ORBIT MULTI MODAL STUDY

1.   Brief background to study including area

  The London Orbital Multi-Modal Study (Orbit) is one of a series of multi-modal studies being undertaken for the Department for Transport (DfT). Multi-modal studies examine problems of congestion on the strategic road network and seek solutions from all modes of transport. In Spring 2000, the Government Office for the South East (GOSE) commissioned a consortium led by KBR to undertake Orbit.

  The overall aim of Orbit was to examine the existing and future problems for orbital travel around London and to produce a long-term sustainable management strategy for the M25, which meets the Government's objectives for transport and solves, or at least ameliorates, the problems on the M25, both now and in the future.

  The Study area is all of London, the M25 and an area outside to a distance of 15-20 miles.

2.   Start and end dates of the study

  The Study commenced in the Spring of 2000 and finished in November 2002 when the final report was sent by GOSE to the Regional Planning bodies. However, after this time, GOSE has arranged a call off contract for KBR to respond to queries and subsequent meetings.

3.   Duration of the strategy

  The study has looked forward to a number of future years, including 2011, 2016, 2021 and 2031, with various tests being undertaken at these years. The prime forecast year is 2011 for the strategy, but this has also been tested at 2021 and 2031.

4.   Forecast traffic growth

	1997-2016	2016-2031
Population	+10%	+4%
Households	+19%	+9%
Jobs	+15%	+9%
Jobs in central London	+27%	--
Cars	+34%	+12%
Trips by all modes	+17%	+11%
Car trips	+23%	+9%

	1997-2011	2011-2021
Trip length	+20%	+4%
Traffic (vehicle Kilometres)	+36%	+15%

5.   Key issues

  The key issues of concern in the study area are as follows (as extracted from the Executive Summary):

—  severe congestion on the road network, and the unpredictability of travel times;

—  the lack of good orbital roads other than the M25;

—  severe over-crowding on some rail lines and services, especially into London;

—  the lack of an orbital rail line or any other orbital public transport service;

—  too many freight movements made by road, but a recognition of the large scale of the investment in the rail system that would be required to change this significantly;

—  inadequate access to airports by public transport, notably from directions other than Central London;

—  the need for orbital and radial access by road and rail to the Thames Gateway regeneration area;

—  the shortage of crossings of the Thames, especially to the east of London;

—  noise and air pollution experienced by communities near to main roads;

—  the lack of integration between land-use developments and the transport system which has permitted developments in the M25 corridor which have generated large volumes of car traffic on the motorway;

—  a change in culture which has increased dependency on and use of the car, and hence road congestion; and

—  the tendency, in the past, to try and keep pace with the demand for travel by car by providing more road capacity, thereby further encouraging car as the dominant mode of travel.

  The causes of congestion on the M25 are as follows. Analysis of the traffic currently using the M25 in the morning peak period has shown that:

—  about 50% of the traffic is making a journey to work;

—  many trips are very long (over 40% are longer than 100kms), although the average use of the M25 is quite short (over 40% travel 1 or 2 junctions);

-—  average car occupancies for commuting trips are low (1.15 people per car);

—  both origins and destinations are very widely dispersed, with 40% of the trips having both ends outside the M25 and 20% having both ends inside (see Figure 3); and

-—  the current public transport system is a very inconvenient means of making the commuting journeys currently made by car on the M25, leaving aside the lack of capacity on many services in the peak periods (see Figure 4).

  We believe (based on our reading of the literature and with discussions with many experts in the field) that this dispersed pattern of car commuting has grown up over the last two decades or so because:

—  increasingly, people have preferred to live in an environment of their choice, in houses they can afford, where they have family and friends nearby, where their children can attend schools of their choice, and where they can access a wide range of employment locations via the strategic road network;

—  increasingly, jobs are less secure and people are unwilling to move house to be nearer a job which they may have to change in the foreseeable future;

—  house prices are higher the closer the location is to London and hence many people who may work in outer London or the M25 corridor live further away where housing is more affordable than closer to their employment;

—  new business parks, retail and leisure developments have tended to locate on out of town sites adjacent to the M25 corridor; and

—  a generally good motorway and other trunk road system has been provided outside London, car prices have not increased in real terms over a long period (and have decreased in very recent years), and the price of fuel in terms of pence per mile has decreased in real terms.

