House of Commons - Transport

Select Committee on Transport Seventh Report

3 NETWORK RAIL

53. Network Rail Infrastructure Limited acquired Railtrack PLC on 3 October 2002 and assumed the business of operating, maintaining and renewing the national railway infrastructure network on that date. The company is the monopoly owner of the national rail network and operates under a network licence issued by the Secretary of State and, as explained in Chapter 2, is regulated by the Rail Regulator.

54. We asked ourselves in what respects Network Rail appeared to be fulfilling its remit of operating, maintaining and renewing the infrastructure, and have identified a number of serious problems.

Ownership and accountability

55. Network Rail has no shareholders, but instead has members who own the company and to whom it is accountable. However, the members have no financial or economic interest in the company and receive neither dividends nor share capital.[63] The Annual Report and Accounts 2003 nevertheless states that "members of Network Rail will have an important role in ensuring that Network Rail is managed in line with high standards of corporate governance."[64]

56. Industry stakeholders are eligible for membership on the basis of specific criteria including franchise holders, railway undertakings, and operators of railway assets. Public Members are appointed on the recommendation of a "Membership Selection Panel" which is chaired and contains up to three independent members but is appointed by the Board of Network Rail.[65] The decision on who to appoint is that of the Board of the company, not the Panel.[66]

57. There are 116 members whose main roles are to: [67]

receive the accounts of the company;

approve changes to the constitution;

approve the appointment and re-appointment of directors (except the SRA director);

approve the appointment and re-appointment of the company auditors. [68]

58. We asked Mr Armitt, Chief Executive of Network Rail, how the members influenced the company's decisions. He instanced two formal annual meetings and informal meetings.[69] He considered the accountability exercised by members was effective,[70] and reminded us of the many other accountabilities owed by the company:

59. However, accountability is not the same as people "publicly expressing disquiet", and it is arguable that the accountability of Network Rail is less than Railtrack which had shareholders. Network Rail did not convince us that the members of the company were exercising an effective control of the company. We were also concerned that industry members were virtually self appointing. These members include contractors,[72] and while members have a duty to the company, there was always some possibility of the appearance of a conflict of interest. Finally, the public members are appointed by the Board of the company and represent no-one but themselves.

60. While Mr Winsor was reported widely in the press as being critical of the company's structure,[73] he thought that the compensating measures he had taken to strengthen the network licence would correct the "accountability deficit":[74]

61. The actions of the Rail Regulator to strengthen the terms of Network Rail's network licence may be welcome in themselves, but are no substitute for sound day to day management and powerful managerial accountability to the owner. We do not believe that appropriate accountability is demonstrated at present by the company.

Business planning and performance

62. Network Rail states that it has a developed a "clear plan" for "transforming the business to meet the requirements of our stakeholders".[76] But the delivery of the plan depends upon a number of assumptions, for example: asset knowledge; greater engineering access to the network; an increase in supply chain capacity; the introduction of high-output machinery; and the estimated cost of the West Coast Route Modernisation remaining stable.[77]

63. Network Rail readily acknowledges that it does not have complete control over the factors that contribute to industry-wide objectives for safety, performance, capability and relationships.[78] Mr Armitt admitted "It is not only our own performance, it is that of the train operators in operating the trains that has to improve equally …".[79]

64. When the Regulator gave evidence to this Committee in October he castigated the performance of Network Rail for being "92 per cent worse than before Hatfield…".[80] When he asked himself why it was so bad, he thought that this was due to Railtrack's legacy and the period of administration, but also because 'the company still has to regain operational competence in terms of the management of delay."[81] That the performance of the infrastructure provider should have plummeted on the railway in the period since Hatfield by 92%, and from 70% to 92% between June and October 2003 alone is scandalous, and demonstrates the utter inability of the industry as presently structured to improve its performance.

65. The performance of the infrastructure is a key determinant of the performance of the railways as a whole. 54% of the delays attributable to trains overall arises from operational inefficiencies on the infrastructure.[82] In October 2000, immediately before the Hatfield accident, the total delay on the railway attributable to inefficient infrastructure work was 7.7 million minutes; last year the total was 14.7 million minutes, figures Network Rail does not dispute.[83] The Regulator has set what appear to be testing, year-on-year, improvement targets for the company expressed as "delay minutes affecting all operators" as follows:

Table 2

Year	Delay minutes affecting all operators	Year on year reduction
2004/05	12,300,000	-
2005/06	11,300,000	8.1%
2006/07	10,600,000	6.2%
2007/08	9,800,000	7.5%
2008/09	9,100,000	7.1%

ORR, Access charges Review 2003: Final Conclusions Table1: Network Rail's performance trajectory, para 13.

