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Column Number: 1235
Standing Committee B
Tuesday 4 March 2003
(Morning)
[Mr. Eric Illsley in the Chair]
9.10 am
Mr. Graham Allen (Nottingham, North): On a point of order, Mr. Illsley. Owing to an oversight, new clause 31—formerly new clause 23—did not appear on the selection list yesterday. I know that that was entirely accidental and that it was an administrative problem, but could you tell us how it might be handled for the benefit of the Committee?
The Chairman: I understand that the new clause had been tabled and should have been printed on Friday. It should have appeared on the amendment paper yesterday. Had it not been for the printing error, it would have been available for selection. It is therefore my intention to call it when we reach it in today's proceedings. New clause 26
Excluding the civil liability of the victims
of crime
'.—(1) A person who has been convicted of a criminal offence before a relevant court shall have no civil action for damages in respect of personal injury caused by the victim of the offence for which that person has been convicted.
(2) Subsection (1) shall only apply to personal injuries caused during the circumstances of the offence for which the person was convicted.
(3) For the purpose of subsection (1) ''victim'' is defined as any person natural or corporate—
(i) whose interests were affected or threatened by the relevant offender, or
(ii) who believed on reasonable grounds that their interests were affected or threatened by the relevant offender;
(iii) who was, at the time of the offence, a servant or agent of any person falling within paragraphs (i) or (ii) and who either knew or reasonably believed that the person's interests were so affected or threatened by the relevant offender.
(4) For the purpose of subsection (3) ''interests'' includes—
(i) any proprietary interest;
(ii) a personal interest in avoiding physical injury.
(5) For the purpose of subsection (1) ''damages in respect of personal injury'' shall be defined to include all consequential loss suffered by the offender.'.—[Mr. Grieve.]
Brought up, and read the First time.
Mr. Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield): I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
As the Committee will see, the new clause raises the issue of civil proceedings brought by criminals against their victims after their conviction and arising out of the circumstances in which they committed the offence. I felt that tabling a new clause that talked in absolutes was the best way to approach the issue if we were to have a reasoned and sensible discussion. The new clause would wholly deprive anyone convicted of a crime of the ability to sue or bring civil proceedings against their victim on the basis of the circumstances
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in which they committed the offence. I felt that that was the best way of proceeding, although one may advance perfectly reasonable arguments against my proposal or seek to temper its full force.
Hon. Members will be fully aware of the extent to which the current system has given rise to serious public disquiet. There have been several high-profile cases, one of which is still running. Individuals who have committed serious offences, such as burglary, and who were injured by their victims, have brought civil claims against them. That has given rise to public outrage—there is no other way of describing it. The Martin case is a classic example, but there are others. Five or 10 years ago, for instance, there was a case involving a person who owned an allotment in the north-east of England. Someone persistently broke into and damaged the cabin on the allotment. Eventually, the owner lay in wait for him and caused him serious injury when he appeared. The owner was subsequently convicted, but the victim brought civil proceedings.
The new clause would prevent such cases. One can advance perfectly good arguments against owners—the victims—using excessive force against aggressors, but there are sound public policy reasons for arguing that someone who commits a burglary or theft should entirely forfeit their rights under the civil law. Although the homeowner in the Martin case may have been properly convicted for using excessive force, that does not give the victim or his relatives the right to bring civil proceedings when the injuries sustained were the direct result of his own criminality.
The public are not well aware of how the system works at present. It is perfectly possible for a criminal victim who has been injured in the course of his crime to bring civil proceedings against the person who injured him. He may recover damages. He may however—this happened in the case that I cited from the north-east of England—find that his damages are substantially reduced for contributory behaviour or negligence. I think the reduction in that case was 75 per cent. The public do not see that: they see a person initiating legal proceedings—frequently brought with the backing of legal aid—to seek damages arising from his criminality. That is a cause of deep public disquiet, and if I understand the Home Secretary's response on ''Any Questions?'' on Friday, it seems to be a cause of considerable disquiet to him too.
Mr. Humfrey Malins (Woking): Does my hon. Friend agree that understandable public outrage is usually based on press reports that are at best misleading? Such reports fail to make the point that in an action by a so-called victim, contributory negligence applies and the damages would be greatly reduced. If the press were more responsible, the public outrage would perhaps be reduced.
