We have sought to determine how science and technology can be harnessed to develop countermeasures to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) devices employed by terrorists, how science and technology is informing the response to terrorism and what measures are required to discourage the use of science and technology to develop such weapons. We have found areas of good practice, for example with the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister's (ODPM's) New Dimension programme of procurement for the Fire Service. It is clear that the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) and the Police Scientific Development Branch (PSDB) are playing an active role in establishing the merits of available technologies and we welcome this.
  

We have concerns about the long-term research and development of CBRN countermeasures. There has been very little new investment in this area. The UK's greatest source of expertise - at, Dstl Porton Down - has a military focus and does not have a home defence remit. The Home Office is the lead Department on CBRN issues but we have detected a weak scientific culture there. We hope that this will change with the recent appointment of a Chief Scientific Adviser to the Department.
  

We propose a Centre for Home Defence, under the Home Office, to develop technologies for civilian use. The Centre would form the hub of a national network of researchers to tap into the research capabilities in our universities and Research Councils.
  

The surveillance of dangerous chemicals and pathogens, both nationally and internationally, has been a concern to us. Existing public health services provide a good basis for this nationally and the formation of the Health Protection Agency must not weaken this. Internationally, we are aware of concerns that the World Health Organization (WHO) is not well resourced and that there is a lack of coordination with the bodies responsible for monitoring plant and animal diseases, an issue which the UK Government should pursue.
  

The Government's attitude to public communication seems to betray a fear of alarming the public. As a result, scraps of information have trickled into the public domain. A clear picture which could provide the necessary reassurance to the public has not yet emerged. As a result, the public is insufficiently prepared for a CBRN event, and hence the country (which needs an informed public) is also insufficiently prepared.
  

The Government has also imposed an unnecessary level of secrecy surrounding its counter-terrorism research. In our view this is counterproductive and only serves to stifle the national and international effort to develop countermeasures.
  

We recognise that scientific education, research and publication conducted in the UK could provide information and expertise of value to terrorist groups. The Government has sought to limit this through the Export Control Act and the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act and it is considering changes to the Voluntary Vetting Scheme. These measures must be applied in a sensitive manner, and the evidence suggests that this is the case, but we urge the Government to resist the pressure to impose strictures on science that would damage the research base and hamper the scientific response to terrorism.
  

We have concluded that scientists working with dangerous substances or pathogens should subscribe explicitly to an ethical code. While we recognise that such subscription will not prevent misuses of science, it will have the effect of heightening awareness of scientists' responsibilities. The learned societies and the Research Councils should develop an understanding of what such a code involves and provide incentives to sign up.