of the Services, we do not
believe that a Military Ombudsman or an external complaints mechanism
would constitute an obstacle for the chain of command. We criticised
earlier in this report the effectiveness of Empowered Officers
and other existing complaints procedures. We noted how Service
personnel have recourse outside the chain of command for allegations
of sexual and racial discrimination.
421. As we noted earlier in this report, society
is changing. One aspect of that change is the increased expectation
among the general population that public bodies will be subject
to some form of independent scrutiny of their actions. The Independent
Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) was established to provide
that independent scrutiny for the police. The IPCC was established
at a time when public confidence in law enforcement was low. There
were concerns that the IPCC would lead to the politicisation of
the police force or would be such an intolerable additional burden
that police effectiveness would be reduced. In the event, both
the public and the police have benefited from the existence of
the IPCC.
422. We have sought to identify a model for the Armed
Forces that would provide similar benefits of independent scrutiny
as the IPCC does for the police without undermining the operational
effectiveness of the Services, the maintenance of which this report
acknowledges to be of fundamental importance. We set out below
some of the characteristics such a body should have, but we have
not proposed to describe its precise structure and organisation.
423. We therefore recommend that an independent
military complaints commission be established. It would have the
authority and capability to make recommendations which would be
binding on the Armed Forces. It would also have a research capacity
that would enable it examine trends that it had identified.
424. It would be for the commission itself to
decide whether to undertake an investigation, but we would expect
it to take into account the seriousness of the allegation. The
commission should have the authority to consider past cases. In
deciding whether to pursue a past case, the commission might consider
any investigations or inquiries that had already been conducted
as is the case for the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland which
has retrospective powers.
425. The primary goal of the commission would
be to resolve complaints made to it. If the commission decided
to pursue a complaint, it would have the right of access to all
documentation, and to Service personnel, in order to enable it
to establish whether the correct procedures had been followed
and whether there were matters that required criminal investigation.
We do not envisage that, for matters unrelated to duty of care,
the commission would replace existing grievance mechanisms.
426. The commission should be required to make
an annual report to Parliament.
427. We recommend that the commission be established
in such a way as to assure both complainants and the public of
its independence from the Armed Forces. We believe that the commission
would help MoD identify lessons that need to be learned. We also
believe that a truly independent scrutiny mechanism would contribute
to bolstering public confidence in the Services.
616 
