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Mr. Speaker: Order. Let the Prime Minister speak.
The Prime Minister: Furthermore, Lord Hutton deals with the issue of the 45 minutes claim. Instead of this, as has been claimed, being disputed by the intelligence services and inserted in the dossier at the behest of Alastair Campbell or Downing street, the true position was that a concern about it and how it was phrased in the dossier was raised by Dr. Jones in the defence intelligence staff, was rejected by the head of defence intelligence and never actually came to the attention of the chairman of the JIC, let alone anyone in Downing street.
In any event, Dr. Jones—again contrary to reports—did not say it should have been omitted from the dossier. On the contrary, Dr. Jones thought it should be included as it was "important intelligence". Dr. Jones told the inquiry that Dr. Kelly thought the dossier was, and I quote, "good" and Mr. A, from the counter-proliferation arms control department, said of himself and Dr. Kelly:
- "Both of us believed that if you took the dossier as a whole it was a reasonable and accurate reflection of the intelligence that we had available to us at that time."
- "However I consider that the possibility cannot be completely ruled out that the desire of the Prime Minister to have a dossier which, whilst consistent with the available intelligence, was as strong as possible in relation to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's WMD, may have sub-consciously influenced Mr
- Scarlett and other members of the JIC to make the wording of the dossier somewhat stronger than it would have been if it had been contained in a normal JIC assessment".
- "Although this possibility cannot be completely ruled out, I am satisfied that Mr Scarlett, the other members of the JIC, and the members of the assessment staff engaged in the drafting of the dossier were concerned to ensure that the contents of the dossier were consistent with the intelligence available to the JIC."
- "only accepted those suggestions which were consistent with the intelligence known to the JIC and he rejected those suggestions which were not consistent with such intelligence."
Let me also remind the House that when this dossier was published, it was routinely described at the time as "low key" and by Mr. Gilligan, no less, on 24 September 2002 as "sensibly cautious and measured"; and actually moved public opinion hardly at all. Only in retrospect has it been elevated into the single thing that conclusively persuaded a reluctant country to war.
The dossier itself reflected independent reports such as that of the International Institute of Strategic Studies published on 9 September. It reflected precisely that evidence which led the UN Security Council unanimously in November 2002 to agree Saddam and his weapons posed a threat to the world. The 45 minutes claim, for the record, was in fact mentioned once by me in my statement in this House on 24 September and not mentioned by me again in any debate, not even in the debate on 18 March or indeed by anyone else in that debate. Again, only in retrospect has history been rewritten to establish it as the one crucial claim that marched the nation into conflict. Lord Hutton establishes clearly why the 45 minutes was put in the dossier, what its provenance was—and whether or not subsequently it turned out to be correct. It finds it was put into the dossier entirely in good faith by the JIC. So much for the first charge of dishonesty over the dossier.
The second charge was over the naming of Dr. Kelly. Again, throughout these past six months, the context in which this has been debated has largely been that Dr. Kelly's name should not have been revealed, it should have remained confidential and therefore anyone, including myself, who discussed or acted upon the issue was acting improperly.
In hindsight, of course, the name of Dr. Kelly and his evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee has taken on a different and altogether more tragic aspect. Rightly, Lord Hutton puts it back into its proper contemporary context. The truth is that, by early July, the FAC was actively engaged in examining the truth of the Gilligan allegations and due to report on 7 July. The Intelligence and Security Committee was about to begin its
deliberations the same week. The Government had already given evidence to the FAC and all of us, myself included, were due to give evidence to the ISC, beginning with the chairman of the JIC on 9 July.Suddenly in late June, Dr. Kelly came forward and said to his managers that he believed he might have been at least part of the source for the Gilligan story. That information was given to me personally on 3 July. By Monday 7 July, it was apparent that in all likelihood he was indeed the source of the Gilligan story. The dilemma we were in, therefore, as Lord Hutton accepts, was how we could possibly keep that information secret not just from the FAC, which had just taken evidence on that very point, but also from the ISC, who were about to interview us all about the intelligence relating to Iraq, with the first session on the morning of 9 July.
The evidence, very frankly given, of both my right hon. Friend the Chairman of the FAC, and at least one of the Committee's members, was that if they had been told that the MOD knew the source and had interviewed him, the FAC would have wanted to do the same—as, of course, they did. Indeed, they told the Hutton inquiry that they would have liked to have been told sooner.