Mr. Grieve: My hon. Friend is quite right. That is why I explained that I intend to point out the pros and cons of the new clause. It is, however, a proposal that the Committee must consider.
Mr. Paul Stinchcombe (Wellingborough): I wonder whether one of the cons might be that a prostitute who
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stole from a client and who was then raped and beaten would not be able to claim any damages at all.
Mr. Grieve: The hon. Gentleman gives one example, but let us take another: two 13-year-old boys climb over a wall to steal apples, for which they may subsequently be convicted of theft, but the homeowner, who might have seen them at it five or six times, loses his temper and beats them with a stick, causing one of them serious injuries. In such circumstances, should that 13-year-old be deprived of the opportunity of bringing civil proceedings? I am extremely mindful of proportionality. However, proportionality does not mean that the Committee should simply shirk the matter, as there is considerable public concern.
I will come to several ideas that the Committee may like to consider—ideas that I describe as halfway houses.
Mr. Stinchcombe: The hon. Gentleman is right that we should not shirk the matter, but it is also right that we should reject the new clause.
Mr. Grieve: The hon. Gentleman may have detected from my opening words that I am unlikely to press it to a vote. Nevertheless, I thought it right to table it in those terms, and I did so quite deliberately. I thought that in that way we could consider one end of the spectrum.
Some people, who are not necessarily wrong, will say that it is all very well, but a person who uses excessive force against someone who is committing a crime against him merits the sanctions of the criminal law. However, in those circumstances there should not be an absolute right to bring civil proceedings. Although some would say that that is an excessively harsh rule, I do not think that it is wrong as an absolute moral principle. Those who choose to commit crime—this relates to both children and adults, but especially to adults—may be taken as having to accept the consequences of those actions. If they carry out a crime that is likely to excite or anger somebody, it is difficult for them to complain if they suffer injury as a result. That point goes right across the spectrum, from the householder who may be able to claim legitimate self-defence so that not a penny is recovered, to somebody who uses greatly excessive force. Nevertheless, people who go out and choose to commit crime, especially adults, may reasonably be said to have forfeited their rights to bring civil proceedings if they suffer injury as a result of their own wrongdoing.
Let us move away from that absolute stance for a moment and consider what might be done to meet the public disquiet, which my hon. Friend the Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) rightly said might in part be a result of misreporting. However, the newspapers and the public have latched on to the fact that civil proceedings are being commenced and that public money is being made available to bring them in circumstances in which they cannot see the smallest shred of justification. They would express horror if a
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single penny were paid over to that criminal victim in the event of the litigation succeeding.
Mr. Malins: My hon. Friend makes a good point. I simply add that public money is used, which is in stark contrast to what happens to the victim of the crime, who may have received absolutely nothing by way of compensation.
Mr. Grieve: That is absolutely right. For many victims of crime, the consequences of being victims often do not allow for compensation, although if they suffer injury themselves, there may be recourse to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. Very often, however, there are material losses to the victims—especially the poorest or the uninsured—from which they never recover. Leaving aside the conviction and sentence for the offence, a startling aspect of the Martin case is that on release it will be unsafe for him to return to his own home. That has been widely reported in the newspapers. It has been suggested that he will have to be sent to Australia as an exile. Furthermore, during his imprisonment his house appears to have become ruined, and he will suffer serious financial consequences, over and above the conviction that he received for using excessive force. Those matters are all likely to excite adverse public comment on how our system of justice operates. We cannot get away from that.
I do not know what attitude the Minister will take, and I shall be interested to hear from him. As I said, I understand from the Home Secretary's reply on ''Any Questions?'' on the radio on Friday that my concerns appear to be substantially shared. I do not know whether things have changed from Friday to Tuesday, but I should be grateful to hear the Government's response.
There are, of course, some possible halfway houses, and I simply float those proposals for the purpose of discussion. It might be possible to frame legislation more narrowly than I have done in the new clause to provide that the case of a person who wishes to bring civil proceedings as a result of a crime committed by him would have to pass some preliminary hurdle, examining the issue of proportionality. That would provide the court with a speedy mechanism for saying, ''What happened to you was not so disproportionate to the offence that you committed that you should have a right of action,'' and preventing the action from proceeding. That would also allow the courts to explain publicly why certain cases, in which it appears that the injury suffered by the criminal was not disproportionate, should not be allowed to proceed. That might go a long way towards reassuring the public about the operation of the system.
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