Conclusions and recommendations
1. We
recommend that the Department produce a fuller estimate of the
cost implications of this Bill before its presentation to Parliament.
With future draft legislation more attention should be devoted
to ensuring that there is a comprehensive estimate of the cost
implications and that any Regulatory Impact Assessment is available
at the same time as the draft Bill. (Paragraph 8)
2. We consider that
a clear and unambiguous statement of the overarching principles
within which the NDA will work would be a useful addition to the
draft Bill. Such a statement would have most force if it were
given in the main body of the Bill. (Paragraph 13)
3. We suggest that
the draft Bill should be amended to make clear that, in fulfilling
its obligations regarding clean-up and decommissioning, the NDA
will operate in accordance with the concept of remediation and
harm as set out in the Environmental Protection Act 1990, as amended.
(Paragraph 14)
4. The White Paper
gave an assurance that there would be no direct link between the
NDA and new nuclear build. This assurance should be given force
through a statement of policy by the DTI that approval of any
proposal from the private sector for new nuclear plant would be
conditional, amongst other factors, upon the establishment and
maintenance of a segregated fund to meet the costs of clean-up
at the end of its useful operational life. (Paragraph 20)
5. As regards the
widening of remit of the NDA, we feel that the Government has
been prudent in giving the NDA wider powers to take account of
the possibility that if British Energy were to cease trading (or
another private firm in the industry) then it would be necessary
for the Government to intervene in the interests of public safety,
especially since legislating later, if such an event occurred,
would be a lengthy process. (Paragraph 21)
6. On balance, it
seems to us logical that, since the primary objective of the NDA
will be the decommissioning and clean-up of the nuclear legacy,
there should be some reference made in the legislation to the
need for a regular review of the justification for the continued
operation of the nuclear facilities under the control of the NDA,
and the publication of a timetable for their withdrawal from service.
(Paragraph 24)
7. We noted that while
the development of the NDA's Research and Technology programme
was an essential component of the Authority's work, the draft
NDA management statement did not address this function directly.
We recommend that this crucial activity be afforded a higher priority
when the management statement is developed further. (Paragraph
26)
8. We recognise the
iterative and interactive nature of R&T and that it is not
necessarily simple to separate out from BNFL's current R&T
programme those elements that relate specifically to decommissioning,
or to distinguish generic research not oriented towards new nuclear
build from generic research which is so targeted. It is appropriate
that 'New BNFL' retain the last, but it would make sense for it
to have some capability in the first twonot least because
it would need to maintain its competency as an Management &
Operations contractor for decommissioning and clean-up. The Government
should give more thought to the question of how these R&T
functions are to be separated, before the Bill receives its second
reading. In so doing the Government must ensure that the NDA does
not lose its focus on decommissioning and clean-up. (Paragraph
28)
9. In our view, one
of the best ways of establishing whether openness, transparency
and public confidence has been delivered is to include the public
in the evaluation of such engagement right from the start of the
process. Such participatory evaluation would help to define criteria
for success that the general public understand and ensure that
the outcomes of the evaluation are ones they can endorse. Establishing
an interactive process that ensures credibility among a wide range
of stakeholders could be a more flexible, less prescriptive process
than using fixed criteria, formal measurement and audit. (Paragraph
37)
10. We would have
liked to have seen more information on how and whether performance
against targets will be independently validated. This information
should be included in the NDA's management statement in order
to ensure that this process is fully in the public domain. (Paragraph
38)
11. It seems to us
that the requirements for stakeholder consultation by the NDA
and its contractors strike a reasonable balance between prescription
and the need to have the flexibility to adjust the consultation
arrangements to suit the individual problems posed by any particular
site. In practice, the NDA will be required to have regard to
any representation made by a member of the public. Failure to
do so, or do so adequately, would leave the Authority's decisions
open to challenge through the process of judicial review. Bearing
in mind that the processes for stakeholder consultation are at
an early stage of development, we would expect the Government
to monitor the NDA's efforts in this area closely and to take
suitable corrective action should the need arise. (Paragraph 40)
12. It seems to us
that the rights and responsibilities of the NDA and its site operators
and managers should properly be set out within the contracts between
the two parties. That said, the three-way relationship between
the Authority, its contractors and the nuclear regulators, and
a framework for the conduct of this working relationship could
usefully be recognised in the draft Memorandum of Understanding
which is being developed by the Government in advance of the establishment
of the NDA. (Paragraph 43)
13. The Government
should ensure that the transfer of assets and liabilities to the
NDA is complete, and does not leave any residual long-term liability
remaining with the site operator, unless provision for this is
made in its site management contract with the Authority. (Paragraph
46)
14. In principle,
we agree that the creation of a nuclear industry pension scheme,
providing benefits of membership equivalent to those provided
by the existing schemes, could provide an incentive to join and
remain in the decommissioning and clean-up industry. In any case,
the pension rights of BNFL staff should be protected to remove
any potential for discrimination between different groups of BNFL
staff. (Paragraph 51)
15. We are still of
the view that the use of a Segregated Fund to provide the resources
required by the NDA would be preferable to the Segregated Account
that is proposed by the Government. However, what matters most
is that the NDA is provided with the resources that it needs to
carry out its responsibilities. The Government has provided assurances
that the necessary support will be forthcoming, although it cannot
provide more than a rough estimate of the resources that will
be needed annually. That is understandable. However, before the
Bill is presented to Parliament the Government should finalise
and publish the process by which the level of its initial and
annual contributions to the Account will be determined. (Paragraph
59)
16. We note that more
than two years will have elapsed from the issue of the Government's
consultation document "Managing Radioactive Waste Safely",
in September 2001, and the first meeting of CoRWM. We hope that
the Committee will show a greater sense of urgency in its approach
to its work than Government Departments have demonstrated thus
far. From the outset, the NDA will need clear instructions from
the Government as to the waste management strategy that it will
be required to implement. Given the central role that the Government
envisages for Nirex in the development of this strategy, the uncertainty
over the future funding and management of the organisation should
be resolved without delay. (Paragraph 64)
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