House of Commons - Science and Technology

Select Committee on Science and Technology Eighth Report

8 SECURITY, OPENNESS AND THE MEDIA

225. An important part of a democracy is the right for citizens to know what is being done in their name by their Government. Scrutiny by Parliament forms an important part of this process. Limits need to be placed on this openness, and national security is one of them. This section looks at the balance that should be made and the restrictions being made by the current Government. Our visit to the US, provided a useful comparison, where we discovered a more open approach.

Our inquiry

226. We have experienced difficulty in receiving Government cooperation and several sessions have been held in private.
Table 5: Problems with the Government during the course of this inquiry.

February 2003 The Home Office agrees to coordinate the Government response to the inquiry. It will supply two versions of the evidence: one for public use and the other containing information up to the level of "Secret". The terms of reference and our suggested list of Government witnesses are not questioned and the issue was not raised in discussions between officials

10 April 2003 Our Chairman receives a letter from the Home Secretary complaining about the line of questioning at the evidence session with officials from the Office of Science and Technology, the Department of Health and the Home Office on 2 April 2003 and expressing concerns about the remit of our inquiry.

20 May 2003 The Home Secretary withdraws official Home Office witnesses from an evidence session the following day which planned to look at the development of technologies in the transport sector on the grounds of security and that the subject goes beyond our remit. The Department for Transport follows suit and withdraws its witnesses, as does BAA.

9 June 2003 Our Chairman meets with Home Office Minister, Lord Falconer, to discuss the future cooperation of the Government with our Inquiry. It is confirmed that we will restrict the inquiry to technological developments and long-term research strategy.

12 June 2003 Nick Raynsford, Minister of State in the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, signals the withdrawal of witnesses for a planned evidence session on 16 June 2003 looking at technological development and procurement in the Fire Service, stating that the issues it planned to cover were too sensitive to be held in public. Dr Gibson responded by offering to hold the session in private, to which Mr Raynsford agrees.

227. Ministers seem to think they have a role in determining the remit of select committee inquiries. They do not. Our remit is to scrutinise the work of the OST. The Head of the OST is Sir David King. His business is our business. His involvement in the CBRN Science Working Group and the Scientific Advisory Committee on Emergency Response justifies our involvement. Even if this were not the case, just as Government should be joined up, so should departmental select committees. Government action does not always fall neatly within departmental boundaries. In these cases, departments will no doubt discuss between them how to take the issue forward. In the case of our inquiry, our Chairman, Dr Gibson, made contact with the Defence and Home Affairs Committees and others that had taken an interest to seek to avoid duplication. No objections to the scope of our inquiry were made.

228. This raises the further issue of Parliamentary scrutiny of security arrangements. Mr Blunkett believes that the Intelligence and Security Committee is the appropriate body to scrutinise Government policy in this area. It should not be necessary to point out to the Home Secretary the difference between a Parliamentary committee and a committee made up of Parliamentarians appointed by Government. As the Foreign Affairs Committee has pointed out, when the ISC was set up in 1994 the House was assured that it would not "truncate in any way the existing responsibilities of existing committees".[260] They concluded that the Intelligence and Security Committee be reconstituted as a House of Commons Select Committee, a view with which the Foreign Secretary has "a great deal of sympathy".[261] The Home Secretary has been unnecessarily sensitive about this inquiry. It is perplexing and disappointing that he took steps, belatedly, to prevent us hearing from certain witnesses from his department and that he apparently sought to instil this uncooperative attitude in other Departments. The Home Secretary's actions have sought to undermine the role of select committees. We recommend the Liaison Committee establish clear ground rules on the nature and extent of cooperation which is expected from Government in select committee inquiries.

