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Standing Committee B
Thursday 9 January 2003
(Morning)
[Mr. Eric Illsley in the Chair]
9.15 am
Motion made, and Question proposed,
That the Order of the Committee [17th December] be amended as follows—
(1) in paragraph (3), by leaving out '34' and inserting '26';
(2) after paragraph (3), by inserting—
'(3A) the proceedings on Clause 27 to 34 (so far as not previously concluded) shall be brought to a conclusion at 7 p.m. on Thursday 9th January 2003;'
(3) in paragraph (4), by leaving out '5.15 p.m.' and inserting '6.50 p.m.'.—[Mr. Heppell.]
Mr. Graham Allen (Nottingham, North): I support the motion, which underlines how important the Bill is for policing. I also want to take this opportunity to mention a very sad event that occurred in my constituency. Yesterday, a police dog-handler and his dog were dragged along by the car of a joyrider that they were trying to apprehend, and the officer is in a critical, indeed life-threatening, condition. Brave officers such as he serve our communities and they will be looking to the Committee to ensure that the Bill is something of which we can all be proud.
The Chairman: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman carries the whole Committee with him.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 14
Appeals to High Court
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Hilary Benn): I beg to move amendment No. 40, in
The Chairman: With this we may discuss Government amendments Nos. 41 to 43.
Hilary Benn: Before I discuss the amendments, I want to echo your concern, Mr. Illsley, about the circumstances described by my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North (Mr. Allen). I am sure that the Committee's best wishes go to the officer and his family.
Amendments Nos. 40 and 41 are simple drafting amendments, which are designed to make the provision amended by clause 14(1) easier to understand.
Amendment No. 42 provides that the High Court is to have no power—I think that the Committee accepted at the end of our previous deliberations that the change proposed in the clause was generally welcome—to entertain bail applications in cases where the Crown court makes a bail decision under the new powers in clauses 75 and 76, which relate to the retrial
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of serious offences. That situation would not be covered by the abolition of the High Court's bail jurisdiction under clause 14(3), which necessarily refers only to existing powers.
Amendment No. 43 is a drafting amendment, which is primarily designed to take account of the reference to the revocation of bail in clauses 75 and 76.
Amendment agreed to.
Amendments made: No. 41, in
clause 14, page 10, line 4, after 'and' insert '(b)'.
No. 42, in
clause 14, page 10, line 19, at end insert—
'(4A) The High Court is to have no power to entertain an application in relation to bail where the Crown Court—
(a) has granted or withheld bail, or
(b) has varied the conditions of bail,
under section 75 or 76 of this Act.'
No. 43, in
Clause 14, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 15
Appeals by prosecution
Mr. Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield): I beg to move amendment No. 26, in
clause 15, page 10, line 37, after 'imprisonment', insert
'for two years or more'.
First, I associate myself with the Minister's response to the information given to us by the hon. Member for Nottingham, North. We all send our best wishes to the officer and his family.
The clause amends the Bail (Amendment) Act 1993. Under the clause, it will be possible for the prosecution to appeal not only in the case of an offence that is punishable by imprisonment for five years or more but in the case of any imprisonable offence.
When I saw the words ''Bail (Amendment) Act 1993'' in the Bill, it brought back memories—I drafted that legislation, having been asked for help by the hon. Member who was introducing it as a private Member's Bill. I had never drafted a piece of legislation before, and might never do again. Since it appeared on the statute book, the Court of Appeal has criticised its drafting on a number of occasions and it has been tinkered around with several times. That drafting was done by my fireside with a whisky in one hand and a pen in the other, quite late at night, when I came back from my barrister's practice, but at least it has stood the test of time and the Government seek to improve it—or do they?
