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Select Committee on International Development Fourth Report

Who will deliver humanitarian relief?

The Role of the UN—during and after a conflict

30. Even without a further UN Security Council Resolution authorising military action, the UN will still be able to operate in Iraq under its humanitarian mandate. Clare Short thought that a lack of UN authorisation for military action would not prevent a humanitarian relief effort and that UN agencies would "still take it as their duty to engage if they could reasonably engage".[112] The UN stated that they have a mandate to operate, that there was a need to be involved and that they did not need a UN Security Council Resolution for every crisis as they worked to their mandate. It is possible that the UN position as a deliverer of humanitarian assistance might even be made easier if there were no UN authority for war because it would allow the UN to carry out humanitarian duties without being seen as a party to the conflict. The importance of UN involvement was stressed by NGO witnesses: "certainly in the south of Iraq the number of international and local NGOs available would not meet the humanitarian need without the punch that the United Nations has operationally".[113]

31. The involvement of the UN post-conflict is a more complicated issue. Clare Short told the House of Commons on 26 February that her "greatest worry is that there is not yet agreement that the UN should have the lead role in a post-conflict Iraq".[114] Without UN post-conflict involvement, NGOs may have difficulty operating but may also face a dilemma over whether they can continue to operate in accordance with humanitarian principles. CARE International's Programme Director told us: "If there is not a credible, co-ordination and leadership position by the UN for the humanitarian relief and rehabilitation activities in the aftermath of a war, it could be very difficult for most NGOs to even justify being there at all, let alone being operationally effective".[115] If there is any prolonged military occupation after a war, UN and NGO operation would be difficult if they are seen as closely affiliated with the occupying force. One UN Agency confirmed that it was not looking too far ahead, principally because of the restrictions on funding but also because of lack of clarity as to its role in the post-emergency stage. Any role for the UN outside its mandate would require discussion at the Security Council and a UN Security Council Resolution. We agree with Clare Short's assertion that "the complexity of all of this if there is not a unity internationally will be dreadful and the possibility of things being well prepared will be much more difficult".[116] It is important that the UN should have the lead role in a post-conflict Iraq as soon as possible. There is a real danger that donors and NGOs would not play a full part in the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq if the country were administered by a military governor.

A new UN Security Council Resolution

32. Clare Short and NGOs all argued the need for a further Security Council Resolution which should explicitly provide for the provision of humanitarian relief.[117] Clare Short told us:

there is a genuine commitment in our Government to think through and try to have the humanitarian considerations fully taken on board, and my own view is if there is to be a second Resolution it is massively desirable for the world, and indeed for the people of Iraq, that there is united and considered UN-authorised action, if there is to be action, and that any such authorisation would have to take account of the needs of the people.[118]

A second Security Council Resolution has been proposed but it is designed mainly to reinforce Resolution 1441. The draft makes no provision for humanitarian relief. We believe that the Resolution should take account of the likely humanitarian consequences of military action. Subsequent to any armed conflict, a further Resolution will be needed to make provision for changes to the OFF programme to allow for its continuation during and after a conflict. It should also set down what the UN's role will be after a conflict. In Afghanistan we saw the importance of the role played, in the early days, by the UN Special Representative in balancing different interests and championing and safeguarding the rights of civilians before, during and after military action. Iraq will also benefit from a Special UN Representative. We believe that an appointment should be made immediately, regardless of the plans of the US military for the post-conflict stage.

Role of NGOs

33. Clare Short did not see NGOs as the deliverers of humanitarian relief in the first instance.[119] In response to this one NGO commented that although its capacity would be limited in the event of use of "non-conventional" weapons, it and other NGOs did have the capacity to provide humanitarian relief in major conflict situations.[120] In central and southern Iraq there are few international NGOs working with a limited number of national NGOs. However, throughout the region there are many more. Indeed we were told that there are forty NGOs operating in Jordan alone which, together with NGOs in Iran and Kuwait, have been very helpful in UN planning. The International Committee for the Red Cross will remain operational even in the event of war as its mandate is to assist civilian populations in times of armed conflict.[121] The ICRC is likely to be the main organisation responsible for IDPs as part of its mandate for the protection of civilians.[122] It is possible that any military action may result in the withdrawal of international staff and there have been reports that this has started happening in some areas.[123] The conditions under which NGOs would withdraw vary, they include any threat to the safety of staff or if their neutral position was compromised.[124] It is likely therefore that in the early stages, the military will be the primary providers of humanitarian relief.

