House of Commons - Science and Technology

Select Committee on Science and Technology Eighth Report

7 SECURITY OF RESEARCH

Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act

187. Parts VI and VII of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001 strengthen legislation controlling weapons of mass destruction, and tighten controls on access to pathogens and toxins used in research laboratories in the United Kingdom. Part VI of the Act makes it an offence to aid or abet the overseas use or development of chemical, nuclear, biological or radiological weapons. Security measures in laboratories maintaining or researching pathogens have focused in the past on the containment of the pathogen and the safety of workers. (The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 had controls intended to ensure the safety of people working with such substances, now embodied in the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 1999.[215]) Part VII of the Act supplements existing measures by restricting access to pathogens. The dangerous pathogens are listed in Schedule 5 of the 2001 Act. Existing controls were contained in the Biological Weapons Act 1974 and the Chemical Weapons Act 1996. HSE says it has contributed its expert knowledge and advice on the nature and extent of the hazards presented by CBRN substances, and, in several cases, has been able to supply intelligence by identifying the sites holding such materials.

188. Under the ATCSA, premises (such as universities and research establishments) must notify the Government if they hold certain dangerous substances and provide this information to the police if requested. The Act sets up a register of premises holding specified pathogens and toxins. It also confers powers on the police to inspect such premises and give directions as to their security.

189. The Act also requires managers of laboratories and other premises to furnish, on request, the police with details of people with access to any of the specified dangerous substances held there. The Home Secretary is given power to direct that a named individual must not be allowed access to such disease strains or the premises in which they are held. The Act provides for its extension to animal or plant pathogens, pests or toxic chemicals. A Counter Terrorism Security Advisers' network has been established to work to help with the implementation of the Act.

190. The US has brought in similar restrictions on the possession of certain agents. The Patriot Act of 2001 makes it an offence for a person to knowingly possess any biological agent, toxin or delivery system of a type or in a quantity that, under the circumstances, is not reasonably justified by prophylactic, protective, bona fide research or other peaceful purpose.

Industry

191. Dr Philip Wright of the APBI told us that there was strict security at commercial sites, largely because of the threat from industrial espionage and animal rights protestors.[216] He said that few companies were working with agents covered within ACTSA (only a few companies have category 3 facilities and none have category 4); however, he was concerned that extra legislation could hamper research.[217] The ABPI argues that the existing health and safety regulations, enforced by the HSE, can be an effective means of overseeing the safety and security of pharmaceutical facilities and that new regulations would risk undermining competitiveness and research efforts to develop new medicines.[218] The ABPI questions the expertise of Home Office or Special Branch officials responsible for carrying out inspections and argues that the existing system of HSE inspections could be used more effectively to gather intelligence on research in the UK. It offered to provide help to the Home Office.

Universities

192. David Harrison of Birmingham University said that the police have been making initial contacts with universities concerning the enforcement of on ATCSA but that the impact of the Act was limited at the moment. "They have been very wise in that they have accepted their lack of understanding of the technical issues such as biological agents and toxins. … in terms of the security, it has been tentative and, in the absence of a standard, which is what we are waiting for, I think they are holding back".[219] Mr Harrison said "One of the things that universities are doing is helping the counter terrorism officers understand the technicalities of the issues they are dealing with because they are not used to dealing with biological agents or radioactive materials … they are being very sensitive to that. They are not imposing inappropriate security".[220] According to Universities UK, "universities are now fully compliant with the terms of the Act" but early indications have "highlighted the need for greater awareness amongst the Police of laboratory procedures".[221]

Research Councils

193. Nick Winterton from the Medical Research Council said that there had been very stringent controls already in place in Research Council institutes in relation to the management of toxins, pathogens and genetically modified organisms before the Act was passed. Measures such as controls on the physical access to buildings, rights of access to buildings and the use of biological containment facilities were in force and the HSE had to be notified of rights of inspection. The emphasis had been on protection of staff and the risks of an accidental leak into the environment. He said "What we now need to think about is whether the same measures which protected staff are adequate in the face of potential terrorist risk".[222] Research Councils are currently reviewing grant terms and conditions to reflect the Act 2001.[223]

Schedule 5

194. In drawing up Schedule 5 of ATCSA, the Home Office drew upon the Australia list of biological agents for export control (see Table 4).[224] This list had the advantage of being readily available and the timetable for the legislation was rapid following the 11 September 2001 attacks.Table 4: Australia Group core list of biological agents for export control.

