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Alun Michael: I assure the hon. Gentleman that it is not. There is no lacuna in that case. In order to commit the offence or share in the committing of the offence, the individual would have to give permission knowingly for the hunting to take place. That person would have to share knowingly in the decision that led to the offence. Someone who shares ownership of land and does not have 100 per cent. ownership—for example, someone with, a 20 per cent. share—and who knowingly gives permission for the land to be used commits an offence. That is absolutely clear. Those who own the other 80 per cent. of the land, but do not knowingly give permission are not associated with the offence. The constituent elements of the offence are clear. They have to be in place for an individual to be guilty of that offence. That is clear without needing to repeat it in the Bill. Mr. Gray: I am still rather troubled by the matter. I accept the point that the Minister makes about collective ownership. That seems a reasonably sensible point, but the way in which clause 45 relates to clause 4 seems worrying. Clause 4(1) does not say that a person commits an offence if he allows hunting to occur or allows his land to be used for hunting. Clause 4(1) merely refers to land being entered or used in the course of a commission, not for the purpose of a commission. The phrase ''course of a commission'' is very important. If people stated that they were going on to land for other purposes, the collective owners would believe that those people were doing so legitimately and would not realise that there was an Column Number: 1185 intent to commit the crime, but the crime may still be carried out. That is very worrying.Alun Michael: No, the hon. Gentleman again misunderstands. I understand why he is worrying, and I hope that I can satisfy him on the point. Let me go back to the example of individuals asking for permission to park. Let us imagine that they ask an individual, ''Can we park our vehicles here? We are going for a walk on the hills.'' There is no suggestion that there is any knowledge of an intention to commit an offence. In that event, the person who shares in the ownership of the land, or a landowner, would not be committing an offence. If the person were to ask permission to go on to land with dogs in a trailer to undertake hare coursing, and the purpose for which that request was being undertaken was clear, the person would be knowingly committing the offence indicated here. In areas concerning legal interpretation, it is as well to take formal advice from lawyers. I am happy to write to members of the Committee to put the advice on that point on the record because I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman would like to hear a legally sound interpretation. However, I am confident that my interpretation is correct. Mr. Edward Garnier (Harborough): I understand the points that the Minister is making in response to the intervention by my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (Mr. Gray). Will he address corporate ownership of a piece of land by a limited company, a trust or some other form of legal, non-human instrument? Because such a body is just a set of bits of paper, it cannot think or act by itself, and can do so only through human beings. I can understand a situation in which the land agent gave permission for hunting to take place on the land, because we can clearly see from the Bill that the land agent, as a human being, will be liable. I dare say that the corporation will be liable because of the act of its servant. Where a number of servants—some of whom know about the illegal permission and some of whom do not—act for a company, however, one is left with the vicarious liability for a criminal offence committed by a company. The law on that matter has been fluid for a little while, and whereas in some respects a company can be vicariously liable for the offences of its servants and agents, in others it cannot. I wonder into which category hunting and the use of land for hunting will fall.
Alun Michael: The hon. and learned Gentleman always raises interesting questions, and I hope that I can give him a sensible answer. A corporation is, of course, legally a person in terms of the responsibilities for the use of land. Clause 44 covers offences by companies in the same way as the ownership of land by a body other than a company. In order for a prosecution to succeed, it would be necessary to show that an officer of the company consented or connived in the commission of the offence. The knowledge would have to be proved in relation to a company, or a person acting on behalf of a company, in the same way as it would in relation to an individual.
Column Number: 1186
Lembit Öpik (Montgomeryshire): My ongoing concern is duress, which we have discussed at length. I hope that the Minister can assure me that there will be some guidance on how proactive somebody in that category would need to be in order to prevent their being prosecuted. I raise that point because there will be a policing issue; at the beginning, at least, there will be a lot uncertainty among people in that category.
Alun Michael: The amendment relates narrowly to people who own a share in the land and does not take us into more widely into the clause. However, the points that I made about duress in a previous debate apply equally to this clause. That may be the response that the hon. Gentleman is looking for.
The hon. Member for North Wiltshire has raised a number of concerns, but members of the Committee can be assured that to include people with a share in land ensures that responsibility is correctly identified. It certainly would not enable a person to be prosecuted who had not committed the offence. That is at the heart of the issue. It would be odd to exclude someone with a share in the land, as they might commit the offence. For that reason, I am not willing to accept the amendment. An inadvertent effect of the amendment would be to remove the power of an owner of an interest in unoccupied land to give permission for registered or exempt hunting to take place. I am sure that that is not the hon. Gentleman's intention. At present, such permission can be given by the occupier, where the land is occupied, or by the owner or manager where the land is unoccupied. I refer the hon. Gentleman to clauses 27(2)(c) and 28(2)(c). The amendment could prevent hunting on some unoccupied land. I hope that I have said enough to satisfy the hon. Gentleman, but I also undertake to write to him and to copy the letter to other members of the Committee, to make explicit the legal advice on the points that he has raised. Andrew George: I was interested in what the hon. Member for North Wiltshire said, because I have sympathy for his argument. However, until I had heard the debate, I was not sure whether the amendment was the best way to deal with the point. The Minister addressed the lacuna in the picture that was drawn up. There is perhaps a logical connection between knowing permission and the person who is knowingly permitting it. However, I still have concerns. The Minister said that he would provide the Committee with a note from the Department's lawyers to clarify any residual matters on this point, and on that basis I feel reassured. Having listened to the Minister, I cannot support the amendment. Column Number: 1187 Mr. Gray: Like the Minister, I am no lawyer and would not claim to be. There is definitely a technical question here. The law with regard to the ownership of land seems to me to be complex and difficult, and the way in which clause 45(3) reads into clause 4(1) is particularly worrying. Clause 4(1) does not say:
for the purpose of carrying out the crime. In other words, the intention is not included in clause 4(1). It is still slightly worrying that somebody who owns an interest in land may inadvertently permit a crime to be carried out on his land without knowing about it. He may allow the criminals to enter his land and to use it in the course of the commission of an offence under subsection (1), but he would not know that it would be so used. However, the subsection does not contain the word ''purpose'', so the owner does not know that people intend to commit a crime when they go on to it. The words used are ''in the course of'' rather than ''for the purpose of''. Alun Michael: Clause 4(1) is explicit. It says:
Ownership therefore includes partial ownership, so the words ''knowingly permits'' are clear. The hon. Gentleman is wrong. Mr. Gray: The Minister should not jump to his feet so quickly. I, too, read the clause out and my point has nothing to do with the words ''knowingly permits'', which mean allowing people to go on to land during the commission of the offence, not for the purpose of committing the offence. The person who allows someone to go on to the land in the course of committing the offence may not know that an offence is being committed. Clause 4(1) states:
The problem is the words ''in the course'' of carrying out the offence, not the words ''for the purpose'' of carrying out the offence. The person owning the land may not know that that is the other person's purpose. Textual analysis becomes tiresome, but I shall give way to the Minister.
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