RT HON TONY BLAIR MP

TUESDAY 21 JANUARY 2003

  140. Prime Minister, you will recall the Defence Committee produced a report on homeland security—you can call it defence and security—in the UK, and made a number of positive recommendations not all of which went down a bundle with the Home Office or, I suspect, yourself. One of the things we said was a phrase—it was not mine—that we should "not confuse activity for achievement". Now that Sir David Omand has been operating for some time, could you give some indication of his and the Government's achievements in strengthening defence and security in the UK, should deterrence, the police, intelligence and security services fail to deter or identify a terrorist organisation which may well use weapons of mass destruction?
  (Mr Blair) What David Omand does is he coordinates this on behalf of the Civil Service and he brings them all together. Really there are two functions of this. There is first of all to look at what the security threat is and where are we getting intelligence from about potential threats. You can see, even after the terrible tragedy in Manchester a few days ago, that the security services and the police are working together in order to try to deal with that. But then also the other part of it is, on the basis of whatever assessments we have, to try to take any preventive action. That is where you then decide, "Look, it's worth investing in this," whether it is vaccines, or protective clothing or exercises that are being undertaken.

  141. Whilst what you said is quite correct, that money could be thrown at problems, could you tell us, if resources are required to meet any perceived or actual weaknesses in our ability to defend or recover from an attack which could kill—I think you mentioned the figure—30,000, it could be far higher than that, are there any financial constraints, Prime Minister?
  (Mr Blair) No, we should make whatever investment is necessary on the basis of the advice we have, and there is nothing we have been advised to do that we are saying, "Oh, we can't afford that." All I am pointing out, though, is that it is very, very difficult. I think September 11 is quite an interesting example of this, because there has been a lot of discussion about what intelligence was received about September 11, but the truth of the matter is this. Even with the benefit of hindsight, when you piece all the intelligence together, yes, you might have thought something big was going to happen around that time, yes, it was against American interests—and that is with the benefit of hindsight, incidentally, that you would piece all that together—but it was by no means clear, in fact probably you would not have thought it was going to happen in America, but against American interests elsewhere, and what is more, you would have had absolutely no idea as to the nature of the threat and the attack. That is why I say that the first line of defence is the security and intelligence. For the rest we do what we reasonably can and we try and do it as well without alarming people. If you say, "Well it's sensible to look at the Tube and what might happen", people end up saying, "Ah well, they know something's about to happen on the Tube" when it simply is not so.

  142. A number of weaknesses were identified in our civil defences, the method by which we would react, should there be an attack. Whilst I can see legislation that is rushed is often very imperfect, legislation that takes 16 months to introduce and still has not been introduced indicates either that the issues are very complicated or there has not been sufficient pressure put on the Civil Service in producing the civil contingencies legislation. If it is introduced soon, by the time it goes through Parliament then begins to be implemented, it could be two or three years after 9/11. Do you have, Prime Minister, any explanation as to why this process of introducing this legislation has been so protracted?
  (Mr Blair) I think the answer really is that—I mean, the legislation is important, but we see the actual coordination and provision as the central thing we should concentrate on. However, having said that, we promised that we would bring forward the Civil Contingencies Bill, and we will, but I think that when you look in detail at the issues that could arise there, there are, I think, important structural issues and so on, but the absolute essence and what we put our priority on is trying to identify the exact nature of any attack that might happen and how we best coordinate the response to it.

  143. But if it is so complicated and it takes so long, and eventually it is introduced and achieves some hitherto unknown effect as a piece of legislation, it might be some time after a successful attack has been launched, with the inadequacies not yet having been remedied. Is there not a case, Prime Minister, for saying, "Look, you've had long enough to draft this legislation. Please get it through Parliament", so that we can start to do the things necessary to meet what is clearly, in my view and in many people's view, a growing and very, very serious threat?
  (Mr Blair) I take what you are saying entirely, Bruce, and will look at it again, and maybe I should write to you and tell you what our plans are as to when it may be introduced. All I say to you is that if there are any inadequacies, we should be dealing with them operationally, but not waiting for legislation in any event. So the legislation may give us something that is a different structure, but any shortcomings or gaps there are in our capability should be remedied without legislation but as a matter of operational efficiency.

  Mr George: Our Chairman has speeded me up, Prime Minister. I hope you succeed in speeding up the Civil Service. Thank you very much.

  Chairman: I think this will be the last question.

  144. Two quick ones. Has the enhanced public concern about terrorists in our midst convinced you, Prime Minister, of the case for identity cards? Given the fact that we heard that asylum was given to a Taliban fighter eight months ago in the UK, do you anticipate that members of the Special Republican Guard from Iraq who cannot return to their country after a regime change will be given asylum in this country?
  (Mr Blair) No is the answer to the latter point, and I have to point out that actually, as a result of the action in Afghanistan, we are able to return people to Afghanistan in a way that we were not able to do before. On the other point that you make, I think what it does is it underlines the necessity of having had the emergency legislation after September 11. It is only as a result of that legislation that we are able to pick up suspected terrorists and detain them, even without trial. In respect of identity cards, of course all asylum seekers now are fingerprinted and have proper identification. I think there is a long-term question about identity cards that is still under discussion. I think the question is, will it be really effective, and there are issues to do with cost.

  145. And your view?
  (Mr Blair) I think perhaps I had better wait for the Government collectively to come to a view before I launch my own views on it. I think what I would just say is this. I do not think there is any reason in principle against it. I discount the civil liberties argument against it. I think there are no civil liberties objections to having identity cards, but I think there are issues to do with cost and effectiveness that need to be looked at, and those are the issues that we are looking at. I think this is an argument that has gone on for many, many years, but it is important to recognise that in relation to the issue of asylum there is a process of identification now in place.

  Chairman: Thank you very much, Prime Minister. It has been very wide ranging. You have been very open in your replies. I apologise to those members of the Committee who did not get in. I let it run. We did have another subject we were going to look at, but I felt the interests and the matters were so important that I should let the Committee try to exhaust its questions, which we still did not do. I thank you again.