Openness and research

229. We heard in the US that the prevailing philosophy there was that the better the flow of scientific information, the better equipped we are to harness science to combat terrorism. Research Councils UK shares this view: "The best way to defeat those who might misuse scientific information is to keep one step ahead. Suppression of information exchange makes this more difficult".[262] Professor Malcolm Dando from Bradford University argues that "transparency will reduce the risk that the research is … misappreciated nationally or by other countries".[263] Professor John Marburger, Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, has stated that US national laboratories require close interaction with international scientists and that excessive security will hamper the laboratories' ability to achieve their aims.[264] We agree with these views. We were struck during our visit to the US by our hosts' admirable desire to harness the whole scientific community in the defence against terrorism.

230. There are concerns that excessive security will hamper the scientific research effort more generally. There are suggestions that the US is suffering as a result of the restrictions placed on the travel of researchers to the US. An editorial in the journal Nature suggests that even researchers from its allies, including the UK, are finding it difficult to work in the US and that the top European research institutions are enjoying a "mini-boom" as a result. Truly international gatherings of scientists, the article indicates, can no longer take place in the US. There has been alarm in the US scientific community about the treatment of Thomas Butler from Texas Tech University, who could face years in jail for failing to explain adequately the destruction of cultures of Yersinia pestis, the plague bacterium.[265]

231. Attempts at introducing blanket restrictions on research will be counterproductive. It is far more likely that a terrorist will undertake his research elsewhere yet if we hamper our research effort then we undermine our own ability to devise countermeasures, and indeed scientific research more generally. We recommend that the Government heed the experience of the USA in developing its security policies.

Openness and security

232. We have heard that classification of information could be hampering CBRN countermeasures. Gary Coleman, National Focus for Chemical Incidents, told us that "All the evidence from the States and from most countries of the Western World is that the most effective response to this kind of incident or a chemical incident is done at the lowest level possible".[266] The implication is that if information is retained at too high a level then the local response is less well-informed and therefore less effective.

233. The culture of secrecy can have an effect in engaging the private sector in developing countermeasures. We have heard that pharmaceutical companies have struggled to initiate a dialogue with the DoH. Nick Higgins from Acambis said the open approach of the US Government has had a positive effect of getting companies interested.[267] This was confirmed by Gail Cassel of Eli Lilly during our visit to the US.

234. The difference between the situation in the US and the UK is most clearly demonstrated by the provision of smallpox vaccine. In the US, the CDC website indicates which States have received what doses of the vaccine.[268] In the UK, Dr Paul Drayson told us that the contract under which PowderJect has supplied the smallpox vaccine to the UK Government had been done under a confidentiality agreement. This prevented him from revealing the number of doses supplied "for reasons of national security".[269] The UK Government has a publicly declared smallpox vaccination policy. If it has sufficient doses to fulfil this policy, then it has no reason to be secretive. All the Government has been prepared to say is that "We have sufficient stocks of smallpox vaccine, which would be rapidly deployed to contain any outbreak. We are planning for every eventuality and this includes the ability to vaccinate the entire population if necessary".[270]

235. We take the security of the UK and its allies very seriously and we have no wish to undermine Britain's response to the CBRN threat. We were pleased to hear Beverley Hughes say that "nobody, least of all ministers or officials, want to be secretive for the sake of it".[271] This is not consistent with the Government's behaviour during this inquiry. The restricted disclosures the Government has made to us, in writing and orally, could be of very little use to anyone except the very people who are trying to develop countermeasures. Indeed, officials have sought to block publication of material that was already in the public domain. We suspect that the Government's reasons have less to do with security and more to do with control of information, avoiding embarrassment and a misguided belief that openness will panic the population. The culture of secrecy is embedded in the Home Office.

236. We have found that Government scientists are engaged in a wide range of cutting edge counter-CBRN research programmes, many in collaboration with the US. Instead of keeping such work as secret as possible we believe the Government should be prepared to be more open about it, in order to reassure the public that security is being improved, to galvanise the research community and to act as a deterrent against potential future attacks. The Home Secretary is forever proudly announcing new anti-crime initiatives yet he seems unconcerned that this might provide valuable information for criminals. It is a pity that he has not shown an equal willingness to publicise anti-terrorism measures.

