Memorandum by Alan Wenban-Smith (SHC 24)
INTRODUCTION
Analysis of John Prescott's statement suggests
that his Department has too narrow a view of both the problem
and the solution to the housing crisis:
The problem is seen as not enough
houses affordable to lower wage earners (never mind the unwaged).
This is certainly true in most of the South East, where an average
income will not buy the average house in an increasing number
of places. It is also true in a more limited range of housing
pressure areas in nearly all other regions (eg popular `rural'
commuter and retirement villages). However, there are large swathes
of housing suffering from the opposite problem of low demand,
particularly widespread in the North West, North East and Yorkshire
& Humber, but also in inner urban areas, outer estates and
former mining communities all over the country. The public debate
is unbalanced because it is dominated by the South East perspective,
and although John Prescott's statement refers to low demand it
fails to make the broader link to the supply of affordable housing.
The solution is seen exclusively
in terms of increasing the supply of new housing: local authorities
`delivering' the targets in RPG; growth areas at Milton Keynes,
Thames Gateway, Ashford and in the M11 corridor; and increasing
densities and using more brown field land. But new housing is
only a small part of the supply: there are about 20 million existing
dwellings in England and around 2 million of these change hands
each year. Over the last 10 years new building has run at around
150,000 a yearless than a tenth of this number. While new
building is around 120,000 at present, it is unlikely that this
reduction in supply (about 1.5% of the total market) can account
for the general rise in house prices. For the same reason, increasing
new building is a very ineffective way of reducing prices.
A credible strategy for resolving the housing
supply problem needs to take a broader and (dare one say?) more
joined-up approach, starting with a more balanced appreciation
of the underlying problem.
THE HOUSING
SUPPLY CRISIS
The major reason for the supply crisis (and
it is one) is not the lack of new housing but the collapse in
the attractiveness of so much of our existing housing.
Two key factors are (a) the widening economic gap between different
parts of the country and (b) the flight of the better-off from
some older urban areas and former mining towns to suburbs and
so-called "countryside". The result is an increasing
concentration in less attractive areas of people lacking the resources
to maintain and improve their housing (or the social fabric that
would support them in doing so). This in turn gives a further
twist to the vicious cycle of decline. Where both factors are
strongin parts of the North East, North West and Yorkshire"low
demand areas" are now a major phenomenon. They are also emerging
on a smaller scale even in parts of London and the South East.
These houses are being removed from the effective supply
(houses that people actually want to live in), raising prices
for the rest. And these price rises are further fuelled by the
housing finance system and the lack of an attractive social housing
alternative.
HOUSING LAND
SUPPLY
Demanding that local authorities meet RPG housebuilding
targets is pointless. They do not (any longer) build houses: the
private sector builds 80% and housing associations most of the
rest. The only lever local authorities have is the release of
more housing land. But according to CPRE[19]
there is already more than a 5-year supply of land at RPG rates,
even in the South East. If house-building is to be accellerated
by this means the extra would need to be in the places where housebuilders
prefer to build: in attractive areas and on greenfield sites.
Without addressing the urban and regional causes of the problem,
this would simply reinforce the vicious cycle that is polarising
neighbourhoods, removing housing from the pool of attractive stock,
increasing commuting distances and car-dependencyand raising
prices. Releasing enough land to increase the total amount of
housing on the market (new and existing) by enough to impact on
prices would require truly heroic quantities (and the abandonment
of all other aspects of urban and regional policy).
PLANNING GAIN,
GROWTH AREAS
AND BROWNFIELD
LAND
But if land supply is not the answer to the
current crisis, what is? As indicated earlier housing finance,
for both social housing and owner-occupation, are likely to be
important areas. But as far as the RTPI and the planning system
is concerned, I believe that there are two significant issues:
The attempt to finance affordable
housing through planning gain is simply leading housebuilders
to hold their land off the market: it is difficult to see how
else to explain how record high house prices can co-exist with
record low rates of building and an adequate supply of identified
land. Planning gain has failed to deliver anything remotely approaching
the numbers of affordable housing units needed, and is simply
distorting the planning system and land markets. There is in any
case no reason why the surplus value that could be captured in
any particular area should relate to the local need for affordable
housing even if the system worked. Meeting the housing needs of
people who cannot meet them in the housing market should be borne
as a collective social responsibility, not a tax of almost accidental
incidence.