Viruses

Chikungunya virus
Congo-Crimean haemorrhagic fever virus
Dengue fever virus
Eastern equine encephalitis virus
Ebola virus
Hantaan virus
Junin virus
Lassa fever virus
Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus
Machupo virus
Marburg virus
Monkey pox virus
Rift Valley fever virus
Tick-borne encephalitis virus (Russian Spring-Summer encephalitis virus)
Variola virus
Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus
Western equine encephalitis virus
White pox
Yellow fever virus
Japanese encephalitis virus
Rickettsiae

Coxiella burnetii
Bartonella quintana
(Rochalimea quintana, Rickettsia quintana)
Rickettsia prowazeki
Rickettsia rickettsii

Bacteria

Bacillus anthracis
Brucella abortus
Brucella melitensis
Brucella suis
Chlamydia psittaci
Clostridium botulinum
Francisella tularensis
Burkholderia mallei (Pseudomonas mallei)
Burkholderia pseudomallei (Pseudomonas pseudomallei)
Salmonella typhi
Shigella dysenteriae
Vibrio cholerae
Yersinia pestis
Toxins

Botulinum toxins
Clostridium perfringens toxins
Conotoxin
Ricin
Saxitoxin
Shiga toxin
Staphylococcus aureus toxins
Tetrodotoxin
Verotoxin
Microcystin (Cyanginosin)
Aflatoxins
Abrin
Cholera toxin
Diacetoxyscirpenol toxin
T-2 toxin
HT-2 toxin
Modeccin toxin
Volkensin toxin
Viscum Album Lectin 1 (Viscumin)

195. Mr Harrison said there was a certain amount of confusion on the list of substances (Schedule 5) covered under the Act: "We are not quite sure where it came from. Currently, the counter terrorism officers are also producing a second list which is called the Salisbury list, which seems to have some categorisation which is different from the other list. There is some confusion. Clearly the Australia list, Schedule five, is a legal requirement." He said that the implication is that the new list will be adopted at some stage.[225] Beverley Hughes, when asked whether there were any plans to make changes to Schedule 5, told us that the Government had not decided yet.

196. We have attempted to find out more about the mysterious Salisbury List. We gather it is referred to in the Government's written evidence as follows:

226

This, we understand, is all the public is allowed to know, or at least it is all our Committee is allowed to know. We understand that the list has been widely distributed among university health and safety officers, which of course it has to have been if they are expected to act on it.[227] It is unclear how the Government can keep such a widely circulated list secret or why it should wish to.

197. A further concern is the extensive nature of Schedule 5. It features, for example, tetrodotoxin. This substance is found naturally in the Japanese puffer fish. Research Councils UK points out that this toxin has been a key tool in studying the function of nerve cells.[228] It would be counterproductive if the controls placed on research for the public good hamper the progress of basic medical research.

198. Mr Harrison also complained that universities were waiting for a national minimum standard for compliance with the Act from the Home Office.[229] They have been promised that they will at least get sight of the draft. Ms Hughes said she hoped that this would happen by the end of August. As this report is being finalised, this has yet to take place, although we understand Counter Terrorism Security Advisers have been visiting these establishments.[230] Mr Harrison said that there would be additional costs to universities, depending on the standards set. Some institutions at present have equipment that might not be up to standard. He was not aware of any extra funding being available to remedy this.[231]

199. We are pleased to hear the police are taking a sensible and measured approach in enforcing the provisions of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act. The confusion over the emergence of a second list of agents not covered under the Act is unfortunate, however. The Government seems to be under the impression that it can have one list of agents laid down in the Act, yet enforce another list which is beyond the scrutiny of Parliament. We recommend that the Government decide which organisms it wishes to control and amend the Act accordingly.

Vetting of students and researchers

Voluntary Vetting Scheme

200. The Voluntary Vetting Scheme was established in 1994, to assist the Government in preventing the transfer overseas of technology related to weapons of mass destruction. Under the scheme, university institutions are invited, on a voluntary basis, to refer to the Government for advice on any applications from potential students from certain countries seeking to undertake research in particular disciplines, who might in the future engage in the proliferation of dangerous technology. The Government advises on this likelihood, leaving university institutions with the final decision on whether or not to accept those applicants. There are currently 10 countries of concern and 21 academic disciplines of concern. Where a postgraduate research application from a country of concern coincides with an academic discipline of concern, the advice is that the application should be referred to the FCO. In responding, the FCO may give a clear indication that a referred application to enter the UK is unlikely to be successful and universities might wish to take this into account in deciding whether to continue to consider the application.

