African Foundation for Development

© AFFORD (2004)

OVERVIEW

1.  Within this memo we aim to contribute to the IDC's deliberations on maximising the benefits of migration for development by focusing on the role of the African diaspora in contributing to Africa's development. That is, we focus on international migration, so-called transnational communities. In particular, while we recognise the diversity of the African diaspora to include people of African descent who involuntarily left Africa during the Atlantic Slave Trade and other traumatic episodes, here we focus primarily on the "new African diaspora" - in broad terms, those African migrants who left the continent in the post-independence era for a range of reasons including economic hardship, fleeing conflict, political persecution, etc.

2.  We welcome this opportunity to contribute to the Committee's inquiry on migration and development. The points we make here echo comments we made in a submission to DFID in advance of publication of its second White Paper on globalisation and development entitled Globalisation and development: the diaspora dimension. In that submission, we suggested how a consideration of the movement of people, in relation to globalisation, ought to influence the development policy agenda.

3.  This memo aims to offer concrete policy recommendations, directed primarily at DFID, starting with the broad overall policy framework, then addressing brain drain and remittance issues in turn.

4.  The comments draw upon AFFORD's ten-year experience of conducting and publishing its own action-research on matters relating to the African diaspora's development initiatives; of building the capacity of UK-based African civil society organisations in their developmental efforts; of collaborating with a range of African and non-African partners to organise courses, events, etc around the diaspora-led development effort.

5.  We are guided by the strategic goal of shifting the balance of power to Africa as we believe that Africans in Africa should be in the driving seat of their own development. As Africans in the diaspora, we seek to add to voices from the continent itself that echo this determination to shape their own destiny. Thus we do not think it is our right or place to determine policy from the North, but to help shape it in ways that indeed do contribute to long-term sustainable development in Africa and other developing regions.

6.  AFFORD's mission is to expand and enhance the contribution that Africans in the diaspora make to Africa's development. AFFORD is African-led, we recognise and celebrate the full diversity of African peoples in our work and we also work with non-Africans in seeking to fulfil our mission.

DIVERSITY OF DEVELOPMENT APPROACHES: HORSES FOR COURSES

7.  Speaking to members of the Ghanaian diaspora gathered at a recent Homecoming Summit, President John Kufuor described the Ghanaian diaspora as the government's most important overseas partner. Thanks, in the main to remittance flows that dwarf official aid, it is fair to say that Africans, Asians, Latin Americans, through their own diasporas are their own biggest aid donors. This is development as self-help, as diasporas often see themselves as intrinsically linked to the communities and households they have left behind. Of course, not every dollar of remittance is "developmental", but neither is every penny of ODA.

8.  Thus DFID should start from the premise that migrants are serious development actors who in the most practical way possible, through their pockets, actively support international development. While practical problems may hamper efforts to engage constructively and meaningfully with diasporas, this difficulty does not undermine the fundamental principle. Rather than seeking to impose a monolithic view of what constitutes development, DFID should embrace the diversity of approaches that emanate from civil society (which of course includes the sorts of organisations and associations to which diasporas typically belong) and work constructively with this diversity.

9.  Perhaps to a larger degree than other civil society development actors, diaspora groups and communities bring a strong sense of identity to the table. It is their sense of connection with people, places and communities in the developing world that motivates their action. Other non-diasporic actors may ostensibly be more motivated by ideology but we see no reason why one form of motivation should be privileged above the other. Respecting the diversity of approaches means valuing different people's approaches and contributions and learning to work constructively with them to achieve shared goals.

LOCAL-GLOBAL NEXUS

10.  The transnational nature of many diaspora communities, and especially the significant role they play in the development of their regions of origin blurs the traditional distinctions between the local policy domain (Home Office, local authorities, etc) and the global policy domain under the briefs of DFID and the FCO. A raft of policies - such as right of abode, right to work, freedom of movement, etc - would enable diasporas to better harmonise their own welfare needs/interests here with their desires/obligations to support family and community members in their region of origin. Policy makers with a remit for local/national issues have too little understanding of the ways that diasporas may in effect socially exclude themselves - by deferring investment in their own education, living in the cheapest, substandard housing, etc - in order to provide greater support to relatives abroad. Urban regeneration policies in areas with high concentrations of migrants focus rather too narrowly on issues such as crime, employment, health, education and skills, poor housing, physical environment. All of these aspects are important but regeneration policies should also take account of diasporas' vulnerabilities to shocks, events and demands emanating from regions outside their immediate locality. These regions may be the region of origin or a place where other diasporas are gathered (eg Liberian refugees encamped in Ghana).

