Select Committee on Science and Technology Eighth Report


4  RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND PROCUREMENT

TRANSPORT

115. TRANSEC regulates security across the aviation, maritime, channel tunnel and railway industries.

Rail

116. The DfT website says that since the events of 11 September 2001, the Surface Modes Branch of TRANSEC has developed a number of new initiatives, while continuing to advise/regulate its industries along established lines. It says that advice on chemical and biological weapons has been issued to the industry, including London Underground. There is work being undertaken to develop detection systems that would enable it to extend the application of screening at airports across all modes of transport.[131]

117. The British Transport Police (BTP) says it has had considerable experience of dealing with terrorism on the railways in Britain. Since 1997 around half the terrorist attacks on mainland Britain have had rail targets. The BTP has officers trained and equipped to deal with terrorist situations, including a chemical or biological threat, and contingency plans are in place and kept under constant review. It does not make public many details of its response capability or contingency plans. BTP says that some hoaxes are specifically designed to test the reaction of the authorities as part of the terrorist's planning process. Where an incident turns into a terrorist inquiry, it will be investigated by the Anti-Terrorist Branch of the Metropolitan Police.[132] The Government says that in London, the Metropolitan, British Transport and City of London Police have approximately 1,100 trained officers and the necessary equipment to provide a full CBRN response capability.[133]

118. On its website, BTP describes railway stations as generally very controlled environments - mainline stations, it says, particularly in London, are among the safest areas of public space in Europe. Less information is available on the London Underground and we have failed to get cooperation from Ministers to address this issue. TRANSEC did provide evidence to the Defence Committee inquiry on Defence and Security in the UK, in which it stated that "Following the Sarin attack in Tokyo, LUL actively considered what action is needed to take to deal with a similar attack. BTP have trained officers to respond to CB [chemical and biological] attacks and exercises have been held to test and develop contingency plans involving the emergency services".[134]

119. We have been unable to pursue the development of countermeasures for the London Underground on the basis that in doing so we would be compromising national security. We have been fortunate that our hosts in the US were more than happy to explain the systems they are developing to counter the CBRN threat in their metro systems (see Box 3). Underground railways do pose particular problems, as Dr Richard Scott of Dstl was keen to point out.[135] That is why in March 1995 the Aum Shinrikyo sect targeted the Tokyo metro. We understand that the BTP is taking part in handling trials for biological detection equipment, which hints at some activity.[136] The Government's refusal to allow us to examine the technologies employed by the London Underground is wrong. We fear that the Government's refusal to discuss the problems simply creates the impression that it does not know how to solve them. We will return to the issue of openness and security in Section 8.

Box 3: US metro systems

A partnership was formed in 1999, between the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) and several Federal agencies (including the US Departments of Energy (Sandia Laboratory), Justice, and Transportation) to advance the efforts to improve the safety and security of the Metrorail system against chemical or biological terrorism. (Scientists from the Sandia Laboratory briefed the Committee on this programme during its visit to Livermore, California.)

The federal partners and several National laboratories offered installation direction and testing of the chemical sensor system. WMATA is utilising a sensor system designed to act as an early warning system to safeguard first responders, employees, and customers on its subway system. WMATA was the first transit property in the United States to implement a strategic test programme of this nature.

In addition to the PROTECT system, the Metro Transit Police Department has provided small devices to its officers that they can wear in the Metrorail system that detect radiation. The devices notify the officer of the presence of radiation so further investigation may be employed. The department has also deployed hand held radiation sensor equipment to its specialised units.

120. In the area of nuclear and improvised radioactive devices ("dirty bombs"), HSE has provided technical advice [to the DfT] on the range of applications and sizes of radioactive sources used in the UK, and helped to prioritise those which presented a significant opportunity for terrorist activity. HSE also gave advice on the trial of detection devices for use in transport monitoring.

121. We find it curious that the HSE should have given advice on radiation devices for transport monitoring but not for other applications nor for other forms of CBRN detection. It must have expertise in these areas that could be usefully employed. The HSE has made the case for a strong role in informing CBRN countermeasures but we do not have the impression that it has been sufficiently proactive in providing that advice nor adequately consulted by other parts of Government. It is right that the HSE has a degree of autonomy but it seems the Department for Work and Pensions provides little input to its activities. We believe that the HSE needs stronger ministerial direction which its sponsoring Department is either unable or unwilling to provide.