  It is evident from experience and the literature that the planning system has been able to exert only a limited degree of control on the dispersal of activities and the growth in travel by car. Recent research carried out by the Town and Country Planning Association for the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions has highlighted past trends towards dispersal of housing and employment locations and concluded that: ". . . if one really wanted to reverse the self-reinforcing trends towards decentralised residential and employment locations, the most effective means of doing so, perhaps the only effective means of doing so, would be to substantially curtail the use of the car." (quoted from "The People: Where Will They Work", 1999).

  6.   Details of objectives that strongly influenced the outcome of the studies.

  The study aims and study-specific objectives are as follows (as extracted from the Executive Summary):

Study Aims

  The overall aim of Orbit is to examine the existing and future problems for orbital travel around London and to produce a long-term sustainable management strategy for the M25, which:

—  meets the Government's objectives for transport; and

—  solves, or at least ameliorates, the problems on the M25, both now and in the future.

Study-Specific Objectives

  Within the framework of the Government's objectives for transport, a series of more specific ojectives was developed in conjunction with the Steering Group and by taking account of views expressed during consultations with the Wider Reference Groups. The resulting study-specific objectives, which the strategy should achieve, are as follows.

—  To make best possible use of the existing orbital road network to improve (where necessary) journey time reliability and reduce congestion. Address key " bottlenecks" on the network where these act against the provision of a consistent level of service in terms of reliability.

—  To reduce the growth in demand for travel, primarily on the orbital road network through:

—  the integration of land use and transport in support of national and regional objectives to encourage urban renaissance and support more sustainable travel patterns, for example, through facilitating orbital movements by public transport; and

—  promoting alternatives to the car, for example by improving the integration, quality and choice of public transport, providing better facilities for cyclists and improved pedestrian access.

—  To manage and improve the strategic transport network for effective freight distribution, by encouraging the transfer of freight from road to other modes and minimising the impact of heavy goods vehicle traffic on non-strategic roads.

—  To improve orbital transport in support of regional objectives to maintain sustainable growth in areas of economic success and facilitate growth in regeneration areas, especially Thames Gateway and the Lower Lea Valley.

—  To acknowledge the importance of the orbital transport network as a key national artery and develop it in such a way as to provide better connectivity with the continent through improved links to airports, ports and the Channel Tunnel.

—  To manage and improve orbital transport such that it facilitates access to employment and training opportunities and fosters social inclusion, especially for those without access to a car.

—  To develop strategies that reduce the impact of transport on the built and natural environment, reduce the consumption of non-renewable fuels, and enable more sustainable use of the region" s natural resources.

  This is a wide-ranging and ambitious set of objectives and, as will be seen, the Recommended Strategy addresses them to varying degrees.

7.   Summary of the main options appraised and the reasons for pursuing the final strategy

  The options appraised were considered in the following (specific) order

(a)  making better use of the existing transport system

(b)  demand management (trying to reduce the reliance upon the private car)

(c)  alternatives to the car, and

(d)  new road capacity, as a last resort.

  In essence, we have tried to see how demand for travel by car (and lorry) on the M25 can be reduced, before examining the need for extra road capacity.

  The options looked at were as follows (further details can be found in the Executive Summary)

  (a)   Making better use of the existing transport system

  Best Practice traffic management to minimise the number and duration of delays and provide better information and details of alternative routes in the event of extraordinary delays on the M25. The elements of best practice traffic management are :

—  Management of road works

—  Management of incidents

—  "controlled motorways" and " active traffic management"

  Whilst it is difficult to be precise about the extent to which these would reduce congestion, improve reliability or reduce accidents, we believe that these measures are likely to be beneficial, but are unlikely to delay or reduce the need for more assertive action.