66. While Network Rail has a leading role to play in improving performance, achieving those improvements depends on train operators and other industry players working co-operatively. It appears clear from the evidence we took from the company that it recognises the importance of the issue, is taking the problem seriously and is making efforts to address it. But the company's attribution of the increased delays to a wide variety of factors, such as safety standards, contractor response times, and poor cross-industry co-ordination following disruption and even a much higher level of track renewals is reasonable. Network Rail told us "…we will ultimately carry some risk that our industry partners will not be able to achieve the profile of improvements which would enable us to met the regulator's targets."[84] In view of the number of contributors whose performance will be required to achieve these targets, it is hardly surprising that Network Rail describes the targets for future years set by the Regulator as "extremely challenging".[85]

67. The fact that Network Rail has to assume for business planning purposes that industry partners will make improvements in step with its own, is a further example of the extreme difficulties caused by the structure of the industry. In the present circumstances of extreme industry fragmentation the company's key main performance indicators - improved safety, higher performance, increased system capability, improved customer and stakeholder relationships, improved financial control, improved asset stewardship, improved business performance[86]- can never be measured and scrutinised to any satisfactory degree against the company's own activities alone.

68. That overall railway performance depends on such a large number of companies is not just a problem for Network Rail. The problem is that while it is possible, for example, to collect statistics on the number of trains running, or the number of minutes of delay, and who is responsible for them, unless there is a body empowered to direct performance, companies blame one another for poor performance, rather than working together for improvements. One result is that the responsibility for train service interruptions is not transparent: the fault may lie with Network Rail, the train operating company, a train operating company elsewhere which has caused a 'knock on' delay, or a combination of these. That train passengers often do not know who is responsible for delays under the current system is a further, major, frustration for those using the service.

69. It appears most unlikely that the targets for reducing delays set by the Rail Regulator for Network Rail will be met fully, if at all. The cause is, in large part, the result of the fragmented state of the railways and the enormous, wasted effort required to co-ordinate effort between a wide range of parties. Network Rail alone has over 10,000 suppliers of goods and services and approximately 200 main contractors on the infrastructure.[87] Many delays will arise from events beyond its control. For the Regulator to place ever more challenging targets on a structure which is incapable of meeting them fully is nonsensical.

Incentives

70. In the absence of shareholders, the sole lever of improved infrastructure performance is the Regulator's incentives regime. He stated in his Interim Review of Track Access Charges: Draft Conclusions document published on 17th October 2003, that he was relying on it to improve Network Rail's efficiency by 8% per annum during the next 3 years and by 6% thereafter.[88] There is, however, some underlying uncertainty in the projections. For example, in the Final Conclusions document published on 12 December 2003 "spending [by Network Rail] should fall below approximately £4 billion per annum within five years (emphasis added)."[89] When we asked Mr Winsor what confidence could be placed in the incentives he has for the company, we were not particularly impressed to hear him rely on the "professionalism and integrity of my office."[90]

71. We were concerned by one measure that the Regulator presented as an 'incentive', namely, the SRA's "step-in" right.[91] Where Network Rail is unable to meet its interest payments the SRA is able to "step in" with a £4 billion credit facility ("Facility A"). This is embodied in an 2002 agreement between the SRA and Network Rail which also gives the SRA the right to determine whether the Network Rail Chairman and Chief Executive should keep their positions if more than 5% of "Facility A" is drawn down. The Regulator presents these arrangements for an SRA credit facility for Network Rail as a protection for any company investor. This is surely correct. But he also considers it to be a discipline upon the company.

72. Although the Chairman and Chief Executive may be deterred from breaching 5% of "Facility A" by the threat to their positions, in the final analysis, "Facility A" is a Government guarantee for Network Rail. It appears to us that such a "Facility" has little to do with a sound mechanism to force the company to live within its means and perform to agreed targets. Indeed, it could be argued that such a cushion acts as a disincentive to maintaining budgetary controls. We are utterly unconvinced that "step in" rights for the SRA provide an effective incentive for Network Rail to improve its performance and live within its means. This is an example of the Rail Regulator "dressing up" Government financial support as a regulatory "incentive" to defend the present regulatory regime.