122. The issue of CBRN countermeasures in the UK transport system is curiously absent from the Government's written evidence to this inquiry. We invited a representative from TRANSEC to give oral evidence before us. The Secretary of State for Transport refused permission at the last minute, we suspect on the promptings of the Home Secretary. We were told that CBRN issues were a Home Office matter, despite information on the DfT website stating that TRANSEC had issued advice to industry. We agree with the former Minister of State at the Home Office, John Denham, who stated (while in office): "It is tempting to feel that … airport security should be taken away from the DfT and given to someone else, but in practice it is essential that those who are responsible for our airlines, airports, railways and the underground actually build into their day-to-day responsibilities an understanding of what is needed in the running of those major services so that we can respond to emergencies".[137] Transport companies will want to take a holistic approach to their security and this will be made difficult if they have to go to different departments for advice depending on the threat. The transport of hazardous materials could be an attractive target for terrorists. This needs proper attention from the DfT. TRANSEC is charged with providing security guidance to transport operators yet we are told that an important part of security will now be dealt with by another department. Transport operators need clear lines of communication with Government. We recommend that either the transport security is brought under the remit of the Home Office or that the DfT is left to deal with all transport security issues.

Aviation

123. Aviation security within the UK is regulated by TRANSEC. It sets out the security processes, training and technology to be deployed at UK airports, as part of its responsibility as the Appropriate Authority for the UK defined by Annexe 17 of the Chicago Convention.

124. BAA plc is the largest airport owner in the UK. Its security performance is overseen by a board sub-committee, the Safety, Security and Environment Committee. It says it has developed a proactive safety and security management system, covering policy, performance standards and monitoring. One third of its employees work in security, mainly screening passengers and hand baggage after they have checked-in, before the airside departure lounge. It has completed the installation of systems to screen hold baggage for all international departing passengers at its UK airports, costing over £175 million. BAA says these systems use the world's most advanced and effective screening technology, whose development was led by BAA, with TRANSEC.[138]

125. BAA in its evidence cites the example of its hold baggage screening system as an example where a previously non-existent technology was developed by BAA working together with a manufacturer and Government. The BAA Chief Executive chaired a seminar in February 2003 to address the new threats from chemical, biological and radiological weapons, with TRANSEC, Smiths Industries and QinetiQ. BAA says that several areas were identified for further research and will be taken forward using the same successful methodology that was used for hold baggage screening.

126. BAA says that the national response to the threat from chemical, biological and radiological weapons is still at a relatively early stage with the focus on response. It says that work on preventative measures, which consist of technology and the appropriate processes for deployment, is now going ahead.

127. During our visit to the US we heard from scientists at the Sandia National Laboratory. Its PROACT system (Protective and Responsive Options for Airport Counter-terrorism), having been installed successfully in the Washington Metro (as "PROTECT", see Box 3), is now being tested at San Francisco International Airport. The programme seeks to demonstrate detection system components as a basis for future integrated chemical and biological facility-monitoring systems.

128. We commend BAA on its initiative in working to develop technological solutions to the issue of CBRN security. We recommend that the Government assist BAA in its efforts and investigate how the US PROACT system could be tested in the UK.

FOOD

129. The Food Standards Agency (FSA) is the lead department for consequence management of food contamination incidents in England and Wales. The expertise, experience and contacts used in the management of these relatively frequent incidents are directly relevant to a CBRN attack. The Agency has no formal role in prevention and resilience, but works with UK agriculture departments to provide advice to the food industries.[139] The FSA has a radiological safety research programme which supports continuous surveillance of levels of radioactivity in food, and investigates any food safety aspects of radioactive waste. The FSA issues advice on outbreaks of food poisoning. Most recently it has issued advice on a Salmonella outbreak last year in the South East and North West of England.[140]

130. Tesco describes the malicious contamination of food for terrorist purposes as a real and current threat. It operates on the principle that food retailers have always been a possible target for individuals or groups seeking personal gain. Tesco says its suppliers must meet stringent safety and quality criteria. Routine testing by the supplier takes place on products prior to delivery. Product samples are chosen at random by their Quality Control staff for chemical and microbiological analyses as appropriate. Tesco says it has developed strong links with the FSA, DEFRA, the Pesticide Safety Directive and the European Commission. John Longworth, Group Trading Law and Technical Director at Tesco, said that he had expert scientists who have direct access to Dstl Porton Down. These range from toxicologists through to microbiologists and epidemiologists. He said Tesco had close contact with the FSA, DEFRA and other Government agencies on a daily basis.[141]

131. The British Retail Consortium provided us with a full list of security measures its members currently employ. What seems to be lacking is a sense that there is a new threat from terrorists that provides new challenges to the food industry. We were interested to read the remarks by Eliza Manningham-Buller made on 16 October 2003 that supermarkets present very attractive targets for terrorists.[142] The food industry has established practices to deal with tampering but concerted effort by an international terrorist organisation is a problem on a different scale. It would be regrettable if it allowed a misplaced confidence in its procedures to lead to vulnerabilities.

