RT HON TONY BLAIR MP

TUESDAY 21 JANUARY 2003

  20. But when he does that, as I suspect he will, because, as I said, he is not mad or suicidal and his main aim, I think, is to say in power, then we will pull back and allow him to continue in power?
  (Mr Blair) As I have always said to people, and I make no secret of it, I think it would be an excellent thing for the region and the world if Saddam was removed, but the issue is weapons of mass destruction and he has got a choice and the choice is the same as it has been throughout.

  21. Prime Minister, you have said that people wish to see proof of what is happening in Iraq and you have also emphasised the importance of the United Nations' route. What happens if the weapons inspectors ask for more time?
  (Mr Blair) Let us wait and see what actually happens. The weapons inspectors have got to make a report on 27 January and at the moment we do not know what they will put into that report. I have said that they should be given the time to do the job, and I am sure they will be.

  22. But when you were asked this, I think, by the Liberal Democrat spokesman last Wednesday, in fact you did not give a response to that, you gave a similar response to the one you have just given. Robin Cook the day after, when asked about that again, said "Let me repeat what has been said on a number of occasions about the 27 January report. It will, of course, be the first substantive report from the inspectors to the Security Council but it will not necessarily be the last. It will probably be a staging post for future reports and I would not be at all surprised if Hans Blix's main conclusion on 27 January is that he requires further time in which to explore the issue". If that, indeed, is what Hans Blix says, when you meet President Bush on 31 January, will you be arguing that the weapons inspectors need more time in order to add to the legitimacy of whatever action is finally taken?
  (Mr Blair) As I say, let us wait and see what he turns up on 27 January. The weapons inspectors should be allowed to do their job properly. I have said that 27 January is an important day but it is not the end of it. It depends what the weapons inspectors find on the 27. If I could just add this point: the weapons inspectors as well will make a judgment about the degree of co-operation with Saddam. I want to make this point because it is absolutely crucial to how much time they should have. This is not a game of hide-and-seek. The aim of weapons inspections is not that they go in and, like detectives, try and search the country in order to see if they can discover some weapons of mass destruction. The way it is supposed to work is this: the regime is supposed to give total co-operation to the weapons inspectors, make an honest declaration of what weapons they have and then the purpose of the inspectors is not really to go round the country and try and find the stuff, the purpose of the inspectors is to inspect the material that is given to them, close it down, destroy it and monitor it. There will be a point in time, and this is the purpose of what Hans Blix has been saying in the last few days, when he has to come to a judgment about whether they are co-operating or not. You do not put the weapons inspectors in there and say "Well, you stay in there for as long as you can just to see if you can find it". The purpose of them going in and making their reports back to the UN is to state whether they believe that there is proper co-operation going on with the Iraqi regime. Do you see what I mean? They need the time not just to find the material but to make a judgment as to whether the regime is co-operating with the inspections or not.

  23. But there is a difference between the two, is there not, Prime Minister, in terms of the way the world will see it? If the weapons inspectors discover an installation or clear evidence that is proof, as it were, that is exhibit A in court—
  (Mr Blair) Correct.

  24. If the weapons inspectors say "We do not think we are getting sufficient co-operation", that is a qualitative judgment because that is a process that has got to be assessed. You have said that a great deal of world opinion attaches itself to the UN route through which we have gone, so there is a difference between the two. If the weapons inspectors say "We would like some more time either to establish a degree of co-operation or to find out why things are not in their report which we think ought to have been in their report", or indeed to discover things, will it not be politically necessary in order to grant some additional time in order to maintain as great a consensus as possible in very divisive world opinion for whatever action is ultimately necessary?
  (Mr Blair) Of course that is a judgment the Security Council has got to make and will make that judgment on the basis of what the inspectors say to us. You are absolutely right in saying, David, that, if you like, there are two different sets of circumstances. There is a set of circumstances in which you find the conclusive proof and there is a set of circumstances in which a pattern of behaviour develops of non-cooperation. The first is easy to describe as a category and the second, as you rightly say, requires more considered judgment and I agree with that. Part of the difficulty is that what we are doing at the moment is we are increasing massively the pressure on Saddam and his regime. How are we managing to get the intelligence out of there? How are we managing to see what Saddam is up to, to see the cracks developing in the regime? We are doing it precisely because we are sending troops down there, he knows that the threat is real unless he co-operates, so we are trying to put maximum pressure on him and if I am sometimes coy about speculating what happens after 27 January or if the inspectors say this or say that, it is because I do not want to do anything that weakens that enormous pressure coming to bear on the regime either to co-operate or, frankly, to crumble.