Profits, losses and debts

PROFITS AND LOSSES

73. One of the main claims for Network Rail by the Government is that it will be "run along commercial lines to make surpluses from its operations, which will be re-invested in the network."[92] Mr McAllister, Chairman of Network Rail, told us, both, that 'We are expected to make profits',[93] and that "We do not expect to make a profit in the foreseeable future…. because with the level of debt our interest payments are very considerable and will be very considerable…."[94]

74. Network Rail is far from profitable. In 2002-03 Network Rail's preliminary figures indicated a loss of £290 million.[95] This has since been adjusted to £255 million in the audited accounts for the year.[96] Had the company not moved from historic cost accounting to depreciated replacement cost accounting for valuing the railway's fixed assets, Mr Armitt confirmed the £290 million loss would have been much higher, £1.8 billion.[97]

75. In exploring why the company had made a loss, and why the company apparently had spent at levels in excess of those allowed in the Rail Regulator's Periodic Review of 2000, we were astonished to be told by Mr Armitt:

we were allowed to expend at the levels of expenditure that we had indicated were necessary (

76. Mr Armitt indicated that the Regulator had agreed "in that period" to add the overspend to the company's "regulated asset base".[99] However, Mr Winsor told us "I was not consulted about the levels or the efficiency or the extent of overspending because Ernst & Young, as the administrators of Railtrack had a direct line to the Strategic Rail Authority…The Government took the decision to put the company into administration… and in that time the efficiency of the company and the spending was out of control."[100]

77. The outcome of this overspend was that the Regulator:

The increase in the regulatory asset base is the result of a number of additions to the regulatory asset base which were not scheduled in the periodic review. The major contributor, accounting for around 50% of the increase, is the expected overspend during the current control period, during the period of administration mainly. The overspend in 2001-02 and 2002-03 is about £2.5 billion. The overspend in 2003-04 is £2.9 billion.

an agreement between the Strategic Rail Authority and Network Rail made prior to Network Rail's takeover of Railtrack which stated that the Strategic Rail Authority would compensate Network Rail for overspending up to April 2004.

101

78. We understand the arguments in favour for adding overspend to the Regulatory Asset Base (RAB), but it might be thought that this seems rather like increasing someone's credit limit on the grounds that the goods they have bought by overspending increase their real wealth. The huge sum of £5.5 billion was overspent in the period 2001-2004. The addition of this amount to the 'regulatory asset base' of Network Rail -apparently a decision for the Rail Regulator alone- is the equivalent of a massive, one-off subsidy to the rail infrastructure. Yet, even so, Network Rail has posted a loss of £290 million.

79. This episode demonstrates the extent of the power which the present structure has allowed the Regulator to accumulate at the expense of all the other parts of the railway, and of the Government. The Regulator is meant to be restraining costs and seeking value for money. Instead, the present structure has permitted him to write off astonishingly large sums of public money, apparently on his own authority. One highly significant aspect of the overspending during the period in which Railtrack was in administration is that, in the middle of the most severe crisis for the industry in the last 10 years, the SRA, which must have been backed by the Government, bypassed the Regulator. The system was not flexible enough for all parties to join together in finding the best solution in extreme circumstances.

DEBTS

80. Network Rail's debt is soaring. In 2002-03 Network Rail's net debt increased from £6.3 billion to over £9 billion.[102] In Network Rail's interim financial statements for the 6 months to 30 September 2003 the debt is stated as £10.3 billion against a forecast of £10.7 billion.[103] The company gave evidence to us that the forecast for the year to 31 March 2004 was for debt of between £13 and £13.5 billion.[104] However, additional debt of around £4.4 billion is expected over the next 12-24 months as a result of the Regulator's Interim Review of Track Charges.[105] Reprofiling revenue streams as borrowing could result in the company incurring further debt of up to £2.8 billion over the same period.[106]

81. As a private sector company, Network Rail has no access to Government funding for borrowing purposes.[107] It estimates the annual cost of borrowing to be approximately £39 million for each £1 billion.[108] The company might therefore eventually incur debt repayments in the region of £800 million annually were it to have to borrow to the extent it believes possible as outlined above. Lord Oakeshott of Seagrove Bay was reported in May 2003 as believing that the company would have saved £80 million in interest payments if it had been financed by Government gilts rather than private finance.[109] Evidence received by this Committee has suggested that Network Rail's borrowing would cost less if raised by the Government.[110]

82. The argument for private financing might be that this transfers the risk to the private sector, but Network Rail's borrowing has been possible because the SRA has supported it with £21 billion of standby support loans,[111] thereby transferring the risk back to the Government.