The context therefore for the meetings on 7 and 8 July, which I chaired, was how to act properly in relation to those two Committees when we were in possession of information plainly relevant to their inquiries and when one Committee was on the point of publication and another was about to begin proceedings.
The evidence of Sir David Omand to Lord Hutton was that it would be "improper" to keep this information secret and that moreover we were under a duty to reveal it to Parliament. So, as Lord Hutton accepts, the whole basis of the claim that somehow Dr. Kelly should never have been named or that his name was leaked in breach of a duty of confidentiality is based on a false premise. On the contrary, our duty was to disclose his name to the Committees and to allow them to interview him if they so wished; and Lord Hutton finds expressly that our concern at being accused of misleading those Committees was "well-founded".
In any event, again as Lord Hutton finds, no one in fact "leaked" his name— not myself, not the Secretary of State, not the officials. As Lord Hutton finds, the decision by the Ministry of Defence to confirm Dr. Kelly's name, if the correct name was put to it by a journalist, was based on the view that in a matter of such intense public and media interest it would not be sensible to try to conceal it.
So, there was no dishonourable or underhand or duplicitous strategy to name Dr. Kelly. He was named for the reason we gave. And again I ask that those who have repeatedly claimed that I lied over this issue or that Sir Kevin Tebbit lied, now withdraw that allegation also—unequivocally and in full.
Lord Hutton does, however, find that the Ministry of Defence was at fault in not telling Dr. Kelly clearly and immediately that his name would be confirmed to the press if it were put to the MOD. The MOD accepts these findings. However, Lord Hutton goes on to say:
- "However these criticisms are subject to the mitigating circumstances that (1) Dr Kelly's exposure to press attention and intrusion, whilst obviously very stressful, was only one of the factors placing him under greater stress; (2) individual officials in the MOD did try to help and support him in the ways which I have
- described in paragraphs 430 and 431; and (3) because of his intensely private nature, Dr Kelly was not an easy man to help or to whom to give advice."
I come to the final issue: the cause of Dr. Kelly's death; in effect, why he took his own life, since it is now beyond doubt that he did.
Lord Hutton finds that no one could have foreseen that Dr. Kelly would commit suicide. He finds further that, in all probability, he did not decide to do so until the day of his death. He finds that the reason he did so was not for any reason of conspiracy or dark motives. The truth is that Dr. Kelly did speak to Mr Gilligan, and, whatever the distortion, it was an unauthorised meeting, as was his conversation with Susan Watts, the "Newsnight" journalist; and he was surprised to be asked about this at the Foreign Affairs Committee. Lord Hutton finds that the existence of a note of that conversation must have weighed heavily on his mind. Finally, on the day of his death he received notice of a series of parliamentary questions about his contacts, which he was going to have to answer.
Dr. Kelly was a decent man, whose very decency made him feel wretched about the situation in which he found himself.
No one wished this tragedy to happen. All of us felt, and feel still, desperately sorry for Mrs. Kelly and her family. None of us could have foreseen it, because none of us, at that time, knew what Dr. Kelly knew.
Lord Hutton puts it in this way at paragraph 15 of his report:
- "I also consider it to be important to state in this early part of the report that I am satisfied that none of the persons whose decisions and actions I later describe ever contemplated that Dr Kelly might take his own life. I am further satisfied that none of those persons was at fault in not contemplating that Dr Kelly might take his own life. Whatever pressures and strains Dr Kelly was subjected to by the decisions and actions taken in the weeks before his death, I am satisfied that no one realised or should have realised that those pressures and strains might drive him to take his own life or contribute to his decision to do so."
- "The communication by the media of information (including information obtained by investigative reporters) on matters of public interest and importance is a vital part of life in a democratic society. However the right to communicate such information is subject to the qualification (which itself exists for the benefit of a democratic society) that false accusations of fact impugning the integrity of others, including politicians, should not be made by the media."
We can have the debate about the war, about weapons of mass destruction, and about intelligence. But we do not need to conduct it by accusations of lies and deceit. We can respect each other's motives and integrity, even when in disagreement.
Let me repeat the words of Lord Hutton:
- "false accusations of fact impugning the integrity of others . . . should not be made".
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