Military and civilian/humanitarian cooperation

34. The few NGOs involved in Iraq feel they have a responsibility to the Iraqi people but are concerned about how they would be perceived if they co-operate with the military in delivering humanitarian relief, particularly in a post-conflict setting under a military occupation. NGOs emphasised the importance of humanitarian principle of neutrality and were concerned about the effect of military cooperation on the relationships of trust they have established with local people.[125] There is particular concern amongst NGOs about the blurring of humanitarian and military boundaries, especially in the eyes of the local population. CARE International's Raja Jarrah told us:

in the turbulent post-war situation, or immediate post-war situation, where violence is being perpetrated by all sorts of actors, not just formal armies, then any action that fudges the distinction between military and civilian activities is always going to be problematic for humanitarian agencies because it makes us complicit and targets, and makes us identified in the eyes of ordinary people with possible vigilantes. One of the important issues for us in separating civilian and military action is the safety and security of staff.[126]

NGO concern about co-operation with the military is partly about being perceived locally as linked with the military. But it is also one of compromising NGOs by drawing them into military planning. A degree of information-sharing between the military and NGOs is necessary and desirable if it relates to security conditions, conditions in shared space or general estimates about the scope of the emergency but, as a joint NGO Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response put it: "Information should not be shared if it could, in any way, endanger communities or risk staff security"—for example, by helping the army identify targets or by destroying the local trust relationships of NGO staff. Finally, NGOs told us of the moral problem they would have if, immediately after the conflict, they had to operate under a foreign military administration which was not accepted as legitimate by Iraqi civilians.[127] Clare Short recognised the same difficulty in relation to the UN: " the question of if there is an action and afterwards if the present regime falls or is removed in some way how will the country be managed and where will the leadership be if the UN is not settled. We have talked about the UN agencies engaging anyway but I think the complexity of them engaging if there is military leadership will be very difficult."[128]

35. The NGO witnesses accepted that military participation in humanitarian relief may well be the only option.[129] A recent position paper from a group of NGOs stresses that direct military implementation of humanitarian assistance should only take place under exceptional circumstances and should be a stop-gap measure until appropriate humanitarian agencies are able to do the work.[130] Mike Aaronson, Director of Save the Children, was uncompromising in his belief that the military could not be an impartial humanitarian actor while it was engaged in conflict and emphasised that, in a conflict, military and humanitarian objectives would inevitably be blurred but the military would have to give priority to give military objectives.[131] He rejected the comparison with the situation in Kosovo; in that situation the military was not providing assistance to the people it was attacking but rather to the people on whose behalf it was fighting.[132] We do, however, believe that one area in which the military could play an important role is policing and protection. We urge the military to develop plans to provide such protection, where requested, for humanitarian work if they have not already done so. There have been reports of a plan which will include the deployment of UN peace keeping forces, or monitors.[133] We endorse this proposal.

36. Military/humanitarian cooperation is an extremely difficult area. But the difficulties have to be resolved now before any fighting begins. The main issue revolves around what type of administration will follow an Iraqi collapse. If, as has been widely suggested, there is to be a US military administration for anything other than the shortest period necessary for purely practical reasons, then some of the humanitarian agencies believe they will be placed in a difficult position regarding their mandate and principles. It could be said that there is something odd about a line of reasoning which finds it acceptable for humanitarian actors to engage in a country ruled by Saddam but not acceptable to engage in the same country if administered (however temporarily) by a US Army General. The issue though is whether humanitarian agencies are perceived as conferring legitimacy. This underlines the case for having a lead role for the UN planned for the aftermath of hostilities.

How will humanitarian relief be funded and what is needed?