83. However, such Government support does not mean that the company has access to the cheapest borrowing:

112

although "The SRA facilities allow NR to borrow for the short and medium term at very low rates, with a margin of around 35 basis points above gilts. (100 basis points being equal to 1 percentage point)".[113]

84. Further Government support is to be provided for by a securitisation of the company's income:

114

85. The role of the Government in guaranteeing the entire financing of Network Rail, and in providing comfort to private investors, is clear from this evidence. The private status of the company means that the company's borrowing is more expensive than would be the case were it to be Government owned, despite the Government's crucial role as guarantor. In effect, what has happened is that the Government has accepted the risk of the Network Rail operation, but on more expensive terms than it need have had it direct ownership of the company.

86. We are deeply concerned that the cost of servicing Network Rail's considerable debt is higher that it need be because of the company's private status which means that the cheapest Government borrowing is unavailable to it. We can see little prospect of the company becoming profitable and able to feed funds back into the rail industry under present circumstances. This makes it all the more important for borrowing to be done as cheaply as possible.

87. The present Network Rail ownership arrangements do not make sense. The company is not expected to make a profit for the foreseeable future; the cost of funding it as a private sector company is higher than it need be; and its governance arrangements are weak. We consider that it is time for the Government to cut through this tangle of responsibilities and take direct ownership of Network Rail on the grounds that a Railways Agency, incorporating the rail infrastructure, will ensure both the lowest borrowing costs to meet the necessary funding requirements and direct, democratic accountability.

Driving costs down

88. In its Strategic Plan 2003, the SRA expresses great concern about the escalating cost of operating, maintaining and renewing the rail infrastructure.[115] The SRA notes that Railtrack had indicated that the cost for this was 40% higher than allowed for by the Regulator in his Periodic Review for 2000. Network Rail considers that "targeted and incremental savings" are unlikely to effect the desired cost reductions but that a "step change" will be required and has set itself a target of achieving efficiencies equivalent to 20% of costs by 2006 (estimated at almost £1 billion of additional savings). Mr Coucher told us that he estimated that £1.1 billion of savings had been identified already out of an annual target of £1.3 billion.[116]

MAINTENANCE AND TRACK RENEWALS

89. £5 billion of Network Rail's £6 billion annual cost base was spent on external contractors.[117] In June Mr Coucher, Deputy Chief Executive of Network Rail, said that the company was removing three maintenance areas from the private sector to take the work directly under its control "to understand how our cost base moves, and what working practices and standards we put on areas that drive up cost."[118] However, there was no intention by the company to take all maintenance "in-house" at that stage.[119]

90. On 24th October, shortly after the rail maintenance firm Jarvis relinquished its three rail maintenance contracts,[120] Network Rail announced that it was taking all remaining rail maintenance on the national network away from the private sector taken after "a fundamental review of rail maintenance that has been carried out over the last six months."[121] Renewals work would remain with the private sector with the transfer to be complete by summer 2004.

91. Mr Coucher said that savings of "around £170 to £250 million" annually could be expected from bringing the contracts in-house.[122] Mr McAllister estimated the savings to be a little higher at £300 million.[123] These would arise from reduced overheads such as the commercial profit margin - which Mr David Clarke, Strategy Director at Jarvis Rail, estimated was in the "range" of 4% for maintenance and 6% for renewals[124] - and efficiencies, such as removing duplication of systems to manage staff and programmes within contractors and within Network Rail itself, and economies of scale.[125]

92. The company would need to compensate the private sector for early termination of maintenance contracts, but we were told that the level of compensation was commercially sensitive and could not be divulged.[126] It appeared that the earlier worries about absorbing large numbers of employees had been dispelled,[127] even though Mr Armitt told us that the company will now grow from 16,000 to "about 34,000" as a result of taking maintenance in-house as staff transfer from the private sector.[128] The company did not consider this to be a "strategic" decision but, in Mr McAllister's words, an "operational" one for the company alone.[129]

93. We think that the company's decision to take all infrastructure maintenance in-house is a move in the right direction, though we had expected to be given a rather more exact estimate for the likely savings than the range of figures presented to us. It appears obvious that overheads associated with contracting for such work with the private sector do swell overall costs, and that in the absence of private sector profit margins the cost of maintenance should fall. However, the company will need to manage the costs of increasing its own workforce to cope with this work carefully to preserve potential savings. It will also be particularly important that the company attracts the appropriate mix of engineering expertise from the private sector.