201. Concerns have been expressed about the effectiveness of this scheme. The Foreign Affairs Committee recommended in its report on the Biological Weapons Green Paper that "in the light of current threats to the security of the United Kingdom, the Government takes steps to strengthen its control over biotechnological research in British universities and research institutions".[232]

202. The Government has decided that a review of the Scheme was necessary because of its perceived shortcomings. It involves a number of Government Departments. The Government says it will be important to ensure that the academic community can contribute its views to this work. The review will assess the merits of a compulsory scheme and how such a scheme might be implemented and whether or not any scheme should be extended to organisations outside the higher education sector. It is concerned that its investigations should result in a measured response to the real threat. Dr Hilary Dodson, Biological Safety Officer for the University of Bradford, is sceptical about the value of controls, pointing out that "The properties of most pathogens are relatively well known, and have already been taught to a vast number of students including those from overseas" and that "The real threat posed by terrorism is adoption of novel means of delivery".[233]

203. Between 1 April 2002 and 27 March 2003, four institutions between them referred over 500 cases, whereas other similar universities referred very few or none at all. The Research Councils state that they are "active parties to the Voluntary Vetting Vcheme".[234] The identity of institutions not taking part in the scheme is not in the public domain but it is believed these include some large universities with a distinguished research pedigree. The Association of Heads of University Administration (AHUA) reports that some universities take the view that "counter-proliferation is a professional job for the Security Service and the Immigration Service and that universities cannot be expected to be in the front line of national security considerations". There are also concerns concerning competition, academic freedom and racial equality.[235] AHUA advocates a code of practice, claiming it would be more successful than a compulsory scheme.

204. The US has responded by imposing stricter visa controls. The Committee heard that this had led to problems with delays and re-entry and that many researchers had got "lost" having entered the country. Professor John Marburger, Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy said on 19 June that the long delays in issuing visas "appears to be having a significant impact on the US science enterprise". He also stated that US national laboratories require close interaction with international scientists and that excessive security will hamper the laboratories' ability to achieve their aims.[236]

205. The poor participation of some universities in the Voluntary Vetting Scheme means that it needs to be replaced. We do not want to see a compulsory scheme but unless universities cooperate in the new scheme, it may have to be. It is important that the UK does not become a scientific training ground for terrorists.

ETHICAL BEHAVIOUR

206. Concerns that a scientific training could be applied to unethical research have led to the proposal of an oath for scientists analogous to the Hippocratic Oath for medics. This has been initiated by the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (an organisation dedicated "to bring scientific insight and reason to bear on threats to human security arising from science and technology"[237]). One version of the oath states:

238

207. The International Committee of the Red Cross supports the principle of a code of conduct as part of its proposed "web of prevention". It calls on scientific and medical associations and industry "To adopt professional and industrial codes of conduct aimed at preventing the abuse of biological agents".[239] The BMA agrees, stating that "This oath could state that scientists should not work in a field that would lead to the development of weapons of mass killing and incapacitation". The BMA is particularly concerned by the application of genetic technologies to develop biological weapons.[240]

Research Councils and universities

208. Research Councils say they would need to be persuaded that a 'Hippocratic' oath for scientists would achieve anything really useful: "Such pledges are only really effective if there is some system for profession membership, and a means of striking off those that infringe the code. It is also doubtful whether such an oath would discourage those scientists determined to undertake subversive research".[241] Universities UK does not view such an oath favourably: "We remain to be convinced that there is value to be added by introducing an ethical code in what is already one of the most highly regulated areas of university research".[242]

Learned and professional societies

209. Members of the Institute of Biology (IOB) are bound by the Institute's byelaws. These state:

"Every member of the Institute shall at all times so order his conduct … to safeguard the public interest in matters of safety and health and otherwise. He shall … discharge his professional responsibilities with integrity".