  25. One of the problems you face is because of the perceived relationship between yourself and President Bush. If that is the case in British public opinion, it is the case in spades in much public opinion outside the United Kingdom of the perception of the nature of the Bush regime. You have decided to go down the United Nations route and you are widely credited with having persuaded the Bush regime to go down the United Nations route. When you are asked then about how important it is to get a second Security Council Resolution, and again that is something around which a lot of international opinion has coalesced, you have said that it is preferable. Could you indicate what you think the cost might be in wider terms of taking action without that second Resolution? When you talk about the possibility of there being an unreasonable veto, given that the only people who could deliver an unreasonable veto would be France, China or Russia—since it will not come from us or the United States—who do you anticipate it might come from?
  (Mr Blair) I do not anticipate it will, frankly, because I think that the spirit of the original Resolution is very clear. If the inspectors make findings of fact which amount to a breach then the Security Council will authorise action. I think that is what will happen. When I say the preference is for a UN Resolution, it is easier in every respect if there is one. All I say, also, however, is we cannot have a situation in which there is a material breach recognised by everybody and yet action is unreasonably blocked. I do not think that will happen but nonetheless I think you have to have that qualification otherwise the discussion that we have in the Security Council is not likely to be as productive as it should be.

  26. Clearly it is going to provide some uncomfortable moments for Germany, and not many of us will feel particularly heartbroken about that. The position of the UK and the US is different, is it not? The United States could take the line that it is now the only superpower, it does not really matter what the rest of the world thinks, the broader geo-political considerations are not as obvious to it perhaps. In the United Kingdom then those considerations must be more important and, therefore, the need to try and act within the framework of international consensus, is that not more important to us than it is to the United States?
  (Mr Blair) It is very important to us. I think it is important, also, for the US and I think it is important for us to engage the US with that international process. I have to tell you, however, I never had any doubt that President Bush would opt for the UN route because I think he understands the importance of trying to take international opinion with us. I know there are a lot of criticisms of the relationship we have with the US but I will defend that relationship absolutely and solidly because I think it is important for us and for the wider world. I do not think it is right—and I have said this before—that the US is made to face these issues alone. They are important issues and the world community has a responsibility to meet them. Now, my role and task, if you like, is trying to make sure that we establish the broadest possible international consensus. I think we have a consensus at the moment around the original UN Resolution. It is going to be tough because Saddam will be inclined to play this every way he possibly can in order to weaken that international coalition but we have to try and keep it together. In doing that, as I say, I am having it put to me frequently that there are elements of the administration saying this or that or they are about to do it tomorrow without any recourse to international opinion or the US does not care about international opinion. All I can say is that is entirely alien to the conversations I have with George Bush which are about how we make sure that we disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and do it with the maximum international support.

  27. When you use the word "preferable", that is a rather weak sort of word, is it not? It does not have a great imperative behind it. Do you really mean "preferable" or do you mean it really would be very, very much more desirable to go down that route? Is it as weak as it sounds? Could you give me a different adjective? Could you give me a different word, do you think, to describe the importance of getting a second Security Council Resolution which will move me a bit more than "preferable"?
  (Mr Blair) I think you have just given one actually, which is to say that obviously it would be highly desirable to have one.

  28. There would be a cost in not having one, in taking action without one?
  (Mr Blair) Of course it is more difficult but, on the other hand, David, just posit the circumstances that I am positing and all I am doing is just being open with people because I do not think these circumstances will arise. Supposing the inspectors said "Yes, we agree, he is not co-operating, we are not able to do our job properly" or they make a finding that there are weapons of mass destruction that they have discovered in Iraq, supposing we take that before the Security Council, in the circumstances where the whole of the previous discussion in front of the UN was that in those circumstances we would authorise action and somebody puts down a veto, now of course it would be better if they did not, that is why I say it would be highly desirable if they did not put down a veto, but if they did in those circumstances then I think it would be wrong if we said "Right, well there is nothing we can do, he can carry on and develop these weapons.". Of course it is better that we go down the UN route, and that is what we want to do, that is what I have been striving for all the way through. We must not give a signal to Saddam that there is a way out of this. There is no way for Saddam out of this issue other than disarming Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. Just think about achieving that, just think of the signal that it sends out then when we do turn round to North Korea with a different strategy in place for them and say "It is unacceptable that you have withdrawn from the Non Proliferation Treaty, it is unacceptable that you are carrying on exporting ballistic missile technology which can be used for weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons", and we are going to sit down and work out a strategy to deal with them. That is the situation we need to get to and, of course, it is best done with the maximum international support but it will not be done at all if Saddam thinks there is any weakness in it.

  29. So if the logic is so implacable, and I think it is very powerful logic, why do other countries who might be believed to share our liberal values not appear to lend themselves to it in quite such an active way?
  (Mr Blair) I think some do support what we are doing actually. It is not true to say that every European country is in a different place from Britain, if you have seen some of the comments which have come from Spain or Italy recently, for example. I think that there is a hesitation in the international community for the reasons that have been expressed around this table, and what Donald was saying earlier, people say "Look, is it really necessary to do this? Is he such a threat? Do we really have to bother with it? Are there other things that we can turn our mind to?". I think at points in time that is a perfectly understandable feeling, that there is a very, very clear answer you have got to give. Although I think it is different, I remember at the time of Kosovo there were a lot of voices raised saying "Oh, for goodness sake, do not let us go down this path, it is going to be ruinous for the Balkans if we do this". There were even people—and this was about as clear a case as you could have—who said that military action in Afghanistan would be a mistake. Now, I think in the end this is a tougher one because there is not an immediate act that Saddam has taken to provoke America, ourselves or other countries but I think when you sit down and analyse this issue of weapons of mass destruction, and as I say the link that is inevitably going to be there with international terrorism, it is right that the world takes a stand. I think some people think, you know, I am going down this path because Britain is a strong ally of America and I do not want to divide off from America. It is worse than that, it is that I genuinely believe it. If America was not doing it I would be saying to them "You should be doing it".