  (b)   Demand Management

—  Land-use policies

—  "Soft" or "mobility management" measures

(i)  travel plans, including employee and school travel plans

(ii)  flexible or staggered hours for work, shopping and education

(iii.  telecommunications as a substitute for travel

(iv)  parking controls

(v)  other measures to reduce car use and car dependency

—  Workplace parking levies

  Our view on these actions is that they may also be beneficial but are also unlikely to reduce the demand for travel on the M25 to any material extent. Hence some other action will be necessary.

—  Road User Charging.

    This is likely to be the most effective method for reducing the demand for travel on the M25 and is our preferred method for reducing traffic levels and the rate of future traffic growth.

  (c)   Alternatives to the car

  The current pattern of trips on the M25 include a very diverse range of origins and destinations. This means that public transport is ill suited to cater for these trips. However, notwithstanding this we have assessed a range of public transport initiatives, including:

—  A high quality orbital coach system (see below)

—  New rail lines and improved rail services

—  Improvements to the quality of the public transport journey

—  Improvements to interchange

—  Shared taxis.

  We believe that the best opportunity for providing improved public transport in the M25 corridor is a high quality orbital coach system to provide for some of the existing trips made by car on the M25. This would comprise

—  A network of new services forming two rings around London ( along the M25 corridor and 15-25 kms outside)

—  High quality vehicles

—  Frequent and punctual services

—  Good transport interchanges with other services

  (d)   Increases in the capacity of the M25

  Having taken account of the above effects we believe that the M25 needs to be widened, in its existing corridor. This should comprise widening the following sections from dual three lanes to dual four lanes:

—  Junctions 16-23

—  Junctions 27-31

—  Junctions 1a-3

—  Junctions 5-7

  The assessment of this widening has been made on the assumption that Road User Charging will be implemented as soon as practical. (The effect of RUC is to suppress road traffic (in particular, trip length) and reduce the demand for travel.) The assumption (of RUC being introduced) is on the basis that if widening is (alternatively) considered on a predict and fully provide basis, the widening would be over-provided in the event that Road User Charging is brought in subsequently. It might also prejudice the introduction of RUC at a later date.

  In addition, road widening without any controls on the use of the new capacity, will attract induced traffic which will erode the benefits of the widening, and lead to further congestion at a later date. Thus uncontrolled widening of the M25 does not represent a sustainable solution and we therefore recommend that various alternative methods are implemented in order to "lock in" the benefits of the widening.

  The alternative methods of controlling use of the new capacity are in descending order of preference:

(a)  Road User Charging—our preferred solution, as a national scheme.

(b)  Motorway tolling on the widened sections of the M25,

(c)  Physical Integral Demand Management Measures (IDM measures), in the event that neither RUC nor tolling are implemented. These comprise:

—  Ramp flow metering

—  Mainline flow metering

—  Segregated lanes for priority vehicles.

Freight

  We support a number of initiatives for assisting rail freight, especially the provision of better rail capacity for rail freight to bypass London, but as the majority of freight movements on the M25 are not suited to rail transport, these will not reduce the demand for road freight to any extent. As a result we recommend some specific measures for freight on the M25, such as:

—  Climbing lanes through road widening on uphill sections

—  Priorities within some IDM measures

8.   Details of the schemes, including costs and timings, proposed in the final strategy.

  Our core recommendation is for widening the M25 over certain sections as listed above, with Road User Charging applied nationally to control the demand for traffic.

  These widening schemes are recommended for implementation over the period 2002— 11, subject to programming issues to be considered by the Highways Agency. The estimated cost of this is some £850 million at current prices.

  We also recommend that Road User Charging is implemented as soon as is practical, but the Government has indicated that this cannot happen this decade. We have therefore assumed that the earliest date that RUC could be introduced is 2011. We have not attempted to estimate a cost for RUC, as we are recommending that a national scheme is introduced. However, such a system would raise substantial revenues which could be used to improve public transport provision, including for those car drivers suppressed from using the M25.

  We also recommend that the concept of an orbital coach system is studied, at an early opportunity, to determine whether it is viable and the potential costs of implementation.

