| Hunting Bill
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Alun Michael: It is clear that the person must know that he is contributing to the commission of an offence. I understand now that it is worth re-reading the clause a number of times to understand the hon. Gentleman's point. I think that his interpretation is wrong, but I shall deal with the matter authoritatively in the response that I promised. Mr. Gray: Textual analysis is tiresome and tedious, and is a matter for lawyers. Neither the Minister nor I is a lawyer, so perhaps we have had enough of that. However, I think that the word ''purposefully'' or ''intentionally'' in clause 4 would be better. The Minister is prepared to ask his advisers and lawyers to look at the matter to ensure that no inadvertent crime could be committed, which is what we are keen to avoid. I am reassured, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Column Number: 1188 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Mr. Gray: I beg to move amendment No. 362, in
The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 363, in
'at the time of the commission of an offence, and'.
Mr. Gray: Amendment No. 362 and, to some degree, amendment No. 363, bear some resemblance to amendment No. 361. They refer to whether a person could be convicted of inadvertently committing a crime. Simple ownership of a dog that is used in the commission of an offence should not necessarily make that person liable to criminal prosecution, nor should simply having charge of that dog. The amendments would ensure that the offence of someone knowingly permitting a dog belonging to them to be used for hunting would apply to a dog that someone was in charge of and had control of at the time the offence was committed. If someone owns a dog but is not in control of it when the crime is committed, why should they be liable? Equally, it might be possible for someone to be in control of the dog and, therefore, committing the offence without having ownership of it. The purpose of the amendments is to rectify that anomaly. Common law currently makes adequate provision for situations in which a person aids, abets or counsels the commission of an offence or provides the means—the ownership of the land or the dogs—and we debated that on clause 4. The point is that it is wholly irrelevant who owns a dog. The concept of ownership is unhelpful. A family dog does not belong to one individual. A family of four people having four dogs would be said to own them jointly. The concept of ownership does not help in pursuit of animal welfare, which is what the Bill is supposed to be about. The drafting seeks to prevent a person from knowingly permitting a third party to use their dog for hunting. Whether that person owns the dog is not important. If I own a dog and give it to a friend to look after and an offence is committed while that person is in charge of it, I would be liable to prosecution. That is a serious possibility because the definition of hunting is woefully imprecise and includes dog walkers whose dogs search for a scent. If I know that someone is likely to walk my dog and commit an offence, I commit an offence of knowingly permitting a dog to be used to commit an offence. That is madness. A person who uses any dog, regardless of ownership, and who is in charge and control of it at the time of the offence is the person who should be guilty. The person who actually has control of the dog should be the person who commits the offence, rather than the person who owns the dog. The ownership is incidental. The offence created in clause 4 should relate to the person with charge and control of the dog at the time the offence of knowingly permitting that dog to be used for hunting was committed, not at the time the offence of hunting was committed. The amendment is straightforward and would prevent the inadvertent Column Number: 1189 conviction of someone whose dog was used by someone else to commit an offence. I hope that the Government will the see sense of it.Alun Michael: I hope that I can reassure the hon. Gentleman. As he rightly says, the Bill defines the circumstances in which a dog belongs to a person. That includes three elements; where a person owns it, where a person is in charge of it and where a person has control of it. Amendment No. 362 would narrow the definition, removing from its scope the person who owns the dog. To narrow the definition of when a person belongs to a dog—[Hon. Members: ''What?''] Sorry, when a dog belongs to a person. I realise that there was an element of truth in my slip there. To narrow the scope of the definition of when a dog belongs to a person would weaken the Bill. Under clause 4(2):
