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Mr. Michael Ancram (Devizes) (Con): May I thank the Foreign Secretary for what I can only call his astonishingly defensive statement, and for advance sight of it? I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for East Hampshire (Mr. Mates) on his appointment to the Privy Council.
We on the Conservative Benches welcome the announcement of the inquiry. We could hardly do otherwise because we have been calling since last June for an inquiry into intelligence on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and into the use made of such intelligence by the Government. Indeed, over the last few days, my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition has deployed a powerful case for an inquiry, much along the lines of the one that the Foreign Secretary has announced, so we would be churlish not to show our appreciation when our advice is heeded.
It is particularly gratifying in this instance to see that the Prime Minister, who has no reverse gear, can still execute impressive U-turns—there can be few more spectacular examples than this one. Our frequent calls for an inquiry were met with the response from last June onwards that it was unnecessary, that the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Intelligence and Security Committee were enough and that anyway we should wait for the final report of the Iraq survey group.
Even after Lord Hutton reported last week, senior Ministers, including the Lord Chancellor on Sunday, were still insisting that an inquiry was not needed and that we should await the outcome of the ISG, whenever that might come. Then, suddenly, the damascene conversion, which we welcome, even if I am not totally convinced by the Foreign Secretary's explanation. Perish the thought that it had anything to do with the decision of President Bush to hold a similar inquiry. I like to think that it was because the Government have at last seen the light—the light that kicking for the long grass would not make the very serious questions relating to the intelligence on WMD and the Government's use of it go away; the light that the longer a full inquiry into
those issues was refused, the more the credibility of both the Government and the intelligence services would be undermined; and the light that the public have a right to have those serious questions answered, not least in view of Dr. Kay's recent evidence to Congress.So we welcome the announcement of this important inquiry. I am sorry that it will hold its hearings in private. Can the Foreign Secretary assure the House that, when it reports, not only will that report be published in full, subject only to genuine security considerations, but that the evidence that it considered will be published as well? If it is to reassure, the outcome must be as open as possible, even if it is critical of the Government and their agencies.
We accept the terms of reference. However, some fear has been expressed that the inquiry is designed solely to focus the spotlight on our intelligence services, not on the Government. That would be not only unfair, but wrong. Can the Foreign Secretary confirm whether the committee will be able, within those terms of reference, to examine the discrepancies not only between the pre-war intelligence and the outcome of the ISG, but between that intelligence and the use made of it by the Government?
Will the committee be able to evaluate the intelligence made available to the Government against the statements and publications from the Government that purported to be based on it—in particular, the two dossiers of 24 September 2002 and 3 February 2003, the Prime Minister's statement at St. Petersburg on 31 May, the Prime Minister's evidence about WMD programmes to the Liaison Committee on 8 July and his spokesman's reference to WMD product on the very next day? Will the inquiry be able to consider whether there was any cherry-picking, or selective or partial use of evaluated intelligence by the Government that might have cast a somewhat different gloss from that which was intended by the intelligence services?
It is an irony of history that, if the Government had set up such an inquiry when we first pressed them in June last year, many difficulties, accusations and counter-accusations might have been avoided and the serious questions might have been already answered. A considerable price has been paid for the Government's obstinacy on this matter, not only with their own reputation, but with that of the dedicated intelligence personnel who serve our country with commitment and distinction. In this age of pre-emption, the inquiry is vital to restore confidence in our intelligence services, which themselves are so central to meeting the challenges of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction that face us all today.
Mr. Straw: May I say first that I am glad to know that the Leader of the Opposition agrees with what I told the House earlier today? I am very happy to take his compliment and that of the right hon. and learned Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram) in the spirit in which it was offered.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman asks about the timing of the establishment of the inquiry. Of course the evidence from Dr. Kay and the interim conclusions for which he gave evidence before a congressional committee have been a critical trigger in the
establishment of the committee. It was the case that, if we had sought to set up such an inquiry last summer, a large part of the inquiry could not have taken place until after the ISG's work had been completed because everything would have been on a contingent basis—"Well, what is there?"—and, at the time, the question was that we did not know what was there. Since then, we have had an interim report from the ISG, after very considerable inquiries by the ISG that are still not complete. The fact that the time scale will continue for the ISG means that, in our judgment, we should not wait to establish the inquiry. If we had established a committee last summer, I doubt that it could have done its work properly until the ISG had at least reached this interim conclusion.The right hon. and learned Gentleman asks whether the committee will hold its hearings in private. As the terms of reference indicate, the committee of Privy Councillors will model its work on the review of the Falklands Islands conflict, which was published in January 1983—Command Paper 8787, which I have here—and which itself met in private.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman asked me about the terms of reference. They are as they state, and say, among other things:
- "as part of this work, to investigate the accuracy of intelligence on Iraqi WMD up to March 2003, and to examine any discrepancies between the intelligence gathered, evaluated and used by the Government before the conflict, and between that intelligence and what has been discovered by the Iraq survey group since the end of the conflict."
The right hon. and learned Gentleman asked whether the committee's report will be published—I made it clear that it will be published—and asked a question about evidence. That must be a judgment for the committee and the agencies because just as with the Franks inquiry into the Falklands, by definition, a huge amount of evidence is bound to be highly classified. It is my hope, as it always has been with all such inquiries, that the maximum amount that can be made public should be made public.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman went on to make a poor point by suggesting that if the committee has any criticism of the Government, it will be suppressed on the grounds that it is classified. That is utter nonsense. If the committee has criticisms to make of the Government, of course it will make them, and make them public. No member of the inquiry—either Members of the House or distinguished individuals from outside the House—would dream of putting their name to the report unless their criticisms, if they had them, were made public.
Sir Menzies Campbell (North-East Fife) (LD): Perhaps I, too, may add my congratulations to the hon. Member for East Hampshire (Mr. Mates) on his forthcoming appointment to the Privy Council. May I also be allowed a moment's scepticism about the enthusiasm of the right hon. and learned Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram) for an investigation into the reasons why we went to war, given that prior to the publication of the dossier on 24 September 2002, the then leader of the Conservative party told the country that military action was the only option when dealing with Saddam Hussein?
Let me make it clear that I make no criticism of the members of the proposed committee—not of their integrity, competence or independence. However, it is a matter of profound regret that my right hon. and hon. Friends feel unable to endorse the remit announced by the Foreign Secretary or to support the nomination of my right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith) as a member of the committee. That was not an easy decision and nor is it likely, as events have demonstrated, to be universally popular. However, our objections relate to the remit that the Foreign Secretary announced.
As the Foreign Secretary said in response to the right hon. and learned Member for Devizes, the remit is confined to intelligence and weapons of mass destruction. It deals neither with the workings of government, nor with political decision making based on intelligence. Does the Foreign Secretary understand that following the public response to the Hutton report, an inquiry that excludes politicians from scrutiny is unlikely to command public confidence? Let me put on record once again that we have never doubted the Prime Minister's sincerity in these matters. However, should not the Prime Minister and others, given the special circumstances of this case, be willing to submit to scrutiny of their competence and judgment in the discharge of their responsibilities?
The Foreign Secretary mentioned the Franks report. Does he remember the remit of the Franks committee? It was to
- "review the way in which the responsibilities of Government . . . were discharged . . . taking account of all such factors . . . as are relevant".
The Government have performed a welcome volte-face on the principle of an inquiry, for which we must give President Bush some small credit. However, there is still time to give the inquiry a remit that would truly satisfy the public interest, and the Government should take that opportunity.
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