7. The scientific response to terrorism requires an appreciation of the threat. This inquiry focuses on chemical and biological weapons, largely because the Cold War threat from nuclear weapons and the civil nuclear programme has led to the development and availability of effective radioactivity detector technologies. Concerns that terrorists might employ a "dirty bomb", a device in which conventional explosives are used to spread radioactive material over a wide area, does raise issues about the application and deployment of these technologies and the availability of treatments.

8. Chemical and biological weapons are nothing new. There is evidence that the Assyrians employed a form of chemical weapon in the 7^th Century BC and their use was extensive in the First World War.[3] In more recent years concerns over their use has led to major international treaties - the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, parties to which undertake not to develop or stockpile such weapons. The emphasis in both these cases was the use of chemical and biological weapons by states. The awareness that such devices might interest terrorist groups is not new either and indeed there are instances of their use in this way. The attacks on Washington and New York on 11 September 2001 did not employ CBRN devices yet they demonstrated the existence of a terrorist group intent on killing large numbers of people and their ability to do so. A group with such intent would undoubtedly be tempted by the use of CBRN devices. The anthrax letters that followed 11 September 2001 increased the focus on chemical and biological agents. A more detailed analysis of the range of CBRN devices is provided by the Defence Committee's report The Threat from Terrorism, published in December 2001.[4] The Royal Society's report Measures for controlling the threat from biological weapons, published in July 2000, gives an account of the nature of biological weapons, their effectiveness and an assessment of the agents that are most likely to be used.

9. For an appropriate scientific response to the CBRN threat, all players need to be aware of the nature and the extent of the threat. We believe it is important that a single body within Government is charged with formulating a threat assessment and communicating this information. It should be clearly designated at such. The assessment of this threat needs to be communicated efficiently to those who need to make judgements about the appropriate use of resources. In June 2003, the Government set up a Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, which brings together those responsible for assessing the terrorist threat with those charged with reporting it.[5] We understand it will bring together, among others, Security Service's Counter-Terrorism Analysis Centre, the Secret Intelligence Service, Government Communications Headquarters, Defence Intelligence Staff, the police, including Special Branch, and the security division (TRANSEC) of the Department of Transport (DfT).[6] This is a welcome step and we can hope it can bring clarity to a confusing picture.

10. The Government's assessment of the threat posed by possible terrorist CBRN use is provided by the Security Service, drawing on technical help from the Defence Intelligence Staff. On 17 June Eliza Manningham-Buller, Director General of the Security Serice (MI5), told the Royal United Services Institute that "My conclusion, based on the intelligence we have uncovered, is that we are faced with the realistic possibility of some form of unconventional attack. That could include a Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear attack. Sadly, given the widespread proliferation of the technical knowledge to construct these weapons, it will be only a matter of time before a crude version of a CBRN attack is launched at a major Western city".[7]

11. The input from Dstl Porton Down is appropriate. Given that in a previous incarnation it was responsible, until the late 1950s, for developing the UK's offensive biological and chemical weapons programme as well as defences against such weapons, it would seem to be ideally suited to provide input. Many of our witnesses from various parts of Government cited their contact with Porton Down.

12. Despite this there seems to be some confusion. Professor Pete Boriello from the Public Health Laboratory Service (PHLS) was unaware of what threat analysis should inform his work: "From the dangerous pathogens point of view, I am not sure how the decisions were made but I certainly know, as do most of my colleagues, what the four top ones are. We also have a view as to which the most difficult to deal with would be. So whether or not that has come through a myriad of systems or from one given point, I do not know, but we have that information".[8]

13. The Chief Medical Officer reports that anthrax, botulism, bubonic plague, smallpox and tularaemia are the agents that have been most extensively studied and used in scenario plans. In Getting Ahead of the Curve, he states that these have the highest priority because of their ability to be spread rapidly or cause high mortality and that contingency planning has existed for many years.[9] In the DoH's evidence to this inquiry, it states that post-11 September 2001 it improved the provision of diagnostic support to the NHS "by developing a facility, expertise, technology and training base able to respond to Government needs related to agents of greatest threat (Bacillus anthracis [anthrax], Francisella tularensis [tularaemia], Yersinia pestis [plague], poxvirus [smallpox] and viral haemorrhagic fevers)".[10] We also learn that "Standard Operating Procedures were developed for key category A biological agents: anthrax; smallpox; plague; tularaemia; botulism and the viral haemorrhagic fevers".[11] These lists are similar but some agents - botulinum toxin and viral haemorrhagic fevers - appear in some and not others. A report by The Royal Society published in July 2000 included a list of 25 micro-organisms or bacterial toxins that had been identified as those which potentially could be used in a deliberate release.[12]

14. The PHLS list is available on the HPA website (see Box 1). The Centers for Disease Control in the US (the nearest equivalent organisation) presents a similar list for internet users.[13]

  

Box 1: Categories of infectious agents   Category A Diseases/Agents[14] Are easily disseminated or transmitted from person to person Have high mortality rates and potential for major public health impact Might cause public panic and social disruption Require special action for public health preparedness Diseases in this category include: Anthrax, smallpox, botulism, plague, tularaemia and the viral haemorrhagic fevers Category B Diseases/Agents Are moderately easy to disseminate Have moderate morbidity rates and low mortality rates Require enhancement of both diagnostic capacity and disease surveillance Diseases in this category include: Glanders, melioidosis, brucellosis, psittacosis and Q fever Chemical agents The following chemicals could be used in a deliberate release: nerve agents, mustard gas, chlorine, hydrogen cyanide, phosgene and ricin. All have serious and potentially fatal effects.

15. The UK Government employed the "Australia List" of pathogens and toxins for its Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, with respect to the security of laboratories (see paragraphs 190-201). This list was drawn up by a group of countries (including the UK) for the purposes of export control. This seems to have been superseded by the (classified) Salisbury List. The US also includes a list of select agents for its 2001 Patriot Act, which includes 33 viruses, 11 toxins, 20 bacteria, 1 prion (BSE) and 6 fungi. Beyond the broad categorisation of A and B agents in the PHLS list, there is no ranking and as such they provide little basis for policy-making. It seems to be generally assumed that anthrax and smallpox are two of the most likely biological agents and we heard during our visit to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California that they had established four or five realistic scenarios.

16. There seems to be a range of risk assessments, particularly within the Department of Health (DoH). It is not clear who in Government is responsible for determining what threats the UK should be responding to, and with what priorities. We have not established how risk assessments are informing Government policy and thus the scientific response. There should be a single assessment, informed by science and intelligence, which is communicated clearly to all those who need to make strategic decisions on funding allocations. We hope that the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre can fulfil this function.

4   Second Report of the Defence Committee, Session 2001-02, The Threat from Terrorism, HC 348-I, paras 51-72 Back

5   HL Deb, 3 July 2003, col 123 WA Back

6   Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 2002-2003, June 2003, Cm 5837, para 62 Back

7   Eliza Manningham-Buller, "Countering Terrorism", RUSI Journal, Vol148, Issue 4 (August 2003) Back

8   Q 37 Back

9   Department of Health, Getting Ahead of the Curve: A strategy for combating infectious diseases , A report by the Chief Medical Officer, January 2002, para 2.60 Back

10   Ev 120 Back

11   Ev 120 Back

12   The Royal Society, Measures for controlling the threat from biological weapons, July 2000 Back

13   www.bt.cdc.gov Back

14   www.hpa.org.uk Back