The threat

1.  There seems to be a range of risk assessments, particularly within the Department of Health (DoH). It is not clear who in Government is responsible for determining what threats the UK should be responding to, and with what priorities. We have not established how risk assessments are informing Government policy and thus the scientific response. There should be a single assessment, informed by science and intelligence, which is communicated clearly to all those who need to make strategic decisions on funding allocations. We hope that the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre can fulfil this function. (Paragraph 16)

The Government response

2.  In some areas greater investment in CBRN home defence is required, either for research or to reflect that many parts of Government have been expected to expand their role. This must be reflected in their budgets. (Paragraph 25)

3.  We recommend that the Government publish figures on its spending on CBRN countermeasures, before and after 11 September 2001, with an indication of how this money is being spent. (Paragraph 26)

Research, development and procurement

4.  There has been no extensive effort that we can establish to identify the research needs to develop CBRN countermeasures and as a result there has been no clear statement of what is required. Without this, the research community is in no position to respond effectively and in a coordinated manner. (Paragraph 29)

5.  There are few issues in which access to the best scientific expertise is more important than in the fight against terrorism. We welcome the Government's willingness to commission and fund Royal Society inquiries and urge it to consider providing the resources to the Society to produce a thorough and public appraisal of the role that science can play in combating terrorism. (Paragraph 30)

6.  In our view, UK home defence is too reliant on Dstl's military-derived technologies. We need a substantial and clearly focused research programme driven by the specific requirements of civil defence. (Paragraph 37)

7.  Despite regulating animal experimentation for many years, sponsoring the Forensic Science Service and having powers through the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 over the security of laboratories, we are strongly of the view that there is a weak scientific culture in the Home Office. The Office of Science and Technology has set up a Science Review Directorate to assess the scientific endeavours of Government departments. We recommend that it consider the Home Office a priority. (Paragraph 40)

8.  Greater collaboration between Dstl and HPA at Porton Down could be very productive and would avoid duplication. We recommend that greater efforts are made to explore synergies and joint projects. (Paragraph 44)

9.  The establishment of a CBRN Team in the Home Office is important, and it is desirable that a single Department takes the lead, but there needs to be appropriate expertise within and available to other Departments. We are not satisfied that the Department for Transport has such expertise, or that it has a clear understanding of the route by which it could attain the information it would need to respond to a CBRN emergency. (Paragraph 45)

10.  We are concerned that SAPER, as an advisory panel, has no resources to drive through change or initiate research. (Paragraph 46)

11.  The UK does not need a Department for Homeland Security but we do recommend the creation of a Centre for Home Defence as a Government agency, with the following features:

• It would conduct or commission research and development aimed at strengthening the UK's technical capability to prevent, respond and mitigate the effects of a terrorist attack, in particular those using CBRN agents;
• It would be under the auspices of the Home Office within the remit of the Minister of State for Counter-Terrorism. SAPER would act as its scientific steering group;
• It would have its own research budget of no less than £20 million a year and would be responsible for conducting basic research, deriving new technologies for home defence and adapting military technologies for civil use;
• It would not conduct research on medical countermeasures but would have substantial input into and commission research conducted by the Department of Health (including the Health Protection Agency), the Medical Research Council and Dstl;
• It would have a physical presence in close proximity to a centre of academic scientific excellence;
• It would identify relevant research expertise within universities and Research Council Institutes; and
• It would form strong links with academic and Government research laboratories overseas.(Paragraph 48)

12.  We understand that science at the Ministry of Defence will be the subject of a review by the OST Science Review Directorate. This should consider the use being made of academic research by Dstl and what mechanisms could be introduced to maintain quality control at regular intervals. (Paragraph 53)

13.  The formation of the Health Protection Agency is a positive move in terms of ensuring good public health surveillance and combating infectious serious disease, and it should also enhance the UK's CBRN counter-terrorism measures. The split of the PHLS between national and local functions within NHS Trusts has been given much attention and we do not plan to repeat the arguments, except to say that expertise in the identification and epidemiology of possible biological agents must be retained at a local level. (Paragraph 60)