11.  Given the high concentration of Africans around the London region, an important policy partner in addition to the Home Office for DFID in the local-global dialogue is the Greater London Authority and individual local authorities such as Southwark, Hackney, Newham, Tower Hamlets, etc.

12.  In addition to achieving greater coherence in interior policy matters such as citizenship, right to work, etc, we believe that an aim should be to explore pilot initiatives that work with diasporas to find creative ways in which they can balance the "here" and "there" pressures they face in ways that tackle poverty in the South and achieve social inclusion here in the UK.

13.  Given the complexity and diversity of the issues at hand, overall the policy objective should be to create an enabling environment in which diasporas themselves are able to seek creative solutions to their own dilemmas and problems.

14.  By deepening its appreciation of the actual and potential role of diaspora organisations in promoting development, DFID may become more willing, albeit in partnership with other agencies with a local remit, to support capacity building of diaspora organisations to play the roles they already play more effectively.

CONNECTIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT

15.  DFID recently signed a Strategic Grant Agreement (SGA) with Connections for Development (CfD), a network of black and minority ethnic communities with an interest in international development.

16.  We welcome this development as a small but significant step towards DFID establishing a more strategic engagement with diasporas around the international development agenda.

17.  No mention was made of CfD in either DFID's written submission to this inquiry, or DFID officials' oral evidence. Perhaps it is early days but that did seem odd given the potential significance of CfD and the SGA with DFID and the inquiry's focus. The agreement was envisaged as a two-way process of dialogue, exchange and cooperation, led internally within DFID by the Information and Civil Society Department.

18.  While diaspora-DFID engagement should not be limited to CfD-related activities, it would be useful for DFID to report regularly on such activities, specifically not just on CfD's role in broadcasting DFID's messages to its constituencies, but also on what DFID is learning from its engagement with CfD and ways in which the organisation is changing its way of doing business as a result.

19.  We suggest, given the disparate nature of DFID's migration-and-development initiatives (which include CfD) that DFID provide an integrated report on these activities at appropriate timeframes. This suggestion is based on our own view that migration is central to development and to people's own efforts to move themselves out of poverty. Our learning going forwards will be greatly aided by such periodic evaluations of the entire range of DFID's activities seen through the lens of migration, development and poverty eradication.

DIASPORA INPUT TO DFID POLICY

20.  DFID's sporadic efforts at engaging with diaspora communities while drawing up country assistance programmes are a welcome development. It is unclear to us why such piecemeal efforts cannot be undertaken in a more systematic and strategic manner, given the UK's diversity today. Indeed, African communities in the UK originate from as many as 35 African countries so considerable scope exists to engage more broadly around individual country programmes, sector-specific agendas, etc. The absence of representative/umbrella bodies is generally put forward as the reason for not engaging with disparate groups with different concerns and interests. Rather than seeking to impose its own preferred mode of organisation and engagement on communities, DFID should seek to build its own capacity to work with civil society in all its diversity outside Whitehall. Given the panoply of participatory tools and techniques used by civil society in the South, it seems surprising that these cannot be put to good use here to similar ends. Moreover, we assume that when it engages with communities in the South, DFID does not insist on dealing only with formally constituted umbrella bodies. It should adopt the same approach in engaging with diaspora communities here.

21.  That said, efforts are underway by groups such as African Voices for Africa's Development (ADVAD) - a network of African community groups and individuals - to bring a harmonised voice to the policy table. However, such a group represents only a tiny segment of UK-African civil society.

NEW IMPERIALISM AND LIMITS TO POLICY COHERENCE

22.  In spite of our emphasis here on the importance of a joined-up policy framework by HMG, we do acknowledge the severe limitations of any such effort in the current geo-political climate. Diasporas with long memories - along with many others - baulked somewhat upon reading Robert Cooper, senior British diplomat and adviser to the Prime Minister extolling the virtues of a new liberal imperialism. His claim, two years ago, that "the need for colonisation is as great as it ever was in the nineteenth century" was perhaps prescient, if unfortunate. The invasion of Iraq did not enjoy universal support among the British population and it is fair to assume that many diasporas were profoundly opposed too. Thus a search for coherence between a DFID seeking to eradicate poverty and other departments of state pursuing a neo-imperialist agenda is indeed a tall order. For some, DFID will be seen as seeking to apply bandages where others have laid and detonated cluster bombs. Fears of being co-opted by a regime unwilling or unable to shed its past may undermine some people's trust in DFID's anti-poverty agenda. Through deeds and words DFID will have to communicate its integrity and credibility to a potentially sceptical audience.