  30. Prime Minister, America is not just the world's greatest superpower, it is going to remain the world's only superpower.
  (Mr Blair) Yes.

  31. Since that superpower has espoused the policy of regime change, of first strike and not allowing any other power to challenge its supremacy, is it not important for the long term that the Americans show as early as possible an absolute commitment to international law?
  (Mr Blair) I do think it is very important that the US is engaged with the international community and obviously it should act in accordance with international law, as we all should. I think the best way of dealing with that is the way that I have described which is to make sure that when they are raising issues that it is right to raise that we try and engage with them and get those issues dealt with on the basis of the broadest possible support and make sure that American support is there for other issues which are important also. In the speech I gave to the Foreign Office diplomats a couple of weeks ago I said we had to continue to work with America in broadening that agenda, that is what I think the key thing is. I have got no doubt there are voices inside the US which may want the US to go down a unilateralist route but I do not believe that is where President Bush is and I think it is our job to try and make sure that we gain the broadest possible international co-operation. I think the worst thing that could happen—I really believe this—is that the world divides up into the pro American and the anti American forces.

  32. A quick point, Prime Minister. Why have you not given more emphasis to the fact that Saddam Hussein has failed to declare what has happened to the chemical and biological weapons that he had at the end of the Gulf War and which had not been destroyed by the United Nations by the time the inspectors left in 1998? Why has more emphasis not been placed upon this because clearly there are grounds to indicate that he still does possess not nuclear but certainly chemical and biological weapons which were known about but seem to have been lost in all the debate which has occurred subsequently?
  (Mr Blair) It is a fair point. We should make that point continually because there is no doubt at all, I think, there was a list of all the various nerve agents and chemicals and so on at the end of the inspections in 1998 and, you are right, those are unaccounted for. I think Hans Blix was making a point the other day that Saddam's declaration that was supposed to be an honest account of what he had made no mention of much of the material that we know was left over from before. I think that is a fair point.

  33. Prime Minister, can we broaden this out a bit. How would you characterise our relationship with the US Government?
  (Mr Blair) It is a strong relationship, obviously, and it is a strong partnership. We work with them as allies. Despite what people may think, if we disagree with them we say so but on these international security issues I happen to be in agreement with them.

  34. You are on record as saying that the Atlantic Alliance is an article of faith.
  (Mr Blair) Yes.

  35. Why do you say that?
  (Mr Blair) Because I think that it is a very, very powerful force for the values that we believe in. That is not to say that there cannot be disagreements with America over aspects of policy but I think the transatlantic relationship has served America and Europe and the world well through the twentieth century, I think we have to maintain it. Again, I will be frank with you, I find some aspects of some of the public discourse about America just anti-American and I think it is wrong and misguided. America for all its faults—and all nations have them—is a force for good in the world, I believe.

  36. So it is a matter of principle as well as realpolitik?
  (Mr Blair) Absolutely, it is, yes, a strong matter of principle. One of the things that I try and advocate is a good relationship between Europe and America too because I think if Europe and America split off then every other country in the world can play games with that situation, and it is very dangerous.

  37. What do you say to those who say that these days, at least, the special relationship is a bit of a one-way street?
  (Mr Blair) We were talking earlier about Iraq and going down the UN route, and I think we have worked well, both of us. I believe that was the position that George Bush would have come to in any event, I may say, but I believe we worked well to do that. I think one of the least noticed but most important developments in international relations in the past few years has been the new relationship between NATO and Russia which has hugely taken the sting and the difficulty out of both missile defence and NATO enlargement. I think that was in part because of the co-operation between ourselves and the Americans. Now there will be issues like trade issues and so on where you are competing for contracts against America in which each country will fight their own interest very, very strongly. There are issues like Kyoto where we have a disagreement. We believe that the Kyoto Treaty should be ratified, the Americans do not but, by and large, on these big international security issues we stick together, and rightly I think.

  38. I was coming to some of those examples. The ABM Treaty, I take it we agree is a big international security issue so we do not agree with their pulling out of that, do we?
  (Mr Blair) I think that if they can reach a renegotiation on the right terms that is fine. I think that the discussions that they have had with Russia have been pretty fruitful on that basis.

  39. But we would prefer they had not started this in the first place, would we not?
  (Mr Blair) The issues to do with missile defence were always going to be there. I think it is far better that they try and deal with that in a co-operative way and, as I say, a lot of the heat has gone out of that issue as a result of the new relationship between NATO and Russia.