14.  We have concerns about the funding of the HPA and the NRPB. We have been told that they have been asked to take on new functions but it is unclear whether adequate additional resources will be available to meet the challenges from CBRN terrorism. We recommend that any increase in their activities relating to CBRN countermeasures should be reflected in their budgets. The HPA should not be undermined so soon in its existence by a lack of funds. (Paragraph 64)

15.  We recommend that the HPA develop with industry a fast efficient vaccine production facility which combines a service to the tax-payer and benefits participating companies. This should form part of a long-term vaccine development strategy for Government. (Paragraph 73)

16.  The Government's decision not to conduct a mass vaccination programme for smallpox is correct in our view. The reported side effects of the vaccine make this option unattractive. Should a safer vaccine become available, we would expect the Government to reconsider this policy yet the Minister refused to address this point. We have heard of doctors' concerns about the "worried well". A safe vaccine might prove cost effective, provide reassurance to millions and possibly act as a deterrent to any attack. (Paragraph 79)

17.  In its initial procurement of personal protective equipment after 11 September 2001, the DoH acted too hastily and without consulting sufficiently widely. We are content that problems are being remedied but at considerable expense and at a cost to the public's and health professionals' confidence in the Department's competence. (Paragraph 84)

18.  The use of NHS Direct data to give an early warning of a CBRN attack is a useful addition to the existing surveillance techniques but it should form part of an integrated surveillance system that uses data from a variety of sources. (Paragraph 86)

19.  The World Health Organization provides a valuable resource in the response to CBRN terrorism and it should not be under-resourced. We recommend that the Government raise this issue at the appropriate forum. (Paragraph 87)

20.  We accept there has been contact between Government and the pharmaceutical industry to discuss medical countermeasures but it has been insufficient to enable companies to adapt their own research programmes with confidence. (Paragraph 93)

21.  We are pleased that our probings have prompted action to improve the dialogue with the pharmaceutical industry and that Mr Hutton accepts the criticism that the existing dialogue with the pharmaceutical industry has been inadequate. We are less pleased that it took Ministers so long to recognise the crucial role that industry must play in developing biomedical countermeasures. We look forward to learning of his progress in the Government's response to this report. (Paragraph 94)

22.  The UK is a relatively small consumer for the global pharmaceutical industry and it is in a weak position to provide powerful incentives to develop particular products. A UK BioShield is not justified but there is much the Government could achieve, in collaboration with the pharmaceutical industry, to improve the market for medical CBRN countermeasures. (Paragraph 99)

23.  The international surveillance of biological agents should embrace animal and plant diseases as well as human ones. We recommend that the Government take action to improve the coordination between the relevant international bodies. (Paragraph 104)

24.  The New Dimension programme seems a sensible and comprehensive attempt to address the CBRN terrorist threat, for which we commend the Fire Service. (Paragraph 108)

25.  We had been assured that the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister would resume publication of the New Dimension newsletters to inform the fire community of the programme's progress. To our knowledge this has not occurred and we recommend that this takes place without delay. (Paragraph 110)

26.  Government had shown a willingness to communicate the progress of the New Dimension programme, which we welcome. It is our view, however, that the fire dispute did not provide adequate grounds to change this policy. We regret that Ministers apparently felt unable to give the real reason for not cooperating with this part of our inquiry. It is a sorry indictment of the Government's policy on releasing information on security issues that Government witnesses were unaware of, or unwilling to stick to, the reasons advanced by Ministers for refusing permission for them to appear in public. (Paragraph 111)

27.  We welcome the move to install radiation detectors at ports and its public announcement. This will contribute to the public's confidence in the measures taken by the Government and could act as a deterrent to potential terrorist groups. The communication of this initiative is at odds with the Government's usual policy on CBRN countermeasures. We urge the Government to take a more consistent and open approach. (Paragraph 114)

28.  The Government's refusal to allow us to examine the technologies employed by the London Underground is wrong. We fear that the Government's refusal to discuss the problems simply creates the impression that it does not know how to solve them (Paragraph 119)

