Internal conflict
26. Iraq is an ethnically and religiously diverse
country. The overall majority of Iraq's population (55%) are Shia'a
Arabs, but historically they have been marginalised by the dominant
Sunni Arabs who make up17% of the population.[94]
Sunnis dominate the Ba'ath Party, the government and the armed
forces. Tribal and kin identities can overlay religious identities.
Kin networks and patronage have been a major feature of Saddam's
regime.[95] The third
major group, the Kurds, account for between 15% and 22% of the
population. The Kurds have long been in conflict with the existing
government. After the Gulf War the northern provinces of Iraq
were established as semi-autonomous Kurdish governorates under
the protection of US and British no-fly zones. Other ethnic minorities
present in Iraq include the Turkomans, Assyrians and Christian
minority groups. Iraq's history contains traditions of both cross-cultural
integration and of systematic repression and discrimination against
particular ethnic and religious groups.[96]
Since the Gulf War there have been conflicts between Kurdish factions
which resulted in large population movements and since 2001 rumours
of Islamic insurgents have brought insecurity to some areas.[97]
27. Some commentators have predicted that major political
change in Iraq could inevitably lead to civil disturbance and
possible internal conflict as new power balances emerge.[98]
The tensions over the Kurdish region are well known and both Iraqi
and Turkish governments have had a history of, at times, repressive
policies towards the Kurdsgiving rise to concern about
Turkish involvement in this conflict. The Kurds may even resist
Turkish involvement because of fears of Turkey's motives of preventing
Kurdish independence or disarming Kurdish militiamen.[99]
There is a risk that a Kurdish/Turkish ethnic conflict could develop
in the aftermath of a conflict and tensions are already running
high.[100] The Kurds
are not a unified group; there are internal divisions. Save the
Children stated in written evidence:
Co-ordination between the Kurdish parties cannot
be taken for granted in the event of a disruption to the current
humanitarian and political situation...At the same time, other
potential parties, such as Turkish military forces, to a possible
conflict in North Iraq are viewed with profound suspicion, which
would preclude any effective co-operation on emergency response.[101]
28. There is certainly potential for localised ethnic
tension both in north and south Iraq, although the cross-cutting
mix of identities to which an Iraqi may feel affiliate: tribal,
kin, religious etc. may reduce the potential for widespread ethnic
conflict.[102] Scarce
resources may be a greater threat to security than ethnic conflict,
or may aggravate ethnic tension.[103]
The most pressing concern is that military action would lead to
a breakdown of central authority as different groups try to establish
themselves or take control over areas of the country. Clare Short
told us:
It would be a nightmare if different groups started
breaking [Iraq] up and the national borders in the surrounding
area might be changed, that would lead to chaos and very, very
great dangers of terrible humanitarian suffering. Everyone is
clear that Iraq must remain a country within its existing borders
and that the military have to prepare to prevent the outbreak
of ethnic conflict.[104]
There has been some discussion of the potential use
of safe havens (particularly in the Basra area) to protect groups
of civilians from attack, ethnic or otherwise, and to encourage
IDPs to gather in areas where assistance can be delivered to them.[105]
In preparing to prevent the outbreak of ethnic conflict in
Iraq the UK Government should remember the experience of Afghanistan
where an initial "my enemy's enemy is my friend" approach
led the US to support regional power holders, thereby fuelling
warlords and creating barriers to security and stability. The
best case scenario for military action would involve Iraqi surrender
with central authority structures remaining intact. However, it
is essential that in planning for the possible humanitarian consequences
of military action the worst case scenario, involving ethnic conflict,
is considered. Safe havens could be a useful mechanism for preventing
ethnic conflict but it essential that there is clear identification
of who will be safe inside havens and how they will be protected.
Chemical, biological and nuclear
weapons
29. The use of chemical and biological weapons by
Saddam was raised as a very real risk in much of the evidence.[106]
There have even been suggestions that targeted nuclear weapons
may be used against Iraq.[107]
Some have suggested that a ring of chemicals may be used by Iraqi
forces to control population movement particularly towards the
north.[108] The Iranian
Government has expressed concern about the fears of contamination
following this sort of attack if people flee across its borders.
