Memorandum by the Institute for Public
Policy Research (RRD 26)
Despite a sustained period of reasonable overall
economic growth in the UK, regional differentials in GDP per head
are increasing. There is, in broad terms, a "North-South"
divide in regional prosperity, with a "winner's circle"
in the greater south east of the UK, and three regions that lag
significantly: Northern Ireland, Wales and the North East of England.
On current trends, by 2020 GDP per head in the North East could
be half the UK average. This produces problems for both lagging
and prosperous regions alike, which requires public policy interventions
sensitive to different regional needs.
Emerging regional approaches are welcome in
this regard, but the role of central government is inadequately
defined. In particular, Government policy currently neglects the
lack of employment opportunities in the poorer regions. The Government
is right to promote a regional productivity agenda, but this must
be additional to the regional employment agenda. At this stage,
a re-assessment of the impact of present spending is essential.
This will require difficult political decisions, but a combination
of bottom-up and top-down measures are necessary for regional
prosperity disparities to be closed.
ACHIEVING THE
GOVERNMENT'S
TARGET
1. Despite a sustained period of reasonable
overall economic growth in the UK, regional differentials in GDP
per head are increasing. There is, in broad terms, a "North-South"
divide in regional prosperity, with a "winner's circle"
in the greater south east of the UK (consisting of London, the
East of England and the South East regions). There are three regions
that lag significantly: Northern Ireland, Wales, and the poorest
region of all, the North East of England. On current trends, by
2020 GDP per head in the North East could be half the UK average.
2. The "winner's circle" suffers
its own problems, as issues such as congestion and pressures on
the local environment impinge upon the quality of life for those
within "booming" regions. Furthermore, a combination
of congestion and environment pressure around London and the South
East, and excesses in housing, land and labour capacity in the
North, suggests that the UK economy is running below its potential
capacity. As HM Treasury and the DTI have argued, the current
scale of regional inequalities represents a drag on national economic
performance. [84]
3. The Government has argued in the past
that intra-regional differences negate inter-regional differences.
This is a false division as both need to be addressed. Individuals
are at a much lower risk of poverty in regions such as the East
of England or in the South East than in the North East or Walesbut
also in the West Midlands or London. Both inter-regional and intra-regional
disparities deserve attention and different policy responses.
Measures must be introduced to address disparities within and
between regions in locally-relevant ways. Such an approach would
ask new, and sometimes difficult, questions of central government.
CURRENT AND
PROPOSED POLICIES
4. Regional strategies are necessary for
any reduction in disparities in regional prosperitythey
identify and address the distinctive economic needs of individual
regions. Strategies, and the process of strategy-making, provide
the opportunity for regionally-authored, regionally-owned, solutions
to be developed. It is, however, too early to judge the impact
of existing strategies upon regional disparities.
5. The creation of the Regional Development
Agencies (RDAs) is welcome. They include regional stakeholders
in the design and delivery of new regional approaches to economic
development. However, there is no guarantee that current arrangements
will close regional disparities in prosperity. For RDAs in lagging
regions to act as significant economic drivers in their respective
areas requires a discriminatory funding regime reflecting need.
However, this would not be sufficient to close regional prosperity
gapsto achieve this the RDAs must form part of a more explicit
regional policy articulated by central government.
6. Regional assemblies can also be part
of the solution. Regional assemblies would provide the opportunity
to meet broader democratic and public policy delivery goals. Decades
of centralised policy responses have failed lagging regions. These
regions need a strong political voice to counteract this centralisation.
"Bottom-up" policy-making would enable government to
move beyond a one-size-fits-all policy approach, as well as enhance
public policy delivery.
7. As a forum for regional agents and agencies,
regional assemblies could co-ordinate more effective economic
strategies by enabling a more tailored approach. Furthermore,
assemblies would require the development of robust regional political
leadership. This would provide two benefits. First, an enhancement
of regional leadership, enabling assemblies to act as a voice
for their region in central government. Second, assemblies would
enhance the regional "consciousness" of existing government,
or government-sponsored, agencies.
8. International experience demonstrates
that an enhanced regional capacity is crucial to balanced economic
growth. The strengthening of regional institutions would therefore
provide the opportunity to enhance local economic and political
capacity. The long-term security of a democratically elected regional
assembly could provide a bulwark against centralisation.
ACHIEVING A
COHERENT NATIONAL
POLICY
9. A coherent national policy is absolutely
necessary for a reduction in regional disparities. Westminster
and Whitehall have a responsibility to achieve social and economic
justice for all the nations and regions of the UK[85].
Such an "active" role is entirely compatible with the
principle of devolution, and the government's "bottom-up"
approach to regional development.
The importance of full employment
10. Unpacking regional differences in GDP
reveals regionally-specific reasons for variations. As Table one
demonstrates, low levels of employment largely explain the low
GDP per head of Wales and the North Easttheir productivity
levels are similar to other regions with higher GDP per head.
