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Select Committee on International Development Fourth Report


Refugees and internally displaced persons

21. With so many unknowns concerning how military action may develop, predicting numbers and movement directions of potential refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) is largely guesswork. Clare Short told us: "It seems to me there is no way anyone can predict how many refugees there could be because there are so many different scenarios" and highlighted the need for "flexible planning".[61] During the Gulf War 1.8 million persons fled their homes and many travelled to Iran, where some remain today.[62] Estimates of how many people may leave Iraq this time range from between 500,000 to 2 million persons.[63] UN estimates are that there will eventually be around 900,000 refugees.[64] Refugees International, using the UN 'medium impact scenario' which predicts a two or three month conflict involving ground troops, estimates that 1.45 million people will try to leave Iraq and 900,000 persons will be displaced within Iraq.[65] NGO witnesses thought that Iraqis would not move from their homes unless they had to and that they were likely to try to wait for the food distribution to re-start.[66] Although it is difficult to predict the scale of what may happen, it is inevitable that there will be some movement of people within Iraq and along its borders.

Refugees

22. Those trying to flee Iraq will be classified as Internally Displaced Persons if they do not cross an international border and remain in camps in border regions or experience difficulty in leaving. The most pressing factors influencing people's decisions to try to leave Iraq might include fear of chemical or biological attack or news that international staff are withdrawing from the country.[67] Some areas of Iraq are heavily mined and the danger, particularly to fleeing refugees, was recognised by Clare Short, with one DFID official commenting that: "At the moment there is no United Nations Mine Action Service programme within Iraq...".[68] However, we are informed that this task has now been given to the UN Mine Action Service. The likelihood would be for many fleeing civilians to head towards Iran because of its proximity to the populated areas of Iraq.[69] We recognise, along with Clare Short, that Iran has shouldered much of the refugee burden in the past.[70] Iran still has 2.4 million Afghan refugees, and 200,000 Iraqi refugees from the Gulf War also remain inside its borders. Iran's policy in the event of conflict is to persuade Iraqi refugees to remain within Iraqi territory and to attend to their needs inside safe areas inside Iraq. Iran is not alone in attempting to implement a policy of keeping potential refugees in camps on the Iraqi side of their borders. Turkey is also planning and preparing camps along its border.[71] There are also fears in the northern governorates that Turkish troops will enter northern Iraq and remain indefinitely, in order to forestall any move to establish a separate Kurdish state.[72] Syria is the only country that has expressed willingness to take refugees, though refugees may have difficulty reaching Syria, Saudi Arabia or Jordan because of the desert terrain.[73] Some refugees may also head for Kuwait, particularly if there are rumours that there will be sufficient food and relief materials for them at the Kuwaiti borders.[74]

Internally displaced persons

23. Iraq already has between 700,000 and 900,000 IDPs.[75] There are likely to be around 900,000 newly displaced persons in the event of a conflict.[76] UNHCR estimates that there will be approximately an equal population movement between the northern and southern regions.[77] Christian Aid's Roger Riddell told us that the local authorities were preparing for a possible influx of a million IDPs in the north and were discussing with UNHCR the setting up of ten camps for a population of about four million.[78] Although sites for camps of IDPs are being identified, a group of NGOs operating in northern Iraq voiced concerns about the lack of water and sanitation facilities at these sites, and the lack of co-operation between the UN and NGOs operating in the area.[79] Health services will be needed in refugee/IDP camps as the risk of disease, trauma and injury (including injuries following use of chemical weapons) is high. Healthcare services could provide vaccinations against smallpox and other diseases which could potentially be used in a biological attack. Planning for sites for IDP and refugee camps must include planning for the provision of water, sanitation, and health care. Food and non-food items such as tents should be pre-positioned at camp sites. Camp planning must also take careful consideration of the risk of injury from unexploded ordnance and landmines.[80] IDPs may be located in inaccessible rural areas and therefore be difficult to assist. As Clare Short highlighted, there may also be a lack of water or shelter in areas such as these: "There is a very serious issue of potential refugee movements in desert type areas with not enough water that have been thought about, and I am not sure anyone has got solutions in place. That could be very serious".[81] The question of who will be responsible for internally displaced persons in the event of a conflict remains—the UN has not designated, other than the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), a lead agency to be responsible for IDPs, appearing to leave the responsibility to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to take the lead .[82] As IDPs can be classified as civilian victims of a conflict, providing them with assistance does fall withing ICRC's remit. UNHCR will take responsibility for assistance to displaced persons who make it to camps within Iraq, in addition to its traditional tasks of caring for refugees who have crossed an international border.