To show how the amendment would introduce a real problem, I pose a question. If a dog owner knowingly permits another person to use his dog for illegal hunting, why should he not be guilty of an offence? That is a straightforward question, which exposes the mistake that the hon. Gentleman is making in the amendment. The hon. Gentleman used one or two illustrations. An innocent walker cannot be found guilty because if the dog hunts and the innocent walker does not, he is not committing an offence. That returns us to intention, although I hesitate to return to that. Intention is an inherent part of the concept of hunting, as we have explored several times. If an innocent walker cannot be guilty, a person who lends a dog to an innocent walker cannot be guilty except in the unlikely and slightly absurd situation of the person lending the dog intending the innocent walker to go hunting. That reductio ad absurdum demonstrates that the clause does not give rise to the problems that the hon. Gentleman fears. Amendment No. 363, too, seeks to change the scope of the definition of when a dog belongs to a person. The present wording is clear; a dog belongs to a person if he is in charge of it. There is no need to clarify that definition with the explanation that the person had to be in charge of the dog at the time of the offence. The relevance to the offence of the fact that a person is in charge of a dog will depend on the circumstances of the individual case. Clearly, courts will have to make decisions on that by looking at the circumstances surrounding the alleged offence. Mr. Gray: I am slightly puzzled. Let us imagine that I am in control of a dog that was used by someone different in the course of an offence last month. Surely, the clause would allow the constable to arrest me because I am in control of the dog today, even though I had nothing whatever to do with the crime. Alun Michael: In that case, one could not be guilty of knowingly being involved in the commission of the offence. One would have an absolute protection. Again, I understand the protection that the hon. Gentleman seeks, but I can reassure him that it is not Column Number: 1190 needed. It would be an absurd misinterpretation of the law to say that someone was in charge of the dog and associated with the commission of an offence about which they knew nothing, in relation to which they had no intention and, at the material time, did not have control of the dog. No court would seriously entertain that. I can fairly confidently say that even were such circumstances brought to the attention of the Crown Prosecution Service, the case would be sent back immediately with a tart note on the file, since the offence could clearly not have been committed.Mr. Garnier: I want to suggest one or two examples so that the Minister can help me. I have no doubt that the purpose behind the provisions is to prevent people from hiding behind the criminal acts of others. Unfortunately, whether I approve of the definition that says that those people are committing criminal acts is neither here nor there in the context of our discussion. I want to paint a picture for the Minister to see what his response is. Let us assume that I am the owner of one or two male dogs and own a reasonably large garden. One afternoon, I happen to be sitting in my garden with my dogs at my feet. There may come a time when they become uninterested in my company.
9.30 amMr. Nicholas Soames (Mid-Sussex): Never. Mr. Garnier: I hasten to assure my hon. Friend that this is an entirely hypothetical example. Mr. Soames: A doggist slur. Mr. Garnier: Exactly. My dogs set off around the garden, doing what dogs do. For all I know, they may discover that a little farther away is a bitch on heat. They set off, guided by the scent of the bitch, but during their travels they become interested in the scent of quarry—an animal for which hunting is not permitted under the legislation. As the owner of the dogs, I may be considered to be in charge of them. Under road traffic legislation that deals with the control of a motor car while under the influence of drink, one does not physically have to be driving the car to have control of it. My dogs may perform an act of illegal hunting while I think that they have gone off to do whatever—in fact, I do not care what they have gone off to do. One might say that I was reckless. Mr. Soames: In the course of this extremely unsuitable story which, not only in context but in substance, is completely inexplicable to some of the younger members of the Committee, I would be grateful if my hon. and learned Friend would explain in more detail the nature of the quarry for which his dogs are searching. Mr. Garnier: I am not a dog psychoanalyst, but I assume that the dogs that I own under the terms of clause 45(4)(a) have set off on a frolic of their own and have gone in search of a bitch on heat. During the search, they are distracted by the scent of a hare, a fox or some other animal that the Bill makes it unlawful to hunt. As the owner of the dogs and as someone who may, under law, have charge of them—in the event, I could not care less one way or the other what they are Column Number: 1191 doing—I may be charged with a section 1 offence because animals that are in my ownership, perhaps as a matter of law under my charge, are hunting a wild mammal.
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| ©Parliamentary copyright 2003 | Prepared 27 February 2003 |