94. However, the company intends to continue to contract with the private sector for track, telecommunications and signalling renewals. In his Statement to the House of Commons on the 28th October 2003, the Secretary of State said that this was because that market was well suited to competitive tendering and that such work could be carried out on a project basis.[130] The company told us that it had tightened its renewal contracts and that the new contracts "will deliver further efficiencies" and "value for money".[131] Mr Armitt considers that out-sourcing infrastructure renewals work is effective,[132] and has "targeted" a 20% saving in the contracts for renewals over the next three years.[133] However, Mr Bob Crow, General Secretary of the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers, considered that there was no fundamental difference between railway maintenance and renewals work and saw no reason why the latter should not be brought "in-house" by Network Rail.[134]

95. Network Rail's decision to retain the private sector for track renewals could be problematic. While inefficiencies may, or may not, be driven down to the level the company is seeking by this decision, there will remain a contract profit margin cost to the company which will be absent from the rail maintenance side of the business. The efficiency gains will need to be demonstrably significant for National Rail's present renewals' policy to be persuasive. Taking more work "in-house" would also be an opportunity to reduce the number of company "interfaces" and contracts which currently burden the industry. In the longer term, Network Rail should reconsider its decision to retain private sector contracts for track renewals. It should also review now what other services it currently purchases and which might be more economically provided under direct management control.

Estimating funding requirements

HEADLINE FIGURES

96. Network Rail has revised its estimates of the funding it will require over the "control period", 2004-2009, three times since March 2003. In March 2003 the company estimated its requirements at £35 billion; in June 2003 at £29.5 billion; and in September 2003 at £24.5 billion, a reduction of nearly a third from its first estimate.[135] On 7 January, Mr Armitt denied that the company had inflated its original estimate of its requirements in order to attempt to set a high benchmark for the final settlement "Absolutely not".[136]

97. Mr McAllister, Chairman of Network Rail, explained:

137

98. On 17th October 2003 the Regulator published Draft Conclusions which suggested that the amount required by the company was £22.7 billion[138] (since revised down to £22.2 billion when he published his Final Conclusions on 12 December).[139] Network Rail accepted the Regulator's final settlement on 5 February 2004.[140] However, the difference between the company's last published estimate of requirements and the Regulator's still represented £2.5 billion.

RENEWALS

99. Such headline variations may arise because of disputes between Network Rail and the Regulator over the levels of activity. In this case, the Regulator considered that Network Rail should do less renewals work than it had planned.

100. Consultants LEK Consulting, Halcrow Group, and Transportation Technology Centre Inc., retained by the Rail Regulator to study the current expenditure of maintenance and renewals as set out in Network Rail's Business Plan, considered that of 798 track renewals reviewed only 57% of "plain line track" renewals were "fully justified"; of the remainder, 16% were "not justified". Renewals, and other work, were sometimes not justified in the consultants' view because there was insufficient information available in Network Rail to make a judgement.[141]

101. In his Draft Conclusions published in October, the Regulator concluded that Network Rail should spend 20% less on renewals in 2004/05 and 2005/06 -equivalent to savings of £360 million- than budgeted for in the company's March 2003 Business Plan.[142] He noted there that Network Rail disputed the consultants' work,[143] but that he was not persuaded by Network Rail.[144] The view of the Regulator was shared by Roger Ford, the railway journalist, in evidence to this Committee: "Network Rail's projected maintenance costs are broadly in line with historic figures. However renewals are so high as to be ludicrous."[145]

102. The Regulator paraphrased the company's argument in his Final Conclusions document published in December: "Network Rail asserted that the replacement of additional track components in conjunction with a necessary renewal job is often justified by reductions in overall costs."[146]

103. We asked Mr Armitt about this and he told us:

147

104. Probed about whether Network Rail's figures for overall budget requirements might not be more accurate than his own, the Regulator said "It is conceptually possible but let us remember they are the monopoly provider of an essential service. They are hardly likely to ask for less."[148] This seems to be something of a caricature of the Network Rail's position, which was clearly based on professional estimation, even if the company was culpable in not having provided supporting documentation of sufficient and persuasive detail in the case of some renewals.