Infrastructure

24. The humanitarian implications of an attack on Iraq's already dilapidated infrastructure could be considerable.[83] Any targeting of transport infrastructure will affect both food distribution and the movement of people. Attacks on electricity supplies are likely to affect water provision and sanitation as well as heating and cooking facilities.[84] Other sources of fuel, such as gas or kerosene, are likely to become unavailable.[85] DFID's memorandum stated that electricity, transport and other infrastructure essential to the delivery of basic services could be severely damaged—affecting, for example, provision of clean water, the pumping of sewage, and the delivery of food and the functioning of hospitals.[86] There may also be longer-term implications if electricity supplies are targeted affecting the water and irrigation systems: "damage to Iraq's electricity network would cut off vital irrigation systems. Iraq depends on irrigation channels that are 5000 years old. If the land salinates it could cease to be available for agricultural production. So a long war would have serious consequences".[87]

25. The few NGOs operating in Iraq are preparing as best they can for these possible consequences of a breakdown and the humanitarian implications which may follow. The risk of deaths as a result of disease will be high. The lack of safe drinking water is a nationwide problem and typhoid is already in evidence .[88] During the Gulf War, 15, 000—30,000 refugees died from measles, diarrhoea, typhoid and cholera.[89] An unofficial UN OCHA report from December 2002 warns:

The expected increase in the instances of diarrhoeal disease and respiratory infections   resulting from the conditions experienced in a post-conflict scenario, for example the absence of potable water and contaminated air ... as well as over-crowding, traumatic injuries, and a lack of refrigeration, would translate into an increased demand and consumption of medical supplies and drugs, rendering the existing stocks inadequate.[90]

DFID has told us that UN agencies are also pre-positioning humanitarian supplies and some NGOs are also involved in pre-positioning of commodities that will be needed in the event of serious infrastructure damage such as bottled water and medical supplies.[91] The Red Cross and Red Crescent has pre-positioned medical supplies and vaccines in central and southern Iraq as part of its programmes in the region. The World Health Organisation and UNICEF have pre-positioned stocks in the north. Logistic support for tented camps is still to be completed. USAID have stated that they are pre-positioning supplies in warehouses across the region including blankets, plastic sheeting, personal hygiene kits, WHO emergency health kits, water jugs, containers and treatment units.[92] Clare Short has spoken of her attempts to influence military strategy into considering humanitarian implications and seeking to minimise the humanitarian impact: "We are discussing and trying to ensure that targeting takes account of the frailty of the infrastructure and the needs of the people of Iraq... We are trying hard to get them to listen... I cannot guarantee our success but we are engaging with those issues".[93] Such negotiations will be difficult as military and humanitarian objectives will in some instances be irreconcilable. Military planning should seek to minimise humanitarian consequences. However, it is inevitable that there will be damage to Iraq's infrastructure. It is therefore essential that sufficient medical supplies are available to deal with any outbreak in disease. Vaccination programmes should be carried out now to minimise casualties. Provision must also be made to address the potential lack of clean drinking water and sanitation services.