DIASPORAS AND MAINSTREAM DEVELOPMENT

23.  Diasporas are in effect marginalised from mainstream development efforts. By mainstream in this context we refer to DFID, bilateral donors, multilateral agencies, the Bretton Woods Institutions, the United Nations, large international aid agencies and NGOs, etc. Our own research has suggested that in spite of their lack of awareness of the Millennium Development Goals, for instance, diaspora organisations through their own activities do in effect support the realisation of those goals. Obviously, diasporas have different historical trajectories from mainstream players and so numerous reasons may exist for the gulf between them. Here we draw attention to two related issues that DFID could address.

IMAGES OF DEVELOPMENT

24.  First, images of development tend to alienate diasporas. While there is undoubtedly widespread hunger, disease, deprivation, social injustice, etc in the developing South, the media images presented are generally one-dimensional, distorted, negative, demeaning, and often exaggerated (eg see "Charities 'exaggerated Africa famine'", Robin Gedye, Daily Telegraph 17/01/2004). DFID has already undertaken several initiatives to enhance public understanding of and support for development efforts by encouraging more balanced and informative reporting and these efforts are commendable. Our starting premise here that diasporas are in fact the biggest "aid donors" is one that surprises and startles most people given the assumptions they make based on what they see on their TV screens. Through its development awareness programmes, scope exists for DFID to encourage diasporas to tell more of their own stories of self-help that would go a long way to counter misleading images of passive peoples who completely lack agency and are totally dependent upon Western benevolence.

COMPLACENCY OVER INSTITUTIONAL RACISM

25.  A number of informed commentators have addressed the question of racism in international aid (eg see Irish Mozambique Solidarity (1998) Shifting the Balance of Power: In Pursuit of Anti-Racist Aid Delivery; Returned Volunteer Action (1991) For Whose Benefit? Racism and Overseas Development Work; Goudge, P (2003) The Whiteness of Power: Racism in Third World Development and Aid Lawrence & Wishart, London). However, NGOs have demonstrated little enthusiasm for addressing the issue. Indeed, a recent effort by the NGO umbrella body British Overseas NGOs for Development (BOND) to organise a workshop looking at the implications of the Macpherson Report and institutional racism for NGOs was cancelled owing to lack of interest. Such complacency will likely undermine significant diaspora engagement in mainstream development efforts. DFID has made important strides with its own diversity initiatives and could consider giving a lead to NGOs by sharing its experience of such a change programme and how it improves the achievement of its poverty eradication remit. DFID could encourage the NGOs it funds to be more open about their own approaches to diversity and how these enhance development efforts.

TACKLING THE "BRAIN DRAIN"

26.  In broad terms, we suggest that the so-called "brain drain" phenomenon can be tackled by a "3Rs" strategy. The first R is Retention. It is the responsibility of developing country governments and employers to create the conditions that will enable workers in their countries to maximise their potential. If insufficient attention is paid to retention, then all other efforts simply create a revolving door as diasporas are lured home only to see other dissatisfied counterpart depart on the next outbound flight. The second R is for Return. Clearly, under the right conditions, a relatively small number of skilled and experienced people in the diaspora will return home permanently. However, these days, more emphasis is placed on more flexible approaches which we refer to as Retrieval, ie tapping into diaspora networks and know-how in flexible ways. This might include short-term projects, providing long-distance support, and other means. Quite conceivably, someone who has been involved in a number of "Retrieval" initiatives over a few years may be more inclined to return home permanently having connected with the right social networks to enable a successful transition.

27.  We believe that DFID can contribute to each R of this 3Rs strategy if it were to integrate human and institutional capacity building throughout all its work. In practical terms, scope should exist for using Technical Assistance budgets in more strategic ways to ensure, first that existing human resource in situ is fully utilised. Only where such talent is missing should the search overseas begin. And the priority within the overseas search should be to look for opportunities to facilitate the Return or Retrieval of diaspora know-how. AFFORD has joined with others such as CBCAfricaRecruit to call on African governments to take a more flexible approach to employment regulations and see the entire African diaspora as a resource to be tapped when tackling brain drain-related problems.