105. Network Rail's approach to renewals appears to be in line with Government policy, which is that one advantage of the company's commercial structure over Railtrack's equity basis was "decision-making based on long-term analysis of whole-life asset costs- not deferring much-needed investment expenditure for short-term economic gain."[149] This has been Network Rail's position in the Interim Review process. But it is evidently not the Regulator's, and the Government itself may have underestimated the short term costs of such a policy when applied to the run down UK infrastructure. We are concerned that the drive to reduce costs appears in conflict with long term investment in the infrastructure. Balancing costs and investment needs to be undertaken on the basis of solid data and agreed targets, both of which appear to be in short supply. The company needs to get a better grip on the level of renewals required so that there can be confidence that cost and investment are in reasonable balance.

106. The Regulator was entitled to challenge Network Rail's estimates of work required where these appeared to him to be in excess of necessity. We are nevertheless astonished at the spectacle of two bodies - Network Rail and the Rail Regulator - in dispute in this manner. This is not an outside body (the Regulator) undertaking a straightforward check of the operator's documentation, but appearing to undertake a root and branch parallel exercise by consultants of renewals' estimation. Either the renewals documentation of Network Rail is grossly deficient - as the Rail Regulator appears to believe - or the Regulator undertook too detailed an examination, at a considerable consultancy cost.[150]

107. It was inefficient and highly expensive for Network Rail and the Rail Regulator to undertake parallel exercises assessing renewals' requirements of the rail infrastructure. It should be a firm objective for the future economic regulatory authority and the infrastructure provider to ensure that the quality of the latter's estimation processes and records is sufficient to provide a very high degree of confidence in what is being proposed, allowing there to be much less parallel checking and micro-management in future.

108. It is also unacceptable that Network Rail did not have its estimates of overall funding requirements under control. We accept that the original estimate in March 2003 may have been inaccurate owing to the requirement to publish and the relative shortness of preparation time. However, even after an element of joint working with the Regulator and his consultants, the company's final requirements estimates vary by an excess of £2.5 billion from those of the Regulator.

109. In these circumstances it is difficult to understand why the company has now agreed to a settlement which its own estimated figure appears to suggest is too low for the work it considers necessary without complaint. It had options to ask the Regulator either to issue a new review notice, or refer his determination to the Competition Commission, but chose not to do so.[151] This suggests that the company's estimates of funding requirements cannot be relied upon. The company needs to take urgent steps to demonstrate that it has adequate systems in place to ensure future funding forecasting is accurate to establish credibility.

Conclusion

110. Taking the company into direct ownership together with removing the Regulator's present role of determining the level of the company's funding, as discussed in Chapter 2, would enable the Government to ensure cheaper funding for, and more effective overall control over, the railway infrastructure, particularly maintenance, renewals and enhancements. It is likely that there will continue to be a role for the private sector in aspects of infrastructure provision. But the structure of Network Rail needs to reflect the funding reality that the Government guarantees the finances of the railway and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Network Rail's present private sector status and structure mask that reality and not only fails to deliver benefits to the industry and the travelling public, but actually produces the significant funding and governance flaws we have discussed. The Government needs to move quickly to take control of the infrastructure into the public sector.

111. However, in order to rationalise the railway and provide a platform for significant future service improvements, the Government must go further. It also needs to have a much tighter grip of the outputs it requires from the rail industry. To achieve that, the current artificial barriers between those specifying the outputs and those operating the infrastructure (which largely determine those outputs) must be removed. In the next Chapter we examine the SRA's current role in specifying outputs, and the way in which the present structure frustrates its ability to carry out this key leadership function.

63 Policy and Procedure for the Selection and Appointment of the members of Network Rail is available on the company's website. Back

64 Network Rail Annual Report and Accounts 2003, p 10 Back

65 Policy and Procedure for the selection and Appointment of the Members of Network Rail, para 28 Back

66 Ibid, para 35 Back

67 Network Rail Annual Report and Accounts 2003, p 11 Back

68 Policy and Procedure for the Selection and Appointment of the Members of Network Rail, para 13 Back

69 Q76 Back

70 Q78 Back

72 Q75. A list of Network Rail members may be found on the company's website Back