210. At a meeting of the IOB Professional Affairs Board in February 2003, it was agreed that involvement with biological weapons for the purpose of aggression would contravene this code.[243] The Biosciences Federation concludes that "we believe that the vast majority of scientists in the UK act in a responsible and ethical manner which would not be significantly altered by signing such an oath. A more effective approach would be to ensure a wider understanding amongst scientists of public knowledge and concerns and how to interact with the public over sensitive issues". Professor Graham Pearson argues that the UK Government should "engage in an education and outreach programme to ensure that all sectors of the UK scientific community are aware of the provisions and prohibitions of both the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention". We agree that wider understanding of these issues among researchers is important, but we believe that the taking of an oath would have the effect of stimulating that awareness. Learned and professional societies are in a strong position to heighten awareness of the issues surrounding the misuses of scientific research. We urge scientific learned societies to consider introducing an overt ethical code of conduct as a prerequisite of membership and back this up with programmes to heighten awareness of the issues involved.

211. The Foreign Affairs Committee's recommendation to Government that there should be stronger controls on students and researchers is evidence of the degree of political concern on the issue.[244] If the scientific community does not take stronger action to regulate itself then it risks having ill-judged restrictions placed on it by politicians.

212. An ethical code of conduct for scientists has value in promoting awareness and providing basis for better education of researchers. Learned and professional societies and Research Councils should develop an understanding of what such a code involves and enforce it by denying grants or refusing membership. By insisting that a code of ethical conduct is unworkable they are ducking their responsibility.

Industry

213. PowderJect does not accept the need for a code of conduct in industry, although it reports that the European Biotechnology Trade Association, EuropaBio has developed a code of ethics including commitments prohibiting the development of biological weapons.[245] PowderJect argues that "Clear and unambiguous regulation would be a more preferred route for preventing activities for developing biological weapons".[246]

Scientific publication

Statement by editors and publishers

214. Concerns have been expressed that research papers in the scientific literature might inadvertently be of value to terrorist groups. This led in January 2003 to a statement issued on the publication of research with applications that may be of use to terrorists by a Journal Editors and Authors Group on Scientific Publishing and Security (see Box 4). This group featured mainly American publications, although Nature and The Lancet were represented.

Box 4: Statement by a Journal Editors and Authors Group on Scientific Publishing and Security.

The scientific information published in peer-reviewed research journals carries special status, and confers unique responsibilities on editors and authors. We must protect the integrity of the scientific process by publishing manuscripts of high quality, in sufficient detail to permit reproducibility. Without independent verification - a requirement for scientific progress - we can neither advance biomedical research nor provide the knowledge base for building strong biodefence systems.

We recognise that the prospect of bioterrorism has raised legitimate concerns about the potential abuse of published information, but also recognise that research in the very same fields will be critical to society in meeting the challenges of defence. We are committed to dealing responsibly and effectively with safety and security issues that may be raised by papers submitted for publication, and to increasing our capacity to identify such issues as they arise.

Scientists and their journals should consider the appropriate level and design of processes to accomplish effective review of papers that raise such security issues. Journals in disciplines that have attracted numbers of such papers have already devised procedures that might be employed as models in considering process design. Some of us represent some of those journals; others among us are committed to the timely implementation of such processes, about which we will notify our readers and authors.

We recognise that on occasions an editor may conclude that the potential harm of publication outweighs the potential societal benefits. Under such circumstances, the paper should be modified, or not be published. Scientific information is also communicated by other means: seminars, meetings, electronic posting, etc. Journals and scientific societies can play an important role in encouraging investigators to communicate results of research in ways that maximise public benefits and minimise risks of misuse.

The Research Councils say that the operation of standard peer review procedures for research proposals offers an opportunity to identify work at an early stage that might pose unacceptable security or safety risks.[247] The International Committee of the Red Cross also supports the use of the peer review process to "scrutinise all research with potentially dangerous consequences".[248] For this to work, clear guidelines to reviewers would be required, placing some additional burdens on referees. We heard that EPSRC pays the reviewer's department a small sum for each review. This scheme would need to be extended to provide the necessary incentives to academics but this should be funded from central Government. Beyond the research conducted in their own laboratories, Research Councils should not have to meet any additional costs at the expense of funding for research.

215. The editors and publishers statement is welcome but most of the signatories are from the US. This is a pity. It is impossible to regulate the publication of scientific research but there is value in heightening the awareness of researchers around the world about the potential misuses of their research. Sir David King told us "I think that this is a complex international issue that needs to be addressed at that level but certainly we ought to start with the European Union and then be taking it further on". We recommend that the Science Minister raise the issue of the publication of research data with potential misuses with other EU Member States as a first step in drawing up an EU-wide code of conduct for scientific publication.