Internal conflict

26. Iraq is an ethnically and religiously diverse country. The overall majority of Iraq's population (55%) are Shia'a Arabs, but historically they have been marginalised by the dominant Sunni Arabs who make up17% of the population.[94] Sunnis dominate the Ba'ath Party, the government and the armed forces. Tribal and kin identities can overlay religious identities. Kin networks and patronage have been a major feature of Saddam's regime.[95] The third major group, the Kurds, account for between 15% and 22% of the population. The Kurds have long been in conflict with the existing government. After the Gulf War the northern provinces of Iraq were established as semi-autonomous Kurdish governorates under the protection of US and British no-fly zones. Other ethnic minorities present in Iraq include the Turkomans, Assyrians and Christian minority groups. Iraq's history contains traditions of both cross-cultural integration and of systematic repression and discrimination against particular ethnic and religious groups.[96] Since the Gulf War there have been conflicts between Kurdish factions which resulted in large population movements and since 2001 rumours of Islamic insurgents have brought insecurity to some areas.[97]

27. Some commentators have predicted that major political change in Iraq could inevitably lead to civil disturbance and possible internal conflict as new power balances emerge.[98] The tensions over the Kurdish region are well known and both Iraqi and Turkish governments have had a history of, at times, repressive policies towards the Kurds—giving rise to concern about Turkish involvement in this conflict. The Kurds may even resist Turkish involvement because of fears of Turkey's motives of preventing Kurdish independence or disarming Kurdish militiamen.[99] There is a risk that a Kurdish/Turkish ethnic conflict could develop in the aftermath of a conflict and tensions are already running high.[100] The Kurds are not a unified group; there are internal divisions. Save the Children stated in written evidence:

Co-ordination between the Kurdish parties cannot be taken for granted in the event of a disruption to the current humanitarian and political situation...At the same time, other potential parties, such as Turkish military forces, to a possible conflict in North Iraq are viewed with profound suspicion, which would preclude any effective co-operation on emergency response.[101]

28. There is certainly potential for localised ethnic tension both in north and south Iraq, although the cross-cutting mix of identities to which an Iraqi may feel affiliate: tribal, kin, religious etc. may reduce the potential for widespread ethnic conflict.[102] Scarce resources may be a greater threat to security than ethnic conflict, or may aggravate ethnic tension.[103] The most pressing concern is that military action would lead to a breakdown of central authority as different groups try to establish themselves or take control over areas of the country. Clare Short told us:

It would be a nightmare if different groups started breaking [Iraq] up and the national borders in the surrounding area might be changed, that would lead to chaos and very, very great dangers of terrible humanitarian suffering. Everyone is clear that Iraq must remain a country within its existing borders and that the military have to prepare to prevent the outbreak of ethnic conflict.[104]

There has been some discussion of the potential use of safe havens (particularly in the Basra area) to protect groups of civilians from attack, ethnic or otherwise, and to encourage IDPs to gather in areas where assistance can be delivered to them.[105] In preparing to prevent the outbreak of ethnic conflict in Iraq the UK Government should remember the experience of Afghanistan where an initial "my enemy's enemy is my friend" approach led the US to support regional power holders, thereby fuelling warlords and creating barriers to security and stability. The best case scenario for military action would involve Iraqi surrender with central authority structures remaining intact. However, it is essential that in planning for the possible humanitarian consequences of military action the worst case scenario, involving ethnic conflict, is considered. Safe havens could be a useful mechanism for preventing ethnic conflict but it essential that there is clear identification of who will be safe inside havens and how they will be protected.