37. Predicting how much money will be needed to deal with the potential humanitarian consequences is, like so much surrounding this potential conflict, largely guesswork. The UN consolidated appeal started at US$37 million and jumped to US$93 million.[134] A UN interagency preparedness paper issued in February 2003 states: "the agencies have agreed that some US$123.5 million would be necessary to sustain UN activities and to further expand the operational scope of contingency planning for a three month period".[135] Whatever the predictions, the cost will be massive both in providing for humanitarian needs during a conflict and for reconstruction following any military action. It is not yet clear how and when these needs might be met. Iraq, despite being an oil-rich country, owes over US$ 4 billion in foreign debt and war reparations.[136] The cost of repairing infrastructure is also likely to be heavy. Since the Gulf War the UK Government has contributed £115 million in aid to Iraq, £100 million through the UK's humanitarian relief to Iraq and £15 million through the EC.[137] DFID have also told us that they expect to spend a further £8 million, during this financial year, on their ongoing humanitarian relief project for Iraq which is funded from its Iraq aid framework line.[138] DFID's £100 million contingency budget has also been identified as a possible source of funding.[139] However, based on the evidence we heard, the scale of the humanitarian need may well exceed the capacity of the international system.[140] The likely impact of a breakdown in the existing OFF food distribution system—which costs US$250 million per month for the food and transport element alone—would leave a minimum of 10 million people without any source of food.[141] In light of the scale of humanitarian relief needed, it is unlikely that the funds so far identified by DFID will cover all the costs. Although USAID has stated its intention to keep food distribution systems running, precise information about how this might be funded and the legal basis of funding arrangements for a programme established by UN Security Council Resolution, has not been given.[142] Christian Aid felt that: "there remains a lack of clarity as to where funds would come from to pay for an emergency food relief operation for several million people in the absence of oil revenues".[143] DFID is aware that the enormous scale of aid needed may be beyond the capacity of the international system:

The upper estimates, which presume collapse of the OFF and significant damage caused by conflict, would create needs well beyond the financial scope of the international community's current humanitarian budgets. This emphasises the need to refine the military options to reduce these risks—including minimising disruption to the Iraqi oil revenues which pay for OFF. It will also be important to share the costs of humanitarian assistance across as wider group of countries and multilateral agencies as possible, which will be made much easier by an appropriate UN mandate.[144]

38. Although there is potential for an international round of pledging, the lack of available funds is already having an adverse effect. Discussion about resources earlier in the report highlighted that necessary funds were not immediately available to allow planning and preparations for the likely humanitarian consequences of military action to take place. Save the Children wrote that "at present there is no funding and little preparedness planning...".[145] NGOs may face a lack of funds but, far more worryingly, so does the UN. Save the Children reported that its existing £60,000 budget line from DFID has been spent on purchasing supplies and establishing distribution logistics but that these preparations will only be sufficient for 2000 families from what may be as many and 1 million displaced people.[146] Christian Aid cited an unofficial UN OCHA report which states: "all UN agencies have been facing severe funding constraints that are preventing them from reaching the minimum level of preparedness" and goes on to say that "the collapse of essential services in Iraq... could lead to a humanitarian emergency of proportions well beyond the capacity of UN agencies and other aid organisations".[147] Despite pledges being made to a UN emergency fund at a conference in Geneva on 15-16 February, the indication is that the scale of humanitarian need will drastically outweigh the funds available and that there is a severe lack of funds available immediately for planning and preparation.[148] Even if there is a successful international appeal, funding shortfalls could remain. CARE International's Raja Jarrah said:

We fear that there will be a gap between what is needed and what is provided. The evidence from Afghanistan in terms of what was pledged by the international community and what has come, shows that the gap remains enormous. If the international community is to focus on Iraq, we want them to focus for the long term to assist in the humanitarian disaster which, as I indicated, will last for a considerable length of time.[149]

39. The pressure on the international system arising from global humanitarian crises is enormous. Clare Short commented that: "there is a real problem here of the enormous strains on the international humanitarian system, which are very considerable, we have got so many crises around the world, both in funding and in the capacity of people and institutions to provide food and reach people who are in need".[150] DFID's written evidence rightly emphasised that it would be wrong to divert resources away from one crisis to another.[151] Whilst we are satisfied that resources will not be diverted away from existing crises, we remain concerned about the media's inability to give coverage to more than one humanitarian crises at a time. DFID have told us that use of funds from its contingency reserve for Iraq would not affect its overall aid budget but: "could reduce DFID's capacity to respond to other emergencies which have not yet occurred or supplement existing funding to ongoing emergencies".[152] We are concerned that the international system lacks the financial and resource ability to cope with multiple crises around the world and echo the statement made by CARE International that: "We are, as the Secretary of State's written evidence pointed out, very, very worried about the loss of publicity of very serious humanitarian disasters which are in place at the moment in Southern Africa, in East Africa and we now have West Africa with the disruption in Côte d'Ivoire".[153]