MILITARY RESEARCH

216. MOD says it will not publish material in the open literature that could "potentially jeopardise national security or aid proliferation, or could highlight a deficiency in the UK's defence posture".[249] It is absolutely right that national security should not be compromised by the publication of research that could be of value to terrorists. At the same time, if Dstl's research is as world-leading as it claims it would be unfortunate if other research programmes were starved of its results and expertise. The correct balance needs to be drawn. The Government's attitude towards secrecy displayed during this inquiry does not give us confidence that Dstl's judgement is infallible. At the very least, a mechanism needs to be found to communicate useful data to other active researchers in the UK. We recommend that our proposed Centre for Home Defence take on the role of identifying restricted Dstl research data that could be of value to the civil and academic research effort and provide a mechanism for disseminating these data to relevant UK researchers.

Export control

217. The Export Control Act (2002) is the Government's response to the criticisms of the UK's strategic export controls (controls on military and dual use goods) made by Sir Richard Scott in his report on arms to Iraq.[250] The Act provides the Government with powers to impose controls on the transfer of military and dual-use technology by intangible means, and the provision of related technical services. The Bill was the subject of concern in the scientific community since it stated that "The Secretary of State may by order make provision for … the imposition of transfer controls in relation to technology of any description", providing the Government with an opportunity to stifle the flow of scientific knowledge and hamper international research collaboration.[251]

218. As finally passed into law, "The Secretary of State shall not make a control order which has the effect of prohibiting or regulating any of the following activities—the effect of interfering with—

b) the making of information generally available to the public, or

c) the communication of information that is generally available to the public, unless the interference by the order in the freedom to carry on the activity is necessary (and no more than is necessary)".[252]

219. Research Councils UK hopes that implementation of the Act is done in such a way as to "strike the right balance between lowering security risks and permitting the flow of scientific information". There is a danger that similar legislation has failed to achieve this balance in the US. We heard during our visit to the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in California that while it had been straightforward for scientists from Dstl Porton Down to go to America to share ideas and information, the reverse was more problematic, involving lengthy delays for clearance. We recommend that the Government implement the Export Control Act in a sensible and sensitive manner and negotiate with our allies to ensure the efficient flow of knowledge in both directions. Scientific communication must not become a casualty of the "war on terrorism".

220. We have concerns about the awareness of the Export Control Act in the academic community. Mr David Allen, Registrar at Birmingham University, told us that "it has not crossed my radar screen and most changes in legislation do. I wonder whether it is something that Universities UK, my association and other representative bodies clearly should now take very seriously".[253] Mr Allen may not be typical but we are concerned that a representative of a major research university should not have been made aware of legislation governing the conduct of academics. We recommend that the Government survey awareness of the Act among universities and initiate an awareness campaign as necessary.

International conventions

221. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention was agreed in 1972 and entered into force in 1975. It currently has 146 States Parties while a further 17 States have signed the Convention but have yet to ratify it and thereby become States Parties. The Convention, in Article I, totally prohibits biological weapons. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:

Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;

Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. [254]
In the UK, the Convention was implemented by the Biological Weapons Act of 1974, strengthened by ATCSA in 2001.[255]

222. The Chemical Weapons Convention opened for signature in 1993 and entered into force in 1997. It now has 150 States Parties with a further 25 States having signed the Convention but having yet to ratify it and thereby become States Parties. The Convention in Article I totally prohibits chemical weapons. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances:

To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;
To use chemical weapons;
To engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; and
To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.[256]

223. Professor Pearson "strongly" recommends that UK Government websites on chemicals should demonstrate joined-up government by including references and links to all prohibitions and controls on chemicals and pathogens.[257] We agree with him.

224. A degree of openness is required for compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Dr Graham Pearson, a former Director General and Chief Executive of the then Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down (now Dstl), points out to us that under the Convention, the States Parties have agreed to make annual declarations of national biological defence programmes and facilities. Although the UK makes such declarations annually, they are not in the public domain and requests to place copies in the Library of the House of Commons have been refused.[258] The Foreign Office submission to the Foreign Affairs Committee on the Biological Weapons Green Paper states that "that policy does not preclude the UK from placing its own submission in the public domain." and goes on to add that "Consideration might be given to actually placing the return on the FCO and MOD websites".[259]

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224 The Australia Group is an informal arrangement which aims to allow exporting or transshipping countries to minimise the risk of assisting chemical and biological weapon proliferation. www.australiagroup.net Back

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