1. Following the terrorist attacks on Washington and New York and the anthrax letters that circulated subsequently, there has been much activity, on both sides of the Atlantic, to address the threat from major terrorist attacks. We decided to conduct an inquiry to examine the extent to which the UK response was underpinned by science and technology, what contribution science and technology could make in combating terrorism and what issues needed to be faced by the research community to ensure that their activities did not unwittingly assist terrorists' activities. We decided to focus on the conventional attacks employing CBRN agents. This reflects the fact that countermeasures to such agents are most likely to benefit from science and technology rather than any assessment we have made of the threat. The same could be said for cyberterrorism; but we considered that the relevant issues were not significantly different from more general IT security issues.

2. The inquiry was announced on 19 December 2002 with the following terms of reference:[1]

• How countermeasures against biological, chemical and radiological terrorism are informed by science and technology.
• How the surveillance of dangerous chemicals and pathogens is coordinated, both nationally and internationally, and what policies are in place to respond.[2]
• The public communications policy on the threat and response to biological, chemical and radiological terrorism.
• What research relevant to chemical, biological and radiological threats is being undertaken in the UK, and what controls are placed on it.
• The need for an ethical code of conduct for scientists working with dangerous substances or pathogens.

3. We received around 45 items of written evidence. Some of the evidence from the Government was classified as restricted or secret. We held six oral evidence sessions between March and June 2003, which addressed:

• The medical and public health response.
• Government research.
• Research security and the conduct of scientists.
• Protection of food and water supplies.
• Fire service response.
• The response of the Home Office and the Department of Health.

4. Three sessions were held either partially or wholly in private, although as much of this has been published as possible. In the case of the private session held on 16 June with the Fire Health and Safety Directorate of the ODPM, almost all of the transcript was subsequently declassified. The issue of Government openness and its cooperation with this inquiry will be discussed in section 8 of the report.

5. We undertook two visits as part of the inquiry: to Dstl (on a confidential basis) and the Centre for Applied Microbiology and Research (CAMR), both at Porton Down in Wiltshire, on 26 February 2003; and to the United States of America on 4-10 May 2003. We are also grateful to the Security Service for briefing us on the CBRN threat. The easy access to information in the US, relative to the UK, about the threat and countermeasures to CBRN devices has meant that we have drawn heavily on the US experience.

6. We are grateful for the assistance of Home Office officials for coordinating the Government's response to our inquiry and to the staff of the British Embassy in Washington and the Consulates-General at Atlanta and San Francisco for hosting the Committee during its US visit. We are indebted to our Specialist Advisers - Professor Roy Anderson of Imperial College, Professor Alastair Hay of Leeds University, Professor Bill Keevil from Southampton University and Professor Michael Elves, formerly of GlaxoWellcome.

2   This refers to threats both known and hypothetical. Back