The South East growth areas will
not deliver much additional land or housing for many years. When
they do, they may or may not become sustainable communities: unless
something serious is done about managing transport demand (eg
road tolls and area pricing) they could simply add to the South
East's problems of social polarisation, congestion and overheating.
Prescott's statement recognises that brownfield[20]
land is crucial to a sustainable increase in housing land supply.
If this is going to happen though it needs to be central to the
efforts of Government, RDAs and local authorities, and seen as
an integral part of the urban renaissance missionnot in
a separate policy silo marked "housing". Using brownfield
land and achieving higher urban densities whilst still delivering
a quality of housing that people can both afford and want
is not going to be cheap. And it requires attention to the whole
public domainnot just the environment but also services
like health and education. To justify this will require a much
broader process of policy evaluation. We must transcend the present
narrow, short-term and programme specific approaches to appraisal
that have got us into much of the mess we are in.
REGIONAL POLICY
Behind the immediate crisis is the much bigger
question of inter-regional balance. This will take much longer
to address, and to start delivering resultsbut that is
a reason for starting now. This appeared to be recognised in the
first flush of new Labour in Government: one of its first White
Papers was that introducing the legislation for RDAs, and this
contained a very clear statement of the need to address regional
imbalances pro-actively "Wide variations in levels of
economic activity- reflected in wage pressures, levels of unemployment
and movements in house pricesmake the task of providing
a stable macroeconomic climate more difficult. In particular,
setting a national interest rate which suits each region is more
difficult when the regions themselves are widely divergent. The
risk is lower overall growth and employment rates for the country
as a whole"[21].
Quite so.
I am not suggesting (nor was the White Paper)
that we should return to the kind of dirigiste regional
policy tried in the 1960s and 70s, but that we should set ourselves
much higher aspirations for (and devote greater resources to)
developing and exploiting the distinctive economic potential of
the English regions. One measure of success would be the ability
of every region to attract and retain people, reducing the pressures
on the South East which are now endangering its economic success.
If anything the case for a stronger regional policy has increased:
the gap in regional GDP per head has widened dramatically since
1997 (and is widening fastest for those already the worst off)
see table below:
Table 1: GDP per head UK Regions, 1991
and 1998 (UK=100)
| Region | 1991
| 1998 | Change
| 1998 rank |
| London | 124
| 130.4 | +6.4
| 1 |
| South East | 111
| 116.7 | +5.7
| 2 |
| Eastern | 109
| 114.2 | +5.2
| 3 |
| Scotland | 97
| 95.6 | -1.4
| 4 |
| East Midlands | 98
| 94.8 | -3.2
| 5 |
| South West | 95
| 91.9 | -3.1
| 6 |
| West Midlands | 93
| 91.7 | -1.3
| 7 |
| North West and Merseyside | 91
| 88.2 | -2.8
| 8 |
| Yorkshire & the Humber | 92
| 87.8 | -4.2
| 9 |
| Wales | 85
| 79.4 | -5.6
| 10 |
| North East | 85
| 78.8 | -6.2
| 11 |
| Northern Ireland | 82
| 75.8 | -6.2
| 12 |
Source: Regional Trends
This table demonstrates strikingly how interegional differentials
have widened over the last 10 years. Moreover, there is a clear
correlation between position in this league table and the rate
of change in GDP per head: the best-placed regions are accellerating
away from the worst-placed. It is also notable that (apart from
Scotland) position in the table is strongly correlated with peripherality
relative to the South East core.
The quotation above from the RDA White Paper eloquently stated
the problems caused by uneven regional development for a single
currency (the £) even within the UK. The uneveness is getting
worse and we are poised to join a much larger currency area. There
are big national economic issues at stake.
Urban and regional problems have been with us since WW2,
but were made far worse by the social housing and land policies
of Thatcher and Heseltine (respectively). Is it too much to hope
that the present Government will avoid more of the same and act
with greater breadth of vision and wisdom this time?
19
CPRE/Green Balance (1999), `Getting a Grip' and subsequent `Sprawl
Patrol' Newsletters. Back
20
I was particularly pleased to see that in spite of all the efforts
of his civil servants to abolish it Prescott is now using this
handy term that I coined back in 1975! Back
21
DETR (1997), `Building Partnerships for Prosperity', page 11,
para 2.3, HMSO, Cm 3814. Back
|