Table 1
THREE INDICES FOR REGIONAL PROSPERITY
| Employment rate (% of working age population 1999)
| Productivity levels (GDP per hour worked 1999)
| Income levels (GDP per head 1999[86])
|
| London | 71.9 | 116.7
| 130.0 |
| South East | 79.8 | 106.5
| 116.4 |
| East | 78.0 | 107.1
| 116.4 |
| Scotland | 71.9 | 100.9
| 96.5 |
| East Midlands | 76.9 | 95.3
| 93.6 |
| West Midlands | 73.8 | 90.3
| 91.7 |
| South West | 79.1 | 90.4
| 90.8 |
| Yorks & Humber | 73.6 |
92.3 | 87.9 |
| North West | 71.9 | 94.6
| 86.9 |
| Wales | 69.0 | 92.8
| 80.5 |
| Northern Ireland | 67.2 |
83.5 | 77.5 |
| North East | 67.8 | 93.7
| 77.3 |
| United Kingdom | 74.2
| 100.0 | 100.0
|
| Source: Labour Force Survey 1999, ONS
| | | |
11. Full employment is crucial to social justice and
enhancing national economic performance. However, creating full
employment will require a sensitive policy response. The problem
of the concentration of low employment in some parts of a prosperous
region is different in character to the problem of low employment
in a lagging region. London has a healthy jobs market a few miles
away from pockets of high unemployment. Here supply-side measures
to help individuals fill available job vacancies across the metropolitan
labour market are of great importance. In the North East demand-side
measures are required to generate job opportunities within a reasonable
travel-to-work distanceHackney and Hartlepool require different
policy interventions.
12. A reduction in regional disparities will require
a political acceptance that there are "jobs gaps" across
the UK. Of the 68 labour markets that had employment rates below
seventy percent of the working age population in 1999-2000, almost
none were located near areas of high employment. Furthermore,
they were concentrated in regions outside of the greater south
east.
What might be done?
13. Identifying practical policy measures to address
such regional disparities in prosperity is a difficult task. One
option would be the promotion of mass emigration to remove "surplus"
population from the North. Mass emigration would probably prove
politically unacceptable. Furthermore, the promotion of a measure
of inter-regional migration would have serious repercussions for
donor regions. Migrants would probably consist disproportionately
of young people with qualifications, as age, skills and house
prices limit migration. A dynamic region which absorbed the better
qualified workers would gain a further competitive advantage,
creating a vicious circle for lagging regions. However, this process
would create further pressures on housing and land use in the
recipient regions, raising environmental and quality of life issues.
14. A second option is the tightening of development
controls in the South to induce capital to move north. However,
restricting the supply of land in the South, for whatever reason,
cannot guarantee that capital will indeed travel north and will
lead to rising land and house prices in the South. These rising
prices would have serious implications for the poor in those regions.
15. The emphasis should be on "pull", not "push",
factors. The best practical course of action for decision-makers
to solve regional economic disparities is the third option of
creating new jobs in lagging regions. This would require a judicious
balance between top-down and bottom-up policies. New regional
approaches are emerging, but central government's role in tackling
regional economic disparities is much less developed.
ADDITIONAL FUNDING?
16. A re-assessment of the impact of current public sector
spending is necessary. For example, the geography of government
R&D expenditure reveals a strong southern bias. The North
East receives practically no R&D expenditure. Here national
"industrial" policy is carried out with apparently little
thought for its regional impact. [87]A
more co-ordinated cross-departmental approach is required.
17. Although not all parts of Whitehall have come to
terms with regionalisation, there are some reasons for optimism.
HM Treasury has, for example, embraced regional policy, albeit
principally to promote national economic performance. Here strong
regional policy works in harmony with broader national economic
objectives. However, there will be times when these two policies
conflictwhen national economic performance might lead to
a focus on richer regions at the expense of equity between regions.
Policy-makers face hard choices, but they must be open and honest
about the balancing act that they must perform.
18. HMT, DTI and the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
have committed themselves to a target of reducing regional economic
disparities. This indicates that the Government is becoming more
comfortable with a redistributive approach that explicitly targets
lagging regions.
19. There are no quick-fixes available that would significantly
reduce regional disparities. Difficult political choices and compromises
will have to be made, with balances struck between national priorities
and different regional needs. A judicious combination of "top-down"
and "bottom-up" approaches is required to create the
"pull" factors central to boosting lagging regions'
fortunes. Fundamentally, these regional variations in policy must
be supported by a funding mechanism that enables lagging regions
to close the prosperity gap.
84
Productivity in the UK: 3-the regional dimension. London: HM Treasury
and DTI. Back
85
For a more detailed discussion, see: Adams J and Robinson
P (eds) (2002) Devolution in Practice: public policy differences
within the UK. London: IPPR, 198-227. Back
86
Burkitt N (ed) (2001) A Life's Work: achieving full and fulfilling
employment. London: IPPR. Back
87
See Adams J and Robinson P (2002) A New Regional Policy
for the United Kingdom: interim report. London: IPPR. Available
at: www.ippr.org/research/index.php2current=37. Back
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