As with all the factors we have discussed in this report, it is
impossible to foresee what will happen. Even so, reports are that
chemical, biological or nuclear attack is the event most feared
and least prepared for in Iraq and the surrounding regions.[109]
The Kurds, who have been targeted in the past, are particularly
fearful of a chemical or biological attack and have requested
help with protective clothing and equipment.[110]
Neither Iraqi nor international humanitarian staff are trained
to deal with this kind of attack, though IRAC have run some training
programmes for health workers.[111]
In the event of such an attack it is likely that the military
would take over operations and international staff would be withdrawn.
Ideally, international and Iraqi health workers would be trained
in how to deal with the human impact of chemical or biological
weapons and would receive the same immunisations against biological
weapons that are offered to military personnel. The UN has discarded
the option of providing protective suits for its staff because
they will be impractical. In any case UN staff would be
withdrawn at the outset of any chemical or biological attack.
Specialist clothing and equipment are prohibitively expensive,
putting them beyond the reach of most agencies. Every effort must
be made to ensure that information on the supply of protective
clothing is provided. Giving information on weapons capability
is an extremely difficult area for the military but it is one
where there needs to be serious cooperation between the military
and UN agencies and NGOs.
61 Q15 Back
62
Report of forum to discuss humanitarian contingency plans should
there be a war with Iraq, chaired by Caroline Spelman MP,
26 November 2002 Back
63
Ev 13 Back
64
Unofficial UN Report, Likely humanitarian scenarios, Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 10 December
2002 Back
65
Avoiding a humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq, Refugees International,
5 February 2003, Unofficial UN Report, Likely humanitarian scenarios,
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 10
December 2002 Back
66
Q34 Back
67
Ev 37 (HelpAge), Q34 Back
68
Q18, see also Ev 35 Back
69
Q35 Back
70
Q18 Back
71
Avoiding a humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq, Refugees International,
5 February 2003 Back
72
Kurds: We will resist Turkish Troops in Iraq, ABS-CBN News,
1 March 2003 Back
73
Q3 Back
74
Q35 Back
75
Ev 43 Back
76
Avoiding a humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq, Refugees International,
5 February 2003 Back
77
Unofficial UN Report, Likely humanitarian scenarios, Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 10 December
2002 Back
78
Q34 Back
79
Ev 36 Back
80
Ev 16, 23, 36 Back
81
Q9 Back
82
Q19, HC Deb, 26 February 2003, col 245 Back
83
Ev 34 Back
84
Unofficial UN Report, Likely humanitarian scenarios, Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 10 December
2002 Back
85
Ev 36 Back
86
Ev 1 Back
87
George Joffe of London University King's College, Reuters AlertNet,
Monday 24 February Back
88
Report of Forum to discuss humanitarian contingency plans should
there be a war with Iraq, chaired by Caroline Spelman MP,,
26 November 2002 Back
89
Marti Ahtissari Report, United Nations 1991, Op. cit.
Report of Forum to discuss humanitarian contingency plans should
there be a war with Iraq Back
90
Unofficial UN Report, Likely humanitarian scenarios, Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 10 December
2002 Back
91
Ev 2, 13 Back
92
USAID contingency plans for humanitarian assistance to Iraq,
USAID Fact Sheet, 24 February 2003 Back
93
Q13 Back
94
Ev 41 Back
95
Ev 42 Back
96
Ev 41 Back
97
Ev 21 Back
98
Ev 42 Back
99
Kurds: We will resist Turkish Troops in Iraq, ABS-CBN News,
1 March 2003 Back
100
Ibid. Back
101
Ev 22 Back
102
Ev 36, Ev 42 Back
103
Ev 34, Ev39 Back
104
Q20 Back
105
HC Deb, 26 February 2003, col 244 Back
106
Ev 1, 13, 40, 46, Qq 1,4,15,20,27,33,34,35 Back
107
Ev 13 Back
108
Op. cit, Report of Forum to discuss humanitarian contingency
plans should there be a war with Iraq, Back
109
Ev 40, Q33 Back
110
Ev 23, 38. Ann Clwyd MP, a Member of the Committee, also reported
this concern following a visit to northern Iraq in February 2003 Back
111
Q53 Back