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Session 2002 - 03
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Standing Committee Debates
Criminal Justice Bill

Criminal Justice Bill

Column Number: 909

Standing Committee B

Tuesday 11 February 2003

(Morning)

[Mr. Eric Illsley in the Chair]

Criminal Justice Bill

Clause 204

Meaning of ''specified offence'' etc.

9.10 am

Simon Hughes (Southwark, North and Bermondsey): I beg to move amendment No. 893, in

    clause 204, page 114, line 8, leave out 'a specified offence' and insert

    'of a serious sexual or violent nature'.

The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:

No. 894, in

    clause 204, page 114, line 8, at end insert—

    '( ) it is of a serious sexual or violent nature, and'.

No. 895, in

    clause 204, page 114, leave out line 14.

No. 900, in

    clause 209, page 117, line 24, leave out 'relevant' and insert 'serious'.

No. 902, in

    clause 209, page 117, line 33, leave out subsection (4).

Simon Hughes: This is the first of the Committee's debates on chapter 5, which deals with dangerous offenders. This is an issue of significant public importance, and people have strong views about the best way to deal with dangerous offenders. I hope that, in the course of debates on amendments to clauses 204 to 216 and to schedule 11, which lists the offences, we will be able to probe the Government's thinking on the subject. We should have an honest debate about sentencing—about what works and what is good and effective both for defendants and for victims.

Amendment No. 893 would remove the phrase ''a specified offence'' that triggers the list of offences in the schedule, and replace it with a generic definition. Amendment No. 894 would do the same later in the clause. Amendment No. 895 would remove the line that states that the ''relevant offence'' has the meaning given in section 209(4). The result would be clearer and simpler definitions. Perhaps the most important change would be made by amendment No. 900, requiring that an offence be serious.

The intention is to debate what sort of offences should trigger the dangerous offender provisions, and to consider what thought has been given to the subject since the relatively recent amendments to the law made by the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. Section 109 of that Act deals with life sentences for serious second offences, and section 85 deals with sexual and violent offences and licences. It is not long since Parliament last considered the matter, but I shall suggest two or three points that we might wish to take into account when considering the definition.

Column Number: 910

I am content that serious offences are defined, and that they include violent offences and sexual offences. If those two categories are to be treated differently, however, we must explain why. Serious violent and sexual offences have always been defined as the two types of serious offence, but the pathway is different for the two categories, and we must explore the logic behind that.

The second fundamental question is whether it is appropriate to define serious sexual and violent offences by means of a list of offences, and we shall come to the relevant amendments later. The list is very long and includes offences such as assault, which the lay public would not, in the normal course of things, regard as a serious sexual or violent offence. Other offences, such as abandoning children, female circumcision and assault occasioning actual bodily harm, might be seen as forming an entirely different category, and it might not be thought appropriate for them to trigger the dangerous offence provisions by themselves. They may in part be the product of a disturbed mind, or they may be a relatively minor second offence. My proposition to the Minister is that we include the general definitions of serious violent and serious sexual offences, but leave it to the court to determine the consequences—they should not be triggered in advance by a list. The court can then deal with the range of extended sentence and extended supervision for which the Bill provides.

The third point—we will debate the detail later—is that subsequent clauses provide for the treatment of offenders under 18 to be subject to a similar set of arrangements to that for offenders over 18. However, there are strong grounds for saying that we should not include such automatic consequences. We should always assume that those who commit offences when they are under 18 will have the benefit of a review when they become adults. We should not presume that their adulthood will be shaped by the mistakes, offences, behaviour and characteristics of their youth. We should not condemn those who are convicted of serious offences as youngsters to the same length and inevitability of punishment as adults, who are much more responsible for themselves.

One or two other issues arise from the way in which we define serious offences. There is a real debate to be had about whether it is better to have a definite term of imprisonment, followed by an indefinite term of supervision, which may or may not be in custody, or to have an indefinite sentence at the beginning. I do not come to the issue with any theological view, although certainty is often better than uncertainty from the victim's point of view. In some ways, not knowing when someone will be released is a worse punishment than knowing the punishment. However, it is often impossible to predict someone's condition when the sentence is passed and come to a view about when it will be safe to release them into the community. Having taken advice over recent years, I have formed the view that it is better for such things to be determined by the court, rather than by people working in secret on bodies such as parole boards, no matter how good or well informed they are.