132. The British Retail Consortium says that food retailers look to Government, especially the FSA, for advice on specific contamination issues. Mr Longworth complained to us that "we are still awaiting advice from Government on this issue as an industry" and that "the melding together of the Government plan and the industry plan has not yet taken place and has not yet been promulgated within the industry itself".[143] Marcel Bóo, Director of CBRN Resilience at the Home Office, told us that there has been a document on decontamination in the public domain since February, a revision of which would be produced following a consultation that began in July 2003, extended to cover the decontamination of buildings.[144] These documents may be in the public domain but either the industry is unaware of them or do not think they are relevant to them. Mr Bóo said "Clearly they need to be proactive in securing that [information] … each police force round the country has a dedicated resource within the police force which can advise all local businesses about preventive security as well as access to the guidance that we provide". Given the importance of this issue, it is curious that the Home Office thinks that it is acceptable to produce guidelines then sit and wait until someone comes and asks for them. As this report was being finalised, the revision promised by Mr Bóo was not evident on the Home Office's website. The Home Office must improve its communication if the food industry is to put in place the necessary technology and procedures. The DEFRA-led Food Chain Emergency Liaison Group, which comprises representatives from across the food chain and Government, would appear to be the ideal vehicle to communicate information of this kind.[145]

WATER

133. DEFRA's Drinking Water Inspectorate has established with the water industry the facility of a call-off contract, whereby the presence and concentration of a number of materials potentially usable by terrorists to contaminate drinking water supplies can be established. During the emergency phase of a CBRN terrorist incident, the Drinking Water Inspectorate would probably be required to provide technical and scientific advice to the Chief Constable's Co-ordinating Group. The Drinking Water Inspectorate says that research has also been initiated into improving existing methods of analysis for target materials; extending those methods to include additional materials; developing screening methods; improving the speed of analysis; and investigating appropriate on-line monitoring equipment. There are regular reviews of the potential threat to drinking water supplies.[146]

134. We took evidence from Julian Dennis, representing Thames Water and Water UK. He told us that the call-off contract set up by the Drinking Water Inspectorate and Water UK had selected materials and chemicals that might be used by terrorists and planned to investigate detection systems for those substances.[147] It is not clear that the risk assessments made by the group were necessarily the same as those made by others.

POSTAL SERVICES

135. Before 11 September 2001, anti-terrorism measures in the UK postal services were limited to letter bombs.[148] Subsequently, and in particular in response to the anthrax letters that followed in the USA, the Government says it has introduced a range of measures.

136. The HSE commissioned the Health and Safety Laboratory (HSL) to carry out research to determine the risk of Post Office workers being exposed to anthrax if it was introduced into the mail system. The research findings allowed HSE to give the Post Office advice on control options that could be considered to reduce the risk of workers being exposed to this agent. This advice was shared with Government for action where appropriate. HSE also issued public advice (on its website) on the options to be considered to reduce the risk of workers being exposed to chemical and biological agents transmitted by mail.

137. The HSL's research has made a valuable contribution. We have two concerns relating to it. The HSE has not considered any biological agents other than anthrax yet the US incidents demonstrated how effective anthrax could be.[149] It is hard to believe that none of the other A List agents could be distributed through the postal system.

138. A further concern is the process by which this study was commissioned. It seems that it was done on the initiative of the HSE. This shows commendable initiative on their part but it should not have been necessary. There should be a central mechanism by which such research needs are identified and then commissioned. This reinforces our view that there should be a Centre for Home Defence.