When the 1993 Act was drafted, I felt that it would be pushing it a bit to say that it should be possible for the prosecution to appeal what it considered to be a mistaken decision to grant bail in respect of any imprisonable offence. That is why that was confined to offences attracting a sentence of imprisonment of five
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years or more. This probing amendment prompts us to consider, as a topic for discussion, whether we are going too far in including any offence punishable by imprisonment. While I accept that discretion will lie with the prosecution, we could end up with a situation in which grants of bail in offences in which the likely sentence of imprisonment is going to be minute or non-existent could be appealed. That is why I have tabled an amendment that introduces a two-year limit. It is important for the Committee to consider the matter, and I shall be interested to hear the Minister's response.
We do not wish to see people out on the streets who have been wrongly granted bail by magistrates courts; that is why the 1993 Act seemed to be such an important tool. Prior to that, there was no possibility of any appeal by the prosecution against what the police might have felt was a mistaken decision to grant bail. However, it was always thought that it would be used in respect of serious offences, or of a person on trial for a serious offence. What is now proposed is a catch-all that could apply to anyone and would cover a vast number of offences. Do we need to go that far? There is a merit in having certainty in legal proceedings. Apart from the danger of clogging up the courts, if legislation results in people constantly thinking that decisions by magistrates to grant bail might be reversed a few weeks later, is it necessary? That is the key test in our deliberations on the Bill, and I should like the Minister to explain why the current wording is necessary.
Hilary Benn: I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on enlightening the Committee as to his role in the drafting of the original legislation. In the case of this clause—I cannot promise to do it in other cases—where he led, the Government are proposing to follow. I recognise that his is a probing amendment and he asks a legitimate question. The nature of the amendment accepts the case for some change to the five-year limit. We are relying on the consideration that Sir Robin Auld gave to the matter in his report.
Sir Robin referred to the sorts of offences, not especially serious in themselves, that, if repeated, can affect the quality of life of large numbers of people, and give rise to concern about the inability of the criminal justice system to prevent the commission of offences on bail. Minor criminal damage is an example. Offences of that kind are currently excluded, and would also be excluded by the amendment.
Taking the argument that the hon. Gentleman advanced in favour of clarity, I tell him that the clause makes it clear that in relation to all offences that might attract a sentence of imprisonment, there would be a prosecution right of appeal. Despite that, however, it would not be usual for the prosecution to appeal against a grant of bail for a defendant charged with a minor offence. However, there will occasionally be circumstances in which it is appropriate to challenge a decision to grant bail—even for those offences punishable by less than two years' imprisonment, as detailed by the hon. Gentleman's amendment. It is
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sensible and right for the prosecution to have a right of appeal against a grant of bail by magistrates for all cases that would be punishable by imprisonment. The Crown Prosecution Service's internal guidance, which gives advice on the operation of the right of appeal as currently constituted under legislation, would need to be revised to take account of the change proposed under the clause.
Mr. Grieve: I am grateful to the Minister for his exposé of the Government's reasoning, which seems totally coherent. In view of that and of the CPS guidelines in particular—which would, I hope, avoid ping-ponging, with the courts being cluttered up with applications on relatively minor cases—I shall withdraw the amendment.
I say in passing that the provisions raise the prospect of further increasing the prison population. Given that the Government are now sending out mixed signals as to whether burglars should be imprisoned for first-time offences, a situation whereby those who have committed minor offences of criminal damage are kept in custody might lead the public to think that some of our priorities are slightly skewed. However, I accept that some instances of relatively minor criminal damage, especially if persistently committed by those out on bail, are exceptionally antisocial, and are good grounds for withdrawing bail. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Simon Hughes (Southwark, North and Bermondsey): I am supportive of the principle behind the clause. However, I have a question about the time scale. The clause refers to a two-part process: the granting of bail and the prosecution's appeal. If the prosecution appealed, would bail not be granted until the appeal was heard—that is, would the appeal act as a stay? The question raises an important issue, because if so, a court that had decided that there should be conditions of bail would have its decision overridden without the High Court's having a review to change that. The issue touches on an important principle, in terms of liberty and who eventually has the decision. The argument does not apply in the other direction, in the case of the person who is inside. On the traditional defence appeal for bail in cases in which the lower court has refused it, the old position properly stands until it is reversed. Therefore, there is no liberty question.
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