28.  Although they are not large employers in the grand scheme of things, it is difficult to see why international NGOs need to continue relying on placing expatriate staff in overseas positions. Again, we suggest that the same approach of prioritising local or regional talent, followed by a search in the diaspora could make a useful contribution to human and institutional capacity building especially in Africa. We note that some NGOs have begun to take this approach and hope that more will follow suit.

29.  Most brain drain initiatives focus on those individuals who already possess valuable skills, know-how and experience. However, we also draw attention to younger members of diaspora groups whose knowledge, skills and experience will become a valuable resource in a few years' time. Such young individuals do not receive adequate information about career options within the developing world. Careers guidance officers in universities, colleges, and youth clubs lack insight into what options might be available to their young clients and how they might avail themselves of opportunities. Taking this long-term view, DFID could support information schemes that target young diaspora individuals yet to reach working age.

REMITTANCES

30.  Definitions of remittances vary. For our purposes here we refer to sums of money provided mostly by individual migrants but sometimes (an increasing trend) by groups of migrants to relatives, friends, and members of a community of interest or association in the region of origin for a range of purposes. Remittances are, in essence, a private matter. People use their taxed income and should be free to use in the advance of any lawful pursuits as they see fit.

31.  Suggestions that a body such as DFID should seek to intervene in this private matter in a bid to alter the uses to which remittances are put seem perverse. DFID is funded by the Exchequer at tax-payers' expense. Some of these tax-payers dedicate some of their taxed income to purposes as they see fit, usually at the behest of someone at the household or community level in the country of origination. It is difficult to see what additional information another party might have to justify diverting such monies to other uses.

32.  Rather, given that such people sending remittances home have a direct line of communication and usually an expression of need from often poor households in the South, this is valuable information that could inform and enhance the precision of DFID's aid policies, which presumably are intended to be user- and needs-driven. The challenge, therefore, we suggest is for DFID to understand the sorts of needs that poor people are expressing to counterparts in the diaspora and use that insight to inform policy, practice and priorities.

33.  Scope might exist for DFID to match, pound-for-pound, diaspora remittances that tackle poverty in the South. We note that such schemes have been implemented in Mexico in a partnership between three tiers of government and US-based hometown associations, so-called 3 x 1 schemes).

34.  We suggest that the emphasis of interventions should be to facilitate interaction between poor people in the South and their counterparts in the diaspora to work together to maximise the benefits of remittances and to tackle longer term structural impediments to wealth creation. Given that such relationships exist in a largely non-mediated form now, it would be important for any external partner to be clear about the value they sought to add to that diaspora-home relationship. We do question whether DFID or international NGOs should be seeking to divert diaspora resources to fund their own projects.

35.  Probably at least 50% of remittances are transferred via informal routes, including small money transfer companies to be found in areas of high concentration of diaspora communities (in southeast London, for instance). These transnational enterprises play important roles in local economies which are often the most deprived areas of the UK. (18% of the UK's 841 wards which are the poorest 10% are in 20 London boroughs, including all inner London ones where Africans are most concentrated).

36.  Efforts to drive down the costs of remittances that create opportunities for large multinational banks at the expense of smaller operators would likely produce winners and losers. We feel that more thought needs to be given to these proposals. Moreover, efforts to work with transnational entrepreneurs to scale up their businesses, improve customer service and lower costs might produce desirable win/win outcomes. The principle of "do no harm" is an important one to which all actors should adhere. Almost certainly, top down approaches that impose solutions with no participation from those most directly involved - diasporas and their counterparts in the South - will do great harm.

DIASPORA & DEVELOPMENT: HOW CENTRAL TO DFID'S AGENDA?

37.  Most of the points made above are by now well-rehearsed. Historically, the African diaspora has played significant roles in Africa's "development" (as have other diasporas in their own regions of origin). Freed slave Olaudah Equiano and contemporaries were 18^th century activists who campaigned tirelessly for abolition of slavery. Theirs was an emancipation agenda. Post-World War II Britain saw diasporas actively campaign for an end to colonial rule. The 1945 5^th Pan-African Congress was a highlight. Their quest was for self-determination. Today, a far more diffuse range of issues confront Africa and the rest of the developing world but what remains constant is the diasporic effort to emancipate their regions of origin from the bondages of poverty and social injustice and to enable peoples from those regions to shape their own destiny. Seen within this context, the most useful role for DFID would be to see how best it could enable and facilitate people's own strategies for dignity, survival and a future determined by them.