237. We discuss in paragraph 125 an inconsistency in the Government's communication of CBRN countermeasures. Another example can be found in a memorandum by Nick Raynsford, Minister of State for Local Government and the Regions, to the Defence Committee in relation to its inquiry on the Draft Civil Contingencies Bill. In it he describes the testing of biological detectors:

272

This is precisely the level of detail that we have been unable to discuss for reasons of national security. While we welcome this level of openness, we are surprised that the Government felt able to divulge this to the public but not other similar information. Indeed, information supplied to us by the Home Office on chemical detectors was clearly marked restricted. The Government undermines its case for classifying so much information with inconsistencies in the level of detail it is prepared to put in the public domain. We are left with the impression that it does not have a clear idea of how to balance security with openness.

Openness and the public

238. The public communication of the CBRN threat and the Government's reponse is a concern to some. According to the Biosciences Federation, "Fear of the unknown is a major destabilising force in modern society. In Washington DC during the anthrax "scare" fifteen months ago, more people were killed by gunshot wounds and by motor vehicles than by any biological weapon. The public hysteria was nonetheless directed against anthrax rather than more familiar causes of death".[273] Mr Clive Norris, Director of Fire Health and Safety at the ODPM told us "It is a very fine balance. The public need to be reassured that they are well protected should there be a CBRN incident in this country but similarly we do not want members of the public alarmed when equipment is not yet deployed but is in the procurement phase".[274] Mr Norris explained to us that the Fire Service's first decontamination vehicles were being deployed and that this had caused public alarm in Worcester: "The press appeared and there was public alarm because what they saw was a large, very strange looking vehicle and fire fighters wearing gastight suits. They did not know what was going on so we briefed the chief officers face to face to give the reassuring message that we need this equipment".[275] David Veness from Scotland Yard reports a similar problem during the "white powder" episodes that followed the 11 September 2001 attacks. The police had asked the leaders of the media to act responsibly "But the media people said, "If you are going to give us these wonderful pictures of men in moon suits, they are what we are going to print".[276]

239. The Government says it is currently considering a campaign to inform the public of the current situation and to advise them on precautions they can take. All options are being considered, we understand, but no decisions have yet been made. The Government says it will use any method necessary to communicate information and advice to the public - including use of the internet and other technology based media where appropriate.[277]

240. Dr Vivian Nathanson told us that one of the biggest issues in the event of a major incident will be that "the Health Service may have to deal with an awful lot of people who are not in fact directly affected and the services may get swamped by people who are frightened, who might feel that they have been exposed to whatever the agent is, and they will have to deal with that and provide a lot of reassurance" -the "worried well".[278] Acambis argues that "uncertainty breeds mistrust and … speculation in the media, and consequently the public, leading to widespread fear ... None of this helps the Government in what it is trying to do. There needs to be an open and accountable system of public communications policy on the threat and response to biological, chemical and radiological terrorism".[279]

241. Confidence is further eroded if the information provided by the Government is not accurate. For example, the Home Secretary's statement on the availability of the smallpox vaccine on 2 April 2003 alarmed health professionals and his colleagues in the DoH.[280] This clumsy attempt to pretend he knew more than he really did has damaged the Government's communication strategy on the CBRN threat.

242. We believe that the Government is far too preoccupied with the danger of alarming the public. By being so selective about the information it provides to the public, the Government breeds cynicism and results in a public with even less confidence that adequate measures are in place, or being put in place, to protect it.

260 HC Deb, 22 February 1994, Col 164 Back

261 Ninth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, The Decision to go to War in Iraq, HC 813-i, July 2003, para 165; HC 813-vii, Q 836 Back

262 Ev 223 Back

263 Ev 215 Back

264 Remarks to National Academies of Science Roundtable on Scientific Communication and National Security, 19 June 2003 Back

265 "Science and the war on terror", Nature, (Vol 425, No6954), 11 September 2003, p 107 Back

266 Q 44 Back

267 Q 192 Back

268 www.cdc.gov Back

269 Q 185 Back

270 HC Deb, 10 July 2003, Col 1016W Back

271 Q 763 Back