Column Number: 911

If a case is in the realm of serious violent or sexual offences and the evidential base at the time of sentencing shows that it is impossible to predict when someone will be safe to release into the community, the court has a duty to serve the public interest by ensuring that there not be an automatic release into the community. In such cases it might be better to say, ''We cannot at the moment say when it will be suitable to release this person. This is a very serious matter. They have been and are a risk to the community, and might still be a risk in five or 10 years' time. Therefore we shall judge whether it is appropriate to release them back to the community at that time by bringing the matter back to the court and having the court hear the evidence of those who have been dealing with that person's medical, mental and psychiatric condition.'' That would effectively be to have what now happens at the Parole Board happening at court, so that the public can see that the decision is taken in an open and accountable way.

I do not disparage or undermine the work of the Parole Board—I am about to spend some time, at its invitation, sitting in on the process that it carries out of reviewing cases, to which I am looking forward very much. However, the Parole Board suffers from a disadvantage in that that process is not accountable in a full, public way. We should consider whether the process leading to the decision on whether someone is fit for release, made on the basis of the evidence of their behaviour in prison, of the results of their medical treatment and of their psychiatric and psychological assessments, should take place in open court. How we define which offences trigger the dangerous offenders provision gives rise to such issues. I accept that public protection requires that there be a category of offenders for whom the normal sentencing regime cannot apply. At the time of sentencing there should be additional provision for such offenders, and there should be protection at the end of that sentence. I am not satisfied that that happens at the moment in a way that commands public confidence. However, the legislation should not be over-prescriptive, and huge and uncertain sentences should not be given. Matters should proceed in the normal, accountable way through the courts, whether involving the original judge, or another judge sitting in the same court years later.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Hilary Benn): Good morning, Mr. Illsley.

The hon. Gentleman gave a helpful introduction to some of the issues raised by this chapter, which is designed to deal with those circumstances that we all experience currently. One of the responsibilities of my post is to write to my colleagues from time to time to notify them of the release of a dangerous offender—I used to receive such letters myself, and I now send them out. Although such offenders have come to the end of their determinate sentence, the consensus is that the risk that they present to the public remains. Therefore we try to construct licence conditions and supervision arrangements in order to maximise the

Column Number: 912

chances of protecting the public from that continuing dangerousness. As we know from certain cases, however, that does not always work. Victims and those with responsibility for oversight of the system find those cases in which someone who is in essence generally agreed to pose a risk, is released at the end of their sentence and then commits another offence, the most difficult to deal with. People legitimately ask why the system did not protect them from that individual. That is what these provisions are all about. They are based on the essential premise that decisions about release should be based on an assessment of risk—the risk presented to the public—in exactly the same way as a parole board currently assesses risk in relation to mandatory and discretionary life sentences.

The hon. Gentleman asked whether it might not be better to have a system of indefinite terms rather than definite terms followed by indefinite supervision. The Government believe that sentencing for public protection is the right approach because it ensures that individuals will not be released until an assessment of the risk that they present to the public has been made and until it has been decided that that risk is sufficiently reduced. Surely, from a victim's point of view, it is more comforting and reassuring—in so far as one can comfort and reassure victims of sexual or violent crimes—to know that the offender will not be released until they are assessed as no longer presenting a significant risk than to know that the offender will be released after a certain time but that they will then be subject to supervision arrangements, which, in truth, describes the current situation. We try as best we can to ensure that those supervision arrangements cover the dangers, but they do not always work, which is why certain provisions have been included in the Bill.

On the question of who is the best person to assess risk, parole boards have a considerable amount of experience in dealing with the problem. Their record on making difficult judgments and performance in getting them right have been improving and are continuing to improve, and the reconviction rate of those who have been released is now at a record low level. From memory, in the mid-1990s, the reconviction rate was about 7 per cent., whereas the rate is now down to a little more than 3 per cent., although parole boards are releasing a higher proportion of the cases that they consider.

 
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Prepared 11 February 2003