243. We have found that the Government is making a concerted effort to respond to the increased threat of a major CBRN terrorist attack following the tragic events in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. We conclude that the Government has made good use of the expertise at its disposal in the purchase of currently available technologies but that the development of new technologies has suffered from the reluctance of the Government to engage sufficiently with the pharmaceutical industry. Also lacking is an overall civilian counter-terrorism research strategy and a civil Government research facility. We have therefore proposed a new Centre for Home Defence to fill these gaps.

244. While it has not been the focus of our inquiry, we do have comments on the UK's state of preparedness for a CBRN terrorist attack. We have found that there is still work to be done in some areas, but the Government should not be rushed into expensive and inappropriate actions. It is more important that the effort is put in and the right, considered decisions are made on the basis of the best available threat assessment.

245. Much of the evidence presented to us by the Government has been classified and we have been forced to hold several oral sessions in private. We suspect that that the classification of much of this information is not justified on security grounds: at best it is an unnecessary effort to avoid alarming the public and at worst an attempt to prevent proper scrutiny of Government. In contrast, during our visit to the US, we found that officials and scientists were keen to explain the countermeasures they were developing and had a proactive policy of communicating this to the American public. We cannot believe that the US is any less safe as a result of this policy.