29.  The HSE has made the case for a strong role in informing CBRN countermeasures but we do not have the impression that it has been sufficiently proactive in providing that advice nor adequately consulted by other parts of Government. It is right that the HSE has a degree of autonomy but it seems the Department for Work and Pensions provides little input to its activities. We believe that the HSE needs stronger ministerial direction which its sponsoring Department is either unable or unwilling to provide. (Paragraph 121)

30.  TRANSEC is charged with providing security guidance to transport operators yet we are told that an important part of security will now be dealt with by another department. Transport operators need clear lines of communication with Government. We recommend that either the transport security is brought under the remit of the Home Office or that the DfT is left to deal with all transport security issues. (Paragraph 122)

31.  We commend BAA on its initiative in working to develop technological solutions to the issue of CBRN security. We recommend that the Government assist BAA in its efforts and investigate how the US PROACT system could be tested in the UK. (Paragraph 128)

32.  The food industry has established practices to deal with tampering but concerted effort by an international terrorist organisation is a problem on a different scale. It would be regrettable if it allowed a misplaced confidence in its procedures to lead to vulnerabilities. (Paragraph 131)

33.  We recommend that the Government provide detailed guidance to companies on CBRN countermeasures and their development, and satisfy itself that it has the powers, if necessary, to demand the introduction of the necessary security measures. This should be complemented with a system of fiscal incentives or grants to offset the cost. (Paragraph 144)

34.  We recommend that the Government consider a standard vetting scheme for workers at high risk facilities. This should not be compulsory and the Government should work with the industry to develop an efficient scheme with minimum bureaucracy. (Paragraph 145)

Emergency and operational response

35.  We recommend that it should become a medium term aim to provide the ambulance service with a basic level of detector technology for CBRN incidents in high risk areas, along with the necessary training and access to scientific expertise. (Paragraph 153)

36.  We recommend that the Government provide the means for all ambulance services to get access to CBRN training, regardless of their size. (Paragraph 154)

37.  Unless GPs are able to give authoritative information the health service risks being overwhelmed by concerned members of the public. The Government should work with the media to feed information to the public about counter-terrorist activity. (Paragraph 155)

38.  We recommend that the Health Protection Agency take steps to disseminate information on potential biological agents through other channels or employ means to improve awareness of its website. (Paragraph 156)

39.  We endorse the findings of the House of Lords Committee report on Fighting Infection that action is needed to tackle the shortages is several clinical specialties and urge the Government to address them promptly. (Paragraph 159)

40.  There are no easy answers to the problem of improving awareness of potential biological agents, particularly in general practice. Training will help but there is a danger that, unless it is regularly reinforced, it will be hard to condition GPs and other front-line health professionals to recognise and deal with the unexpected. We recommend that the Government make sufficient resources available to achieve this. (Paragraph 163)

41.  The Fire Service says it does not have the skills to work with biohazard detection equipment yet the other emergency services are relying on its expertise. If this arrangement is to remain in place then the Government must move rapidly to provide the Fire Service with effective detection and identification technology and the skills to use it. (Paragraph 169)

42.  The military, and in particular Dstl Porton Down, provide a potentially valuable resource in the response to a real or suspected CBRN incident. Nevertheless, it should be recognised that Dstl's priority is the support of the military. We therefore recommend that the deployment of scientists to a suspected CBRN incident through immediate response teams should come under the control of and be financed by our proposed Centre for Home Defence. (Paragraph 174)

43.  We recommend that one of the first steps for our proposed Centre for Home Defence is to conduct or commission new research into decontamination processes and procedures. (Paragraph 176)

44.  We recommend that the Government consider providing a national template for the procurement of CBRN countermeasures for the emergency services as a whole. Its most appropriate deployment could then be established at a local level. (Paragraph 178)

45.  We are pleased to learn that the Government plans to be more open about counter-terrorist exercises in the future. While some of their findings will be sensitive, we hope the Government is able release some information to the public. (Paragraph 180)

46.   As this inquiry had demonstrated, most departments will need to learn lessons from the findings of anti-terrorist exercises. We therefore urge that detailed findings are disseminated throughout Government. (Paragraph 181)

47.  The response to a radiological or biological will require different responses. We therefore recommend that the "more complex, larger scale exercises" conducted in the future test such scenarios. (Paragraph 182)

