LIST OF MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(a) We recommend that DFID immediately
issues a statement outlining its basic humanitarian contingency
plans. This would be a useful source of information for humanitarian
actors and would also provide reassurance that adequate importance
has been attached to the humanitarian consequences of military
action (paragraph 8).
(b) Notwithstanding the difference of
opinion between UN and NGOs, and understanding the need for confidentiality,
we urge DFID and the UN, where possible, as a principle to provide
confidential briefings to NGOs to facilitate effective planning
(paragraph 10).
(c) There is a pressing need for a mechanism
for coordinating the UK humanitarian response so that UK NGOs
can be connected with the UN, the military and local NGOs to facilitate
information sharing between all relevant actors. (paragraph 11).
(d) It is clear is that the scale of funds
needed will be massive, given the dependency of the majority of
the Iraqi population on the OFF programme which delivers $5 billion
worth of commodities into the country in each six month phase,
the food element of which costs $250 million a month to maintain.
(paragraph 12).
(e) If delivery of food through OFF does
breakdown it will affect the 60% of Iraqis to whom the programme
currently delivers, two-thirds of whom have no other source of
food. Even in northern Iraq, where the WFP have trebled the ration
to allow stockpiling, a food crisis would spread to northern Iraq
within three months and would be severely worsened by a likely
influx of internally displaced persons. Humanitarian contingency
planning must take account of the serious risk that at least 40%
of the population will be without any source of food in the absence
of OFF rations. (paragraph 14).
(f) A new Resolution on OFF is needed
to allow the UN Secretary General to take executive control as
soon as hostilities begin (paragraph 16).
(g) It is to be noted that the current
mandate for OFF ends on June 3rd 2003 (paragraph 16).
(h) As we have already commented, there
may be problems with the delivery of existing Government of Iraq
contracts. Detailed planning around how a replacement supply of
food to OFF can be provided is necessary as is consideration of
how such a supply can be channelled through existing delivery
mechanisms. Consideration has also to be given to alternative
food distribution options, given the risk that local delivery
outlets may not be operational (paragraph 20).
(i) Planning for sites for IDP and refugee
camps must include planning for the provision of water, sanitation,
and health care. Food and non-food items such as tents should
be pre-positioned at camp sites. Camp planning must also take
careful consideration of the risk of injury from unexploded ordnance
and landmines. (paragraph 23).
(j) Military planning should seek to minimise
humanitarian consequences. However, it is inevitable that there
will be damage to Iraq's infrastructure. It is therefore essential
that sufficient medical supplies are available to deal with any
outbreak in disease. Vaccination programmes should be carried
out now to minimise casualties. Provision must also be made to
address the potential lack of clean drinking water and sanitation
services (paragraph 25).
(k) In preparing to prevent the outbreak
of ethnic conflict in Iraq the UK Government should remember the
experience of Afghanistan where an initial "my enemy's enemy
is my friend" approach led the US to support regional power
holders, thereby fuelling warlords and creating barriers to security
and stability. The best case scenario for military action would
involve Iraqi surrender with central authority structures remaining
intact. However, it is essential that in planning for the possible
humanitarian consequences of military action the worst case scenario,
involving ethnic conflict, is considered. Safe havens could be
a useful mechanism for preventing ethnic conflict but it essential
that there is clear identification of who will be safe inside
havens and how they will be protected. (paragraph 28).
(l) Ideally, international and Iraqi health
workers would be trained in how to deal with the human impact
of chemical or biological weapons and would receive the same immunisations
against biological weapons that are offered to military personnel.
The UN has discarded the option of providing protective suits
for its staff because they will be impractical. In any case
UN staff would be withdrawn at the outset of any chemical or
biological attack. Specialist clothing and equipment are prohibitively
expensive, putting them beyond the reach of most agencies. Every
effort must be made to ensure that information on the supply of
protective clothing is provided. Giving information on weapons
capability is an extremely difficult area for the military but
it is one where there needs to be serious cooperation between
the military and UN agencies and NGOs (paragraph 29).
(m) Even without a further UN Security
Council Resolution authorising military action, the UN will still
be able to operate in Iraq under its humanitarian mandate (paragraph
30).
(n) It is important that the UN should
have the lead role in a post-conflict Iraq as soon as possible.
There is a real danger that donors and NGOs would not play a full
part in the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq if the country
were administered by a military governor (paragraph 31).
(o) A second Security Council Resolution
has been proposed but it is designed mainly to reinforce Resolution
1441. The draft makes no provision for humanitarian relief. We
believe that the Resolution should take account of the likely
humanitarian consequences of military action. Subsequent to any
armed conflict, a further Resolution will be needed to make provision
for changes to the OFF programme to allow for its continuation
during and after a conflict. It should also set down what the
UN's role will be after a conflict. In Afghanistan we saw the
importance of the role played, in the early days, by the UN Special
Representative in balancing different interests and championing
and safeguarding the rights of civilians before, during and after
military action. Iraq will also benefit from a Special UN Representative.
We believe that an appointment should be made immediately, regardless
of the plans of the US military for the post-conflict stage (paragraph
32).
(p) We believe that one area in which
the military could play an important role is policing and protection.
We urge the military to develop plans to provide such protection,
where requested, for humanitarian work if they have not already
done so. There have been reports of a plan which will include
the deployment of UN peace keeping forces, or monitors. We endorse
this proposal. (paragraph 35).
(q) Military/humanitarian cooperation
is an extremely difficult area. But the difficulties have to be
resolved now before any fighting begins (paragraph 36).
(r) This underlines the case for having
a lead role for the UN planned for the aftermath of hostilities.
(paragraph 36).
(s) Based on the evidence we heard, the
scale of the humanitarian need may well exceed the capacity of
the international system. (paragraph 37).
(t) Despite pledges being made to a UN
emergency fund at a conference in Geneva on 15-16 February, the
indication is that the scale of humanitarian need will drastically
outweigh the funds available and that there is a severe lack of
funds available immediately for planning and preparation. (paragraph
38).
(u) We are concerned that the international
system lacks the financial and resource ability to cope with multiple
crises around the world and echo the statement made by CARE International
that: "We are, as the Secretary of State's written evidence
pointed out, very, very worried about the loss of publicity of
very serious humanitarian disasters which are in place at the
moment in Southern Africa, in East Africa and we now have West
Africa with the disruption in Côte d'Ivoire". (paragraph
39).
(v) We call on the UN to clarify with
Iraq's neighbours their attitude to accepting refugees in the
event of armed conflict, whether or not they have signed the refugee
convention. (paragraph 40).
(w) Although Clare Short told us that
humanitarian considerations must be paramount, there are still
concerns that this will not be the case. Christian Aid's Roger
Riddell said: "I am worried about a line of questioning which
suggests we do the war and then worry about the humanitarian consequences
afterwards. The Geneva Conventions require that those who engage
in military activity focus on civilians right from the start".
Clare Short told the House that the: "simplistic view that
we should get on with the war, after which my Department and a
few people can clean up, is ill-informed. I and my Department
have been fully engaged in trying to get the world to face the
humanitarian risks and make preparations". The Prime Minister
told the House that there needs to be: "a humanitarian plan
that is every bit as viable and well worked out as a military
plan". We fully concur, but have yet to be convinced that
this is the case (paragraph 41).
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