ENVIRONMENT

139. DEFRA is the lead Government Department in responding to the effects of an overseas nuclear accident. The Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network (RIMNET) system has been developed to monitor airborne radioactivity coming into the UK and expertise has been developed following the accident at Chernobyl.[150] In 1996 the NRPB published a review of decontamination and clean up techniques for use in the UK following releases of radioactivity into the environment.[151] The Environment Agency has responsibility for environmental decontamination and is undertaking "extensive work" in prevention, detection, monitoring, recovery and decontamination and animals and livestock.[152]

PRIVATE SECTOR COUNTERMEASURES

140. Many of the facilities that might prove to be attractive terrorist targets are in private hands. In a written statement in July, the Home Office Minister, Beverley Hughes, said that the Government's advice to private organisations was to "leave the demanding and potentially dangerous job of detecting CBR [chemical, biological or radiological] materials to personnel in the emergency services and responsible agencies".[153] For many businesses this is a practical solution to a problem that few companies will have to face, but for many of the sectors we have discussed above, it is not viable to delegate parts of their security measures to the emergency services. Airport security is a classic example where the role is not undertaken by the emergency services. Some other industries - such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals companies - have their own emergency services and have considerable experience in handling contamination or escape incidents. They should be encouraged to share their knowledge with the public emergency services, where they do not already do this

141. It is not clear to us what obligation the Government places on companies in these situations to install or implement CBRN countermeasures or who takes the lead in developing the necessary technologies. The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 applies where a criminal event is foreseeable. The Home Office tells us that the level of threat, as determined by the security services, is therefore the deciding factor. We do not find this situation reassuring. There may be no specific threat to, say, Heathrow Airport but we feel that the Government should be able to insist on measures being taken by a company. Instead the Government simply "expect something to be done". [154]

142. The Government believes that industry should meet all its running costs, including those relating to security but it is not clear how the appropriate level of expenditure is determined. In the case of transport, the costs of security measures required by the Government are met by industry. In most cases the costs are eventually passed on to the passenger in the ticket price.

143. Private companies may need strong guidance on what measures need to be taken. In the cases we have considered there seems to be a good relationship between the private sector and the relevant Government Department. It is less obvious what happens if the measures recommended impose a cost burden that a company is unprepared to meet. Mr Bóo said that companies were "extremely proactive themselves in wanting to address this because they recognise it is in their own business interest to have thought about and addressed these issues".[155] We understand why the Government is taking the approach that it is but this is a matter of national security. We believe that the Government must have the statutory authority to insist that measures are taken by private companies. Equally we are sympathetic to companies that are obliged to invest large sums in preparing for what must seem to be no more than a remote threat. The US Department of Transportation has been making transport security grants available. We were pleased that Beverley Hughes recognised this as an issue that needed addressing.[156]

144. We recommend that the Government provide detailed guidance to companies on CBRN countermeasures and their development, and satisfy itself that it has the powers, if necessary, to demand the introduction of the necessary security measures. This should be complemented with a system of fiscal incentives or grants to offset the cost.

Staffing issues

145. In Section 8 we discuss the moves made by the Government to update the Voluntary Vetting Scheme for Research Council and university researchers. The ability of journalists to breach security at airports highlights the problems in the private sector, and we suspect that national security is placed at greater risk by allowing potential terrorists unfettered access to key facilities than it is by giving someone a technical background in microbiology; yet it is our impression that the Government gives the latter higher priority. Vetting of personnel in transport facilities, in particular airports, presents a formidable challenge, given the high turnover and low pay of staff but that should not be a disincentive to act.[157] We recommend that the Government consider a standard vetting scheme for workers at high risk facilities. This should not be compulsory and the Government should work with the industry to develop an efficient scheme with minimum bureaucracy.



131   TRANSEC's response to the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September2001,www.dft.gov.uk Back

132   www.btp.police.uk Back

133   Ev 118 Back

134   Sixth Report of the Defence Committee, Session 2001-02, Defence and Security in the UK, Minutes of Evidence, HC 518-II, Wednesday 17 April 2002 Back

135   Qq 272-275 Back

136   Seventh Report of the Defence Committee, Session 2002-03, Draft Civil Contingencies Bill, HC 557, Ev 60 Back

137   HC Deb, 4 March 2003, Col 202WH Back

138   Ev 188 Back

139   Ev 111 Back

140   Salmonella outbreak leads Agency to issue hygiene alert, Food Standards Agency Press Release R491-28, 15 October 2002 Back

141   Q 487 Back

142   Annual James Smart Memorial Lecture, 16 October 2003, City of London Police Headquarters Back

143   Qq 472,478 Back

144   Q 735; Home Office, The Decontamination of People Exposed to Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) Substances or Material: Strategic National Guidance, First Edition, February 2003 Back

145   Ev 158 Back

146   Ev 128 Back

147   Q 450 Back

148   Ev 132 Back

149   Q 551 Back

150   Ev 128 Back

151   Ev 128 Back

152   Ev 129 Back

153   HC Deb, 8 July 2003, Col 49 WS Back

154   Ev 245 Back

155   Q743 Back

156   Q 741  Back

157   Ev 250 Back


 
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