  For other public transport schemes, we support the actions of other authorities and have not therefore separately estimated costs, as these will appear in different budgets.

  We have not made any distinction between public and private sector finance, except that we would expect that the road widening would be provided from the public purse. We would not expect that the orbital coach service would be implemented by the private sector alone, and we would envisage some public funded subsidy, at least.

9.   Details of the timing and scale for the introduction of charging measures in the study area

  As discussed above, we recommend the introduction of a national road user charging scheme as soon as practically possible, and have assumed a date of 2011 for this. An optimum universal charge has been identified at 10.5 pence per mile (at current values) which would reduce traffic levels to around those occurring in 1997. We have also estimated that a charge of 14.5 pence per mile in 2021 (at current prices) would also maintain traffic at broadly 1997 levels.

  Instead of a flat charge for all vehicles, the charges could be varied by time of day, type of road, or congestion levels, but there is a danger that this could lead to traffic being induced on non charged roads.

10.   The costs and forecast impact on traffic levels of the behaviour change measures proposed and a list of suggested measures.

  As indicated earlier, we have considered a number of demand management measures, but with the exception of Road User Charging, we have not identified any measure which will reduce traffic on the M25 to any material extent. For example, as a sensitivity test for telecommuting we assumed that all commuters in SEG groups 1&2 would reduce their travel by 20% in the morning peak hour, the equivalent of all people in these SEGs travelling to work on four days a week only. This had the effect of reducing the peak demand matrix by some 10%, and had the effect of reducing flows on the M25 by less than 1% on average. The reduction in demand had been largely offset by induced traffic taking advantage of the improved conditions.

  The costs of demand management measures have not therefore been costed.

11.   A summary of outcomes including mode shift and congestion reduction.

  The effects of the Strategy are reported in the Executive Summary, which includes details of the Strategy ASTs.

  In the event that nothing is done to the M25, by 2011 travel times will on average increase by some 14% (compared with 1997), and reliability will get worse by some 17%. This is the average of conditions between 7 and 10 am, and conditions will be worse during the heart of the peak period. With the Strategy (including road widening and Road User Charging) average travel times will be better than 1997 by 11% and reliability improved by 20%. In 2021, with the Strategy, travel times will still be better than 1997 by 8% and reliability will be improved by 12%.

  We don't believe that the recommended Strategy (or indeed any other measures that we are aware of ) will have any material effect on modal split on the M25.

12.   A list of key implementation issues and risks identified by the studies.

  It is understood that the widening of the M25 does not raise any abnormal issues of implementation as the work can be carried out within the current highway boundary, subject to detailed design by the Highways Agency. The design of widening options at junctions needs to be considered in detail by the Highways Agency.

  Road User Charging is a contentious recommendation and may attract some reluctance or opposition by the Government of the day. In the event that RUC is decided against, the next best option would be for tolling the widened sections of the M25. This would be less effective than RUC at reducing and controlling traffic levels, but may be less contentious to implement.

  If neither of these interventions find favour, physical IDM measures could be implemented, at least as a stop gap measure, but in the long term, these would not be able to prevent traffic growth occurring on the M25.

  If road widening is implemented without any control measure, it is clear that traffic growth on the M25 would quickly take up any spare capacity, such that the need for further widening would quickly return. This is not considered a sustainable strategy for the motorway.

  In undertaking this study we have been aware that central London is expected to have a growth of some 27 per cent more jobs over the period 1997—2016. This is a large increase and begs the question of how these extra commuters will travel there. Our reference case for future travel provision has assumed that a number of major rail improvements will be completed by 2016, such as Crossrail 1 & 2, Thameslink 2000, East London Line extension and other schemes ( as listed in the Executive Summary). Tests have indicated that these schemes, if fully implemented, could support the anticipated growth, but the implication is that non completion of this programme would jeopardise the occurrence of this growth. If the job growth cannot occur in central London, there is a risk that it may relocate to the M25 corridor with consequent generation of large volumes of traffic. Limited time in the study timescale has prevented us from further researching this issue.