Select Committee on Science and Technology Eighth Report


3  THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Structures

17. The Government's response to CBRN terrorism is led by the Home Office but it involves many departments, agencies and external organisations. A summary of the principal departments and their roles is shown in Table 1. The collated Government written evidence provides a more detailed description of their contribution.[15]
Table 1: Roles of the principal Government Departments.

Cabinet Office The Cabinet Office has a co-ordinating role, ensuring that policy is joined up across the whole of Government.
Home Office The Home Office is the lead Department on CBRN issues. The police have a key role in CBRN countermeasures, including the enforcement of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act.
Department of Health The Public Health and Clinical Quality Directorate and the Operations Directorate play particularly important roles at strategic planning and response levels in dealing with the health consequences of terrorism. The Department's Economics and Operational Research Division provides valuable support e.g. in modelling the effects of deliberate release of hazardous biological agents or material. The Health Protection Agency has a medical surveillance role through the Public Health Laboratory Service and a research function through the former Centre for Applied Microbiological Research (CAMR).
Ministry of Defence The MoD has no direct role in CBRN response, although given its experience with the military response to CBRN devices it is playing an emerging role through Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) and by advising on technology development and procurement.
Department of Trade
and Industry/Office of
Science and Technology
One of the DTI's central objectives is to make the most of the UK's science, engineering and technology skills and resources. The Office of Science and Technology is responsible for funding basic research via the seven Research Councils. It also supports Professor Sir David King, the Chief Scientific Adviser to the UK Government, in his role co-ordinating science and technology across Government. Professor King chairs SAPER.


18. The coordination of the Government's response is achieved through the Cabinet Office. CBRN terrorism is dealt with under the auspices of the Ministerial Group on Protective and Preventive Security and the Ministerial Group on Resilience, both chaired by the Home Secretary. These Ministerial Groups are supported by committees with scientific representatives from other areas of Government, including Dstl Porton Down (Ministry of Defence), the Office of Science and Technology (OST, part of DTI) and the CBRN team (Home Office).[16]

19. The Cabinet Office also houses two other groups relevant to this inquiry: The Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) and the Government Information and Communication Service (GICS). The CCS was "set up to improve the resilience of Central Government and the UK". Its functions include horizon-scanning, ensuring that the Government can function in times of emergency and improving the capability of Government departments to respond.[17] GICS is a network of communication professionals working in Government Departments and agencies across the UK. It leads the Counter-Terrorist Communication Group on behalf of the Home Secretary. Public communication will be dealt with below in Section 8.

The CBRN Science Working Group and SAPER

20. The CBRN Science Working Group, chaired by the Chief Scientific Adviser, was established to look at specific areas of CBRN resilience in December 2001. The group included academic, industry and Government specialists.

21. The CCS, along with the OST, has established an ad hoc committee called Scientific Advisory Panel for Emergency Response (SAPER). Its role is to complement existing mechanisms for providing scientific advice to the Government. The Government's Chief Scientific Adviser, Professor Sir David King, chairs it and membership is drawn from Government, practitioners and academia. While the existence of the Science Working Group and SAPER are in the public domain, their membership and activities are classified.

New funding

22. Gordon Brown announced new money to fight terrorism in his Budget 2003 speech:

23. In the area of health, Minister of State John Hutton told us that "We have made a significant amount of money available. I think that over a four-year period it is something like £260 million of dedicated additional spending. Most of that is to do with counter measures - vaccines, needles, antibiotics, and other supplies".[19] Other health spending is difficult to disaggregate since it is held in primary care trust budgets and other budgets in the NHS. It is not clear whether this is "new" Treasury money. We suspect that it has been found at the expense of other parts of NHS spending.

24. The UK's budgetary response to CBRN terrorism compared to the US is modest to say the least. The US Department of Health and Human Services has increased its annual budget to the National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) to from $2.3 billion $4 billion.[20] According to its Director, Anthony Fauci, NIAID will spend $1.5 billion on research into bioterrorism countermeasures.[21]

25. Any investment must be related to the level of risk, or at least the perceived level of risk. The US response reflects the impact of the attacks of 11 September 2001 on US society and politics. Indeed, despite the high level of US investment, some there argue that it is insufficient. A newspaper article by two senior public health professionals accuses the US health authorities of going "wobbly on biodefense".[22] Government spending must reflect the resources it has available and what impact it could have if spent on, for example, increased healthcare spending or transport infrastructure. It has been difficult to establish new spending precisely in this area in the UK. This is not necessarily a problem since subtle shifts in priorities may not easily be costed. In some areas greater investment in CBRN home defence is required, either for research or to reflect that many parts of Government have been expected to expand their role. This must be reflected in their budgets.[23]

26. Our efforts to establish how much new money has been allocated to the CBRN response have not been wholly successful, and the R&D component even less so. Announcements of new Government money are often greeted with a degree of cynicism owing to a lack of systems to prevent double counting. The Government might argue that new investment only gives a partial picture of the change in its policy and priorities. Nevertheless, we feel that a highly sensitive issue such as this requires the publication of a headline figure which gives an impression to a concerned public of the seriousness with which the Government takes that threat from CBRN terrorism. We recommend that the Government publish figures on its spending on CBRN countermeasures, before and after 11 September 2001, with an indication of how this money is being spent.


15   Ev 96-149 Back

16   Ev 98 Back

17   Ev 98-99 Back

18   HC Deb, 9 April 2003, Col 271 Back

19   Q 671 Back

20   www.nih.gov Back

21   Dr Anthony Fauci, "The power of biomedical research", The Washington Times , 9 July 2003 Back

22   Dr William Bicknell and Kenneth Bloom, "Smallpox and Bioterrorism", The Washington Times, 9 July 2003 Back

23   See paragraph 48 below Back


 
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Prepared 6 November 2003