Chemical, biological and nuclear weapons

29. The use of chemical and biological weapons by Saddam was raised as a very real risk in much of the evidence.[106] There have even been suggestions that targeted nuclear weapons may be used against Iraq.[107] Some have suggested that a ring of chemicals may be used by Iraqi forces to control population movement particularly towards the north.[108] The Iranian Government has expressed concern about the fears of contamination following this sort of attack if people flee across its borders. As with all the factors we have discussed in this report, it is impossible to foresee what will happen. Even so, reports are that chemical, biological or nuclear attack is the event most feared and least prepared for in Iraq and the surrounding regions.[109] The Kurds, who have been targeted in the past, are particularly fearful of a chemical or biological attack and have requested help with protective clothing and equipment.[110] Neither Iraqi nor international humanitarian staff are trained to deal with this kind of attack, though IRAC have run some training programmes for health workers.[111] In the event of such an attack it is likely that the military would take over operations and international staff would be withdrawn. Ideally, international and Iraqi health workers would be trained in how to deal with the human impact of chemical or biological weapons and would receive the same immunisations against biological weapons that are offered to military personnel. The UN has discarded the option of providing protective suits for its staff because they will be impractical. In any case UN staff would be withdrawn at the outset of any chemical or biological attack. Specialist clothing and equipment are prohibitively expensive, putting them beyond the reach of most agencies. Every effort must be made to ensure that information on the supply of protective clothing is provided. Giving information on weapons capability is an extremely difficult area for the military but it is one where there needs to be serious cooperation between the military and UN agencies and NGOs.


61   Q15 Back

62   Report of forum to discuss humanitarian contingency plans should there be a war with Iraq, chaired by Caroline Spelman MP, 26 November 2002 Back

63   Ev 13 Back

64   Unofficial UN Report, Likely humanitarian scenarios, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 10 December 2002 Back

65   Avoiding a humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq, Refugees International, 5 February 2003, Unofficial UN Report, Likely humanitarian scenarios, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 10 December 2002 Back

66   Q34 Back

67   Ev 37 (HelpAge), Q34 Back

68   Q18, see also Ev 35 Back

69   Q35 Back

70   Q18 Back

71   Avoiding a humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq, Refugees International, 5 February 2003 Back

72   Kurds: We will resist Turkish Troops in Iraq, ABS-CBN News, 1 March 2003 Back

73   Q3 Back

74   Q35 Back

75   Ev 43 Back

76   Avoiding a humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq, Refugees International, 5 February 2003 Back

77   Unofficial UN Report, Likely humanitarian scenarios, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 10 December 2002 Back

78   Q34 Back

79   Ev 36 Back

80   Ev 16, 23, 36 Back

81   Q9 Back

82   Q19, HC Deb, 26 February 2003, col 245 Back

83   Ev 34 Back

84   Unofficial UN Report, Likely humanitarian scenarios, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 10 December 2002 Back

85   Ev 36 Back

86   Ev 1 Back

87   George Joffe of London University King's College, Reuters AlertNet, Monday 24 February Back

88   Report of Forum to discuss humanitarian contingency plans should there be a war with Iraq, chaired by Caroline Spelman MP,, 26 November 2002 Back

89   Marti Ahtissari Report, United Nations 1991, Op. cit. Report of Forum to discuss humanitarian contingency plans should there be a war with Iraq Back

90   Unofficial UN Report, Likely humanitarian scenarios, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 10 December 2002 Back

91   Ev 2, 13 Back

92   USAID contingency plans for humanitarian assistance to Iraq, USAID Fact Sheet, 24 February 2003 Back

93   Q13 Back

94   Ev 41 Back

95   Ev 42 Back

96   Ev 41 Back

97   Ev 21 Back

98   Ev 42 Back

99   Kurds: We will resist Turkish Troops in Iraq, ABS-CBN News, 1 March 2003 Back

100   Ibid. Back

101   Ev 22 Back

102   Ev 36, Ev 42 Back

103   Ev 34, Ev39 Back

104   Q20 Back

105   HC Deb, 26 February 2003, col 244 Back

106   Ev 1, 13, 40, 46, Qq 1,4,15,20,27,33,34,35 Back

107   Ev 13 Back

108   Op. cit, Report of Forum to discuss humanitarian contingency plans should there be a war with IraqBack

109   Ev 40, Q33 Back

110   Ev 23, 38. Ann Clwyd MP, a Member of the Committee, also reported this concern following a visit to northern Iraq in February 2003 Back

111   Q53 Back


 
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