Overseas cooperation

48.  The scientific response to terrorism is a global pursuit. We are pleased to see an impressive level of collaboration between the UK and its allies, in particular with the US. We are concerned that our desire to increase security over research may hamper this cooperation by limiting the exchange of scientists and information. The level of cooperation within the EU less evident. Whether this reflects reluctance on the UK's part or on other Member States' is not clear. We urge the Government to address this issue. (Paragraph 186)

Security of research

49.  We are pleased to hear the police are taking a sensible and measured approach in enforcing the provisions of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act. The confusion over the emergence of a second list of agents not covered under the Act is unfortunate, however. The Government seems to be under the impression that it can have one list of agents laid down in the Act, yet enforce another list which is beyond the scrutiny of Parliament. We recommend that the Government decide which organisms it wishes to control and amend the Act accordingly. (Paragraph 199)

50.  The poor participation of some universities in the Voluntary Vetting Scheme means that it needs to be replaced. We do not want to see a compulsory scheme but unless universities cooperate in the new scheme, it may have to be. It is important that the UK does not become a scientific training ground for terrorists. (Paragraph 205)

51.  We urge scientific learned societies to consider introducing an overt ethical code of conduct as a prerequisite of membership and back this up with programmes to heighten awareness of the issues involved. (Paragraph 210)

52.  If the scientific community does not take stronger action to regulate itself then it risks having ill-judged restrictions placed on it by politicians. (Paragraph 211)

53.  An ethical code of conduct for scientists has value in promoting awareness and providing basis for better education of researchers. Learned and professional societies and Research Councils should develop an understanding of what such a code involves and enforce it by denying grants or refusing membership. By insisting that a code of ethical conduct is unworkable they are ducking their responsibility. (Paragraph 212)

54.  We recommend that our proposed Centre for Home Defence take on the role of identifying restricted Dstl research data that could be of value to the civil and academic research effort and provide a mechanism for disseminating these data to relevant UK researchers. (Paragraph 216)

55.  We recommend that the Government implement the Export Control Act in a sensible and sensitive manner and negotiate with our allies to ensure the efficient flow of knowledge in both directions. Scientific communication must not become a casualty of the "war on terrorism". (Paragraph 219)

56.  we are concerned that a representative of a major research university should not have been made aware of legislation governing the conduct of academics. We recommend that the Government survey awareness of the Act among universities and initiate an awareness campaign as necessary. (Paragraph 220)

Security and the media

57.  The Home Secretary has been unnecessarily sensitive about this inquiry. It is perplexing and disappointing that he took steps, belatedly, to prevent us hearing from certain witnesses from his department and that he apparently sought to instil this uncooperative attitude in other Departments. The Home Secretary's actions have sought to undermine the role of select committees. We recommend the Liaison Committee establish clear ground rules on the nature and extent of cooperation which is expected from Government in select committee inquiries. (Paragraph 228)

58.  Attempts at introducing blanket restrictions on research will be counterproductive. It is far more likely that a terrorist will undertake his research elsewhere yet if we hamper our research effort then we undermine our own ability to devise countermeasures, and indeed scientific research more generally. We recommend that the Government heed the experience of the USA in developing its security policies. (Paragraph 231)

59.  We take the security of the UK and its allies very seriously and we have no wish to undermine Britain's response to the CBRN threat. We were pleased to hear Beverley Hughes say that "nobody, least of all ministers or officials, want to be secretive for the sake of it". This is not consistent with the Government's behaviour during this inquiry. The restricted disclosures the Government has made to us, in writing and orally, could be of very little use to anyone except the very people who are trying to develop countermeasures. Indeed, officials have sought to block publication of material that was already in the public domain. We suspect that the Government's reasons have less to do with security and more to do with control of information, avoiding embarrassment and a misguided belief that openness will panic the population. The culture of secrecy is embedded in the Home Office. (Paragraph 235)

60.  We believe that the Government is far too preoccupied with the danger of alarming the public. By being so selective about the information it provides to the public, the Government breeds cynicism and results in a public with even less confidence that adequate measures are in place, or being put in place, to protect it. (Paragraph 242)